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ABSTRACT 
Analysis of political economy within primary sectors such as fisheries and agriculture provides 
insights that can be applied more broadly. Since the 1990s there has been a growing recognition 
that the world's fisheries are in a state of crisis and that this is symptomatic of a more general, 
global sustainability crisis. In fisheries, worldwide, excessive capacity is harvesting fish at 
unsustainable levels. New technologies for communication and the processing, transport and 
storage of fish is contributing to the development of expanding marketing opportunities. These 
generate economic incentives that motivate ever more intensive fishing effort on declining 
stocks of increasingly valuable fish. In addition, environmental damage to marine and 
freshwater ecosystems undermines their capacity to sustain healthy, productive fisheries. 
Fishing communities are also experiencing stress associated with worldwide trends in fisheries 
management. These trends can be linked to the global ascendancy of neoliberalism as, a 
political culture, and a feature of fisheries debate over the past two decades has been the contest 
between advocates of market mechanisms, private property rights and economic efficiency, 
versus defenders of social values. Both sides have sought to incorporate the concept of 
sustainability into their arguments. The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship of these 
social and political-economic trends with sustainability in fisheries, and to consider the 
implications for the sustainability of societies more generally. 
The thesis is based on case studies featuring Newfoundland, Tasmania and Pakistan, in which 
fisheries issues are examined ' within the context of broader cultural and structural 
characteristics. Comparisons and cross references are made between the case studies, and they 
are also linked by the development of an ongoing discussion of themes relevant to the economic 
versus social fishery debate. Social inequality emerges as a key issue in the interaction of 
social, political, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability. 
The first case study focuses on Newfoundland, where the collapse of the cod fishery in the early 
1990s came to serve as symbolic of the worldwide problem. Historically entrenched social 
dualism, or inequality, was found to be a significant factor in various forms of sustainability 
dysfunction in the social and material structure of Newfoundland's fisheries, and of 
Newfoundland society more generally. It was implicated in various of the interrelated, 
underlying "causes" of the fishery's failure including the institutional corruption of the scientific 
processes that were the basis of fishery management. 
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Tasmania, the site of the second case study, shares many points of comparison with 
Newfoundland, including the persistence of characteristics that are linked to a history of 
institutionally entrenched inequality. In Tasmania these are a legacy of European settlement 
through the establishment of a convict colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
Tasmanian case study examines how these characteristics have been perpetuated by a political 
and resource management culture that is contemptuous of transparency and democratic 
processes and which tends to serve established vested interests and foster rent-seeking activity. 
The influence of this political culture on resource management and environmental protection in 
Tasmania raises questions, in light of the Newfoundland experience, of Tasmania's prospects 
for sustainability. 
The third case study focuses on Pakistan. Social dualism, identified as a key factor in the 
Tasmania and Newfoundland case studies, is a pronounced, arguably defining characteristic of 
Pakistani society. Pakistan is afflicted by poverty, corruption, dysfunctional institutions and an 
economy distorted by structural characteristics associated with unproductive rent-seeking 
activities. Military dictatorship, sectarian violence, a constant threat of war with its neighbours 
and the rise of militant religious fundamentalism are also features of Pakistan's seemingly 
perpetual state of crisis. A fishery case study demonstrates the apparent compatibility and easy 
integration of market mechanisms and private property rights within Pakistan's traditional 
feudal system, but shows how, ultimately, this does not support institutional and social 
structures conducive to sustainability. The analysis is extended to establish a link between the 
social and economic insecurity of people displaced from access to resources, whether this is a 
consequence of political aspects of distribution or results from environmental collapse, and the 
rise of fundamentalisms, which, through their suppression of communal rationality, become 
causes as well as symptoms of sustainability dysfunction. In conclusion, the study supports 
arguments that the transformation of fisheries, and by extension, of societies more generally in 
accordance with prevailing neoliberal trends undermines the social cohesion and institutional, 
integrity required for sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement: The Global Fishery Crisis 
Since the 1990s there has been a widespread recognition that the world's fisheries are in 
crisis. Excess capacity in the global fleet, exacerbated by technological advances, is 
harvesting fish at unsustainable levels. New communications technologies and advances in 
fish processing, transport and storage contribute to the development of expanding marketing 
opportunities. These generate economic incentives that motivate ever more intensive fishing 
effort on declining stocks of increasingly valuable fish. In addition to overfishing, pollution 
and other forms of environmental damage undermine the capacity of marine and freshwater 
ecosystems to sustain healthy, productive fisheries. These ecological aspects of the global 
fisheries crisis are often matched by interlinked social, political and economic dimensions. 
Many fishery dependent communities experience division and stress related to underlying 
issues of resource allocation, and exclusion, that are linked to modernisation and policy 
trends in fisheries management. The global ascendancy of neoliberalism is a major influence 
of these trends, and a feature of the fisheries debate over the past decade has been the contest 
between advocates of market mechanisms, private property rights and economic efficiency, 
versus defenders of social and community values, cultural traditions and equity. Both sides 
in the debate seek to legitimise their arguments with claims that the management approaches 
they oppose, often for reasons of ideology or vested interest, are inherently unsustainable. 
Understanding the broader political and social forces at work in society provides insights that 
help to explain policy trends associated with the fisheries crisis. The converse is also true 
and an important reason for studying political economy in relatively simple, primary 
production systems such as fisheries and agriculture is that they often demonstrate how such 
processes work, on a more extensive scale, to affect society more broadly (Mansfield 2004). 
Examining trends in global fisheries with regard to social, political, economic and 
environmental aspects of sustainability, may, therefore, provide insights that have a wider 
relevance. It is the aim of this thesis to study these global fishery trends through 
examination of three geographically located case studies, from Newfoundland, Tasmania and 
Pakistan, and to explore the broader implications for the sustainability of fisheries, and of 
human societies more generally. 
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1.2 Research Approach 
Authorities on research design and thesis writing emphasise the advisability of identifying a 
central, clearly defined research question, or aim, to serve as a helpful tool in focusing the 
study (Creswell 1998: 99; Evans and Gruba 2002: 60). They recognise that it is often 
difficult to identify this central question, especially in qualitative research. Creswell (1998: 
101) acknowledges there may be a need for "topical subquestions" where the central 
question provides inadequate information to describe the study. Broad and open-ended aims 
are common for exploratory research undertaken with a systemic analytical perspective (as 
in this thesis). As such research progresses, new questions often arise. There is a constant 
opportunity to follow tangents or patterns that emerge as greater knowledge of the subject 
matter develops in the course of the studyl. There is also considerable latitude for 
interpretive flexibility, and individual creativity in composing arguments and this accounts, 
in part, for the criticism often levelled at qualitative research; that it is subjective, 
constructed and easily biased (Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 7). Ethnographic research (from 
which modem qualitative methods are largely derived) has a recognised potential for bias 
(Baszanger and Dodier 2004: 9). Yet, it is also true that systemic, qualitative analysis is the 
basis of many of the foundations of the rational, Western philosophical tradition; a tradition 
that does not shrink from presuming to delve into realms where subjective values and 
unquantifiable concepts, matters as elusive of measurement as "wisdom", for example, are 
addressed without discomfort. It is a tradition that generates ideas that remain open to 
ongoing analysis and challenge, and that, thereby, retain a timeless relevance as explorations 
and interpretations of the human condition. 
Various qualitative research methods were used in combination in this thesis. These include 
the use of case studies, textual analysis and elements of traditional ethnographic research. A 
flexible approach, unrestricted by prescriptive methodological procedure, permitted the easy 
1 As an example (relevant to the Newfoundland case study in chapter 3), one may begin with the 
question: what was the cause of a fishery collapse? After analysing alternatives, the collapse may be 
attributed to overfishing. This, however, immediately gives rise to another question: what was the 
cause of overfishing? After analysing alternatives, overfishing may be attributed to overcapacity. But 
this gives rise to the question: what was the cause of overcapacity? Bad fishery science might be 
blamed, but this gives rise to the question: what was the cause of bad fishery science? Socio-political 
dysfunction might be identified as the underlying cause, but this, again, gives rise to another question: 
what was the cause of socio-political dysfunction? And so on, and the situation is not even as 
straightforward as this description may imply. The solut10ns to each question are often multiple, 
complex and interconnected. This sort of research, or philosophical analysis, can only be undertaken 
with a systemic perspective that recognises that everything is connected to everything and 
acknowledges the importance of the interconnections. 
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integration of this material in the overall analysis with material drawn from a range of 
disciplines including fisheries biology, history, political theory and economics. It is common 
for qualitative researchers to "deploy a wide range of interconnected interpretive practice's"' 
in order "to get a better understanding of the subject matter at hand" (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000: 3-4). The term bricoluer describes the researcher as a tinkerer who borrows from 
different disciplines. Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 6) note: "The researcher-as-bricoluer-
theorist works between and within competing and overlapping perspectives and paradigms" 
and this aptly describes the research approach adopted here. Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 2-3) 
also identify seven "historical moments" in qualitative research that "simultaneously operate 
in the present". The seventh moment, "the future", is a post 2000 development and is 
"concerned with moral discourse, with the development of sacred textualities. The seventh 
moment asks that the social sciences and the humanities become sites for critical 
conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation-state, globalisation, freedom and 
community". Some of these issues are key themes in this study, which is located 
comfortably within this contemporary "seventh moment" in qualitative research. 
The thesis is structured around three major case studies, featuring Newfoundland, Tasmania 
and Pakistan. The case-study approach is commonly used, but not limited to qualitative 
research methods (Stake 2000: 435). Case study research is essentially a process of building 
theory, which enables generalisations to be drawn, that can be tested or applied more widely 
(Evans and Gruba 2002: 92). Thus, it is a useful approach for comparative studies. It also 
lends itself to exploratory :t:esearch. Evans and Gruba (2002: 92) also emphasise that a 
different approach is taken, if one is "investigating a phenomenon in its own right or as a 
case study from which you might later draw some generalisations". In this thesis there is not 
always a clear distinction. There are elements of both of these approaches. The case studies 
are investigated in their own right, some original insights are developed, but important 
themes and concepts serve as focal points that provide a continuity in the discussion as it 
progresses through chapter 2 and the case study chapters. 
Newfoundland, due to the much-studied collapse of the cod fisheries in the early 1990s, is a 
key location to investigate the causes and processes associated with unsustainable fisheries 
management. Tasmania is well suited to comparison with Newfoundland, sharing many 
geographical, cultural, and economic features. It provides the opportunity to validate, by 
triangulation2, theories and conclusions that emerge from the Newfoundland case study. 
2 Stake (2000: 443) observes: "triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple 
perceptions to clarify meaning", and Flick (1998: 230) and Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 5) suggest that 
triangulation serves not so much as a tool of validation as an alternative to it. 
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Pakistan, which shares some features with Newfoundland and Tasmania, but differs in other 
ways, represents a society immersed in a seemingly perpetual state of social, political, 
economic and environmental crisis. By exploring the role of key factors found to be 'iillked 
to unsustainability in Newfoundland and Tasmania, within Pakistan's more comprehensive 
state of crisis, it provides the opportunity for further validation as well as providing insight 
into the social, political, economic and environmental conditions within a society in which 
dysfunctional features have become exaggerated and deeply entrenched. Within each case 
study, fisheries management issues are discussed from an analytical perspective that regards 
resource management patterns as reflecting the political and cultural structures and trends 
that are characteristic of each place. 
The Newfoundland case study is based primarily on textual analysis, guided by some 
ethnographic influence. In the course of my research I made two visits to Newfoundland 
(2001 and 2002) and I also visited Nova Scotia. These visits provided the opportunity to 
meet and exchange ideas with researchers at St Mary's and Dalhousie Universities in Halifax 
(Nova Scotia), St. Francis Xavier University at Antigonish (Nova Scotia), and at Memorial 
University of Newfoundland in St John's. These interactions also provided helpful direction 
towards relevant literature. The second visit to St John's included a two-month period of 
study as a visiting researcher at the Public Policy Research Center at Memorial University. 
Much of the literature referred to in the Newfoundland case study was accessed during this 
period. I also visited a number of coastal settlements and gained an appreciation of the 
enormous significance of the cod fisheries in the development of Newfoundland's history 
and culture and this provided insights that influenced and enriched the analysis. 
The Tasmanian case study is based on a combination of textual analysis supported by several 
resource management case studies3. Literature from the disciplines of history and political 
theory provides background information explaining the origins and persistence, in Tasmania, 
of particular cultural and structural characteristics. This provides a context in which three 
discrete resource management case studies are analysed. These concern Tasmanian forestry 
management based on textual (and documentary film) analysis, and two fisheries related case 
studies that examine the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, and the regulation of pollution and 
coastal salmon farming. The rock lobster fishery case study examines historical 
developments and trends in the management of the fishery including the establishment of a 
management system based on individual transferable quota (ITQ). This research is based on 
3 These minor case studies are internal to, and not to be confused with, the major chapter case studies 
featuring Newfoundland, Tasmania and Pakistan. 
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analysis and interpretation of policy developments in the management of a fishery and is 
augmented by textual analysis4. The material for the case study dealing with salmonid 
aquaculture was developed from a project in which I was professionally involved during the 
period of my PhD candidature. This was an "open", community-focused resource 
~anagement project involving representatives from federal, state and local government, 
several industry stakeholder groups and from the local community. The manner in which 
material for this case study is treated in the thesis reflects a combination of ethnographic and 
participatory research supported by textual analysis of documentation relating to the project. 
The Pakistan case study includes background information based on textual research, 
extensive informal interviews with key informants, and personal observations made during 
travel to the region. This is combined with a fishery case study from Rawal Lake near 
Islamabad that was developed using a traditional, almost stereotypical, ethnographic social 
science approach. This fishery case study was researched during a one-month visit to 
Pakistan in April/May 2001. During this visit I also travelled widely in the North West 
Frontier Province and Punjab Province between Islamabad and Peshawar, and in the northern 
regions of Mardan, the upper Swat River Valley and the Kagan Valleys. This travel 
provided the opportunity to observe, first hand, conditions in Pakistan to support information 
obtained from literature sources and from numerous informal discussions. I was greatly 
assisted in this field research by a friend and colleague, a Pakistani national who had recently 
completed a Masters degree at the University of Tasmania, and who provided essential 
translation skills, background information and logistical support, and who also facilitated 
interviews with government officials, academics and other sources. 
Fieldwork for the Newfoundland and Pakistan chapters required flexibility to respond to 
unforeseen problems and to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. For example, the 
deterioration of security in Pakistan following September 2001 made a follow up visit in 
mid-2002 inadvisable and the study, therefore, was limited to working with material 
gathered during the initial field exercise in 2001. Nevertheless, this was adequate to develop 
an important section of the thesis. Conversely, unforeseen sources of travel assistance 
became available in 2002 and facilitated the study visit to Newfoundland in the northern 
hemisphere summer and fall of that year. A flexible research approach allowed these and 
other changes to be accommodated with some shifts of emphasis in the degree of attention 
4 I was the prmcipal author of a paper (Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002) on the topic that was 
published during the course of my candidature, and some of the material from this paper is included in 
the thesis. 
5 This region was severely affected by the earthquakes that occurred in October 2005. 
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devoted to the different chapters. While, clearly, the final proportions of different sections of 
the thesis were influenced to some extent by uncontrollable factors such as these, they did 
not unduly compromise its general shape and direction. 
1.3 Thesis Structure and Overview of the Study 
The thesis has six chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 2 (approximately 21 pages) 
provides an overview of the global fisheries crisis and of recent trends in .fisheries 
management. Key concepts relating to the "social fishery" versus "economic fishery" debate 
are explained in the context of excess capacity and the realisation of resource limits in global 
fisheries. Competing rationales for sustainability inherent to the two paradigms are 
explored. The economic fisheries management model, with its theoretical grounding in the 
"tragedy of the commons.., thesis and emphasis on enclosure and resource privatisation is 
explained, and its emergence as the orthodox management approach over the past two 
decades is discussed in relation to the corresponding, global ascendance of neoliberalism as a 
political and resource management culture. The alternate, or dissenting, social fishery 
paradigm is also examined. It emphasises the importance of equity and social cohesion as 
preconditions for sustainable resource communities and this is the basis of the sustainable 
communities concept. Chapter 2 introduces key concepts and themes that are explored 
further in relation to specific situations in the case study chapters that follow. 
The Newfoundland case study is the subject of chapter 3 (approximately 109 pages) and 
examines the causes of the collapse of the cod fishery in the early 1990s. The analysis is 
comprehensive and systemic in its perspective and explores the way that elements of 
Newfoundland's history, geography and the political economy of the cod fishery combined 
to shape persistent cultural and structural characteristics of Newfoundland society, which, in 
tum, influenced the conduct of the fishery. The role of inequality, or social dualism, as a 
factor linked to the fishery collapse was a particular issue of focus. 
The Tasmania case study is the subject of chapter 4 (approximately 75 pages). Some 
historical background and a number of geographic, cultural, political and economic features 
common to both Tasmania and Newfoundland are established, providing the basis for 
comparative analysis and the extension of generalities from one case to another. Tasmania 
was settled at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the establishment of a convict 
colony, and the persistence of social, economic and political inequality, and the influence of 
this on resource management in Tasmania is discussed. Implications for sustainability are 
considered and also related to the conclusions from the Newfoundland case study. 
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Chapter 5 focuses on Pakistan (approximately 49 pages). The pronounced and 
institutionalised inequality that characterises Pakistani society is described and linked to 
Pakistan's seemingly perpetual state of social, political, economic and environmental crisis -
conditions that sustain military dictatorship and give rise to fundamentalism. A fisheries 
case study illustrates the ready integration of property-rights-based resource management 
regimes with Pakistan's entrenched feudalism, and examines how this undermines the 
development of social structures conducive to sustainability. Socially and environmentally 
unsustainable resource management practices are linked with the rise of fundamentalism in 
the region and the discussion is extended to further examine the connection, raised in chapter 
2, linking the global trend towards resource management practices that promote rent-seeking 
and inequality, and the rise, world-wide, of various forms of fundamentalism. 
Chapter 6 (approximately 18 pages) provides a summary and overview of the entire study 
and draws together conclusions from the case study chapters. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapte.r introduces the global fisheries crisis that e~erged in the 1990s. It describes 
issues and trends in fisheries management, and the particular emphasis now given to 
concerns about sustainability. It also provides a brief, contextual introductiol! linking 
contemporary trends in fisheries management to the ascendance of neoliberal economic 
ideology that has dominated the global political climate over the past twenty-five-years. 'The 
simplistic market focus of neoliberal economic poliCies have continued to arouse cP,allenges 
based on concerns over their social and environmental implications. These have escalated in 
the early years of the twenty-first century with a growing awareness of an intensifying 
global, social and political crisis that is inextricably linked to resource and environmental 
issues. Consequently, more holistic approaches to the challenges of environment_al, social, 
political and economic sustainability are gaining greater salience. Holistic or systemic 
approaches emphasise that "everything is connected to everything". It is the nature of the 
interactions of social, political, economic and ecological factors that is a key area of focus. I 
have explored these interactions more extensively elsewhere with respect to fisheries 
sustainability (Phillips 1998), and summarise some core points here. The purpose of the 
chapter, therefore, is to provide a brief overview of key issues and themes in the fisheries 
debate of the past two decades, and to show how this is linked to the sustainability debate 
more generally. This establishes a perspective within which the case studies in the following 
chapters will be examined. 
2.2 Resource Limits 
It became apparent in the 1990s that the total harvest from global fisheries had approached 
the maximum level of production allowed by ecological limits (Garcia and Newton 1994; 
Buckworth 1998). Data compiled by the Food and Agriculture Division of the United 
Nations indicated that the annual catch from world fisheries, which had been increasing 
consistently since World War II, had levelled off at somewhere around 90-100 million 
tonnes in spite of continuing growth in fleet capacity and fishing effort (FAO 1995a). It was 
estimated that 70 per cent of the world's marine stocks were fully exploited, overexploited or 
recovering from overexploitation (Mace 1997: 3). The collapse of some major fisheries, 
such as the Canadian Northern cod fishery, heightened concerns, and, at the same time, 
raised doubts about the ability of modem, scientific fisheries management to manage 
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fisheries sustainably. These factors all contributed to a sense of "global fisheries crisis" in 
the 1990s6. 
The relative ease with which industrial fishing capacity can be relocated around the world, 
and the increased globalisation of world economies, including trade and investment in 
fisheries, adds relevance to this global perspective on the fisheries problem, as does the 
global ascendance of a neoliberal political culture which has, in the past two or three 
decades, had a profound effect in fisheries as well as in other areas of social and econorpic 
policy. But in some respects the global fisheries crisis of the 1990s contained little that was 
new. In some ways it was simply an expansion of perpetual, recurrent fisheries issues to a 
global perspective. Nevertheless, a sense of finite limits inherent to the global dimension has 
significant implications. 
Overcapacity was recognised as an underlying cause of overfishing at the United Nations 
International Overfishing Conference held in London as early as 1946 (Garcia and Newton 
1994). Mc Vay (1966) warned that global overfishing and a pattern of sequential "mining" of 
stocks must inevitably lead to resource collapse.' From World War II until the 1990s, 
fisheries have followed an expansionist pattern and global fleet capacity increased four-fold 
from 1965 to 1995 (Mace 1997: 4). As some stocks were overexploited new fishing 
grounds, or species, or more powerful fishing technologies were discovered allowing 
continued growth in the total harvest. But in the 1990s it became clear that this could not 
continue. The realisation of ecological limits, and the curtailment of opportunities for 
continued expansion had implications for capital growth, and initiated a renewed concern 
about sustainability and an intensification of competition over what were now recognised as 
limited, scarce and increasingly valuable fish resources. Intensified competition between 
6 "The Sceptical Environmentalist", Bjorn Lomborg (2001: 106-108) dismisses the global crisis in 
fisheries as insignificant (fish accounting for only one per cent of calories in the human diet) and 
easily solved by establishing "ownership" over wild fisheries. Expanded aquaculture production, 
Lomborg argues, is increasing the global supply of fish protein. Aquaculture is widely touted as the 
solution to the fishery crisis and the means to _expand production, but it is also problematic and 
associated with serious environmental and social impacts (Aiken and Sinclair 1995). Much of the 
expansion of global aquaculture production in recent decades has been with salmonid and shrimp 
culture. These species are produced with diets based largely on fishmeal and 5-10 kg of fish are 
generally required to make the feed for each kilogram of shrimp or salmon produced (O'Riordan 
1996). This sort of aquaculture may not, therefore, contribute to expanding the supply of fish 
available for human consumption (Holmes 1996). Often small pelagic fish are targeted for fishmeal 
production and this raises ecological concerns about "fishing down the food web" (Pauly et al. 1998). 
There are also serious pollution problems associated with aquaculture and some of these will be 
discussed in chapter 4, the Tasmanian case study. 
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capital and labour, traditionally substitutable inputs in fishing capacity, is one area in which 
this has been apparent. 
The issues involved in this global fishery crisis were historically familiar in many local 
fisheries. At a local level, a level that is generally more relevant to fishers and their 
communities, and to resource managers, than is the global perspective, the inherent 
ecological instability of fishery systems (Wilson et al. 1994; Sharp 1995), the constant 
evolution of increasingly powerful fishing technology, and the "open-access" conditions of 
many fisheries has meant that resource crisis, competition, and concern about sustainability 
has been a common experience throughout the human history of fishing. This historical 
perspective is nicely illustrated by a petition (cited in Dyson [1977: 37]) from traditional 
fishers of the Thames Estuary in 1376, requesting that Edward III prohibit the use of a new 
and powerful fishing technology that was damaging to their interests7• This example of a 
fisheries conflict from 600 years ago is remarkably similar to some contemporary ones and is 
worth repeating for the issues that it raises as much as for its literary qualities. 
The great and long iron of the wondyrchoun runs so heavily and hardly over the 
ground when fishing that it destroys the flowers of the land below the water, 
and also the spat of oysters, mussels and other fish upon which the great fish 
are accustomed to be fed and nourished. By which instrument ,in many places 
the fishermen take such quantity of small fish that they know not what to do with 
them; and they feed and fat their pigs with them, to the great damage of the 
Commons of the Realm and the destruction of the fisheries. 
At the heart of the conflict is competition between the interests of traditional, small-scale 
fishers_ and those equipped with more powerful, "efficient", and capital-intensive technology. 
The political nature of the dispute is clearly evident, and the arguments that the petitioners 
invoke in seeking intervention on their behalf refer to the broader public interest (implied in 
reference to the "Commons of the Realm") and to values that, today, would be associated 
with concerns over the "sustainability" of fish stocks, habitats and ecosystems8. Similar 
arguments raised by small-scale fishers against industrial, bottom trawl fishing have been a 
common issue in fisheries management throughout the twentieth century, particularly as 
motorised propulsion became progressively more "efficient" enabling ever larger, more 
powerful, and potentially destructive nets to be dragged (for example, Dyson [1977: 270]; 
Kurlansky [1999: 139-141]). But these disputes do not only involve trawl gears. Almost 
7 The wondyrchoun was a beam trawl net about three metres across that was dragged along the seabed 
by a sail powered vessel. 
8 Dyson (1977: 38) notes that the fishers were unsuccessful with their petition, the interests of capital 
and "efficiency" predominated. 
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any different technology, especially if it is capital intensive and more efficient in terms of 
fish harvested per fisher, can incite opposition from users of "traditional" methods9. 
SteinbecklO (1960: 294-298) provides another historical case of a fishery conflict in an 
account of industrial trawling by Japanese vessels in Mexican waters in 1939. He observed a 
fleet of six trawlers, each 150-170 feet long, accompanied by a mother ship and other 
vessels, and noted: "They cruised slowly along in echelon with overlapping dredges, literally 
scraping the bottom clean. Any animal which escaped must have been very fast indeed, for 
not even the sharks got away" (1960: 295). Only shrimps were retained while many tons of 
other species were discarded, dead, into the sea. Steinbeck questions why the Mexican 
government should have permitted such a wasteful destruction of valuable food resources to 
the detriment of the local, small-scale fishing communities that depended upon them. He 
commented: 
We liked the people on this boat very much. They were good men, but they were 
caught in a large destructive machine, good men doing a bad thing. With their 
many and large boats, with their industry and efficiency, but most of all with 
their intense energy, these Japanese will obviously soon clean out the shrimps 
of the region. And it is not true that a species thus attacked comes back. The 
disturbed balance often gives a new species ascendancy and destroys forever 
the old relationship ( 1960: 297). 
And further: 
The Mexican official and the Japanese captain were both good men, but by 
their association in a project directed honestly or dishonestly by forces behind 
and above them, they were committing a true crime against nature and against 
the immediate welfare of Mexico and the eventual welfare of the whole human 
species ( 1960: 298 ). 
Steinbeck's observations reflect concerns similar to those expressed by the Thames fishers in 
the fourteenth century. The conflict between the interests of small-scale, local fishers and 
larger, more powerful, capital based, industrial fishing operations is a central issue. The 
environmental damage and resource waste associated with powerful, industrial fishing 
methods, and the damage this implies for a broader public interest, even to "the whole 
9 In chapter 3, for example, Cadigan's (1999b) discussion of the opposition by traditional hand-line 
fishers to the introduction of cod traps and long-lines in the Newfoundland coastal fisheries in the 
mid-1800s will be examined. 
10 Steinbeck, novelist and winner of a Nobel Prize in literature incorporated a strong element of 
political economy in his work. He had studied manne biology at Stanford University and The Log 
From The Sea of Cortez is an account of a marine biological survey expedition to the Gulf of 
California in 1939. The book is a philosophical exploration interlinking ecology, politics, economics 
and the human condition. 
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human species'', is also raised. Notably, Steinbeck speculates that greed and political 
corruption are behind the forces that permit such abuse of a broader common interest to 
occur, and he also raises issues of national interest and international involvement. Some of 
these issues are particularly relevant to the Newfoundland case study in chapter 3 and these 
two historical examples of fisheries crisis demonstrate that fishery problems can be more 
complex than simply being due to "too many boats chasing too few fish". 
Mace, discussing the global fisheries crisis of the 1990s (and referring to statistics compiled 
from FAO and other sources), notes that of the total estimated marine catch of approximately 
100 million tons, only about half was used for direct human consumption, a quarter was used 
in the manufacture of stockfeeds (including those used in aquaculture) and another quarter 
was discarded as bycatch. Shrimp fisheries are the most wasteful in terms of discarded 
bycatch "with discard ratios of up to 15 times the landed catch" (Mace 1997: 3). 
Mace (1997: 4) notes, overcapacity is the most important problem in marine fisheries. 
Overcapacity means there are "either excessive amounts of capital in the form of fishing 
vessels and gear (i.e. overcapitalisation), or excessive numbers of participants, or both". In 
resource limited fisheries, the ability of capital equipment to substitute for labour and 
compete with fishing people for fish stocks is the cause of many fishery conflicts, especially 
where industriaJ opei:ations share access to a resource with artisanal or small-scale fishing 
methods. McCully (1991: 77) examined this issue from a global fisheries perspective and 
was critical of "modernisation" policies (of the FAO) that led to overfishing, to increased 
income disparities in fishing communities and to the "marginalisation and impoverishment 
of traditional fishing communities around the world". Comparing industrial fisheries with 
. artisanal fisheries, McCully shows that, per ton of fish harvested for human consumption, 
artisanal fisheries support approximately 30 times as many fishworkers, use less than a fifth 
as much fuel, produce very little discarded bycatch and cause less habitat damage. 
McCully's views demonstrate a perspective on problems in the global fishery of the 1990s 
that is in sympathy with the concerns of local, small-scale fishers in the two historical 
examples already discussed. 
2.3 Development of the Modern Fisheries Management Paradigm 
The regulation of fishery resources generally reflects the ethos, attitudes and interests of 
those directing policy. It is fundamentally a political matter. Politics, as Leftwich (1983: 
21) notes, has to do with the use and distribution of power and resources, and "control over 
resources is the essence of power in any society" (1983: 219). Thus, patterns of resource use 
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both reflect and reinforce established patterns of distribution of power and contribute to their 
persistence through social, political and economic structures and cultural traditions (see, for 
example, Leftwich [1983: 219-261]; Putnam [1993: 123-157]). Particular patterns of 
economic production are entrenched by what Randall (1981: 150) refers to as "conservative 
reinforcement". 
At the end of the nineteenth century the fishery policies of the industrial nations expressed a 
commitment to the principle of the "freedo~ of the seas" based on the confident assertion 
that "in relation to our present modes of fishing a number of the most important sea fisheries, 
such as the cod fishery, the herring fishery, and the mackerel fishery, are inexhaustible: that 
is to say that nothing we do seriously affects the numbers of fish" (Huxley's famous 
inaugural address as President of the Royal Society 1883, as cited in Dyson [1977: 269))11 . 
Thus, there was no acknowledged need to regulate in the interests of conservation. This was 
a period of unrestricted capital expansion and global colonisation. 
The North Sea soon provided evidence that industrial fishing could depress stocks over a 
large area of ocean. Dyson (1977: 274) explains how at the beginning of the twentieth 
century the North Sea was one of the first places to be intensively fished on an industrial 
scale by steam-driven trawlers. There were some indications of declining catch rates prior to 
World War I. Hostilities in the North Sea caused fishing to be suspended for four years 
(1914-18), and after this, when fishing resumed, catch rates rebounded dramatically before 
rapidly falling off again over the next four to five years. This clearly linked fishing effort 
with declining stocks. However, it was not until after World War II that serious measures to 
conserve ocean stocks began to be put in place. Since then there has been a gradual 
evolution of fisheries policy in the industrial nations. A guiding ethos for this trend has been 
the perceived need to curb the growth of fishing effort that occurs in open-access conditions. 
In the 1970s the concept of "freedom of the seas" began to be curtailed as coastal nations 
extended jurisdiction over fisheries, and other matters, to 200 nautical miles offshore. 
Limited-entry licensing policies were widely adopted in the 1960s and 1970s restricting the 
number of participants in certain fisheries, and more recently property-rights mechanisms 
based on instruments such as individual transferable quota (ITQ) have increasingly been 
adopted, effectively enclosing and privatising many fisheries. This policy trend is supported 
by a management rationale that is the basis of what can be regarded as the mainstream, 
modem fisheries management paradigm. 
11 Many local fishers, as will be discussed in the Newfoundland chapter, did not share this "official" 
global view. 
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2.3. 1 The Tragedy of the Commons and the Rationale tor Enclosure 
Free or open-access to fishery resources is generally regarded by fishery managers as the 
fundamental cause of fisheries management problems (Rothschild 1983: 160). McVay 
(1966) linked overfishing to the "freedom of the seas", and Hardin (1968) examined the 
issue more broadly in his essay "The Tragedy of the Commons" and established what has 
become one of the most influential (though frequently challenged and qualified) tenets of 
modern resource management theory. 
Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) established the link between open-access and overfishing in 
terms of economic theory. They laid the groundwork for the development of the equilibrium 
yield model that is one of the key theoretical concepts in modern fishery management 
(Schaefer 1954). The model illustrates the inevitability of (economic) overfishing in an 
- . 
"open-access" fishery (noted, for example, by Anderson [1977]; Waugh [1984: 4]; Amason 
[1993]; Roberts [1997]; Phillips [1998: 43-58]). Hodge (1995: 38), while acknowledging 
this point, draws a distinction between economic overfishing and biological overfishing, and 
notes that open-access does not necessarily lead to biological overfishing. In theory, extra 
effort will, if permitted to do so, be drawn into a fishery up to the point that the marginal cost 
of effort equals or exceeds the marginal value of the fish it captures. Whether biological 
overfishing would occur at this economic equilibrium point depends on many factors. If 
fishing costs are relatively high, and the value of a particular target fish species relatively 
low there will be insufficient financial incentive to attract fishing effort to a level that 
threatens the biological sustainability of the fishery. There are many examples of 
biologically sustainable, open-access fisheries that support economically viable fishing 
communities. Nevertheless, the economic theory associated with the equilibrium yield 
model indicates that in these cases economic overfishing still occurs, and potential resource 
rents are dissipated as more effort is attracted into the fishery than a level that would provide 
for a maximum (surplus) economic return12. 
According to theory, biological overfishing occurs in open-access conditions if the marginal 
price of the fish caught is high enough, and the marginal costs of fishing effort low enough, 
to encourage entry of so much effort that the stock is harvested with such intensity as to 
depress its biological productive capacity. Yield (in biomass rather than economic terms) 
from the fishery is less than it would have been if subjected to a lower level of total fishing 
effort. The marginal efficiency of fishing effort is, therefore, a key factor in biological 
12 Surplus economic return can be considered as the profit from fishing activity after all fishing costs 
are covered and is sometimes referred to in economics terms as resource rent. 
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overfishing. This is why technological advances that increase the "efficiency" or power of 
fishing effort, such as the use of trawl nets, as in the two examples previously discussed, is 
associated with increased concern about biological overfishing. For the same reason many 
traditional forms of fisheries management have regulated the efficiency of the gear that can 
be used. This is also an important part of the explanation of why the major gains in fishing 
power and efficiency that have occurred with the developments, over the twentieth century, 
of mechanised propulsion and the use of fossil fuels, as well as in other aspects of fishing 
technology such as electronic navigation aids and fish-finders, are associated with an 
increased potential to overfish stocks. 
Where overfishing is considered problematic in an open-access fishery, there are, in theory, 
two basic approaches for preventing it. (Many fisheries management systems employ 
combinations of these but may lean more towards one or the other.) Efficiency constraints 
can be applied to all fishers, typically through gear restrictions, sometimes referred to as 
input controls, and thus maintain what some may regard as an open-access fishery, but which 
might better be termed an equal-access fishery. Conservation, in such a fishery, generally 
rests on a range of constraints framed around ecological considerations, and on gear 
restrictions tha( limit the potential for individual profit-making to stimulate overfishing. 
Feedback mechanisms linked to yield and effort operate to promote sustainability. Operating 
on the margin of economic efficiency, any decline in fish stocks that causes a decline in 
catch per unit of fishing effort, results in sub-economic returns and fishing effort would, 
according to the logic of economic theory, be diverted to other pursuits, thus, allowing stocks 
to recover (according to the logic of theoretical, biological models). A resource-based tax is 
also likely to act as an economic efficiency constraint and, as Amason (1993) points out, it is 
likely to inhibit effort. Many recreational fisheries operate on the open-access, efficiency 
constraint principlel3. 
While the efficiency constraint option is the basis of many traditional, community based, 
resource management regimes, and may address the problem of biological overfishing, it 
does not prevent economic overfishing. Efficiency constraints result in the dissipation, 
typically to labour, of potential profit or resource rent. Fishers will still have an economic 
incentive to enter the fishery if it offers better rewards than other options, and competition 
will (in theory) cause returns to each fisher to reach a marginal level, i.e., a level at which 
income is comparable to that available from other employment options. It is important to 
13 Analysis of the economics and incentives in recreational fisheries can be used to bring into quest10n 
the whole rationale behind the goal of promoting "economic efficiency" in commercial fisheries (for 
example see Larkin [1977], Kearney [1999], Phillips [1998: 43-60]). 
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recognise that "economic overfishing" of this sort, while not yielding an economic surplus 
(or resource rent) can be biologically sustainable and support prosperous fishing 
communities (for example, Stoffle et al. [1994]; Davies [1995: 230]). This fishery 
management approach tends to promote wealth equalisation and is often favoured by small-
scale fishers and their communities. It may be characterised as a "social fishery" rather than 
an "economic fishery". 
An alternative to efficiency constraints is to control fishing effort by limiting the tqtal catch 
with a quota. Once an established quota has been harvested the fishery is closed, thus 
conserving remaining stocks. This approach allows the fishing effort to be restri~ted to a 
level that (in theory) allows a surplus economic yield to be produced. A common, 
competitive quota, however, still encourages rent dissipation as a consequence of "capital 
stuffing" and the "race for fish" as participants compete to catch as large a portion of the 
common quota before others do, because once the quota is harvested the fishery is closed to 
all. Those who fish fastest and hardest get the largest share of the total catch. Thi's causes 
participants to invest in more powerful vessels and more efficient gear in order to gain an 
edge on their competitors, and this leads to overcapitalisation as the cause of rent 4issipation, 
and economic overfishing is again considered to occur. The solution (in theory) is to 
allocate shares of the total catch quota as individual quotas among a limited number of 
participants, thus removing the competitive dimension that stimulates economic overfishing. 
Clark (1993) points out that private property rights are not required for conservation but are 
essential to the production of an economic surplus. If quota are tradable, market 
mechanisms can operate to allocate catch to the most efficient harvesters and economic 
efficiency is promoted. This provides a theoretical rationale for the adoption of fishery 
management systems based on private property mechanisms such as ITQ. A key objective is 
to maximise economic efficiency in terms of resource rent. 
The ITQ approach, in theory, allows the most efficient harvesting technologies to be used to 
generate the maximum economic surplus. If unrestricted, these efficient technologies, as 
previously discussed, can have the potential to overfish the resource. Thus, in fisheries 
managed to maximise rent through the use of mechanisms such as ITQ, sustainability relies, 
to a great extent, on the combined effectiveness of fishery science and quota enforcement. 
Science has to determine an ecologically "safe" harvest level upon which the allocation of 
quota is based, and enforcement mechanisms have to ensure that quota restrictions are 
observed where conditions of "economic efficiency" mean that there is likely to be an 
economic incentive for individual fishers to cheat. Fisheries managed with an emphasis on 
this approach conform to the "economic fishery" paradigm, which tends to favour the 
16 
Chapter 2 The Global Fisheries Crisis 
interests of institutional science and other potential rent-seeking stakeholders and 
professions, of capital rather than labour, and of the centre rather than the regions. 
2.3.2 The Trend Towards /TQ in Fisheries Management 
ITQ based fishery management was first widely adopted in South Africa, New Zealand, 
Australia, and Canada, all former British colonies, and in Iceland and the Netherlands. fu 
South Africa ITQ was identified by Hersoug and Holm (2000) as an instrument to regulate 
resource use so as to perpetuate racially based social inequality. Van Stittert (2002: 295), 
however, suggests that class rather than race is the key issue. He examines fisheries reforms 
of the 1940s, and the post-apartheid reforms of the 1990s, and suggests that the 
"redistribution agenda in both instances was subverted in favour of a consolidation of 
monopoly capital and state control over the marine commons". Hutton, Kevern and Pitcher 
(1997) note the limited success of redistribution policies. fu New Zealand, ITQ in fisheries 
management is viewed in some quarters as "part of a particular political and social agenda" 
that has led to the exclusion of small-scale and independent fishers from fisheries which 
have fallen "increasingly under the control of large, profit seeking corporations" (Duncan 
1995: 97). fu Iceland, with an economy heavily dependent on fisheries, ITQ remains 
contentious due to concerns about quota concentration and the effects of ITQ based 
management on social equality and economic development (Eythorsson 2000; Hannibalsson 
2001; Matthiasson 2001). 
· Fisheries management in the European Union is complex. Derogations from the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) provide for national management of inshore waters to 12 nautical 
miles. fu some cases this provides protection for small-scale, coastal fisheries and the 
interests of adjacent fishery dependent communities. Paradoxically, these derogations often 
provide well-managed fisheries in contrast to the general mess of the CFP. Within the 
combined offshore waters of the EU member states' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), 
quota systems form the basis of management. A total allowable catch (TAC) is set for each 
species and divided into national quotas. Member states manage national quotas in different 
ways ranging from ITQ to competitive 'free fishing' until the national quota has been caught 
(Hoefnagel 1998: 81). The CFP is widely acknowledged to be dysfunctional. Unlike the 
Common Agricultural Policy the fisheries policy was scarcely concerned about social 
impacts (Symes 2000: 3), and its performance has also been poor in terms of conservation 
and economic efficiency (Symes 1999: 4-11). 
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In the 1980s - 1990s, Norwegian fisheries management was considered to be markedly more 
effective than the CFP of the EU. Quota based management was resisted in Norway during 
the 1980s where concern for social equity and regional economic wellbeing provided a 
countervailing force. But individual vessel quotas (IVQ) were temporarily introduced to 
address a crisis in some Norwegian fisheries in 1990 and, once in place, associated vested 
interests have become committed to maintaining this system (Holm, Ranes and Hersoug 
1998; Hersoug, Holm and Ranes 2000). The effect of the IVQ/quasi ITQ system14 in 
Norway has not served to reduce over-capitalisation but has increased the profitability of a 
limited group of fishers (Williams and Hammer 2000). Maurstad (2000: 37) shows that 
"instead of limiting economic expansion", the move to quota and the "introduction of formal 
bureaucratic regulations provided fishers' incentives to expand". Hersoug, Holm and Ranes 
(2000: 442, 443) suggest, based on analysis of the politics of local, state, industry, and 
fisherfolk interests, that the trend towards ITQ and "privatisation of the comm~ns" will 
continue and "contribute to the eradication of the small-scale fleet". Indeed, Arland and 
Bjorndal (2002) advocate conversion of the IVQ system to a more easily transferable ITQ 
system to promote greater economic efficiency in the industry. There is likely to be ongoing 
debate and political manoeuvring. 
Canada has favoured the implementation of fisheries management systems based on ITQ and 
this issue is discussed in relation to the failure of the Newfoundland cod fisheries in chapter 
3. Australia has also favoured ITQ based systems for Commonwealth managed fisheries, 
and some Australian states have also preferred ITQ based systems for managing fisheries 
within their jurisdictions. Tasmania, notably, adopted ITQ in its abalone and rock lobster 
fisheries15. The introduction and consequences of the ITQ system in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery will be discussed in chapter 4. 
France, constitutionally affiliated with the traditions of an eighteenth century revolution that 
was inspired by the democratic, humanist values of the Enlightenment, has resisted ITQ. 
French law has "moved towards an explicit rejection of property rights over fishery 
resources" (Prat 1998: 49). This reflects an underlying French legal disposition to avoid 
"patrimonialisation" of fishery resources in order that they retain the status of a "collective 
heritage" (Prat 1998: 52). Individual fishing quotas (IFQ) have also been controversial in the 
USA, a country with a constitutional framework that reflects a similar revolutionary heritage 
to France (albeit one that generates some interesting domestic versus international policy 
14 IVQ are considered tradable to a degree through sale of the vessel to which they are attached. 
15 In contrast, the Western Australian lobster fishery is managed by limited entry. 
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contradictions arising from the role of the US as global political and economic hegemon). In 
1996 only three fisheries under Federal jurisdiction were managed by IFQ systems and their 
further implementation was temporarily blocked by Congress subject to enquiry and review. 
Greenpeace campaigned strongly against IFQ (Jennings 1999) and Criddle and Macinko 
(2000) have suggested that further development of IFQ for US fisheries is unlikely because 
of opposition based on concerns about equity ahd the tendency of these systems to encourage 
the proliferation of rent-seeking behaviour. It is likely, however, that pressure for IFQs, 
ITQs or similar instruments will continue given the concentration of wealth that generally 
benefits some parties by the transfer of public resources to private interests when these 
systems are adopted. 
Worldwide the trend has been towards the adoption of ITQ in fishery management. It is a 
"consequence of modernisation and market economics" (Symes 2000: 5) and of policy 
measures that have favoured capitalised, industrial sectors at the expense of small-scale 
coastal fisheries. Opposition to ITQ based management systems generally focuses on two 
areas of concern - they often fail to effect resource conservation, and, they undermine social 
equity. ITQ based fisheries are often associated with anti-conservationist practices including 
quota busting, quota-induced bycatch dumping, high-grading, price dumping, and discount 
driven stock depletion and frequently it is "enclosers" rather than "commoners" who cause 
environmental destruction (Anon. 1992: 128). 
The dependence on fishery science for conservation in quota-based fisheries is also an area 
of concern. Wilson et al. (1994) and Sharp (1995) argue that fishery biosystems are 
characterised by chaos, complexity and unpredictability and cannot, therefore, be effectively 
modelled. The theoretical concept of sustainable yield and regular annual harvests that 
promise the predictability and stability required by corporate-capitalist production systems 
is, therefore, often unrealistic, and setting fish harvest quotas based on these erroneous 
assumptions can lead to overfishing when stocks are depressed by other factors. 
Correspondingly, a strong argument can be supported, for example by Wilson et al. (1994), 
in favour of fisheries management systems that are more ecologically sensitive and more 
responsive to stock fluctuations. There are a great many studies that demonstrate the 
resilience and sustainability of ecologically flexible, often small-scale, pluriactive, 
community based fisheries with devolved systems of management that focus on social rather 
than technical outcomes (for example, Pinkerton [1989]; Crean and Symes [1996: 200]; 
Baines [1995]). 
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Copes (2000: 1), referring to matters covered in Copes (1994; 1997; 1998), lists some 
objections to ITQ on social equity grounds: 
Gratis quota allocations give windfall gains to the privileged few. 
Capitalisation of quota rights at high values encourages their accumulation in 
the hands of corporations and wealthy investors. This facilitates financial and 
geographical concentration of fishing operations, with substitution of capital 
for labour, causing irrationally excessive job losses. High quota costs deprive 
crew members of the traditional opportunity to become independent owner-
operators as they can no longer afford to purchase a vessel with quota 
privileges. Communities, historically dependent on adjacent fish stocks, find 
their economic viability - and sometimes their very existence - threatened when 
their resources are alienated to outsiders. Members of the public are 
scandalized by the gifting of access rights to public resources, privileging an 
emerging class of "armchair fishermen" who become rentiers, living off the 
avails of quota leasing. 
Conservation is often a focus of debate, but concerns linked to social equity provide a 
powerful underlying motive for opposition to fisheries privatisation. Enclosure provides 
exclusive rights to some, but denies others access to resources and opportunities. It creates 
and entrenches inequality. The tendency for limited entry licences to become capitalised 
beyond the means of ordinary fishers (Pinkerton 1989: 18), and for growing inequality to be 
associated with ITQ based fisheries (Palsson and Helgason 1996: 18), has been recognised 
for some time. Enclosure causes inequality in two ways. Often the initial allocation is 
inequitable as the strong get the largest share while the weak are excluded, but there is also 
the matter of opportunity costs. When more and more of the resources available to a society 
become privately owned, the economic options of propertyless individuals becomes 
increasingly restricted and this renders them increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. In this 
vein, the social evils associated with resource monopolisation and enclosure (as will be 
discussed further in this chapter) have long been concerns in Western political philosophy. 
The debate for and against fishery privatisation and rationalisation through the use of 
property rights instruments such as ITQ has, understandably, been strongly linked to 
ideological positions, and these have been adopted by stakeholders with vested interests to 
defend. Academia has been split; the traditional resource management-linked disciplines, 
grounded in biology and economics, tend to favour the private property solution to the 
"problem of the commons'', while, on the other hand, social scientists have tended to oppose 
privatisation because of concerns about the socio-economic impacts (Symes 1998: 5-7; 
Conner 2000: 33;). The social sciences have received some criticism for monitoring the 
adverse effects of privatisation, but not promoting alternative management systems, but in 
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fairness, many informative case studies of successful 'social fishery' altematives16 have been 
presented. It is also difficult to challenge the core presumptions of the mainstream bio-
economic fisheries management approach because, to do so, is to challenge the core 
structural social and economic presumptions of modem W estem society. 
2.4 Sustainable Communities 
State fishery managers, imbedded within institutions oriented towards fostering ,capitalist 
interests, typically operate within the mainstream bio-economic paradigm, but fail to 
recognise that it is a product of ideology (Ward and Weeks 1994), and institutional self-
interest. Operating within the paradigm, their role is to translate its basic tenets into 
"rational" fisheries policy and management, having to negotiate the complexity and 
obstruction offered by diverse social, political and economic forces in order to do so. Theirs 
is often a frustrating and thankless task because of the competing interests that are involved. 
Their perspective tends to be limited because their management powers are largely limited to 
the regulation of fishing effort (Ward and Weeks 1994). At the micro level of fishery 
management the ideological aspects of fishery debate may seem irrelevant and an irritating 
distraction to the perceived role of fisheries management as being limited, simply, to the 
implementation, in a given fishery, of enforceable and effective regulation to address 
straightforward issues of economic efficiency and conservation. But this reductionist view 
overlooks many of the key factors and interactions that are critical to sustainable fisheries 
and sustainable societies. 
While the social fishery versus economic fishery debate addresses, to a significant degree, 
this immediate concern with regulating fishing activity, it also takes on a wider relevance 
and a more holistic perspective with respect to the concept of sustainable communities. 
Pinkerton (1989) and Symes (1996:5) explore the idea that environmental sustainability is 
dependent on underlying socio-cultural conditions, and Clay and McGoodwin (1995) 
emphasise that there is a two-way interaction between society and the environment. Jentoft 
(2000) articulates this issue convincingly. He argues that ethics, community integrity and 
cohesion built upon shared and common interests are essential to achieving fisheries 
sustainability. This argument is made with respect to achieving effective compliance with 
conservation measures by participants in fisheries. It becomes even more critical with regard 
to wider catchment issues. 
l6 These fisheries, not coincidentally, often tend to be structurally incompatible with capitalist 
interests. 
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Overfishing and fishing related damage to habitat and ecosystems are not the only threats to 
fisheries. The capacity of many marine and freshwater environments to sustain healthy, 
productive fisheries is vulnerable to the effects of pollution and other forms of ecological 
disruption. Pearce ( 1995), for example, identifies environmental impacts relating to 
catchment irrigation practices as the cause of great damage to the fisheries of the Aral, Black 
and.Caspian Seas, and Thompson (1995) links the decline of some Mediterranean'fisheries 
to the disruption of annual patterns of nutrient flow from the River Nile following 
construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. These are large-scale examples of a very 
widespread problem. It is well known that dams and other in-stream obstructions also 
impact severely on migratory species such as salmon (see, for example, Montgom~ry 2003: 
3, 62-68, 81-82, 108-110, 160, 132, 179-202, 233). These and other forms of habitat and 
catchment impact are often critical to fisheries sustainability, but are generally beyond the 
control of fisheries managers. 
Sustainable management of coastal and inland fisheries, where problems such as catchment 
pollution may pose a threat, is increasingly recognised as requiring a whole of system 
approach. For this to work effectively there must be institutions and socio-political and 
economic structures that integrate potential conflicts between fishery and catchment 
interests. Some authors, such as Brubaker (1996), see private property rights and legal 
instruments as the means to achieve this. Others, like Jentoft (2000), with more of a social 
science perspective, emphasise the sustainable communities argument, which becomes 
increasingly salient in dealing holistically with catchment issues. This is where issues of 
ethics and equity, key concerns in the social fishery versus economic fishery debate, again 
assume critical importance to sustainability - the argument can be extended to suggest that 
these qualities, in general, are essential for the sustainable operation of social-ecological 
systems - and concern about ethics that transcends traditional stakeholder-interest-arbitration 
is gaining increasing reference in fisheries. It is a concern that resurrects the underlying 
political-economic values inherent in opposing ideological positions in the sustainable 
resource management debate. 
2.4. 1 Global Neoliberalism 
It is important to acknowledge the influence of fashions or trends in the global political 
environment on the trends in fisheries management being discussed. Squires et al. (1995: 
143), Apostle et al. (2002: 11-17), and Mansfield (2004), for example, specifically link the 
worldwide trend towards the adoption of fisheries management systems based on ITQ to the 
22 
Chapter 2 The Global Fisheries Crisis 
global ascendancy of neo-classical economics or neoliberalism17, and this provides an 
explanation for why alternative approaches18 to sustainable fisheries management are either 
not adopted, or are supplanted by those that emphasise private property rights and market 
mechanisms. It is a logical extension of the assumption that resource management is an 
intrinsically political process and therefore reflects the prevailing neoliberal political climate. 
Martinez and Garcia (2000: 1) describe neoliberalism as "a set of economic policies that 
have become widespread during the past 25 years or so" associated with the "rapid 
globalisation of the capitalist economy". Its main features include: abdication to the rule of 
the market; the reduction of public expenditure on social services; deregulation (in the 
interests of increased profits/economic efficiency); privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
assets and resources (including banks, transport infrastructure, power and water distribution 
systems, schools and hospitals); and elimination "of the concept of 'the public good' or 
'community' and replacing it with 'individual responsibility'" (Martinez and Garcia 2000: 
2). 
Coronil (2001: 70-71) discusses the consequences of neoliberal globalisation as presented in 
a report (United Nations 1997) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCT AD) "that documents rising worldwide inequalities". He points out that this report 
reflects an establishment position grounded in scholarly research, and is not an extreme or 
marginal-leftist view19. Key effects of globalisation noted in the UNCTAD report include: 
widening income inequality within and between countries as the rich have gained 
everywhere at the expense of the poor and middle sections of society; "capital's share of 
income has increased over that assigned to labour"; "employment and income insecurity are 
spreading worldwide"; global economic growth has slowed, and; "finance has gained an 
upper hand over industry, and rentiers over investors" (Coronil 2001: 70-71). These features 
associated with neoliberal globalisation strike a resonance with the social concerns widely 
expressed about privatisation of fisheries through property rights based management as 
discussed earlier. The UNCTAD report (United Nations 1997) also argues, notes Coronil 
(2001: 70), that these "troublesome features ... pose a serious threat of a political backlash 
against globalisation". Other establishment contributors to the debate who recognise the 
benefits that have come from globalisation, nevertheless acknowledge the problems of 
l 7 For the general discussion here the terms neoliberalism and neo-classical economics are regarded as 
dealing with the same basic economic philosophy. 
18 Alternative approaches that emphasize a range of social and community values rather than the 
economic efficiency agenda of the mainstream management paradigm. 
19 Coronil also presents a compatible view of globalisation from the left of politics. 
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inequality, insecurity and poverty, and the link between these symptoms of the way that 
globalisation has occurred and the rise of terrorism as expressed in the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the US (De Soto 2002; Sen 2002; Soros 2002). George (2002) rejects the 
terrorism connection in relation to the September 11 attacks but concedes that deprivation 
and frustration obviously lead to violence. 
The theoretical basis for neoliberal philosophy - that markets free from state intervention 
provide the best mechanisms to allocate resources - is attributed to Hayek (1944; 1960), and 
neoliberalism was promoted, according to T. Ali (2003: 312), as a "victorious counter-
Revolution" led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s as the Cold War 
came to an end, and, correspondingly, the principal ideological challenge to Western 
capitalism was greatly diminished. Neoliberalism is seen by writers such as T. Ali (2003: 
311-315) and Wood (2003: 130-137) as an ideology promoted to serve Western and 
especially American capitalist imperialism. Wood (2003: 132) argues that global economic 
instruments such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) have imposed "structural adjustment" around the world "to open other 
economies, their resources, their labour and their markets, to Western, and especially US, 
' 
capital". T. Ali (2003: 313) notes that a priority for the WTO is to "accelerate the 
privatisation of education, health, welfare, social housing and transport" to create investment 
opportunities for Western capital. Worldwide, the alienation of people from a sense of place 
and access to resources, the increasing social polarisation, rising unemployment and 
increased sense of income insecurity associated with neoliberal globalisation promotes social 
disengagement. It gives rise to intolerance and prejudice, and contributes to the rise of 
religious and other forms of fundamentalism (MacKay 2005). 
These conditions of social disengagement are out of step with the social cohesion and 
communitarian spirit identified as necessary attributes of Jentoft' s (2000) concept of 
sustainable communities as discussed earlier in the chapter. Prospects for sustainability are 
also jeopardised by the irrationality inherent in the simple, certain solutions offered by 
various forms of fundamentalism, including those offered by economic rationalists, who, 
Mackay (2005: 4) explains, are a "variety of fundamentalist, because they claim to have the 
one, true answer - the free market". The association between resource alienation, poverty, 
inequality, the rise of religious fundamentalism and unsustainability will be discussed further 
in the Pakistan case study in chapter 5. 
The connection between neoliberal trends in fisheries and global neoliberalism in general 
can be viewed in two ways. Fisheries rationalisation and privatisation, as suggested in the 
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introduction to this section, can simply be regarded as a consequence of the extension of the 
political influence of global neoliberalism to this sector, as it has been extended, with 
privatisation, into others, often where there are no apparent resource conservation issues 
(other than economic efficiency) to consider. Alternatively, one can follow the rationale (as 
described in relation to the development of the mainstream fisheries management paradigm) 
that the neoliberal restructuring of fisheries, through their enclosure and privatisation, is the 
necessary response to dealing with a resource crisis arising from the confrontation of the 
demands of human population and technological capacity with the constraints of resource 
limits. This perspective, with its emphasis on environmental crisis as an underlying cause of 
the neoliberal trend, could be extended from the fisheries case to the more general, to suggest 
that the ascendance of neoliberalism as a global phenomenon may also be a consequence of 
an underlying global environmental and resource crisis. Neoliberalism' s tendency towards 
selfishness, growing inequality and community dysfunction may, therefore, reflect a natural 
response of human societies to conditions of intensifying resource scarcity. But it is a 
response that can lead to resource management and societal failure. 
2.4.2 Why Societies Fail 
Jared Diamond (2003; 2005) examines the interrelated social and ecological factors that 
cause societies to collapse and addresses the question of why some societies, when faced 
with crisis, fail to take the measures that could save them. One of Diamond's key findings is 
that they are more likely to fail in this way if the decision-making elites and their interests 
are insulated, at least in the short term, from the effects of social and resource management 
practices that are leading, in the long term, to social and ecological failure. Societies with a 
high degree of inequality are likely to be most at risk of having their decision-making elites 
insulated in this way. Highly polarised societies are, not coincidentally, also likely to be 
ruled by the authoritarianism and irrationality associated with various forms of 
fundamentalism. 
Diamond's insights emphasise the need for a holistic approach when dealing with the 
challenges of sustainability. They highlight the importance of the ethos and attitudes of a 
society in dealing with resource management questions, and link these attitudes to social and 
political structures. Within this holistic perspective, issues such as inequality, and arguments 
that are commonly linked to ideological positions on resource management, emerge to 
assume critical and practical importance. 
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McMichael (2001a; 2001b) is another writer who takes a holistic approach. He draws a link 
between.the September um, 2001 attacks on the USA and other human disasters, including 
epidemic disease and political and military actions, and the global environmental crisis with 
its origins in global economic and social trends (2001a: n.p.). This approach is gathering 
momentum in the post 2001 world as the emphasis of concern shifts from environmental to 
socio-political dimensions of the interrelated aspects of sustainability. There is a, growing 
awareness of the dangerous trend towards the politics of fundamentalism, or authoritarianism 
based on various forms of ideology, and that this is linked to the nature of resources and to 
economic structures that favour the concentration _and monopolisation of power. -It is also 
linked to socio-political structures that are dysfunctional in terms of their inability to serve 
the broader common interest and the interests of sustainability - which returns the discussion 
. ' 
to the issues at the heart of the debate over trends in fisheries. Can fishery restructuring that 
is driven by an ideology that emphasises selfish rather than common interests, and serves to 
concentrate wealth in few hands while dispossessing many, serve the broader common 
interest in sustainability? Clearly the answer is no when a society faces challenges relating 
to resource scarcity, and sustainability rests on the ability to address them in a rational way, 
undistorted by internal competition and a decision-maker preoccupation with sectoral 
interests and rivalries that stand in the way of furthering the common interest. This holistic 
perspective has well-established precedents among the foundation texts of Western political 
philosophy. Plato, more than two thousand years ago, provided a discourse on governance in 
The Republic, and emphasised the dangers of allowing the rulers to accumulate private 
property which would cause conflicts to develop between their private intere~ts and the 
broader common interest that they were entrusted to serve. He noted that the corrupting 
influence of the pursuit of private wealth inevitably caused the ruin of states (Cornford 1941: 
'270-1, 288). 
Thomas More's ·utopia, written nearly five hundred years ago, contains a critique of the 
enclosure or privatisation of the commons and the rationalisation of land use to maximise 
rent20 ' without regard for the wellbeing of traditional tillers of the soil and of rural settlements 
(Adams 1975: 14; Logan and Adams 1989: 19). This bears remarkably close comparison 
with modem critiques of the enclosure of fisheries commons, and of fisheries rationalisation 
in the interests of economic efficiency, and at the cost of displaced fishworkers and the 
demise of coastal communities. More questions the morality of allowing landowners to 
20 Agricultural land was being converted to sheep pastures for wool production. This use required 
relatively little labour compared to traditional agriculture, which produced a greater diversity of crops 
and livestock, employed many and, thus, sustained communities. The overall economic production 
was less under wool production than traditional mixed agriculture but yielded a higher rent to the 
landlord because there were so few labourers to support. 
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pursue self-interest in the use of private property if this entails a greater cost to others and to 
the "Commonwealth". He also saw danger in the concentration of wealth in too few hands 
and argued: "restrict the right of the rich to buy up anything and everything, and then to 
exercise a kind of monopoly" (Logan and Adams 1989: 19). More noted the corruption of 
politics by self interest and commented on the futility of providing wise and honourable 
council to encourage kings to govern in ways that serve the broader public interest: "if I 
proposed wise laws .. .- and tried to root out corruption, don't you suppose I would be either 
banished forthwith, or treated with scorn?" (Logan and Adams 1989: 29). But, he noted, one 
could readily advance one's own interests and those of one's friends when in public office 
(Adams 1975: 22, 23, 30; Logan and Adams 1989: xxii, 14). More, like Plato, also 
commented on the futility of trying to persuade the people to look after their own interests 
(Logan and Adams 1989: 38). He muses that it may be better to avoid sharing their plight 
and observes that it is wiser to keep away from 'public business' altogether, sentiments that 
might be shared by many disillusioned resource managers in modem times21. More (Logan 
and Adams 1989: 33-34) also raised the issue of social sustainability, questioning whether a 
king is more secure if he keeps his people impoverished so they don't become "insolent with 
wealth and freedom", or looks after their wellbeing because "who is more eager for 
revolution than the man who is most discontented with his present position?" This question 
addresses similar concerns to those raised in the UNCT AD report, discussed above, about 
the "employment and economic insecurity" stemming from neoliberal economic policies, 
and the threat of a political backlash that this poses (Coronil 2001: 70-71), a threat that 
underlies the intensification of fear of fundamentalism and violence currently being 
experienced (and manufactured) world-wide, and the fear of public dissent that the "war on 
terror" provides a justification to suppress. 
The legacy of Plato and More is also evident in the views of Marsh (1864), one of the 
intellectual pioneers of American conservation. Marsh wrote about the destruction of forests 
and fisheries (1864: 104-108), and considered the efficacy of conservation measures based 
on severe penalties (1864: 241) and private property (1864: 258) with respect to prevailing 
socio-political and economic conditions. He also suggests that: "the human race seems 
destined to become its own executioner", and notes that "domestic corruption has destroyed 
more nations than foreign invasion" (Marsh 1864: 286). He expresses a particularly scathing 
view of private corporations noting their unscrupulous lack of conscience, and their tendency 
to corrupt governments and to provide false "scientific" information where a motive exists to 
21 This issue is relevant to a section in chapter 3 that examines the advisory role of the Canadian 
Department of Fisheries ar;id Oceans in the lead up to the 1992 Northern cod fishery crisis. 
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falsify reports: "every person conversant with the history of these enterprises knows that in 
their public statements falsehood is the rule, truth the exception" (Marsh 1864: 51). 
Marsh also observes: 
The practice of irrigation - except in mountainous countries where springs and 
rivulets are numerous - is attended with very serious economical, social a'nd 
political evils ... [t]here is a constant tendency to the accumulation of large 
estates of irrigated land in the hands of great capitalists, and consequently to 
the dispossession of the small cultivators, who pass from the condition of 
owners of the land to that of hireling tillers (1864: 231). 
-
Marsh's comments on land use, like those of More, are relevant to the modern fisheries 
debate where there are concerns about the economic, social and political "evils" of 
management trends that favour resource enclosure and the concentration of ownership in the 
hands of capital, and the consequent dispossession of small-scale fishers who pass from 
owner-operators to contract harvesters. These issues, while relatively new in fisheries, fit 
within a long established paradigm dealing with social, political, economic and 
environmental resource issues. This paradigm provides some perspective in the analysis of 
the case studies in the following chapters. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 described the global fisheries crisis in terms of increasing competition between 
capital and people for scarce resources, which, at a global level, have reached the limits of 
their productive capacity. Global trends in production and allocation of these resources were 
examined and linked to broader neoliberal political trends, and the theoretical implications of 
these trends for socio-political and environmental sustainability was discussed. The 
following chapter examines the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fisheries in the 1990s. 
The role of social and cultural factors, conflict between small-scale coastal fishers and 
capitalised interests, the relationship between fish corporations and the state, and the 
influence of this on fishery policy and science, will all be considered in developing an 
understanding of the underlying causes of the Newfoundland fishery crisis. This analysis 
will be further developed in chapter 4, and with increasing emphasis on issues of socio-
political dysfunction in the Pakistan case study of chapter 5. 
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A Case Study of Unsustainability 
Figure 3.1 Map of Newfoundland showing its 
location off the east coast of Canada 
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Figure 3.2 Typical Newfoundland fishing outport, Quidi Vidi , St Johns 
3.1 Introduction 
The coll apse of the Northern cod fi shery of coastal Newfoundland in 1992 serves as a 
defining case study for the global fi sheries crisis of the 1990s. Many of the issues discussed 
in chapter 2; resource limits and allocation conflicts between capital and labour, the "social" 
versus "economic" fi shery, the modern fisheries management paradigm based on science and 
enclosure - and its apparent failings, and issues to do with equality and the concept of 
sustainable communities; are all relevant to the Newfoundland case study and it serves to 
illustrate their interactions and effects. 
The aim of the chapter is to explore the underlying causes of Newfoundland' s fishery crisis 
of the 1990s and to understand these causes in a broader historical and social context. The 
study is intended to be sufficiently analytical and in-depth to stand alone as a useful 
contribution to knowledge about the Newfoundland fisheries . Further, it provides some 
insights that have a wider application, contributing to an understanding of more general 
causes of resource fai lure. In particular, Newfoundland serves as a usefu l case for 
comparison with Tasmania (the subject of chapter 4) due to a number of cultu ral, political, 
geographic and economic characteristics that the two islands have in common. Issues raised 
in the chapter are also developed further in the Pakistan case study in chapter 5. 
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This is the longest chapter in the thesis (approximately 45,000 words) and begins with an 
overview of the events leading to the 1992 crisis. Then discussion of geography, the natural 
history of cod and the economic history of the Newfoundland fishery provide background 
information on factors that influenced the pattern of European settlement. The way that 
political and economic restrictions have influenced the development of the fishery and 
Newfoundland society for five hundred years is established as a key theme. It is discussed in 
relation to the political and economic domination of Newfoundland by English mercantile 
interests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by St John's based merchants from 
the mid-nineteenth century until the economic crisis of the 1930s. Following World War II 
and confederation with Canada, these socio-political issues continue to be relevant, and an 
examination of the work of Brox (1972), Wright (1997; 2001), Alexander (1977) and 
Sinclair ( 1985) links the hegemony of an industrial vision with neglect of the inshore fishery, 
the entrenchment of inequality, contradictory policies and division and conflict withi?- the 
fishery. 
The chapter then examines events leading to the crisis of the 1990s, with particular attention 
devoted to Finlayson's (1994) investigation of the dysfunctional performance of the 
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The role of Newfoundland's political and 
cultural structures as underlying causes of the crisis is also discJissed and several of the post-
1992 explanations for the crisis are analysed. Comparisons are made with_Norway and 
Iceland, countries that have been more successful than Newfoundland in managing Atlantic 
cod resources, and this provides additional support for the argument that the underlying 
causes of the crisis are linked to systemic, structural or social factors that are characteristic of 
Newfoundland. Further support for this position is provided by reference to the work of 
Charles (1994) and Jentoft (2000), which articulates the importance of community integrity, 
equity and social cohesion as preconditions for sustainability; qualities that the analysis 
demonstrates to have been lacking in Newfoundland22, where conflict, strife and 
opportunism undermined the capacity for collective action. The analysis explores the 
linkage between sustainability and resource policies that result from, and serve to perpetuate, 
social inequality, and this establishes an important 'theme that is developed further in 
1 chapters 4 and 5. 
22 While this generalisation of 'dysfunctionality' is applied to the Newfoundland fishery as a whole, 
there is strong community integrity, cohesion and functioning at a smaller, mote local scale, within 
many of Newfoundland's rural communities as demonstrated by the work of Doug May's (2004) 
Community Accounts groups. The political and economic powerlessness of these local communities 
within the larger society is what undermines their prospects for sustainability. Similar circumstances 
occur in Pakistan's fishing communities to be discussed in chapter 5. 
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3. 1. 1 Background to the Crisis 
Newfoundland's Northern cod fishery was one of the greatest fisheries the world had ever 
known and its failure in the early 1990s had a wide-ranging significance. For five hundred 
- ' 
. years, fishers from Europe, particularly the UK, France, Spain and Portugal, had been 
catching cod in Newfoundland waters (see, for example, Innis [1954]; Sahrhage and 
Lundbeck [1992: 90-102]; Harris [1990: l]). The fishery had played an important role in the 
European discovery, conquest and, colonisation of the New World and in the associated 
economies of trans-Atlantic trade from the sixteenth century onwards. Newfoundland cod 
became an important staple in Mediterranean countries and other places r~ached by 
-"' 
European colonial trade including the Caribbean, Africa, and South America, and most 
especially of Portugal where bacalao was the national dish (Toussaint-Samat 1987: 319). 
The Newfoundland cod fishery, therefore, had cultural significance for people from around 
the Atlantic and beyond. But for the people of Newfoundland itself, it served as a central 
defining aspect of cultural identity. 
Newfoundland's history, politics, and social and economic development had always been 
closely linked with the cod fishery. In the 1980s the fishery remained an important 
economic base for the Newfoundland economy (Munro 1980: 1-2) and at the beginning of 
the 1990s Harris noted, "[t]he vast majority of the Newfoundland coastal communities that 
were built upon a foundation of cod are still utterly dependent on that resource for their 
continued existence" (1990: 1). Most Newfoundlanders, if not associated directly with the 
fishery, had relatives who were, or were only distanced from involvement in the fishery by a 
generation or two (Finlayson 1994: 4). Thus, the collapse and closure of the fishery in 1992 
impacted on many. The immediate economic blow was cushioned to some extent by transfer 
payments funded by the Canadian government. But the closure of the fishery has had a deep 
social and cultural impact on the people of Newfoundland because the island's sense of 
identity is, even now, intimately connected with it. 
The failure of the fishery in the 1990s was blamed on a management regime that had 
developed in the wake of a previous stock collapse in the mid 1970s. This first collapse had 
been caused by overfishing and was a consequence of technology-driven expansion of 
offshore trawling effort, primarily by international fleets, in what had been a largely 
unregulated "open-access" fishery (Charles 1997). Supported by Hardin' s (1968) tragedy of 
the commons thesis, and by arguments of the benefits that would result from enclosure and 
scientifically grounded management, Canada succeeded, in 1977, in gaining extended 
jurisdiction over coastal waters to the 200 nautical mile-limit from shore (see, for example, 
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Munro [1980]; 'Harris [1990: 1]; Finlayson [1994: 20-25]). With the exception of the nose 
and tail of the Grand Bank, the 200 nautical mile-limit enclosed most of the annual 
migratory range of the Northern cod stock and provided Canada with the power and the 
obligation to manage the fishery sustainably. 
Following 1977, Canada's management policy for Northern cod23 had emphasised the goal 
of rebuilding the spawning stock (Harris 1990: 2). It was optimistically forecast that with 
stock recovery and sound management the fishery could yield a sustainable annual harvests 
of around 550 OOO tons (Kirby [1983: 242] cited in Finlayson [1994: 8]). Management goals 
therefore specified (what was thought to be) conservative harvesting in order to promote 
rapid stock rebuilding, while at the same time allowing a sufficient harvest to satisfy the 
needs of the fishing and processing sectors. At this time the capacity of the Canadian fishing 
and processing industries were encouraged to expand substantially to replace the foreign 
fishing effort that could now, in theory, be excluded by application of the 200 mile limit 
(Munro 1980; Finlayson 1994: 20-26; Schrank 1995). Nevertheless, there continued to be 
ongoing demands from foreign fleets with a long tradition in the fishery for access to a 
portion of the total allowable catch, and ongoing allocation conflicts between 
Newfoundland's traditional inshore fisheries and the more industrialised and capital 
intensive offshore sector. 
In the early 1980s it was maintained that these conflicting pressures were being successfully 
managed. Stocks were reported to be rebuilding satisfactorily, and there was a sense of 
optimism about the long-term prospects for the fishery (for example, as expressed by Munro 
[1980]; Kirby [1983]). The tragedy of the commons problem had, in theory, been addressed, 
with the separation of science (as the impartial arbiter over the inherent conflict between the 
requirements for conservation and socio-economic demands on the resource) from politics 
(which dealt with conflicts over allocation). At this time the responsible management 
agency, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), was held in high· regard 
internationally and its scientists and managers enjoyed prestige among their international 
peers (Finlayson 1994: 24). The Northern cod fishery was widely regarded as a model of 
successful fisheries management, a 'demonstration of the benefits of applying modem, 
science-based fisheries management techniques. Thus, the failure of the fishery in the 1990s 
raised challenges to the management paradigm itself and to fishery management institutions 
23 The policy prescribed a harvest rate designated as FO.l, which allowed an annual harvest of 
approximately 20 per cent of the exploitable biomass. Hutchings and Myers (1995: 56-57) argue that 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as in the late 1960s, harvest rates actually exceeded 50 per cent of 
harvestable biomass. 
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and individuals, and stakeholder interest groups worldwide that were ideological and 
structurally affiliated with it. In the climate of acrimony following the collapse, the 
Canadian government's role in the mismanagement of the fishery through its agency, the 
DFO, received particular criticism (see, for example, Finlayson [1994: 19-32]; Newell and 
Ommer [1999a: 5]). 
The roots of the crisis have elements of historical legacy. Newfoundland had been an 
important off shore fishing ground for European fleets since the beginning of the sixteenth 
century and shore stations had been occupied year round to service the fishery, but 
settlement had generally been discouraged (Brox 1972: 1). It was not until the first forty 
years of the nineteenth century that immigration and settlement occurred on a large scale. 
European colonisation of Newfoundland took place in a single wave of immigratiOn in this 
period by people of two distinct ethnic groups, Catholics from Ireland and Protestants from 
the English western counties. Since this time population growth has occurred mainly from 
natural increase (Felt and Locke 1995: 203; Jonsson 1995: 272). These immigrants were 
drawn to Newfoundland by the cod fishery and they occupied over a thousand scattered 
coastal settlements adjacent to the inshore fishing grounds. These "outport" fishing 
communities came to characterise the traditional Newfoundland inshore fishery. The fishery 
operated from small boats in coastal waters, generally within a mile of shore and it changed 
' 
little between the 1850s and 1950s. The annual catch for this period was remarkably stable, 
varying between about 200,000 and 300,000 tons (Harris 1990: 21-26)24 . 
. Dramatic transformation of the Newfoundland fishery began in the late 1950s with the' 
expansion of industrial trawling, initially by European vessels in offshore waters. The 
annual catch increased substantially, peaking at over 800,000 tons in 1968 (Harris 1990: 2), 
far in excess of ecologically sustainable limits. As the offshore catch had progressively 
increased from 200,000 tons to 800,000 tons between 1959 and 1968, the catch in the 
inshore sector progressively declined from a little under 200,000 tons to only about 30,000 
tons. From 1968 to the mid 1970s total landings from all sectors plummeted as the stock 
collapsed (Harris 1990: 32). This failure from overfishing by largely unregulated 
international fleets provided a background and justification for the push for extended 
jurisdiction by Canada, and this was realised with the extension of Canadian authority to the 
200 nautical mile-limit on January 1, 1977. There followed a period of optimism as stocks 
increased and the Canadian fishery expanded to take the place of reduced foreign fishing 
24 Sahrhage and Lundbeck (1992: 90-102) also report estimates of annual catches of up to 250,000 
tonnes from the period 1580-1750. 
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effort. Then in the mid 1980s, a declining inshore catch reminiscent of the decline that had 
preceded the collapse of the 1970s began to show signs of being repeated. 
For several years in the mid 1980s, prior to the intensification of the crisis, traditional 
inshore fishers had been complaining of poor catches. This, they had insisted, was indicative 
of stock decline, and they blamed overfishing by the industrialised offshore sector. As the 
offshore catch had increased in the mid-1980s, the gain was offset by a decline in the 
landings of the small-scale inshore sector. For several years DFO scientists and managers 
dismissed the claims of the inshore fishers, maintaining that the stocks were in fact growing, 
rebuilding from the severe depletion of the early 1970s. On this basis they continued to set 
TACs that in hindsight proved to have been excessive. The offshore industrial sector, aided 
by constantly improving technology for finding and catching fish, was able to harvest the 
allocated TAC without difficulty. In theory, a decline in the size of the stock would be 
reflected in a reduction in the catch for a given amount of fishing effort. But continuous 
improvements in the efficiency of fishing technology allowed the offshore fleet to maintain 
catch rates, and masked, for this sector, the warning symptoms of stock decline. During the 
1980s DFO scientists relied, to a significant degree, on catch per unit effort data from the 
industrial fishery as the basis for stock assessment. They failed to adequately take account 
of the way that efficiency gains associated with new technology distorted the assessments. 
The consequence was an overestimation of the size of the stock and a corresponding 
allocation of excessive TACs during the mid 1980s. This led to a dangerous combination of 
unrecognised stock depletion, and the buildup of human and capital capacity that was 
dependant on harvest levels that the fishery could not sustain. Harris' account (1990: 129-
150) of these events has been accepted and incorporated into many subsequent studies, for 
example Finlayson (1994), Hutchings and Myers (1995), Schrank (1995), Blackwood 
(1996), Charles (1997) and Wright (1997; 2001). 
In 1986 the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries Association (NIFA) commissioned an 
independent inquiry into the scientific basis upon which the stock was being assessed. The 
findings of this inquiry, referred to as the Keats Report (1986) after its principal author, 
differed from the DFO assessment of the data and supported the inshore' s concerns about 
overfishing. In response to the Keats Report and growing pressure from the inshore fishery, 
additional reviews of the data and the stock assessment process were commissioned 
(Alverson 1987; Harris 1990). These raised serious questions about the status of the stock 
and the methods of appraisal. They highlighted the uncertainty of the stock assessment 
process and confirmed the views of Keats (1986) and the fears of the inshore sector. They 
showed that the data upon which stock assessments had been made contained a high degree 
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of uncertainty and could be interpreted to show stock decline, rather than the growth ·that 
more optimistic assessments had indicated (Finlayson 1994: 33-80). A significant reduction 
in the TAC was now recommended (Harris 1990: 149)25. The high degree of uncertainty 
inherent to fishery science, which in itself was becoming increasingly discredited, enabled 
political and economic pressures to dampen the government's response to the looming crisis. 
The TACs were not cut sufficiently to avert the collapse. Finally, in 1992, when it was 
apparent that the stock had been fished down to an extremely low level and could no longer 
sustain a fishery26, the government had no choice but to impose a moratorium, closing the 
fishery in an effort to protect whatever might remain of the depleted stock in the hope that it 
would rebuild. Initially the closure was for a two-year period and introduced as a temporary 
measure, but it has been extended and more than a decade after its introduction, the 
moratorium remains in place, with the cod stocks showing little prospect of recovery27 . 
3. 1.2 Fallout From the Crisis 
Following the fishery's collapse, a considerable amount of academic research was initiated 
to investigate the causes of the crisis and its likely consequences. This produced an 
extensive body of work that provides a comprehensive study of the failure of a modem, 
Western society to achieve sustainable management of a renewable resource. 
Several factors have contributed to the effectiveness of this research. First, because of the 
scale and significance of the social, economic and political implications of the crisis, the 
resources made available were substantial, enabling a large body of work spanning the 
perspectives of many disciplines and interest groups to be produced. Second, researchers 
were able to closely scrutinise the role played in the crisis by powerful vested interest groups 
such as the industrial sector, the inshore fishers, and, perhaps, most especially, by 
government agencies such as the DF028. The result of this exposure to critical scrutiny (for 
25 The economic implications of so severe a reduction in the TAC made this course politically 
untenable. The fishery had developed a sigmficant inertia with social, political and economic 
components that made it difficult to reduce the harvest level. The build up of this capacity related 
inertia had been supported by the optimism that had accompanied extended jurisdiction. 
26 Charles (1997) notes that the moratorium was only imposed when the industrial trawlers could not 
find any fish to catch at the beginning of the 1992 season. 
27 Finlayson's (1994) analysis of these events is discussed more thoroughly later in the chapter. 
28 Generally, state institutions are able to use embedded power and state authority to shield 
themselves from too close and critical a scrutiny, and they often gain added protection from affiliated 
structures. In this case the DFO had become thoroughly discredited by its management failure and, in 
addition, it had lost the support of the political sphere of a government embroiled in the political 
fallout from the crisis. 
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example by Finlayson [1994]) provides a revealing insight into dysfunctional processes and 
structural characteristics in the fishery and how these contributed to its failure. 
Another factor that contributed to the effectiveness of research into the crisis relates to the 
nature of Canadian society and the Canadian academic system. This provides an 
environment in which researchers enjoy a relatively high degree of academic independence, 
which is a vital prerequisite to the development of a healthy culture of critical analysis of 
government policy and the role of other powerful stakeholder groups in resource 
management processes. Academic independence is not an absolute, but a matter of degree. 
Researchers are seldom entirely free, even in the most open, liberal and democratic societies, 
to address critical research into the activities of powerful private and public organisations 
without experiencing repercussions that impact on funding and career prospects. Academics 
are generally embedded within institutions that are also very much a part of the interlinked 
framework of competing and cooperating power structures within a society. The power and 
ability of academic institutions to secure resources is based, at least to some extent, on 
compromise and the need to balance their credibility as independent critics of social forces 
with sufficient restraint so as to avoid disrupting the establishments of power with which 
they are, to some degree, mutually dependent. Academic institutions therefore have 
mechanisms to maintain internal discipline over staff to discourage them from engaging in 
conflicts that are potentially risky or damaging to the institution itself. It is essential to their 
functioning and survival amongst other powerful, rival institutions that they do so. One 
should not discount the influence of the political climate in Newfoundland in the wake of the 
crisis as a factor in freeing up the academic environment, in regard to this sort of political 
constraint, but neither should one overlook the importance of the significant body of critical 
research into the fishery and its management that had been produced in the decades prior to 
the crisis. Perhaps this is indicative of a healthy climate of academic criticism in this period, 
or of the chronic or recurring state of crisis in the Newfoundland fishery. Much of this 
research had a social science perspective, and it gained new relevance in the 1990s and has 
provided an important foundation for understanding the deeply rooted causes of 
Newfoundland's resource management crisis. 
The failure of the. fishery and the associated crisis gave strength to alternative views on 
fisheries management that have raised some challenges to the orthodox paradigm. Fields 
such as traditional ecological knowledge (see, for example, Neis et al. [1999]), and co-
management became incorporated into the mainstream language, if not entirely into the 
practice of fisheries management. Greater consideration was given to previously 
marginalized issues, for example the role of women in fisheries (see, for example, Neis 
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[1999]). There has been a greater acknowledgement of the relevance of the social sciences 
and humanities in fisheries management. Subjects such as history, political science, 
philosophy and ethics have increasingly asserted their role in the study and management of 
resources, alongside the traditional disciplines of biology and mathematics. At least they 
have done so at an academic level, but one cannot assume with confidence that this will lead 
to meaningful and positive changes to fisheries management in Newfoundland, or elsewhere, 
unless the underlying management goals, with their preoccupation with narrow economic 
objectives, are reconsidered. 
Thirteen years after the peak of the crisis there have been some notable developments in 
Newfoundland fisheries and in the fishing communities. The cod fishery has not recovered, 
but there has been an expansion in other fisheries particularly crab, shrimp and lobster. 
Unlike the traditional inshore cod fishery that was characterised by ease of entry and 
widespread participation, these fisheries are restricted by limited entry (lobster, shrimp and 
groundfish trawl), ITQ based management systems (crab), and the need for capital-intensive 
industrial technology (shrimp). There are strong pressures toward more extensive use of 
ITQ in Newfoundland's fisheries with all that this implies for the social and economic 
structure of the fisheries and Newfoundland's coastal communities. Nevertheless, many of 
the people of the outports continue to resist being uprooted from their traditional homes and 
way of life. And in this resistance, they continue with a long established Newfoundland 
outport tradition. 
The legitimacy of the Canadian federal government to manage Newfoundland's resources 
was damaged by the DFO' s role in the fishery collapse. Combined with traditional 
Newfoundland scepticism, and the rivalries and tensions that exist between the provincial 
and federal governments, this fosters a climate of distrust that can be expected to undermine 
the effectiveness of future attempts at conservation. 
The ambiguity and multitude of interpretations of the meaning of sustainability gives scope 
for a diversity of prescriptions but the perennial questions that have dogged Newfoundland's 
fisheries remain. Cadigan's (2001) question "for whom do the fisheries exist" lies, as it 
always has, at the heart of the politics of Newfoundland's fisheries and of decisions over 
how access to the resources should be managed. It also lies at the heart of explanations for 
the crisis. This question is pertinent to the seemingly inevitable movement toward greater 
use of ITQ in Newfoundland fisheries and to other policy options. Does this movement 
reflect a continuity of the sort of policies that favoured vested interests in the past and 
arguably contributed to the failure of the cod fishery? What are the alternatives? What are 
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the implications for sustainability? And does sustainability really matter anyway? It is not 
easy to produce uncontested answers to these questions but they are at least worth exploring. 
The direction and future of the fisheries and Newfoundland's coastal people continues to 
depend to a large degree on how they are addressed and lessons learned from the failure of 
Newfoundland's fishery can contribute to a better understanding of resource management 
issues elsewhere. 
3. 1.3 Comparative Studies 
An important function of this case study analysis of resource management failure in 
Newfoundland is to provide insights to inform the analysis of resource management 
practices in Tasmania in chapter 4. But this is a two-way interaction, and the social and 
historical context that frames the Newfoundland study was shaped to some extent to 
facilitate comparative analysis with already published work on Tasmanian fisheries29 . 
Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay (2002) have argued that fisheries management policies and 
practices in Tasmania have developed within a political and resource management culture 
that has its origins in the history of European settlement, when, particular social, political 
and economic patterns were established and institutions developed to maintain them. The 
resulting resource management culture, it is argued, has promoted patterns of resource 1,1se 
that serve rent-seeking interests, entrench inequality and sustain structural characteristics in 
Tasmanian society that are fundamentally incompatible with sustainability. This chapter 
explores the extent to which similar structural characteristics, which may be traced to similar 
roots in the history, colonial culture, and geography of Newfoundland, may be a factor in 
sustainability dysfunction in Newfoundland's fisheries. 
Newfoundland and Tasmania, as has been noted, share a number of features that make them 
suitable subjects for comparative study. Geographically, they are both islands, situated at 
relatively high latitudes off the shores of large continental landmasses. Although Tasmania 
is geographically smaller than Newfoundland their populations are comparable (about 
470,000 people for Tasmania, 550,000 for Newfoundland), and the populations of both 
places are dominated by people of Anglo-Irish origin. The economies of both islands have 
traditionally been dominated by resourc~ extraction and primary production industries, and 
both places have suffered from persistently weak economies and lower than average incomes 
29 This material is referred to and some of it is incorporated in the section dealing with the Tasmanian 
rock lobster fishery in chapter 4. 
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and relied to a significant degree on subsidies and transfer payments from their respective 
federal governments. Politically both islands also have much in common. Both are 
relatively small members of federal systems, and there are many similarities in the structures 
of the Australian and Canadian federal systems and in the design of the respective 
institutions of the provincial and state governments within them. This is not surprising as 
both systems have emerged, without major disrµption, from a shared history of British 
colonial government, and both remain within the British Commonwealth. In the histories of 
both Newfoundland and Tasmania there were periods of harsh and repressive governance 
that, arguably, influenced the directions in which their respective societies and resource 
management cultures and institutions developed, and which have ongoing implications for 
social, economic and resource sustainability. 
The social and historical perspective has been well established in scholarly research into 
Newfoundland's problems. For example Brox (1972), Alexander (1977), Sinclair (1985), 
and Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2002a) have all made links between Newfoundland's history, its 
contemporary political, economic and social environments, and developments in the cod 
fishery that were demonstrably unsustainable for some combination of social, economic, 
environmental or political reasons. This approach, with its emphasis on a socio~political­
economic perspective, was more in vogue 25 to 40 years ago as part of an extensive 
twentieth century debate over the principal competing ideologies and models for social and 
economic development. It struggled to sustain relevance in the 1980s and 1990s during the 
ascendancy of neoliberal (or neo-classical) capitalist ideology. But the debate is regaining 
salience, and being transformed in the post 2001 world as, worldwide, an intensification of 
environmental, social, political and economic crises have begun to raise serious new 
questions about global resource politics; questions to which the neoliberal agenda of the past 
25 years appears to offer few convincing solutions. 
In addition to comparative studies with Tasmania, reference is also made within the chapter 
to comparisons with Northern Norway and Iceland. Northern Norway and Iceland are, like 
Newfoundland, North Atlantic fishery dependent regions. They share a similar climate, flora 
and fauna, and a similar fishery resource base upon which economic development has 
historically depended. But Norway and Iceland's social and political history is different to 
that of Newfoundland and they have pursued a different approach to regional social and 
economic development. These differences may provide some insight into why these 
countries have apparently been more successful than Newfoundland at the sustainable 
management of their fisheries. 
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An understanding of the many factors that interacted and contributed to the sustainability 
crisis in the Newfoundland fishery, developed in part with insights gained from comparative 
studies, should provide the basis for the development of better policies in the future. This 
provides a positivist, utilitarian justification for such research. Failing this the understanding 
gained may at least contribute to the ability to recognise ongoing problems and help to 
explain why it is so difficult to make progress towards sustainability, not only in 
Newfoundland, but everywhere. 
3.2 The Northern Cod Fishery of Newfoundland 
Atlantic cod (Gadus morua) is the fish most closely identified with Newfoundland. It is a 
member of the family Gadidae, a temperate-water family of fish with several commercially 
important species including haddock, hake and pollack. Cod· inhabit continental shelf and 
offshore bank areas across the North Atlantic Ocean and the fish has supported important 
coastal fisheries in Europe, Iceland and the northeastem United States and Canada since pre-
medieval times. The Canadian Northern cod fishery, of particular focus in this chapter, 
refers specifically to stocks that occur in the waters of the continental shelf off the east and 
northeast coasts of Newfoundland, and off the east coast of Labrador. This large area ~of 
ocean is defined by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisatiqn (NAFO) management 
areas 2J, 3K and 3L, and frequently referred to as 2J3KL. Cod are also found off the western 
and southern coasts of Newfoundland in the Gulf of St Lawrence. 
3.2. 1 A Description of Atlantic Cod 
A number of sources provide general descriptions of Atlantic cod and its ecology (see, for 
example, Innis [1954: 1-10]; Harris [1990: 17-35, 47-49]; Hutchings and Myers [1995: 39-
45]; Dobbs [2000]). Atlantic cod are semi-demersal in habit, generally occupying the 
bottom layers of the water column in depths of between 30 and 250 fathoms, but they 
sometimes swim near the surface when migrating or in pursuit of food. They are 
opportunistic feeders on a wide range of prey species. The Northern cod stocks off 
Newfoundland feed largely on capelin, shrimps and crabs and are, in their tum, taken by 
various predators including sharks, seals, and larger cod and of course by human fishing 
activities. Cod stocks are directly affected by fishing impacts and other forms of predation. 
They are also affected by competition for prey species. Seals, for instance, eat cod but 
predominantly feed on capelin and shrimp (Stenson, Hammill and Lawson 1997). Harp seals 
number several million in the waters off Newfoundland and Labrador and consume about 6 
per cent of their body weight of fish each day. They may conceivably depress stocks of 
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capelin and shrimp to the point that food scarcity becomes a limiting factor on cod stock 
recovery. Commercial fisheries for capelin, shrimp and other species may also reduce the 
abundance of prey and thus affect cod stocks indirectly (Harris 1990: 27). Juvenile cod may 
also suffer significant mortality as bycatch, for example, by getting caught in trawl fishing 
gear being used to target capelin and shrimp. Large, slow maturing fish are particularly 
vulnerable to intensive trawling effort at levels that may be sustainable for smaller species 
with a shorter lifecycle. Cod recruitment is also likely to be significantly affected by 
ecosystem factors that influence both the availability of suitable prey and the level of 
predation on cod in the egg, early larval and fry stages of their lifecycle. Cod ecology and 
predator-prey relationships are, therefore, complex, non-linear, poorly understood· and hard 
to predict. 
Age and Growth, Maturation, Fecundity 
Cod can live more than 26 years and attain a weight of more than 80 kg (Hutchings and 
Myers 1995: 40). Some suggest they may live as long as 50 years and grow to 180 cm long 
(Momatiuk and Eastcott 1994). Such large fish are exceedingly rare and commercial catches 
typically comprise fish of 5-6 years old, which range in size from 1.5 kg to 2.3 kg. Sexual 
maturity generally occurs in the sixth or seventh year (Hutchings and Myers 1995: 40). 
Growth rates vary to a significant degree across the cod's range (Harris 1990: 75). Growth is 
much slower in the north, off the coast of Labrador, than in the southern end of the range. A 
mature 12 year old fish, for example, may weigh as little as 3lb (l.5kg) off the northern 
Labrador coast, while a fish of a similar age off the Grand Bank might weigh 13lb (6kg). 
Growth rates are also dependent on cod population size, which may be linked to greater 
competition for food at high stock density. 
In the winter months cod congregate to spawn on the outer slopes of the continental shelf at 
depths of 300 to 400 meters with a water temperature of around 3 ° to 4 ° Celsius (Hutchings 
and Myers 1995: 40). Cod have a high fecundity. An average female spawning fish 
produces between one and two million eggs (Dobbs 2000: 66), and older, larger fish may 
produce up to ten million eggs. The eggs are approximately l.5mm in diameter and are 
buoyant. After spawning they drift with the currents in the plankton community, and take 
between 10 and 50 days to hatch, depending on the water temperature. On hatching the 
young fish continue to drift and feed on plankton in the upper levels of the water column. 
When they reach a size of about 25 to 50mm, they settle to the bottom (Hutchings and Myers 
1995: 40). 
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Because cod produce such a large number of eggs there was thought to be little relationship 
between the size of the spawning stock and the size of the resulting year class, unless the 
-
stock was severely depleted. Large spawning stocks can produce poor recruiting year 
classes, and small spawning stocks can produce large recruiting year classes (Laevastu and 
Favorite 1988; Finlayson 1994: 27). There is a wide range of other factors, for example, 
ocean environmental conditions, that may influence the available food supply for early life-
stage juveniles, and so influenGe survival and recruitment. 
The assumption that recruitment and therefore the future productivity of the fishery was not 
closely linked to the size of the surviving adult spawning population has been a significant 
factor in the outlook of fisheries managers. It implies a certain degree of resilience in the 
stock that, in theory, should allow it to be fished down to relatively low levels without 
affecting recruitment, future productivity, ·and the long-term viability of the fishery. This 
assumption, based on a simplistic view of cod ecology, might allow fisheries managers to 
feel less concerned about the possible consequences of stock decline due to overfishing and 
may account for the inadequate concern for the risk of overfishing ·displayed by managers in 
dealing with the uncertainty inherent in stock assessment methods in the late 1980s. Even ~ 
severely overfished stock, should, in theory, be able to recover if fishing pressure is abated. 
This as_sumption likely contributed to the managed overfishing of northern cod in the years 
following 1977. In contrast to the belief that there was no significant correlation between the 
size of the spawning stock and subsequent recruitment, Harris (1990: 29-35) expressed 
concern that there was a danger of reproductive failure due to the depletion from overfishing 
of the spawning biomass. Finlayson (1994: 27-28) discusses this contradiction and suggests 
that the danger may have been exaggerated by Harris to assist the government to "gain 
public support for politically risky action by legitimating it in the name of biological 
necessity." Regardless of motive, the failure of the stock to recover since the moratorium 
suggests that Harris' view may have been more accurate than the orthodox scientific opinion 
of the time30• Hutchings (1999: 262) with the benefit of hindsight and increased knowledge 
30 This "scientific opinion" had been long held and was firmly established as common knowledge 
even among English housewives of the mid-nineteenth century. Mrs. Beeton's classic book of 
household management, first published 1859-61 (Beeton 1994: 123), discusses the natural history of 
cod with specific reference to its fecundity, noting: "So extensive has been the consumption of this 
fish, that it is surprising that it has not long ago become extinct; which would certainly have been the 
case had it not been for its wonderful powers ofreproduction". Citing a Dr. Cloquet, Beeton mformed 
her readers that 10,000 vessels of all nations were engaged in the cod fisheries and brought 
40,000,000 salted and dried cod into the commercial trade. "If we add to this immense number, the 
havoc made among the legions of the cod by the larger scaly tribes of the great deep, and take into 
account the destruction to which the young are exposed by sea-fowls and other inhabitants of the seas, 
besides the myriads of their eggs destroyed by accident, it becomes a miracle to find that ·such mighty 
multitudes of them are still in existence, and ready to continue the exhaustless supply. Yet it ceases to 
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explains that there was a severe reduction in recruitment (three year old fish) concomitant 
with a 94 per cent decline in spawning biomass between 1962 and 1977. 
Another questionable assumption of the management models was that the Northern cod 
comprised a single stock. The concept that cod stocks, treated as a single population for 
management convenience, are actually comprised of discrete subgroups is also becoming 
more apparent in coastal Norway and in the north eastern United States (Dobbs 2000: 129-
130) and has significant management implications as it points to the inapplicability of 
management models based on a single stock concept. This matter also has important 
implications for the politics of the fishery. If the fishery is conceived of as a single stock, 
then the traditional inshore fishers and the offshore industrial fleet are logically understood 
to be competing over the same resource. Declining inshore stocks can be blamed on 
overfishing by offshore trawlers. If, on the other hand, inshore and offshore stocks are 
considered to be completely discrete, then each sector is itself responsible for any decline 
caused by overfishing of the sub-stock to which it has access. The Northern cod stock in 
2J3KL is now thought to be made up of a number of somewhat discrete sub groups with 
some seepage between them, and in and out of the 2J3KL management unit (Harris 1990: 
49). Thus there are grey areas that are open to differing interpretations on this issue that has 
critical implications for the long prevailing conflict in the fishery between the inshore and 
the offshore sectors. 
Seasonal Migrations 
Northern cod off northeastern Newfoundland have been generally understood to follow a 
seasonal pattern of migration. In late autumn, they gather in spawning concentrations in 
deep water on the outer edge of the continental shelf and on the slopes of Hamilton Bank, 
Belle Isle Bank, Funk Island Bank and the Grand Bank31. In the spring and summer cod 
slowly migrate, following prey species, into the gradually warming waters of the offshore 
banks and the coastal shallows. This summer migration, which generally runs from June to 
September, traditionally brought the fish into range of Newfoundland's inshore fishery. 
There are still vast gaps in knowledge of the factors that influence the patterns of inshore 
migration (Harris 1990: 49): Differences in ocean temperature and currents have been 
excite our wonder when we remember that the female can every year give birth to more than 
9,000,000 at a time". Beeton also demonstrates a complacent, anthropocentric view by attributing the 
"amazing fruitfulness of this fish" as "one more instance of the wise provision which Nature has made 
for supplying the wants of man". 
31 Harris (1990: 49) also noted that some inshore sub-groups gather in spawning aggregations in 
deeper channels in inshore waters. 
44 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
thought to influence the migratory paths of the fish and this has been put forward to explain 
occasional, localised seasonal failures of the fishery in the past. The "cold water theory" was 
'also put forward to explain the decline of the inshore fishery in the late 1980s, though this 
has been refuted and more convincing arguments demonstrated that the decline was simply 
due to stock depletion by overfishing (Hutchings and Myers 1994). An understanding of the 
existence of at least partially discrete, localised, inshore sub-groups of the Northern cod 
stock supports arguments that localised fishery failures in the nineteenth century were caused 
by overfishing. The rapid fall-off of productivity in the Labrador fishery in the 1800s also 
provides evidence for the vulnerability of Northern cod to overfishing, even with nineteenth 
century fishing technology (Cadigan and Hutchings 2001), though this view, and 
corresponding calls for conservation, were often overwhelmed by arguments favouring 
expansionary interests (Cadigan 1999b; 2002a). 
3.3 Early History of Newfoundland and the Northern Cod Fishery 
The history of the Newfoundland's Northern cod fishery was based on seasonal, inshore 
fishing and salt curing the catch from the late 1400s until the 1950s, when factory freezer 
trawlers began to appear on the offshore grounds (Blackwood 1996: 50). Toussaint-Samat 
(1987: 318) notes, "of all the fishes, the cod alone has created colonies and founded trading 
stations and towns". Harris ( 1990: 17) describes how, near the Strait of Belle Isle, the 20 km 
stretch of water that separates the Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland from Labrador on 
the Canadian mainland, "a fortuitous confluence of oceanographic and biological elements 
conspire to produce a profusion of marine life, fish, flesh, and fowl that promised a 
seemingly inexhaustible resource for those who could harvest its teeming abundance". This 
abundance was exploited by Native Americans, who occupied the region around eight 
thousand years ago, and it was instrumental to the European discovery and settlement of 
Newfoundland. 
The European discovery of these marine resources is subject to some debate. The Vikings 
occupied sites near L' Anse aux Meadows on the northern tip of Newfoundland's Northern 
Peninsula a thousand years ago. Toussaint-Samat (1987: 318), a Frenchman, emphasises the 
discovery of the cod banks of Newfoundland by Basque whalers around the year 1000, (and 
credits them with setting eyes on North America before Leif Eriksson or Christopher 
Columbus). There is little doubt that the fisheries of Newfoundland and the Grand Banks 
were well known to Basque and other European fishers for some time before John Cabot 
made his voyage of "discovery" in 1497, and initiated British colonial expansion into the 
New World. When Jacques Cartier "discovered" the Gulf of St Lawrence in 1535, he found 
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that more than 1000 Basque fishing boats were assembled there (Toussaint-Samat 1987: 
319). By the beginning of the sixteenth century the abundance of cod in Newfoundland 
waters was well known (Harris 1990: 18) and fishing fleets from England, Spain, Portugal 
and France were soon making regular annual visits. The fishery developed very quickly and 
Sahrhage and Lundbeck (1992: 91) report estimates of 15,000 European fishers active in 
Newfoundland in 1518. 
Innis (1954) provides a comprehensive account of the history of the cod fisheries from the 
1500s until World War II. The events of these five centuries correspond to the modern 
capitalist system's development and expansion out of Western Europe. This ,:outward-
looking quest for new resources, markets and trade came to drive the successive waves of 
exploration, conquest and colonisation that shaped the world over the next five centuries. 
Development of the Newfoundland cod fishery was a consequence of this European political, 
cultural and economic expansion, this sixteenth century'"globalisation", and it came to play 
an important role in sustaining it. Cured codfish became a "currency" as well as a 
commodity in trans-Atlantic trade. Hard-dried and salted codfish was easily transported and 
could be kept for several years without perishing. It was a food commodity that leant itself 
to storage and control, and the ability to control the food supply was a tool in the 
management of people in the slave/plantation economies that were developing in the New 
World. Newfoundland cod became an important component of the triangular trade. Slaves 
were shipped from West Africa to plantations in the New World to produce sugar, cotton, 
indigo, molasses and other tropical products. These commodities supported the development 
of processing industries in Europe and the enormous amounts of profit and capital 
accumulated from these activities in the eighteenth century funded the industrial revolution 
(Leftwich 1983: 144). 
A seasonal fishery became securely established during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The European fleets would typically cross the Atlantic Ocean in the spring, fish 
and cure the catch during the summer months, and return to Europe in the late autumn. The 
seasonal nature of the fishery was dictated by a number of factors. Most critically, the 
migratory behaviour of the fish meant that they became more accessible to the simpler 
fishing technology of the day, during the summer inshore migration. In addition, the 
preferred method of curing the catch, the lightly salted, hard dried cure, could best be 
prepared during the relatively benign weather of the short Newfoundland summer. 
Fishers from the different nations who engaged in the Newfoundland fishery employed 
different methods to preserve the fish (Harris 1990: 18). The French, Portuguese and 
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Spanish typically gutted the fish, salted it heavily, and simply packed it in the holds. Cod 
salted on board the fishing vessel in this way is referred to as "salt bulk" and known in 
French as morue verte, which translates as "green cod". It can be preserved for some time to 
allow transatlantic shipping, and later reprocessed by scrubbing, filleting, removal of the skin 
and bones, and then may be prepared for consumption or resalted or dried (Toussaint-Samat 
1987: 321). 
The English developed the lightly salted, hard-dried cure that became known as the 
Newfoundland "shore cure" (Harris 1990: 18). Felt and Locke (1995: 205) explain that the 
fish were split, lightly salted, and dried in the sun and strong prevailing winds of the summer 
season. Several weeks might be required to dry the fillets sufficiently, and the process was 
labour intensive. The fillets needed constant attention, regular turning and protection from 
rain. Once the processing was completed, the hard-dried, shore-cured fish had the advantage 
of a long storage life and could be kept for 10 to 12 years. It contains about 14% water and 
79% protein. Morue verte or salted cod, by comparison, contains about 39% water and 38% 
protein (Toussaint-Samat 1987: 324). The shore-cured fish was therefore a more 
concentrated and valuable product than morue verte. 
The differing climates of England and continental Europe influenced the choice of cure 
adopted by fishers from these countries and also influenced the areas they fished. The 
warmer, drier climates of France and Portugal enabled solar salt to be produced there. Salt 
was essential to the fishery, and commercial interests in fishing went hand in hand with 
commercial interests in the salt necessary for the preservation of the fish (Toussaint-Samat 
1987: 322). The whole trade was a complex economic network linking nations in alliances 
or competition involving the fisheries, salt, transport, taxes and the control of ports. In the 
middle ages England had to import salt from France, and the English preference for the 
lightly salted "shore cure" was influenced by the desire to economise on the use of salt (Innis 
1954: 50-51; Harris 1990: 18). Consequently English fishers concentrated their activities off 
the north east coast of Newfoundland where the fish tended to be smaller and were a more 
suitable size for the lightly salted, hard dried shore cure than those off the banks to the south 
of the island (Innis 1954: 10). 
The labour intensive English cure required on-shore facilities or "stages" where drying racks 
or "flakes" could be erected. Thus, while the continental fleets were more self-contained, 
ship-based fisheries, the English fishery came to depend on access to suitable sites for shore 
based processing. The flakes, and other onshore infrastructure also needed to be guarded 
and maintained over the winter season. This, Harris suggests (1990: 18), explains why the 
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Newfoundland coast was primarily settled by fishers from Britain rather than from other 
European nations (see also, Innis [1954: 30-94]), though other political considerations, to be 
· · 'discussed further, were also significant determinants of settlement. 
Conflicts between England and France over fishing grounds, ports and suitable sites for 
onshore processing, were frequent prior to the eighteenth century (Innis 1954; Sahrhage and 
Lundbeck 1992: 92-93). The Portuguese had been excluded from the fishery by about 1600 
and had, henceforth, relied on cod imported by British vessels, which was exchanged for 
olive oil, wine and salt. The English crown had claimed Newfoundland in 1583 but it was 
not until 1713, in the Treaty of Utrecht, that France gave up its claims, but was granted rights 
to process fish on the shore in north-west Newfoundland. This area came to be known as the 
"French shore". In 1783, at the Treaty of Versailles, the boundaries of the French shore were 
altered (Sinclair 1985: 9). Britain reclaimed the northeastern section, and the French rights 
were extended to include the entire western shore of Newfoundland. From 1783 till 1904 
when French rights were finally eliminated, the French shore extended from Cape St. John to 
Cape Ray. These treaty rights had a significant influence on the history of settlement in 
western Newfoundland. Under the terms of the treaty, the French could fish and process the 
catch on the French shore without interference, but they were prohibited from establishing 
any permanent building or settlement. British and Newfoundland fishers were also 
discouraged from settling on the French Shore to reduce the potential for conflict (Sinclair 
1985: 9). 
In addition to political factors, the pattern of settlement of Newfoundland was influenced by 
access to other resources of use in the fishery. These included sheltered harbours, fresh 
water, and timber for fuel and for the construction of drying flakes, but of prime 
' 
consideration was access to the fish themselves. 
Locations for settlement were those at which a precise combination of 
geographic, oceanographic, and biological elements came. together, the 
essential conditions being the interaction of winds, tides, and currents, 
operating to keep plankton rich waters sufficient to attract concentrations of 
feeding fish within reasonable distance (given primitive technology) of an 
adequate haven with sufficient foreshore and a supply of fresh water. Look at 
the early and ultimately most successful settlements and we will see that they do 
not represent the best or most accessible supply of arable land or of fresh 
water; rather they frequently offer only the barest modicum of shelter from the 
seas, only a modicum of passably good land, only the least amount of fresh 
water necessary to survival. What they have in common is easy accessibility, at 
a time before the invention of the internal combustion engine, to good fishing 
grounds (Harris 1990: 19). 
48 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
Fishing stations were established close to these productive fishing grounds in spite of 
difficulties relating to the shortage or lack of other resources. In some places, for example, 
the absence of suitable harbours meant that fishing boats had to be raised and lowered from 
cliffs, and in places without beaches, drying flakes were sometimes precariously constructed 
on the sides of cliffs to which the fish had to be thrown up out of the boats. Principally for 
these reasons, the settlement pattern of Newfoundland came to be characterised by: 
A relatively small population, thinly scattered in more than one thousand 
communities along ten thousand miles of coastline, often in locations most 
difficult of access involving astronomical per unit cost for basic infrastructural 
services like roads, harbours, electricity, water, sewage, schools, and hospitals; 
and, all dependent upon a single seasonal resource that fluctuated in 
availability in tune with environmental fluctuations that were neither 
understood nor controllable (Harris 1990: 20). 
Newfoundland's historic and cultural identity was built upon the traditions of this inshore 
fishery with its many scattered settlements isolated in a harsh North Atlantic environment, 
and a predominant theme of that history, and one that continues to pervade the folklore of the 
province to this day, concerns ~e political restrictions on the economic development of the 
coastal populations that maintained them in conditions of disempowerment, dependency and 
exploitation. 
3.3. 1 Political Restrictions and Exploitation in the Newfoundland Cod 
Fishery: An Historical Precedent 
Brox describes how for almost the first three hundred years after the European rediscovery 
of Newfoundland: 
[t]he English West Country merchants controlled the fishery and all other 
resource exploitation there, either directly, through their officers, or indirectly, 
through their parliament, administration and armed forces. Settlement of 
Newfoundland was actively discouraged in order to cut off alternatives to 
service on the ships. The history of recruitment to the British fleet in this 
period, and later, is largely one of press gangs. It is not surprising that many 
crewmen jumped ship, hid in the dense forest, and lived off the land and sea ... 
As late as 1811, it was illegal to erect a building of any sort anywhere in 
Newfoundland without explicit permission from the governor. Women were not 
allowed on the island, and schemes were developed to remove those who were 
already there. Military commanders were ordered to seek out settlers, burn 
houses and root out population ( 1972: I). 
Brox suggests that these political restrictions on settlement contributed to the highly 
dispersed settlement pattern of coastal Newfoundland ~s settlers sought inaccessible 
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harbours and hideaways in which to settle, where they might escape detection and 
harassment from the British Navy. Harris (1990: 18) gives less credence to this as an 
infil.!ence on the pattern of settlement and suggests that the restrictions may have been "more 
honoured in the breach than in the observance", particularly during the Seven Years War 
(1756-1763) and Napoleonic War (1792-1815), when the resident population grew in 
response to a combination of the increased market demand for cod, and the impact of the 
hazards of war that served to discouraged fishers from making the seasonal return trip to 
Europe. 
One should not, however, underestimate the effect and intent of the laws of prohibition on 
settlement merely because they were not always enforced. Laws such as these convey much 
power from the discretionary manner in which they may be applied. When, by an arbitrary 
"application of the rule of law", established authority has the power to bum people's homes 
and displace them in a hostile and unsettled environment, their existence becomes entirely 
dependent on maintaining the patronage and good will of that authority. This entrenches 
relationships of power, patronage and dependency and renders people vulnerable to 
exploitation. The effect of the entrenchment of such a culture of powerlessness, patronage, 
dependency and exploitation on the population of Newfoundland, and on their collective 
psyche, can be expected to have had a significant effect in shaping Newfoundland's social 
and political character, an issue of perhaps greater importance than its effects on the physical 
pattern of settlement.32 
3.3.2 The Rule of English Mercantile Interests 
Newfoundland's society and economy, from the sixteenth century until recent times, was 
dependent on shipping. The salt-cod economy depended on imports of large quantities of 
salt, and also on the export of cured fish to overseas markets. Settlers in Newfoundland also 
depended on shipping to supply many basic necessities. Agriculture and animal husbandry 
are limited by poor soils and an unfavourable climate making it difficult to produce many 
European staples in Newfoundland. Flour, molasses, rum, salt-cured beef and pork, and 
other commodities were all imported. This allied with the dependence of the export cod 
economy on shipping, ensured that control over shipping, assisted by complementary laws 
32 Hay (1977) has described how an environment of intense social insecurity associated with the 
shame of association with convict ancestry contributed to a preoccupation with respectability that 
served to entrench conservative political forces in Tasmania from the mid nineteenth century until 
well into the twentieth. 
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and regulations, would provide the means to exercise power over society and the resources 
of Newfoundland until well into the twentieth century33. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the English West Country merchants and ship 
owners had gained control of the fishery. With the assistance of the British government and 
navy, the economic and social development of Newfoundland was directed in accordance 
with their interests. Support for British mercantile interests in the cod fishery was seen to be 
complementary to the development of a strong British Navy. The dominance of the English 
merchants also extended to control over markets. They had, for example, towards the end of 
the seventeenth century, entrenched a monopoly over the cod trade in Portugal (Abreu-
Ferreira 1995: ii). The power of the English ship-owner merchants at this time, in global 
shipping terms, was substantial. In 1713, when they secured control over the Newfoundland 
fishery, they also obtained the asiento, which granted them the sole right to supply slaves to 
the Spanish colonies. For the rest of the eighteenth century the profits from this trade, with 
which the cod trade was integrated, were to be enormous (Leftwich 1983: 144-145). 
The migrant fishery controlled by the English West Country merchants persisted for nearly 
two hundred years. As late as 1683-84 there were only about 120 permanent residents on the 
island. During the eighteenth century the population increased substantially, numbering 
3,400 in 1754, 12,000 in 1774, and 20,000 in 1804 (Authors unknown [Encyclopaedia 
Britannica] 1965). During the Napoleonic wars, European fishing activity was curtailed, 
and Newfoundland cod enjoyed a monopoly in Mediterranean markets leading to high prices 
and an economic boom in the fishery. Following the end of hostilities there was a brief 
depression in the trade, but it recovered and enjoyed a long period of stability (Authors 
unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 336). The nineteenth century was a time of 
general prosperity and economic growth for Newfoundland. The population continued to 
grow reaching about 124,000 in 1857, 146,000 in 1869 and 161,000 in 1874. The bulk of 
these immigrants were from Ireland and their numbers contributed to the growth of the 
inshore fishery. While offshore fishing took place on the Grand Bank it was prosecuted by 
larger ocean going vessels based in the ports of the Maritime Provinces, New England and 
Europe. Newfoundland fishers remained, for the most part, tied to the sixteenth century 
traditions of the inshore fishery. 
33 Innis (1954) provides a detailed and extensive examination of this within his study of the history of 
the cod fisheries. 
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Other economic developments, including a lucrative seal fishery, contributed to 
Newfoundland's prosperity during the middle of the nineteenth century. Attempts were 
made' to' develop agriculture and so add a greater degree of diversity and self-sufficiency to 
the island's economy, but the difficulties of climate and geology were always a limiting 
factor on the economic viability of agriculture in Newfoundland. The cod fishery remained 
the single industry in which Newfoundland enjoyed some natural advantage and upon which 
the economy remained largely dependent. 
3.3.3 The Reign of the St John's Merchants 
The political and economic domination of Newfoundland by English merchants and ship 
owners was diminished by the early 1800s as the restrictions on settlement fell away and the 
resident population grew. The new force that emerged to dominate Newfoundland's political 
and economic life was again a mercantile class, but now it was based in St John's rather than -
in the port cities of England's Western Counties. Institutions of representative government 
were established in Newfoundland in 1832 in the form of a bicameral parliamentary system. 
The upper house was controlled by the St John's saltfish merchants. The lower house was 
more widely representative but the discord that rapidly developed between them made the 
system dysfunctional, leading to a suspension of the constitution and amalgamation of the 
two houses. In 1855, full legislative responsibility was granted to Newfoundland_~Authors 
unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 28). 
Though numerous, the fishermen of the outports were politically unrepresented on any 
effective level. A dual society was maintained, with political and economic power 
concentrated with the merchant class in St John's, while the scattered outport communities 
remained backward, and economically dependent on the merchants and their agents. In the 
outports the merchants often remained monopoly providers of credit, monopoly suppliers of 
essential staples such as flour and molasses, and monopoly buyers of the salted cod that the 
fishermen produced. 
The outport economy was based on the widely criticised "truck" system,_ which entrenched 
feudal relationships of dependency and patronage in the outports. Merchants (or their 
agents) extended credit to enable fishermen to buy winter supplies, and payment was made_ 
when cod were delivered in the summer and autumn. Cash was seldom exchanged. If 
fishermen had a good season, positive balances were carried as credit on the books. The 
system was subject to abuse. In addition to monopoly power, the merchants kept the books 
and illiteracy was widespread in the outports. 
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Under the long domination of the English merchants, little of the wealth from the cod fishery 
remained in' ·Newfoundland. The English merchants had no interest in fostering the 
diversification of the Newfoundland economy away from fisheries, and had opposed capital 
investment in the construction of transport infrastructure and agricultural development. With 
responsible government in 1855 and the ascendancy of local St John's merchants, this trend 
continued as local merchants remained preoccupied with fishery interests (Innis 1954: 387-
389; Summers 1994: 32-59). 
This changed in the 1870s and 1880s. These were economic boom times for Newfoundland. 
Cod prices were high and investment in infrastructure stimulated the economy. During this 
investment boom there was a tendency of government to look to economic diversification 
(McBride, Kealey and Cadigan 2002; Ommer 2002). Railways were built to open up the 
interior for mining, and with unrealistic optimism, for agriculture (Cadigan 2002b: 244). At 
first this investment in economic diversification was based on Newfoundland capital. This 
situation was to change dramatically in the 1890s when, following a fire in St John's that 
triggered an economic crisis, infrastructure and economic development became dominated 
by foreign, direct investment. 
3.3.4 Economic Dependency Entrenched 
In 1892 fire destroyed three quarters of the city of St John's. Damage to property was 
estimated at $20,000,000, of which only a quarter was covered by insurance (Authors 
unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 337). Following this disaster, Newfoundland's 
two leading banks failed, and in order to stave off complete collapse of the financial system, 
the government sought loans in Montreal, New Yark and London. Canadian banks entered 
Newfoundland. Their currency replaced the Newfoundland dollar, and the business life of 
Newfoundland became increasingly dominated by foreign investment attracted by the 
opportunity to exploit the island's natural resources. The government's weakness and 
dependency on foreign financiers was such that some questionable transactions occurred. 
For example, in 1899 virtually all of the island's communications systems, including the 
railways, shipping lines and the telegraph, as well as extensive timber and mineral 
concessions, were transferred to Sir Robert Reid, a railway promoter. The monopolistic 
features of this unusual contract raised concerns and it was subsequently renegotiated, but 
the incident is reflective of the nature of politics and business of this period, which was to 
extend through the first thirty years of the twentieth century (Authors unknown 
[Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 337). 
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Newfoundland had rejected federation with Canada in 1869. After 1869 the Newfoundland 
government' ignored the most important economic sector, the fishery, in favour of economic 
diversification based on foreign direct investment (McBride, Kealey and Cadigan 2002). 
Economic dependence was entrenched. Projects based on foreign investment often failed to 
produce hoped-for economic benefits, while the neglected fishery stagnated and failed to 
maintain an advantageous competitive position with respect to other cod producing countries 
such as Iceland and Norway. But why was development of the fishery neglected? The lack 
of any challenge to the political domination of the merchants is the likely answer. Their 
interests were served by the existing economic relations in the fishery, which, though 
backward and almost feudal in character, were sufficiently profitable to be maintained. The 
lack of alternative economic opportunities for outport people, for example through 
development 9f commercial agriculture or industry in the outports, meant that there was no 
development of countervailing economic interests to challenge those of the merchants. 
There were no competitive pressures to stimulate investment in the fishery, for example, by 
building large, seaworthy vessels that could challenge the dominance of American and 
European fleets in the Grand Bank fishery. 
3.3.5 Economic Depression and Failure of the Newfoundland Government 
The Newfoundland economy had been sustained by imported capital from the 1890s to the 
1920s and the great depression brought on severe economic, political and social problems. 
The inflow of capital investment ceased. Demand fell for Newfoundland's exports. The 
market for salt cod plummeted causing poverty in the fishing communities and the 
Newfoundland government could neither ser~ice its debts nor adequately relieve the poverty 
and hunger of the people. By 1933, in light of the incapacity of the Newfoundland 
government to manage the crisis, a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into 
Newfoundland affairs, its financial situation and its prospects. The Commission was made 
up of members from Newfoundland, Canada and the United Kingdom. Its report released in 
autumn of 1933 contained a severe indictment of Newfoundland's system of government, 
finding that the problems of the dominion were largely a consequence of "a perverted 
parliamentary system which had been exploited for party and personal. gain" (Authors 
unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 337). 
Poverty was the underlying cause of the political crisis, and mismanagement of the fishery, 
so important in the Newfoundland economy, was a significant cause of the poverty. The 
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Royal Commission's criticism focused particular attention on the fisheries, as noted by 
Alexander: 
Not always fairly, it argued that the country had squandered precious resources 
over the years, borrowed recklessly on precarious prospects, was riddled with 
political corruption and patronage, and was administered by a public service 
that was slovenly and incompetent. The hardest blows, however, were reserved 
for the commercial elite - the ''fishocracy" of Water Street in St John's - which 
·had failed to organise through cooperation a national fishing industry which 
would be internationally competitive in the technology of catching, processing 
and marketing (1977: 2). 
The Commission's most imposing recommendation was for the suspension of responsible 
government in Newfoundland and the appointment of a unique body, a Commission of 
Government, to carry out the legislative and executive functions. The Royal Commission 
also recommended that the United Kingdom should assist Newfoundland financially until it 
could become self-supporting. In response to the findings of the Royal Commission, 
representative self-government was suspended and a special Commission of Government 
was established in February 1934, made up of six appointed members, three from 
Newfoundland, and three from the United Kingdom. Overton (2005) provides analysis of 
the dominance of commercialism as a factor in the failure of the Newfoundland state and the 
voluntary abandonment of democracy and responsible government in Newfoundland at this 
time. 
3.3.6 Commission of Government, World War II, and Union with Canada 
In the yeats leading up to World War II, the Commission of Government's record on 
rehabilitation and . reform was impressive. Expenditure on health and education were 
substantially increased. The Commission established a fisheries board to improve the 
standards of production and marketing in the fishing industry, and shipping and railway 
transport systems on the island were improved. This was financed in large part by 
substantially increased revenues that were achieved after the Commission simplified and 
reduced customs duties, which encouraged imports and led to increased trade (Authors 
unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965). 
The Commission of Government continued with its role through World War II and until the 
confederation of Newfoundland with Canada in 1949. During the war the island was of 
strategic importance due to its location on the Atlantic air and sea routes. Large contingents 
of Canadian and American troops occupied key installations such as Gander airport and the 
port of St John's, and several large military bases were established on the island. The war 
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brought prosperity to Newfoundland. Labour was in demand and high wages were available 
in construction and other industries. The economy also benefited from the high, wartime 
demand for dried cod and other commodities from Newfoundland's mines and forests. At 
the end of the war the Commission of Government had built up a substantial economic 
surplus. 
Following World War II, the question of Newfoundland's constitutional status was 
addressed. Several possibilities were considered, including continuation with the 
Commission of Government, the restoration of representative government - which would 
have made Newfoundland an independent state - and confederation with Canada. Overton 
(2005: 47) notes that significant opposition to confederation came from the Newfoundland 
elite who viewed the nation as "their estate, their patrimony, their project. The people were 
their subordinates, necessary for the creation of wealth, but by no means to be thought of as 
citizens or as having an equal stake in the affairs of state". In rejecting self-determination in 
favour of confederation "the Newfoundland people demonstrated that they would rather join 
Canada than risk seeing their country handed back to the control of the merchant and 
professional elite which had controlled politics in 1933" (Overton 2005: 48). After a 
lengthy process, which included two controversial plebiscites, confederation with Canada 
was adopted, and on April 1, 1949 Newfoundland assumed provincial status within the 
Canadian federation. Its constitution was restored, with a single-chamber provincial 
legislature. With confederation the modem era in Newfoundland's history began. 
3.3. 7 The Smallwood Era and Industrialisation 
The first premier of the new Canadian province of Newfoundland (and Labrador) was Joe R. 
Smallwood and his government was to hold power until 1972. Smallwood had been a strong 
advocate of confederation and he promoted an industrial vision for ·the economic 
development of Newfoundland. For 450 years the history of the Northern cod fishery, so 
central to the history of Newfoundland itself, had been based on the inshore fishery. There 
had been some changes in the fishery over this time. The adoption of seines in the 1840s and 
the introduction of the cod trap in the 1870s represented a degree of technological and capital 
intensification, but the general character of the fishery was not greatly changed. It continued 
to be based on small, mostly oar-powered boats, operated from numerous, isolated coastal 
settlements, with an emphasis on seasonal activity and a mode of production centred on the 
household economy. 
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Smallwood's vision for the future of Newfoundland was based on models of development 
through industrialisation34. . At first he neglected the fisheries, believing that 
Newfoundland's future prosperity rested on development of the island's interior (Felt and 
Locke 1995: 208). The inshore fishery, with its traditional, labour-intensive methods for 
catching and curing fish was disparaged as backward. Development of the outport 
communities was neglected as Smallwood's government encouraged the abandonment of 
many isolated coastal settlements and sought to concentrate population and labour in larger 
centres in order to support the industrialisation of the economy35. Over 300 communities 
were abandoned altogether and the population engaged in fishing declined from 40,000 to 
10,000 between 1951 and 1966 (Felt and Locke 1995: 208). The neglect of fisheries 
development in Newfoundland allowed foreign trawler fleets to expand their fishing effort to 
dominate the Northern cod fishery in the 1960s. 
In line with its industrial vision, when the Smallwood government turned its attention to 
fisheries it favoured the expansion of industrial fishing based on capital-intensive factory 
freezer trawlers linked with modem centralised onshore processing facilities. The tension 
between government policies in favour of industrialisation and centralisation, and the 
preference of outport fishers to retain their communities and traditional rights of access to 
the fishery was, from that time on, to be a central issue in the politics of Newfoundland's 
fisheries. This tension, and the way that its political, economic and social consequences 
shaped developments in the fishery, was also to be a significant underlying cause of ongoing 
crisis and dysfunction in the Newfoundland fisheries leading to the collapse in 1992. 
3.4 Ongoing Development of Social, Economic and Political 
Dysfunction - the Root Causes of Resource Failure 
Wright (1997; 2001) argues that the Commission of Government paved the way for a 
transition from the traditional hegemony in the Newfoundland fishery - exercised by a 
government dominated by mercantile interests - to a new hegemony exercised by a 
government allied to the frozen fish corporations. Partners in this hegemony adhered to the 
dominant Western paradigm - that the only path to prosperity lay in the development of an 
34 Wright notes that Smallwood, during the Commission of Government period, had some 
reservations about the social effects of industrialisation of the fishery and the "transformation from 
'petty capitalist' production to a 'fishery proletariat'. Smallwood argued that national 'traits' he 
associated with independent fishing, such as individualism and adventurousness, would be lost" 
(2001: 34-35). Smallwood's conversion to the 'industrial hegemony' came after confederation. 
35 In the middle of the twentieth century the bulk of the population still Ii ved in 1300 small 
settlements, with less than 500 inhabitants, scattered around Newfoundland's 6000 miles of coastline. 
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industrial capital economy. The traditions of the inshore fishery had no place within this 
vision. Government financial and policy support favoured development of the industrial 
sector. The concerns of the inshore fishery were ignored and its development neglected. 
Government financial assistance was instrumental in creating overcapacity in processing 
plants and trawlers in the industrial sector, and the dependency of the industry on 
government financial assistance, all of which contributed to an unstoppable momentum that 
led to the crisis in the 1990s. Blackwood (1996) argues. that the inshore fishery was in 
competition with the industrial offshore sector for fishery resources as well as for 
government financial and policy support. He maintains that the setting of unreasonably high 
TACs was a mech1;mism that favoured the offshore sector in resource allocation. Alexander 
(1977) describes how policy neglect contributed to decline of the Newfoundland saltfish 
trade (which was closely associated with the inshore fishery) in spite of continued demand in 
world markets for traditional "shore cured cod", a product in which Newfoundland- enjoyed 
advantages of climate and tradition. Brox (1972) described the widening -gap and 
entrenchment of economic dualism in the Newfoundland fishery between the inshore and the 
corporate, offshore sectors in the 1960s. He explained how government policies worked to 
. reinforce dualism, and contrasted the situation in Newfoundland with conditions in Norway 
and Iceland where fisheries development had been more inclusive of the coastal 
communities. Brox noted how economic dualism sustained a tension within the- political 
structures of Newfoundland society that encouraged the generation of contradictory policies. 
Sinclair (1985) examines conditions in the fishery at the beginning of the 1980s and found 
. symptoms of serious dysfunction. There was an atmosphere of confrontation rather than 
cooperation within the production chain in the fishery leading to resource waste and 
economically unproductive practices. Ambiguous and contradictory policies from the 
federal and provincial governments exacerbated the problems. Finlayson (1994) analyses 
how the politics of the fishery influenced the managing agency, the DFO, and caused 
dysfunction of its scientific processes, contributing to the failur~ to properly manage fishing 
effort in the lead-up to the 1992 stock collapse. The work of these researchers will be 
examined in greater detail in the following section of the chapter, after a brief discussion of 
tlie work of Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2001; 2002a) which demonstrates a nineteenth century 
precedent for many of the social, political and ecological features of the present crisis. The 
argument developed here lends support to the thesis that recurring problems of dysfunctional 
resource management in Newfoundland can be linked to persistent, dysfunctional, structural 
characteristics in Newfoundland's social and political framework, and that this has been the 
cause of recurring political, economic and fishery resource crises in Newfoundland from the 
mid 1800s to the present time. 
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3.4. 1 Nineteenth Century Precedents for the Crisis of the 1990s 
Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2002a) discusses the failure in the nineteenth century of 
Newfoundland society to develop fisheries regulation that would promote the common 
interest values of conservation and equity, and so sustain the wellbeing of the island's people 
that depended on the "moral economy" of the fishery commons. This failure was attributed 
to the over-riding strength of narrower interests served by capitalist expansion, and the 
dominance of these interests in Newfoundland politics. 
Cadigan (1999a; 1999b) and Cadigan and Hutchings (2001), demonstrate that overfishing 
linked to the expansionary use of ever more powerful and destructive fishing technologies 
was a focal issue for conflict in the 1800s just as it was later to become in the 1900s. 
Cadigan (1999b; 2002a) also describes social, ecological, and political concerns that 
characterised the debate over conservation and restrictions on fishing technology in the 
nineteenth century that are in many ways similar to the debate associated with the crisis in 
the twentieth. Seines, jiggers and bultows were the threatening capital-intensive 
technologies in the 1840s, draggers and factory freezer trawlers in the more recent crisis, but 
the underlying socio-economic issues were essentially the same. 
Overfishing and Stock Collapse in the Nineteenth Century 
As noted, Newfoundland's coastal population expanded rapidly following the removal of 
restrictions on settlement in 1811. The increasing population depended almost entirely on 
fishing and placed increasing pressure on the inshore cod stocks. Cadigan (1999a; 1999b) 
and Cadigan and Hutchings (2001) argue that this increased fishing pressure may have 
brought about the collapse of some localised inshore sub groups of the Northern cod stock. 
They drew upon the records of William Kelson, a merchant's agent based in Trinity Bay, 
who recorded conditions from 1815 to 1852, and noted the almost complete failure of the 
fishery in Trinity Bay in some years from the 1840s. Records for total cod exports from 
Newfoundland during this period indicated declining catches in some years in spite of the 
presumed increase in effective fishing effort through population increase and the adoption of 
more powerful technologies. 
Pressure to Adopt More Powerful, Capital Intensive Technology 
Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2002a) argues that the effort to maintain harvests from the fishery in 
spite of depleted inshore stocks generated increasing pressure towards the adoption of more 
powerful and capital-intensive fishing technologies. There was a trend towards the use of 
seines and long-lines (often referred to in Newfoundland as "trawls" or "bultows") in place 
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of the traditional baited hand-lines, and also to expand the fishery to exploit fishing grounds 
further offshore as inshore stocks were depleted. Many small-scale fishers resisted this trend 
and opposed fishing . methods and equipment, which they recognised as posing a threat to 
social equity and the ecological health of the fishery. This generated increasing conflict, and 
a debate led by Kelson36, was carried on in the Newfoundland press during the 1840s and is 
discussed by Cadigan (1999a; 1999b). 
Seines, it was argued, caught juvenile as well as mature fish, and fish with flesh that was in 
poor condition and which did not cure well. In addition, their use was thought to drive fish 
out of the bays. There were also concerns about the use of jiggers (unbaited lures operated 
on hand-lines) that often injured fish but failed to catch them. It was argued that the damage 
done by these technologies outweighed the advantages of the short-term increase in catch 
that they made possible. In addition to conservation concerns, the controversy with new 
technologies was also driven by underlying issues of equity and "was a reactioo against 
technologies that allowed those with more property than others to gamer more of an 
increasingly scarce, poorly understood resource for themselves to the detriment of most 
outport people" (Cadigan 1999a: 36). The capital cost of seines put them out of the reach of 
all but the wealthy, and their use, by depleting and driving away the fish, ruined the 
prospects for the poor to take fish by the traditional handline methods and "the increasing 
poverty of outport people could be traced to the use of such gears" (Cadigan 1999a: 34)37. 
Government Response to the Conflict 
Resistance to the new technologies was widespread. Some fishing communities excluded 
seines by informal agreement, and in some places they destroyed bultows and nets' in an 
expression of informal, and illegal, community opposition to their use. Government tended 
to protect the interests of "private property" when communities took such action (Cadigan 
1999b: 162-163). There was a political campaign in 1849 supported by a petition from 
Trinity and Bonavista Bays to gain legislative support to restrict the use of seines, jiggers 
and trawls. An enquiry was held but "most of the magistrates", it was claimed, "always 
sided with the interests of the wealthy, and explicitly favoured the use of cod seines. These 
magistrates would determine who they took evidence from, and would not listen to Kelson's 
supporters" (cited in Cadigan [1999a: 34]). Rather than respond to popular calls for 
36 As a merchant's agent, Kelson's championing of the cause of the fishers and his genuine concern 
for the wellbeing of the fishing people of his community sets him at odds with the image of the 
merchant as proponent of expansionary capitalist exploitation of the fishery and coastal people that is 
widely portrayed in Newfoundland folklore. 
37 Referring to the seines and bultows, not handlines. 
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conservation, the Newfoundland government demonstrated a commitment to technological 
expansion (Cadigan 1999a: 37). Meanwhile, Cadigan noted: 
Fishing people's moral economic regulation of access to the cod fisheries 
experienced a downward spiral of popular protest against, and then resignation 
to, marine-resource degradation. Such resignation was not simply the 
inevitable outcome of European settlement, but rather of the capitalist 
organisation of fish marketing and the development goals of the colonial state 
(l 999a: 41 ). 
The campaigns against seines, jiggers, gill nets and bultows continued and in 1863, in 
response to growing demands for conservation, the government tentatively introduced 
legislation for the restriction of certain gear types (Cadigan 1999b). But while there was 
widespread agreement that the new technologies were damaging to the fisheries, the law 
failed to pass. 
Opposition to the bill made it clear that the fishing industry had come to rely on 
the increased use of newer, more intensive fishing gears to stimulate short-term 
recoveries in fish catches. Such dependence divided fishing communities into 
those who could afford the new gear and those who could not. Such 
circumstances made it extremely unlikely that the government could use new 
laws to manage the industry and conserve fish stocks with unanimous public 
support (Cadigan 1999b: 160). 
The various gear available and differing local circumstances throughout the Newfoundland 
' fishery made it unlikely that a single set of regulations would be effective in regulating 
fisheries across the entire island. The novel proposal that fishing communities should be 
supported by the government to regulate fishing in their local waters, according to local 
circumstances, was quickly dismissed in 1866 (Cadigan 1999b: 161) by a legislative 
assembly that, as has been noted, was dominated by the St John's merchants. Their interests 
would not have been favoured by restrictions on the use of capital-intensive technologies. 
The debate in favour of gear restrictions &nd the rights of communities to self regulate their 
local fisheries occasionally resurfaced, but it ran counter to a prevailing tide in the press and 
government that, after the failure to pass legislation in 1863, had become overtly disparaging 
of conservation concerns that were linked to the call for gear restriction, and which instead 
favoured capitalist expansionism and open-access supported by arguments of the 
inexhaustibility of the fisheries (Cadigan 1999b: 162). 
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The official response in the 1860s could be described as a pretence of receptivity to the 
petitions and widespread popular opposition to the new technologies, but no meaningful 
action was taken by the Newfoundland government to support them38. Cadigan explains that 
justification for open-access to the new technologies was supported in the 1860s by the 
release of a report by a British Royal Commission into sea fisheries that: 
-denied that there was a problem with declining fish stocks in the North Atlantic 
because of overfishing. Charging that ordinary fishing people did not have the 
scientific training to ascertain whether stocks were healthy or not, the 
commission argued that fish were actually increasing (Cadigan 1999b: 162). 
The report dismissed the need for conservation by professing that "no amount of effort could 
diminish ocean species", and that the adoption of new technologies made it possible to land 
larger catches and made the fisheries more productive (Cadigan 1999b: 162). Thus, it 
dismissed concerns about overfishing and calls for restraint on fishing technology. In a 
similar way, and as will be discussed in more depth, the concerns about overfishing, stock 
decline and unsustainability voiced by the inshore sector in the late 1980s were dismissed as 
nonsense by government resource management agencies that attacked the "scientific" 
qualifications of those who challenged government policies. These policies, which favoured 
industrial expansion, rested on what turned out to be erroneous assurances of sustainability 
that were provided by "government science" (Finlayson 1994: 101-127). 
Offshore Expansion 
Cadigan and Hutchings (2001) argue that the decline in landings from the depleted inshore 
fishery was a stimulus for expansion and intensification of the Newfoundland fishery up the 
coast of Labrador from the 1860s, and later, as the Labrador fishery began to decline, into 
the waters of the Grand Bank. They and Cadigan (2002a) argue that the "need" to find new 
fishing grounds resulted from the successive over-exploitation of older fishing areas. On the 
Grand Bank Newfoundland fishers faced competition with established French and American 
fleets, and concern was expressed about the effect of "foreign overfishing" on the offshore 
banks, which was claimed to be a cause of the decline in the inshore fisheries (Cadigan and 
Hutchings 2001: 42-43). Again this is a precedent for similar arguments levelled against 
"foreign fishing" and trawling on the banks by offshore "draggers" that were voiced 
repeatedly in the latter part of the twentieth century leading up to the crisis of the 1990s. 
38 This is reflective of the way narrow sectoral interests frequently predominate over the interests of 
the majority for reasons well explained by Olson's (1965; 1982) general theories of collective action. 
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Discussion - Relevance of the Nineteenth Century Crisis to the Present 
In recent years there has been a tendency to view the 1990s cod crisis as largely a 
consequence of the post World War II industrialisation and intensification of the fishery. 
This perspective provides leverage for various interests engaged in ongoing conflict over 
resource access. Clearly the ~-!Jlall-scale inshore sector has gained, if only in matters of 
public opinion, from a portrayal of a history spanning several centuries of ecologically 
sustainable production from the traditional fishery, until the expansion of offshore industrial 
trawling in the latter part of the twentieth century brought on the present crisis. While not 
wishing to dismiss this argument, which has some substance and is an important theme in the 
debate, Cadigan's work demonstrates that there were histo.rical precedents, from 1815 
onwards, for many of the iss"ues that were argued in relation to the 1990s crisis in the fishery, 
with technology as a focal point of conflict. The seines and long-lines that were regarded as 
the threatening new technologies of the mid 1800s, and the next stage in technological 
development, the cod trap, which appeared in the 1870s, had become the traditional mode of 
fishing post World War II. The offshore trawlers and smaller middle distance draggers were 
the new villains. But, while the technology evolved, the political and economic nature of the 
conflict remained essentially unchanged. 
The historical perspective also provides insight into the biological productive capacity of the 
fishery. Harris (1990: 1, 26) suggested that the fairly consistent annual harvest in the region 
of 250 OOO tonnes for over a hundred years from the mid 1800s to the mid 1900s, indicates 
that the traditional inshore fishery was sustainable at this level over this period. Cadigan and 
Hutching's (2001) work is interesting in light of this because they argue that these landings 
were only maintained by a continual increase in the effective fishing effort due to population 
increase and technological advances, and the territorial expansion of the fishery, offshore 
and up the Labrador coast, as inshore waters were depleted. Cadigan (1999a; 1999b) also 
demonstrates the long recognition of the potential for the Northern cod fishery, or at least 
some inshore sub-groups, to collapse from overfishing39, even with the limitations on the 
technology available in the 1800s, and the denial of this potential by interests committed to 
furthering capitalist expansion in the fishery. He also demonstrates a historical precedent for 
the tendency of Newfoundland's political system to acquiesce to capitalist interests over and 
above the interests of conservation, equity, and the objections of the inshore fishers. Events 
39 Pauly (1999: 359) explains that stocks could recover from these localised depletions because large 
refuges existed in deeper waters that were not effectively fished with nineteenth century technology. 
These refuges sustained stocks of large spawners from which recruitment could, given time, replenish 
depleted inshore areas. 
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in the fishery in past decades provide evidence for the persistence of this tendency in the 
management of the fishery. 
Cadigan (1999a; 1999b) demonstrates a historical precedent for the current crisis, and 
explains the nineteenth century conflict in political and socio-political terms, noting that the 
introduction of more powerful technologies had a distributional effect, serving capital, but 
produced only a short. term, unsustainable increase in productivity. Indirectly, Cadigan 
provides support for arguments that link the current crisis to a persistent political and 
resource management culture in Newfoundland; a political and resource management culture 
that is a legacy of Newfoundland's social, political and economic history, and one that has a 
tendency to promote patterns of resource use that are inherently unsustainable because they 
are associated with the expansionary values of capitalist accumulation. In explaining the 
conflict, Cadigan contrasts the resource management ethos as·sociated with capitalism, with 
the ethos of the "moral economy of the commons" (Cadigan 1999a: 9-11) that, lie argues, 
was the prevailing ethos of non-capitalist, small-scale fishers. He compares it to the 
"spirituality, subsistence-orientation", and over-riding conservation ethic of the First 
Nations, in which the interests of social equity, subsistence and conservation are 
acknowledged and provided for. Cadigan argues that the inevitable conflict between the two 
values systems was a central feature of developments in the fishery in the 1800s, as it was 
again in the events leading to the crisis in the 1990s. 
3.4.2 Fisheries Policies 1940-1966: Hegemony and the Industrial Vision 
Wright (1997; 2001) argues that the roots of the crisis in the Newfoundland fishery of the 
1990s are to be found in the fisheries development policies of the period 1934-1968. During 
this time the Newfoundland fishery experienced a dramatic transformation as the traditional, 
"saltfish industry based on the household economy declined and a new, industrial, frozen 
fish industry arose in its place" (Wright 1997: ii). 
Wright employs the Gramscian concept of hegemony to ~xplain how a "particular vision of 
development - the expansion of the industrial, frozen fish sector - came to dominate fisheries 
policies in this period" (1997: ii): 
For Gramsci, hegemony is achieved when the ideas or concepts that generally 
support the dominant economic system become universal and are accepted by 
the wider population as 'true' or 'common sense'. Although clearly rooted in 
the economic system, hegemony is only realized when the ideas transcend the 
economic and begin to operate on a broader, cultural level. Far from being an 
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inherent truth, however, hegemony is historically constructed. The making and 
remaking of hegemonic power is a continuous process and it survives by 
responding to challengesfr'!.n:t alternative social groups (Wright 2001: 5). 
Wright argues that from, the 1940s through the 1960s, the dominant ideology of "many of the 
fisheries planners and politicians held that industrialization was the true path to prosperity ... 
alternative visions for the fishery had little support within the state"40, and Wright 
emphasises that "ideologies are rooted in material and social interests" (2001: 6; see also 5, 
42, 65, 119, 151, 156). 
The industrial model of capital expansion in the frozen fish industry was driven by an 
alliance between a small group of frozen fish companies and the state. This relationship was 
the driving force behind state policy development for Newfoundland fisheries (Wright 2001: 
35-36). While the inshore fishery was marginalised, the industrial sector received 
considerable state support and this generated an expansionist momentum that ultimately led 
to the resource collapse in the early 1990s. 
Commission of Government Period 
Wright argues that the Commission of Government period (1934-1949) was pivotal in the 
transformation of the Newfoundland fishery (2001: 10-36). The Commission of 
Government assisted the fishery to develop, but paved the way for a transition from the 
traditional inshore fishery based on the saltfish trade, to the modern hegemony of private 
capital and state sponsored industrial development of the frozen fish industry. 
An inefficient political system based on patronage and merchant control of the fishery, and 
the "truck" system of merchant credit that was a cornerstone of this control, were identified 
as significant problems that had hampered economic development of the fishery in the 
decades preceding the 1933 political crisis. Other difficulties faced by the Newfoundland 
fishery included low prices due to the absence of a local market for fresh or frozen fish, and 
tariff barriers imposed by the United States on frozen and processed fish from Canada 
(Wright 1997: 140-142). These tariffs served to protect fishers and processors in the US 
northeastern seaboard from Canadian competition. 
Wright noted that during the Commission of Government period, some development 
initiatives sought alternatives to the merchant credit system by experimenting with different 
forms of community based co-operatives to modernise and invigorate the inshore fishery 
40 This might be compared with the current hegemony of the economic paradigm m fishery 
management. 
65 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
(2001: 11, 18-19, 24, 34). However, these efforts at co-operative economic development 
were soon eclipsed by a growing preoccupation with policies that focused on developing the 
industrial frozen fish sector. ··Later, as the cold war climate intensified, co-operative 
ventures, suggestive of socialism, were viewed with suspicion (Wright 2001: 73-74). Wright 
suggests that there were both ideological and practical reasons for pursuing the frozen fish 
path. "At the practical level, providing loans to the frozen-fish companies, which offered 
employment and cash to fishers for fish, seemed an easier way to develop the economy and 
reduce dependence on merchant credit" (Wright 2001: 35-36), while at an ideological level, 
development of the frozen fish industry was compatible with the dominant ideology of 
Western society that favoured the industrial, capitalist model of development (Wright 1997: 
68, 87, 133; 2001: 5, 35, 42, 65, 119, 151, 156). "In the early 1940s the Commission of 
Government forged links with a small group of former saltfish merchants who were willing 
to make the transition to frozen fish" (Wright 2001: 26). It provided the companies with low 
interest (3.5 per cent) loans to build and operate frozen-fish plants, and to buy trawlers 
(2001: 22-26), and this saw the establishment of a partnership between the government and 
the frozen-fish companies. "This alliance laid the foundation for a long-term relationship 
between private enterprise and the state in fisheries development in Newfoundland. Indeed, 
it became an enduring characteristic of postwar fisheries policy" (Wright 2001: 36). 
Private Enterprise-State Relationship 
Wright argues that understanding the relationship that developed between the state and 
private industry in support of the industrial hegemony is crucial to an understanding of 
ongoing social and economic influences in the Newfoundland fishery (2001: 102-103). 
Expansion of the frozen fish sector was fostered in the 1950s, the decade following 
confederation, by this developing relationship. One company in particular, Fishery Products 
Limited, was to receive the largest share of provincial support. Fishery Products Limited 
had emerged from the war as the largest single frozen fish producer, and during the 1950s its 
expansion and growing dominance of the industry was supported by government loans and 
loan guarantees worth more than $5 million (Wright 1997: 144). Between 1950 and 1967 
the frozen-fish companies received $33 million in government loans for the construction of 
processing plants and trawlers (Wright 2001: 84). 
With the assistance of the provincial government, the frozen-fish industry grew 
rapidly. Between 1950 and 1964, the number of frozen-fish plants doubled and 
the number of fish-plant workers increased from 1, 170 to 7,427. Frozen-fish 
production rose from 34.5 million pounds in 1950 ... to 106.9 million pounds in 
1965 (Wright 2001: 85). 
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In the 1950s Smallwood's provincial government expanded "the scale and scope" of the 
industrialisation program that had been started by _the Commission of Government (Wright 
2001: 103). The financial assistance it provided was instrumental in the buildup of 
overcapacity in the number of fish plants and a "cycle of dependency between capital and the 
state emerged" (Wright 2001: 103). The more funds provided by the government to build 
fish plants, the more would be required later to purchase trawlers tp supply the plants with 
fish. By the 1960s the federal government, too, was to become more directly involved in 
providing soft loans to private firms to build more fish processing plants and to purchase 
offshore trawlers (Wright 2001: 126). 
Wright identifies a number of significant legacies from these developments. The dominance 
of Fishery Products Limited in the industry raised concerns that the "old saltfish merchants" 
had been replaced by "new fish monarchies" and that the concentration of power did not 
serve the interests of those who worked for, or sold fish to the company (Wright 1997: 179). 
The massive assistance given to Fishery Products Limited and other firms also established a 
pattern of economic dependency by the frozen fish industry on government financial 
assistance. This cycle of dependency that developed in the 1950s continued through the 
1970s and 1980s (Wright 2001: 103). Expansion led to overcapacity of processing plants 
and this, in tum, was to contribute to increasing dependency on trawler technology for fish 
supplies and increasing demands on the resource (Wright 1997: 177-80). This subsidised 
expansion of the industrial offshore sector corresponded to policy neglect and a lack of 
financial assistance for development of the inshore fishery. 
In the 1960s the supply of fish to processing plants was increasingly threatened by falling 
catch rates from both the inshore and offshore sectors. This was largely a consequence of 
stock depletion due to the intensification of fishing effort by foreign trawlers on the offshore 
banks. To keep the frozen fish plants supplied, more trawlers were needed, and the private 
firms, with the assistance of federal and provincial funds expanded offshore trawling 
capacity (Wright 2001: 108-110). Intensification of offshore trawling exacerbated the 
problem of declining catches in the inshore fishery (Wright 2001: 104-125). The inshore 
fishery had not adopted modem technologies due to a lack of investment, available funds 
having been largely directed by the government towards the offshore sector41. In addition to 
the lack of access to capital, the inshore fishery also suffered from a lack of adequate 
41 Wright (2001: 104-125) notes some technological efficiency gains in the inshore fishery, such as 
the adoption of gill nets, that helped mask the decline in catch rates/stock abundance, but she also 
noted there were some resource conservation and product quality problems associated with use of gill 
nets. 
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harbours and facilities, and from low prices offered for fish by the processors. Government 
neglect of the saltfish trade and economic distortions associated with the unemployment 
insurance system for fishers (to be. 'discussed further) also contributed to decline of the 
inshore fishery. Smallwood's provincial government was more politically exposed, and, 
therefore, more concerned about the problems facing the inshore fishery and the outport 
communities. But the federal government attacked the Newfoundland government's "plan to 
revive the saltfish economy" for "undermining the larger goal of 'rationalizing' the 
Newfoundland fishery" (Wright 2001: 125). 
A major part of the federal government's response to the intensification of foreign fishing 
was the push for extended jurisdiction. International negotiations over maritime coastal 
jurisdiction continued between 1958 and 1969 but the issue was complicated by cold war 
tensions42 . Countries such as Canada sought an extension of the established three-mile 
territorial limit to allow regulation of fishing to 12 miles. It was not until 1969 that Canada 
gained the power to regulate foreign fishing to 12 miles (from straight baselines). But much 
of the offshore range of the Northern cod stock remained in international waters and exposed 
to foreign fishing. The third Law of the Sea Conference convened in 1973 paved the way for 
extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles, which Canada declared in 1977 (Wright 
2001: 139). Frustration over the delay and opposition to the push for extended jurisdiction 
encouraged the federal government to provide direct support for the expansion of the 
offshore fishery in an effort to outfish rival nations (Wright 1997: 284; 2001: 140). 
In the 1960s the inshore fishery and the outport communities that relied upon it were under 
pressure from a combination of influences. Catches declined as offshore trawling pressure 
escalated. Inadequate government support with loans and infrastructure and the low price of 
fish (to be discussed later) hindered the modernisation of the inshore fishery. And in 1965 a 
resettlement program aimed, with much secrecy and manipulation, to encourage the 
abandonment of many settlements and promote centralisation of population in specific 
locations. This resettlement scheme was linked to the industrial paradigm and it created a 
great deal of lasting bitterness for the coercive manner in which it was promoted (Wright 
2001: 146-149). 
Wright focuses on the argument that while federal and provincial governments were often in 
conflict over fishery management policies, they both shared the industrial vision: 
42 The United States was a powerful opponent of extended jurisdiction. It did not wish a precedent to 
be set by Canada that might be adopted in other parts of the world, limiting the freedom of US naval 
fleets to operate in foreign coastal waters (Wright 2001: 128-140). 
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In general, the hegemonic industrial model of fisheries development gives a 
limited understanding of the problem. This model places unbounded faith in the 
ability of capital investment, technology and increased productivity to improve 
the lives of those who make their li~ing from the fishery. This hegemony was so 
strong that the model itself was rarely questioned by those in power, not even 
when the promised prosperity failed to materialize. This is unfortunate, since 
the model offers a shallow view of problems, never considering the underlying 
socio-economic relations of the fishery or how they might be the source of 
chronic poverty among many fishing people. Promoters of the industrial 
paradigm never raise the issue of who controls the technology or the means of 
production, simply because these questions are not part of the conceptual 
framework within which they operate (Wright 1997: 287). 
Wright criticises the fisheries policies of the period because they 
... were aimed at supporting the existing economic structures and did not make 
significant changes in the way wealth was distributed. One of the limitations of 
the modernization approach is that it focuses on a small number of internal 
factors in the economy, such as capital and labour, but fails to consider other 
reasons for poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth (Wright 2001: 140). 
Prior to 1977, expansion of the Newfoundland offshore fleet may have seemed like the only 
way to respond to the escalation of uncontrollable foreign fishing on the Northern cod 
stocks. If Newfoundland trawlers did not harvest the fish and bring them to Newfoundland 
fish plants, foreign vessels would catch them and take them elsewhere. It is after 1977 that 
the issue of conflict between the Newfoundland inshore and offshore sectors became a 
central focus of political conflict in the fishery. This is when the relationship that had 
developed between the provincial government and the frozen fish industry, the associated 
buildup of excess trawling and processing capacity, and the ongoing hegemony of 
industrialisation, can be seen to have had a tragic effect on fisheries policy. This is the 
period in which an alternative to the expansionary industrial approach might have been 
considered. An alternative approach might have supported the development of a fishery that 
could have sustained Newfoundland's coastal communities. But the expansionist industrial 
approach continued. Between 1975 and 1980 the number of groundfish processing plants 
increased from 89 to 138 (Wright 2001: 152-153). This created an overcapacity momentum 
that proved unstoppable when impending resource collapse became evident in 1989. 
3.4.3 Neglect of the Saltfish Trade and the Inshore Fishery (1935-1965) 
In The Decay of Trade: An Economic History of the Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1935-
1965, Alexander (1977) described how the Newfoundland fishing industry, which enjoyed 
natural advantages in regard to climate and proximity to the cod resource, fell into decline 
following World War II. He analysed the collapse of the traditional saltfish trade, and noted 
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the "manifest failure of the frozen industry to provide the alternative many had hoped for" 
(Alexander 1977: 16). While he argued that exploitation theories, so deeply grounded in the 
folklore of Newfoundlanders to explain' their problems, were not helpful (Alexander 1977: 
135), his analysis can be interpreted as providing additional support for them. 
Alexander noted that the underlying cause of the political crisis of the early 1930s was 
poverty. And the blame for this was largely attributed by the Royal Commission appointed 
by Britain to report in 1933 on Newfoundland's troubles (Great Britain 1933), to 
mismanagement of Newfoundland's fishery and economy by a corrupt and self-serving 
political and business elite. The Royal Commission (Great Britain 1933: 109-110 cited in 
Alexander 1977: 1-2) attributed the failure to years of "unrestricted individualism" which led 
to the decline in the fishery, deterioration in the quality of the 'cure', loss of markets to 
competitors, depletion and deterioration of vessels and equipment, "pauperisation of large 
sections of the population", "an entire absence of organisation or co-operative effort", 
internal rivalries and competition among exporters "which had the effect of depressing prices 
in foreign markets", and a dependence on foreign shipping, particularly from Scandinavia, to 
transport fish to markets. 
Alexander then examined the failure, between 1935 and 1965, to develop effective policies 
to improve production and marketing of the Newfoundland fishery in order to enable it to 
compete more effectively in world markets, particularly with Scandinavian competitors. The 
consequence of this failure was a Newfoundland economy characterised in the 1970s by: 
... massive unemployment, low earned incomes, a crippling dependence upon 
transfer payments from the "mainland", rural poverty in decaying fishing 
villages, and the absurdity of the great fishery resource being exploited mainly 
by distant-water fishing fleets able to overcome the locational advantages of 
Newfoundland itself (Alexander 1977: 1 ). 
The similarities between the situation of the 1930s and that of the 1970s are clearly drawn in 
a manner that hints at the likelihood of similar causes. 
Under the Commission of Government, cooperative marketing was developed through the 
Newfoundland Fisheries Board. This was established in 1936 and had unprecedented power 
to regulate cod exports from Newfoundland. The Board was controlled by the exporters, but 
was supervised by a paternalistic government agency, and it did serve the interests of the 
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fishermen43 in addition to those of the merchants (Alexander 1977: 28-34). The Board was 
effective in overcoming the problems of price-cutting by individualistic exporters that often 
undermined the market as a whole. 
During the Second World War (1939-1945), cod exports and prices were strictly controlled 
and the industry was stable and prosperous due to high demand and the absence of overseas 
competition. Following the war, a new organisation, The Newfoundland Associated Fish 
Exporters Limited (NAFEL), was founded to continue the system of co-operative marketing. 
It was no longer so directly controlled by the government. 
To mute any fears that NAFEL was a cartel of merchants organized to 
impoverish fishermen, the government had agreed to issue the company with an 
exclusive export licence contingent upon the company's articles of association, 
forbidding it to buy fish on its own or interfere in any way in the negotiations 
between fishermen and merchants over the price of fish (Alexander 1977: 36-
37). 
NAFEL was solely a marketing organisation, a coalition of merchants, and it proved 
inadequate to sustain the salt fish industry in the two decades following confederation 
(Alexander 1977: 34-37). It was exclusively concerned with salt fish exports at a time when 
rapid transformation was occurring in the fishery towards a greater emphasis on frozen fish 
products. 
The post war market for salt fish was difficult d~e to currency restrictions and other 
challenges but the situation had greatly improved by the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Demand for saltfish, particularly the traditional Newfoundland "shore cure" was increasing 
from the 1950s onwards (Alexander 1977: 121) but the Newfoundland industry was not able 
to respond effectively to take advantage of the opportunities this strengthening market 
presented (Alexander 1977: 135-138). While the demand for high quality shore fish was 
strong, the trend was towards increasing output of lower quality salt-bulk or green cured cod 
for which demand and prices were low. 
NAFEL had significant limitations. Alexander (1977:75) noted that it was a "blunt" 
instrument "well-designed to market a standardised, industrial product", but in the 
production of shorefish "it was dealing with a handicraft". In better times, before the crisis 
of the 1920s, individual merchants and fishers had been able to meet more specialised 
market demands, for example, producing discernibly different products in shore-cured fish 
43 Set prices protected fishermen, whose bargaining position was typically weak relative to that of the 
merchants. 
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for Spanish and Italian markets. But the NAFEL marketing system did not provide any 
incentives to maintain product quality (Alexander 1977: 37). Deliveries from member 
merchants were simply pooled to make up· 'shipments and there was little quality control. 
This explained the trend away from the production of high quality shore-cured fish in spite 
of increasing prices and growing market demand for this product. 
Alexander was charitable in his view of NAFEL though noting its limitations. This reflects 
his positive views about cooperative marketing, which he saw as necessary to avoid 
individualistic, competitive price-cutting among merchants. Such competition lowered 
prices during the 1930s depression to the detriment of the entire trade, the fishery and 
Newfoundland as a whole. Nevertheless, the limitations of NAFEL meant that the 
organisation provided only for horizontal cooperation between merchants, but not for 
vertical cooperation between merchants and fishermen, or for that matter, consumers. The 
organisation can be seen as a combination of merchants granted an exclusive licence by the 
government to export salt cod from Newfoundland. It was therefore an unlikely medium to 
further the common interests of all the people of Newfoundland and was reflective of "the 
highly conservative political environment of Newfoundland, with its lopsided distribution of 
economic and political power" (Alexander 1977: 37). It was a re-emergence, post-
confederation of the mercantile elite in Newfoundland politics. The suspension of self-
government in 1934 had, for a time, weakened the control and influence of the mercantile 
community over the state. As the saltfish trade declined many of these merchants made the 
transition into the frozen fish industry, obtaining public funds to acquire fleets of draggers 
and frozen fish filleting plants (Alexander 1977: 128-139). 
Alexander paid particular attention to the decline of production and trade in the light-salted, 
hard-dried Newfoundland "shore" fish. "It was a product in the world trade which was 
unique to the weather conditions and curing skills of the island, for no competitor had ever 
been able exactly to duplicate shore fish, either by natural or artificial drying processes"44 
(1977: 45). The shore cure was a labour intensive handicraft and represented a highly value-
added process. The importance of this in providing income to support the coastal 
population, still largely dependent on the inshore fishery, was recognised in 1977, when 
catches had declined due to the crisis that preceded extended jurisdiction45. Alexander 
argued that the salt fish industry should have been sustained as a complementary addition to 
44 The general size of the fish off the northeast Newfoundland coast, which suited them to this 
method, was also a factor. 
45 More recent recognition of the constraints imposed on. total productivity of the fishery because of 
ecological limits should increase the importance of employment generating, value adding processing. 
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the frozen fish industry in order to broaden the range of product from the Newfoundland cod 
resource, to take advantage of the diversity of market opportunities, and so to maximise the 
returns to the Newfoundland economy and its fishery dependent population (Alexander 
1977: 128-132, 155). 
During the 1950s and 1960s viable methods of artificial drying were being developed that 
reduced the drudgery associated with traditional methods, and these new methods were able 
to produce a reasonable "shore cure" (Alexander 1977: 131), but they were not developed by 
the industry, which, by the 1960s, was in decline (Alexander 1977: 61). High quality shore 
cured cod enjoyed strong demand in the 1960s in internationaj markets that were developing 
with the posLWorld War II recovery, but by this time the production of quality shore cured 
fish had almost ceased46. The industry had been allowed to fall into decline due in no small 
part to the lack of government policy support to maintain it. fushore fishermen continued to 
salt part of their catch, but salt fish production had become a mechanism for fishermen to 
delay and prolong the period of delivery of fish to the plants so as meet the bureaucratic 
requirements of the unemployment insurance sy~tem, rather than an enterprise to produce 
quality merchandise fit for a competitive market. Alexander (1977: 16) attributed the 
decline of the Newfoundland saltfish trade, which had once led the world, to "inadequacies 
of federal policy" on the ~ast-coast fishery and to "inadequacies of the Canadian union for 
peripheral regions like Newfoundland", and he noted that by·the late 1960s the relocation of 
communities was taking place to "remove inshore fishermen from access to marine 
resources" (Alexander 1977: 148). 
Alexander's (1977: 135) reluctance to attribute blame and criticism narrowly, is likely more 
than just good manners, but symptomatic of his recognition that there is no simple cause for 
Newfoundland's repeated failure to make good use of her resource wealth. There is 
something wrong that is systemic and he does not suggest that his detailed study of the 
dysfunction of part of the system tells the whole story. His view that exploitation theories of 
the fishermen's and Newfoundland's problems were not helpful and sometimes misleading 
may also be a directive against narrow scapegoating to explain broad systemic dysfunction. 
But he identified recurring tendencies for government policy-making to become of service to 
merchant or corporate interests and implicated this as an underlying cause of the failure to 
develop and sustain the fishery in economic terms in spite of natural opportunities and 
advantages inherent to the Newfoundland fishery. 
46 In 2002 there were some processors making the effort to produce, on a small scale, the light-salted, 
hard-dried "shore" cured cod to supply niche markets for this once traditional staple (Sean Cadigan, 
Department of History, Memorial University of Newfoundland, personal communication, 2002). 
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3.4.4 Dualism in the Newfoundland Fishery in the 1960s 
Brox (1972: 1) explored the extent and implications of "political restrictions on the economic 
development of the coastal population of Newfoundland" and noted that "the history of 
European settlement in Newfoundland" could be understood "in terms of such restrictions". 
Like Alexander, Brox referred in his introduction to the political economy based on 
exploitation that played so strong a role in Newfoundland's social and economic history, and 
he linked this to ongoing problems of social and economic development in Newfoundland at 
the end of the 1960s. Brox noted (1972: 2-3) that the inshore fishermen had "always 
received the smallest share" of the wealth produced from the cod fishery; labouring first for 
Bristol shipowners and, later, for the resident merchants47. He then described politically 
maintained structures in the economy of the fishery that served to maintain dualism48, and he 
argued that these structures were responsible for the economically dysfunctional 
development of the fishery and Newfoundland's outport communities. Poverty, 
unemployment and a poor economic outlook persisted as chronic problems facing 
Newfoundland at the end of the 1960s (Brox 1972: 1-8). Confederation with Canada in 1949 
saw the replacement of a paternalistic colonial government under the Commission with the 
incorporation of Newfoundland within the generous, Canadian welfare state (Brox 1972: 4). 
One of the most important benefits of confederation to the people of Newfoundland's 
outports was the provision, from 1957 onwards, of unemployment insurance (UI) to 
fishermen. This provided a "small but secure" income to fishermen over the winter months 
when they could not fish, provided they had accumulated sufficient stamps by working 
during the summer to qualify for the benefit (Brox 1972: 4). This alleviated the extreme 
poverty of former times, but still the outports lagged economically and received little benefit 
from the general prosperity of the post war period. Brox compared economic and social 
development in Newfoundland with that in Iceland and Norway, the Scottish Isles and the 
Faeroes, and noted: 
The most striking feature of Newfoundland's economy, as seen from the other 
side of the Atlantic, is the dualistic nature of its development. On the one hand, 
there are modern, sophisticated, technologically up-to-date industries. On the 
47 The merchants managed outport economies through "truck" credit systems. It was difficult for 
fishermen to retain their independence in outports with only one store, where the prices of goods were 
high, and where fish were paid for by credit on the merchant's books rather than in cash. Debt, 
dependency, and poor education levels made it difficult for people to evade exploitation within these 
systems, which persisted into the early decades of the twentieth century and contributed to the 
poverty, which was the pnncipal cause of the political crisis of the 1930s. 
48 The term "dualism" as use by Brox refers to a society or economy that operates on two distinct 
socio-economic levels with a large gulf separating them, a gulf that is usually maintained by social, 
political and economic mechanisms. 
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other, economic practices and techniques exist that appear to be almost 
medieval, such as inshore fishing and especially the processing of salt fish, 
where no innovation whatsoever seems to have taken place, either in tools, or in 
work methods. What is more remarkable is that the gap between modern and 
traditional sectors seems to be widening, and the activities within them 
becoming less and less integrated; for example, the processing industry is 
becoming less dependent on inshore fishermen for its raw material because of 
its acquisition of a trawler fleet, while the inshoremen seem to be turning still 
more to salting their catch. Most noteworthy is the fact that the traditional 
fishing population is not mobilised for the trawler fleets - the latest innovation 
in Newfoundland fishing technology. Traditional inshore fishing continues 
alongside commercial, large-scale trawler fishing in striking contrast to 
Scandinavia and especially Iceland, where modernization seems to take place 
simultaneously in all sectors and regions. Hill farms and isolated fishing 
villages in Iceland are no less technically up-to-date than Reykjavik, the capital. 
In many ways, Newfoundland reminds one of the truly underdeveloped or 
dualistic countries, such as are found in the Middle East, where the Arab 
herdsman tends his goats in the same way as in biblical times, within view of 
electronically controlled oil wells (Brox I972: 6). 
Focusing attention on the fishing sector, Brox examined how dualism was being maintained 
and reinforced in Newfoundland in the 1960s. The most important factor he identified was 
the low price Newfoundland fishermen received for their catch (1972: 32-36). He noted that 
the landing price paid to fishermen in Newfoundland was only about one third to one half the 
price that their counterparts in Britain, Norway and Iceland received, although other 
economic indicators, such as wages and prices, were comparable for cod producing countries 
on both sides of the Atlantic, and they competed in the same world market to sell the final 
product (Brox 1972: 28-29). 
Brox identified several mechanisms that kept landing prices low. ·Salt fish buyers co-
operated to keep the prices down and the frozen fish processors owned their own trawlers 
and so were not dependent on outport fishers for supplies. Therefore they could set the price 
they would pay (Brox 1972: 76). Newfoundland fishermen received low prices because their 
bargaining position was weak relative to that of the buyers, and in spite of the political 
potential suggested by their large number, they had not successfully organised the political 
action to change things for their benefit. By contrast, Norwegian fishermen, with a similar 
fishery based on numerous, small coastal communities, had been able to use their political 
power to secure the passage of the Raw Fish Act of 1938, which set the minimum price paid 
to fishermen and accounted for the better landing price they received (Brox 1972: 76). Why 
had Newfoundland's outport fishermen, who represented a large part of the electorate, not 
succeeded in taking similar political action? In attempting to answer this question, Brox 
explained the persistence of dualism in Newfoundland. 
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During the Commission of Government (1933-1949) fishermen had enjoyed the benefit of a 
fixed minimum price. This had countered the exploitative practices associated with 
merchant credit and it is clear that in the 1960s, fishermen perceived that they would benefit 
from reinstating fixed minimum pricing (Brox 1972: 77). But while outport fishers would 
benefit from raising the landing price, the frozen fish processors and salt fish merchants 
would not. 
The absence of effective, political action by the outport fishers to promote their common 
interests and raise the landing price of fish was a consequence of the dominance of the 
vested interests of the frozen fish processors in Newfoundland politics. Brox describes how 
this was demonstrated at a fisheries conference in St John's in 1962, at which Premier 
Smallwood acted as the moderator. When fishermen speaking for the interests of the inshore 
fisheries tried to table landing price as an issue for discussion, asserting that it was the 
priority concern for outport fishers, the Premier determinedly diverted discussion away from 
the issue of price (Brox 1972: 77-78). It is also significant, Brox noted, "that the fishermen-
spokesmen got no backing from their union officials in their attempts at getting the price 
problems discussed at the conference" (1972: 79). The fishermen's union was in fact viewed 
as "an arm of the government", which paid most of its costs, and few fishermen thought it 
"worthwhile to pay the small membership fee". Brox argued that the union helped to divert 
the "overwhelming political potential of the outport population away from policies that 
might have eliminated dualism. It is used only to pressure for more federal subsidies and 
bounties, the effect of which helps to enforce the dualistic structure in the industry" (Brox 
1972: 79). 
Brox explained how the unemployment insurance system could be viewed as a 'federal 
government subsidy to the trade and the processors (Brox 1972: 26, 79). He demonstrated 
that the amount of income fishers received through the UI system was about the same 
amount as the difference in price they received for their catch compared with the price paid 
to fishermen in Norway. Fishers regarded the UI payment as "delayed payments for their 
fishing effort", and it served as an.incentive to keep them supplying fish to the processors at 
the low prices49 offered, but only while they accumulated enough stamps to qualify for the 
maximum level of payment to provide them with income over the winter (Brox 1972: 33). 
This tendency to "fish for stamps", and slacken off production after enough had been 
49 Landing prices in Newfoundland during the 1960s were about 2.5 to 3.5 cents per pound gutted 
head on, compared to 7 to 10 cents per pound in Norway gutted head off. Apparently Norwegian 
fishers could get a better price for selling cod heads for mink fodder than Newfoundland fishers 
received for the whole fish (Brox 1972: 29) 
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accumulated, was recognised in the 1960s as a cause of poor economic development in the 
outports (Brox 1972: 30-34; Copes 1961: 92; Faris 1966), and Brox showed that it was the 
way that the UI system operated that caused it to reinforce.dualism because it helped to keep 
the landing price low. Brox argued that the problems of the fishery, "the shortage of 
enterprise, the absence of vessel diversification, the short fishing season, the unpredictable 
quality of salt fish, the technical retardation, and the low income of the fishermen" were all 
linked to the low landing prices (Brox 1972: 31-32), and to the mechanisms that served to 
keep them low and to maintain dualism in the Newfoundland fishery. 
Development in the outports of modem processing facilities of an appropriate scale to handle 
local production, while technically and economically feasible, was deliberately impeded by 
government policies that were influenced by the concerns of the large corporations, which 
did not want local plants to be developed that would "interfere" with the collection of fresh 
fish for processing in their factories (Brox 1972: 80-82). In other words, they did not want 
development of a more competitive environment that might, by providing alternatives to 
their factories, generate competition and upward pressure on the landing price of fish. Brox 
pointed out that the beneficiaries of dualism in the Newfoundland fishery were the frozen 
fish corporations that were "buying outport fish at three cents per pound, hiring labour at 
seventy-five cents per hour, and selling the product through the supermarkets at sixty cents 
per pound" (Brox 1972: 81). 
Brox also explained how quality control regulations enforced by the health authorities were 
an example of the sort of policy instrument that served to discourage small-scale processing 
in outports (Brox 1972: 81-82, 89). The regulations made small-scale operations impossible 
because they required the installation of costly equipment, the price of which served as a 
"threshold ... which tends to keep small operators off the market" (Brox 1972: 81). If the 
regulations had specified maximum bacteria content of the product rather than the required 
equipment in the plant, small operations, with additional labour and supervision, would have 
been able to meet the standards and compete with the large fish processing corporations. 
Brox (1972: 82) also identified similar barriers relating to health requirements for milk 
production in Newfoundland that served to keep small rural producers out of urban milk 
markets; a situation he contrasted with production in Norway and Iceland where the quality 
of the milk was monitored rather than the plant and equipment in the dairy. Reinforcement 
of dualism by regulation was clearly not limited to the fishery and this suggests that it was a 
consequence of a more pervasive political culture in Newfoundland that protected larger and 
more centralised, capital-intensive operations from the potential competition of small-scale 
rural producers. 
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Faced by these economic and bureaucratic obstacles, or "conversion barriers", which made it 
difficult for outport people to convert their labour and local resources into the cash economy, 
their household economies depended to a significant degree on subsistence activities as well 
as domestic commodity production (Brox 1972: 70-75, 9-19). In addition to cash from 
fishing and welfare payments, the "income" of outport households was supplemented by 
vegetables from kitchen gardens, and by fish, rabbits, seals, moose, firewood, saw logs, 
berries and other commodities hunted and gathered in the local environment for home use. 
Outport people also produced articles of clothing such as knitted goods, and they· built and 
maintained their houses and boats themselves, although at the time people were not allowed 
to build boats while receiving uiso. 
In spite of the conversion barriers that hindered economic development in the outports, 
Brox's (1972: 42-50) analysis of outport househ?ld economies demonstrated that the people 
obtained a higher standard of living, when the value of subsistence production was taken into 
account in addition to cash income, than they would have done as wage labourers· working 
on the fishing trawlers and living in the urban centres from which these operated. It was not, 
therefore, surprising that they resisted relocation to urban centres. The shortage of labour to 
work the trawlers was a limiting factor for the industrial sector in the 1960s. It wasn't that 
people were resistant to wage labour, but the wages on offer were not sufficient to 
compensate for the higher cost of living in the urban centres, where living costs, and 
especially housing rents, were much greater than in the outports. In theory, the wages on the 
trawlers were based on a share of the value of the catch, ·but this was artificially determined 
by the corporations, who, through vertical integration, were really buying the fish from 
themselves, and could set the nominal value for the catch in an arbitrary manner (Brox 1972: 
46). 
Brox (1972) demonstrated that dualism, historically a characteristic of the cod fishery and 
Newfoundland's social and political culture, was being maintained in the 1960s by 
government policies, which directed economic development of the fishery in ways that 
served the interests of the new elite, the corporate frozen fish enterprises, at the expense of 
the inshore fishermen and the economic development of the outport communities. He 
showed that this dominance of vested interests in the politics of the fishery and the island 
was an underlying cause of economic stagnation and Newfoundland's chronic social and 
development problems. Federal transfer payments, the fishermen's UI system in particular, 
50 This regulation was later removed., 
78 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
also served to reinforce dualism. They did this by acting as subsidies to the frozen fish 
processors, and by compensating rural people for the consequences of retarded economic 
development in the outports, they helped to diffuse the potentiai that poverty and frustration 
might otherwise have had to stimulate political action to challenge the status quo of 
economic and political relations in the fishery. 
Brox. demonstrated the interlinked and self-perpetuating causes and symptoms of 
Newfoundland's social and economic stagnation. He made a linkage between 
Newfoundland's political environment, the legacy of a long established culture of 
exploitation, patronage and social, political and economic dualism, and Newfoundland's 
poor economic and social development, which was a consequence of dysfunctional resource 
development policies and practices. But he asserted that alternatives could be found (1972: 
85-103). Newfoundland's fate, though influenced, was not determined, by its history. 
Dualism, stagnation and rural decline persisted in Newfoundland as a result of policies, and 
the presence of conversion barriers, that protected vested interests and reinforced dualism. 
They were maintained by a business and political elite that benefited from the status quo. 
Brox identified and explained the working of some of these policies and conversion barriers, 
and stressed that Newfoundland's development problems were a political issue. It was about 
who benefited from current or proposed systems (Brox 1972: 8). He emphasised that 
alternatives could be put in place with only slight modifications to the existing system. They 
need not imply a threat to capitalism - an apparent concern of critics of the time. And the 
example of Scandinavian rural development, with which Brox was familiar, provided a 
model of what was possible. It indicated the benefits of development based on local 
processing and value adding, co-operative, community based production systems (1972: 95-
96), and intermediate fishing technology that filled the gap between the small boats of the 
inshore fishery and the factory freezer trawlers (1972: 90-92). 
The conflict between the interests of the outport fishermen and the frozen fish corporations 
that bought their fish was fundamental to the politics of the fishery. The high degree of 
separation between the fishers and · the corporations had the potential to generate 
considerable political tension. Brox showed how the provincial government was able to 
divert this tension toward demands on the federal government for subsidies and other forms 
of financial assistance, and away from issues that would -lead to political confrontation 
between the populous outport sector, and the influential corporate sector of the fishery 
(1972: 25-27, 76-88). By diverting potential political challenge, the provincial government 
contributed to the maintenance of dualism and the underlying political tensions inherent to it. 
In so doing it sustained an inherently unstable political structure - one that required ongoing 
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subsidies to continually defuse the underlying tensions generated by inequality in a 
democratic society. Economic subsidy or economic growth was required to defer political 
confrontation. One can appreciate how the persistence of this. political dynamic underpinned 
the need for expansionism in the fishery, particularly post 1977, and this, in part, explains the 
political difficulty of acknowledging the need for restraint due to stock limitations in the 
1980s. Thus, policies that were a product of a persistent Newfoundland political and 
resource management culture that tended to serve the vested interests of a corporate business 
elite at the expense of the interests of the broader population reinforced dualism in the 
fishery in the 1960s and, in so doing, entrenched social and political structures that were 
dependent on economic expansion and subsidies, and this can be seen to have contributed to 
the crisis in the 1990s. These underlying political tensions provide an explanation for the 
incapacity of politicians to properly acknowledge the need for harvesting restraint in the 
Newfoundland fishery between 1989 and 1992. 
In a similar manner to the way in which outport people at first resisted, then were drawn into 
a spiral of dependency on new, more powerful, capital intensive technologies in the 
nineteenth century (Cadigan 1999b: 147-169), they became, from the 1950s onwards, 
increasingly dependent on the frozen fish-corporations and the processing plants. The lack 
of alternative economic opportunities in the outports, a consequence, in part, of policy 
neglect, forced the immediate economic interests of outport fishers into alignment with those 
of the frozen fish corporations in contradiction to the deeply rooted and fundamental 
conflicts between them. The dilemma of dependency on the established structures of the 
industrial fishery made it difficult for alternatives that would better serve the interests of the 
outport people, and the social and economic development of Newfoundland generally, to 
emerge. 
3.4.5 Contradictory Policies and Fishery Conflict in the 1980s 
Sinclair (1985) examined developments and socio-economic conditions in the Newfoundland 
fishery in the 1980s, some fifteen years on from Brox's analysis. Some of the issues that 
Brox had identified had been partially addressed. For example, fishers could now build boats 
while receiving unemployment benefits (Sinclair 1985: 110), and a few inshore fishers had 
made the transition from domestic commodity production to petty capitalism through the 
acquisition of larger vessels (primarily small draggers and longliners from 10 to 20 metres in 
length). But in general the inequality and divisions between the traditional inshore fishery 
and the industrial sector, identified by Brox, remained, and they had become more complex 
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and intense than in the 1960s as a result of new divisions between those outport fishers who 
had adopted new technologies and those who had not (Sinclair 1985: 98-104). 
Limited-entry policies now served as a barrier to prevent the majority of Newfoundland's 
20,000 inshore fishermen from graduating from their small open boats, to the more 
productive and profitable newer technology of the small draggers and longliners (Sinclair 
1985: 57-82). On the Burin peninsular in North Western Newfoundland, the site of 
Sinclair's study, 42 skippers had licences to trawl for shrimp and groundfish, whilst an 
additional 148 "longliners", vessels in the 10-20 meter class, were _largely restricted to gill 
nets and these employed approximately 800 fishers. The majority of the regio~'s 3,789 
licensed fishermen were excluded from these more financially rewarding fisheries and 
operated small, open boats, generally less than 8 metres long. They were, as a consequence 
of state policies, locked into the lifestyle of domestic commodity production, subsistence, 
and UI dependence that was the persistent characteristic of the outport fishery (Sinclair 1985: 
111-114). 
The small dragger fishers, having emerged as a privileged local elite, were nevertheless 
vulnerable to market and regulatory factors that were beyond their control. Sinclair (1985: 
95) describes their condition as "dependent petty capitalism". They could do little to 
influence the price they received from processors for their fish, and they had no control over 
their input costs for fuel and other equipment, and they were dependent on policies of the 
federal state, which regulated access to the fishery resource and allocated quota. Ambiguity 
and contradictory social outcomes continued to characterise federal and provincial 
government policies that affected the Newfoundland fishery (Sinclair 1985: 105-116). There 
continued to be a deep division and conflict between the interests of the fishers and those of 
the corporations. The corporations remained the significant beneficiary of state policies 
shaping the fishery, including those, such as UI, that ameliorated some of the immediate 
social impacts of the ongoing, policy driven transformation towards the capitalist mode of 
production in the fishery. Sinclair's study reinforces the view that the structural problems 
identified by Brox that served to maintain dualism in the Newfoundland fishery and 
undermined social and economic development in the province in the 1960s remained 
essentially in place in the 1980s. 
The Fate of Domestic Commodity Production Within Capitalism 
Sinclair explored the reasons for the persistence of the inshore fishery, and pondered its 
likely fate. With reference to established theoretical views, based largely on research in 
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agriculture, he examined the fate of domestic commodity producers within societies 
dominated by mature capitalist modes of production (Sinclair 1985: 14-30). 
Sinclair noted a number of terms including peasant, dependent and petty capitalism that have 
sometimes been used to refer to small scale family based production systems, but he adopted 
the term domestic commodity production to describe the common mode of production in the 
Newfoundland inshore fishery, which he defined as: 
... aform of production which draws on the household for its labour supply and 
organisational structure; it depends on articulation with commodity markets to 
realise the value of what is produced and to acquire both personal consumption 
goods and the means of production. It is both a domestic unit and a commodity 
producing unit ... (1985: 18) 
and is often combined 
... with other forms of production through the involvement of the household 
members in subsistence economic activity and wage-labour to supplement and 
support domestic commodity production ... to sustain the household. 
Sinclair drew a distinction between domestic commodity producers and those fishermen who 
had graduated from open boats to the small draggers and longliners of the middle distance 
fleet, and he preferred the term dependent petty capitalism to describe this mode of 
production. 
Sinclair's (1985: 22) examination of the fishery is set within a theoretical discussion of 
differing views regarding the survival of domestic commodity production within capitalism 
I 
and he cites key sources and briefly outlines the debate. One school, grounded in the work 
of Marx and Engels, considers domestic commodity production to be a transitory phase, 
destined to reduce and.then disappear over time (Bernier 1976; Breton 1977; Deas 1981; De 
Janvry 1980; Gillespie and Gilbert 1981; Goss et al. 1980; Hedley 1981; Kautsky 1980; 
Lenin 1964; Lessard 1976; Shenton and Lennihan 1981; Sinclair 1980; 1984; Steeves 1972; 
Vogeler 1981). A second group considers it can persist within capitalism if it is "insulated" 
from it, for example, if it can supply the demand for certain goods and services that are not 
easily satisfied by capitalist forms of production (Thomer 1962; Chayanov 1966; Nikolitch 
1972), and especially if it is integrated within, and its continuation is "functional for 
capitalism" (Amin 1974; Denis 1982; Mann and Dickinson 1978; Mottura and Pugliese 
1980; Sacouman 1980; Vergopoulos 1978). 
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Brox (1972: 30-34) had demonstrated how these inshore fisheries have served the capitalist 
frozen fish corporations by supplying raw fish for the processing plants at low prices 
subsidised by federal UI payments. This relationship is compatible with explanations for the 
survival of domestic commodity production within advanced capitalist development where 
this form of production was integrated with and functional for the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Sinclair (1985: 28-30) noted the importance of specific ecological and cultural circumstances 
to the possibility of survival of domestic commodity production, and the significant role that 
state intervention can play in either speeding up, or slowing (but never, it seems, reversing) 
the process of differentiation. Sinclair's examination of the coastal fishery in the early 1980s 
• is framed within the context of an ongoing contest between interests linked with capitalist 
expansion in the fishery, and those linked to concern for the social and economic well being 
of the outport people and their survival in their traditional cultural context. He also 
identified the paradox that is a common dilemma for coastal people in much of the world 
who are experiencing rapid transformation and structural pressures on their modes of 
production, in which they find themselves drawn into conflicts in defence of their livelihoods 
and " ... enterprises, whose survival is threatened by the functioning of the capitalist mode of 
production in which they participate" (Sinclair 1985: 30). Wages, often earned by women 
from work in the processing plants, and associated UI benefits, made an important 
contribution to many outport household economies, at the same time as the draggers that 
supplied the plants with raw materials for much of the processing season, threatened the 
viability of the small-scale inshore fishing that was the traditional backbone of these 
household economies; and these small-boat enterprises had also become dependent on the 
processing plants to purchase their fish. 
Sinclair (1985: 31) noted that the survival of domestic commodity production for so long in 
the coastal fishery was due to the difficulty of accumulating capital for investment out of the 
proceeds of traditional salt fish production and the inability of a poorly educated population 
to overcome the barriers of bureaucratic procedure required to access government grants and 
other assistance schemes. He also identified, as a barrier to progress, a significant "culture 
of limited expectations, which was a realistic adjustment by the fishermen to their 
environment, but one which discouraged constructive, innovative action, either on an 
individual or co-operative basis" (1985: 31). One could also argue that these were self-
perpetuating causes and consequences of entrenched social, political and economic dualism 
in the fishery and in Newfoundland society more generally. 
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Between the 1960s and the 1980s, however, improved education and communications 
enabled some of the younger outport fishers to attempt to realise more ambitious 
expectations than those of their tradition-bound forefathers (Sinclair ·1985: 57-82). With the 
assistance of federal and provincial grants and subsidies, some fishermen graduated to- larger 
middle distance vessels that could work further offshore than the traditional open boats. At 
first these petty capitalist enterprises fished with gill nets for cod, but some began to 
experiment with trawling for shrimp, and later for cod, as more powerful engines were 
acquired in the 1970s and this fishery became profitable. Notably, these longliners and 
draggers, while a highly visible development in the fishery, absorbed only a minority of 
fishers. Most fishers remained with the traditional methods and technology of small boats, 
cod traps, nets and lines. In the late 1970s, the possibility of graduating from open boats to 
larger petty-capitalist enterprises was closed when more restricted licensing policies were 
introduced. 
Sinclair (1985: 105-106) emphasised the significant influence of state intervention and the 
institutional and organisational context on how fish harvesting occurred and on its 
articulation with the wider economy, and he demonstrated that "state policies taken as a 
whole have been ambiguous in their intent and contradictory in their impact" (1985: 106). 
He described the complex political environment in which Newfoundland fishermen operated, 
noting that: 
It might be more accurate to talk about states rather than the state, because the 
federal and provincial administrations often fail to act in a co-ordinated fashion 
with regard to the fisheries. Indeed, their policies are at times contradictory. 
Fishing falls under federal jurisdiction, whereas fish processing, as a 
manufacturing activity, is subject to provincial regulations. However, the 
federal government controls interprovincial and international trade, which 
gives it leverage to establish quality control regulations for fish processing as 
well as for harvesting. Provincial processing regulations are actually enforced 
by the federal inspection officers, a rather unusual example of enduring co-
operation between the governments. Both governments provide grants and 
loans to the harvesting and processing sectors of the industry. They also 
participate more generally in regional and community development (Sinclair 
1985: 106). 
In reviewing the impact on fishermen of a range of state policies, Sinclair divided them into 
three groups (1985: 106). The first set included subsidies to capital investment costs which 
indirectly supported the incomes of fishermen, the second group were direct forms of income 
support, which indirectly supported the small-scale capital investment required to sustain 
domestic commodity production. The third group of policies were those that served to 
control access to the fish stocks. 
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From 1970 to 1981 the federal government provided a 35 per cent subsidy to the 
construction cost of replacing an existing vessel, however, between 1981-1983 this was 
reduced. The provincial government also provided support through the Fisheries Loans 
Board (FLB) for vessel rebuilding and repairs. Bounties or grants were paid on the basis of 
length or tonnage for vessel construction, and a 35 per cent subsidy was also paid for 
rebuilding and repairs (Sinclair 1985: 107). Other capital assistance provided by the FLB 
protected fishermen from interest rate rises by covering the excess repayments if rates rose 
above 12 per cent. Fishing gear was also subsidised during the 1970s, but between 1981-
1983, capital assistance for fishing gear ceased. This reflected a policy reversal from the 
1970s, when optimistic projections for the fishery underscored expansionary policies. By 
the 1980s, as the fishery sector was clearly failing to live up to the expectations that it would 
provide a viable economic base for rural Newfoundland, a policy shift occurred favouring a 
greater degree of economic rationalisation (Sinclair 1985: 108). 
The policy shift towards rationalisation had been foreshadowed by federal government 
policy (Canada 1976) which identified four management objectives for the fishery: (1) the 
extension of jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles off shore; (2) the establishment of firm quotas 
designed to rebuild the stocks; (3) the improvement of quality control and marketing 
procedures; and (4) the elimination of free competition among fish catchers (Sinclair 1985: 
111). Sinclair also noted that: "although the quota concept was first introduced to fisheries 
management to serve a biological goal - the protection of the resource base - it has become a 
device explicitly oriented to social and economic goals" (1985: 111). 
Limited entry was initially introduced in 1967 in the Maritime lobster fishery. It was soon 
extended into other specialised fisheries such as salmon, herring and shellfish, and in 1976 
limited entry licensing was applied to the otter trawl fishery for cod and shrimp (Sinclair 
1985: 112). This became politically contentious after 1977 when these small dragger 
fisheries became increasingly profitable. The provincial government, anticipating a boom in 
the sector, continued to assist fishermen to acquire vessels and gear but the federal 
government resisted granting additional licences. "Thus, for all intents and purposes, it 
appeared that the federal government had blocked any possibility of social mobility by 
fishermen within their industry and had created a local elite, al~ost by administrative fiat" 
(Sinclair 1985: 114). 
Sinclair argued that the federal government's move towards rationalisation of the fishery by 
limited entry and quotas was motivated by the desire to reduce the level of economic 
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dependency of both the corporations and the small-scale outport fishing people on federal 
subsidies. There had also been strong lobbying for limited entry by those who already had 
licences (Sinclair 1985: 113). Sinclair noted: "the state has become .a.major factor in the 
fishing industry in that regulations govern who can fish, what they can catch, how they must 
handle it, how much can be caught, when it can be caught, and what gear can be used" 
(1985: 114-116). The fishery was further shaped by regulations governing UI and other 
subsidies that influence the behaviour of fishermen, and by rules applying to the 
administration of capital-assistance grants and subsidies that influenced the type and 
specifications of vessels and equipment that fishers used in harvesting the fish. These 
policies evolved over the years in an ad hoe manner in response to a series of crises in the 
fishery. They generated contradictory social consequences, as some policies encouraged 
"differentiation and proletarianisation, while others hold back this process" (Sinclair 1985: 
114). They were not therefore component parts of a cohesive vision or plan for the fishery. 
That they generated contradictory social consequences is reflective of the contradictory pulls 
related to the competing demands inherent to the political environment in which they 
evolved; an environment that is the consequence of dualism (as noted by Brox [1972] and 
discussed above). 
Sinclair noted the expression of contradictory policy pulls in federal policy statements which 
prioritised economic efficiency and, at the same time, the maintenance or maximisation of 
employment, as general objectives, observing that: 
The political aspect of the fisheries problem has an economic foundation in that 
the industry has been conducted in such a way that most participants cannot 
derive a standard of living that approximates the Canadian norm. Yet in areas 
such as the Northern Peninsula, there are no alternatives to fishing for most 
people, and forced migration is unacceptable (1985: 114-115). 
Politicians, policy-makers and advisors are concerned with maintaining social order and 
legitimacy. They recognise the threat to their legitimacy that would result from a pure 
capitalist-oriented policy because of the severe social hardship and reduced employment that 
would accompany full-scale rationalisation of the fishery (Sinclair 1985: 115). On the other 
hand, budget pressures in the 1970s and 1980s made it difficult to sustain the levels of 
federal subsidy that had come to be relied upon to soothe the underlying tensions generated 
by the fundamental conflict between the interests of the coastal people and the fisheries 
corporations. 
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Sinclair (1985: 116) emphasised the strength of the role played by the state in shaping the 
fishery. He suggested that the progression towards full blown "capitalist rationalisation" of 
the fishery was restrained by a combination of genuine concern about th'e ·hardship this 
would impose in coastal communities, organised opposition from fishermen, and the desire 
of political leaders to avoid disorder and the "loss of legitimacy to which a hard and fast 
commitment to capitalist rationalisation would lead". Nevertheless, he noted that up until 
1981-1982, the state had generally "been unprepared to promote state or cooperative 
enterprise in harvesting, processing and marketing as possible alternatives to a private, 
capitalist industry" (1985: 116). 
The nature of the economic relationship between coastal fishers and the buyers of their catch 
has been recognised as an important factor determining the circumstances of outport social 
and economic existence. Taking a commodity chain of production approach, Sinclair 
examined this relationship and he noted that both fish harvesters and the processing 
corporations were to a large degree dependent on market forces over which they could 
exercise little or no control. The production chain leading to a fillet of fish on the 
consumer's plate as a final product includes fish retailers, fish wholesalers, processors, fish 
harvesters, and the suppliers of inputs to the harvesting process which include manufactur~rs 
of vessels, engines, fuel and other equipment; and there are often merchants or other 
intermediaries between the steps in the chain. Sinclair (1985: 118) argued that fishermen are 
generally dependent producers as they are unable to control the functioning of the production 
chain. They form a captive market for suppliers of motors, fuel and other equipment, and 
they are 'price takers' rather than 'price-makers' 51 . The processing corporations are also 
dependent, he argued, because they are not strong enough to control the macro-economic 
forces that affected the costs of production and the demand for fish products. This includes 
factors such as interest rates, tariffs, and consumer tastes and incomes. Fish suffers as a 
product from being a weak staple commodity with highly elastic demand. Producers within 
the chain are not able to pass on higher prices to wholesalers and consumers without 
experiencing a falling demand and reduced sales of fish. Sinclair explained that the 
seemingly perpetual conflict between fish harvesters and processors over the_ price of raw 
fish is a consequence of this economic pressure from both ends of the production chain, in 
that: 
Sl The petty capitalist draggers and longliners were in some ways more vulnerable than the traditional 
inshore fishers, being more dependent on purchased technology and borrowed finance. Domestic 
commodity producers in the small-scale fishery might still build their own boats and engage in 
subsistence production and obtain income from other sources in addition to earnings from the sale of 
fish. 
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... except where production has become vertically integrated within a 
corporation, conflict is inevitably built into relations among the producers in 
different segments of the production chain, for they have a competing interest in 
the distribution of the final value of the fish across the chain (1985:'fi6). 
However, it is the fish harvesters that generally are in the weaker position in this conflict. 
They often are restricted by the limited number of buyers when they have an abundant catch 
to sell. They are many and each enterprise, on its own, is too small to be able to influence 
the price on offer. It is in the processors' interests to maintain an environment among fish 
harvesters, of competition and over-supply. It is in the fishers' interests to attempt to 
organise to act collectively so as to be able to deny raw materials to the processors as a 
means of leverage for higher prices. It is also in the fishers' interests to have many-buyers to 
provide a more competitive market. 
Sinclair (1985: 126) observed that "the problem of mobilizing domestic commodity 
producers and petty capitalists against corporate fishing capital was overcome by the late 
1960s,'' in northwest Newfoundland with the successful establishment of the Newfoundland 
Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers Union (NFFA WU), and the Northern Fishermen's 
Union. This led to more effective action by fishers, including boycotts and strikes that 
closed processing plants in 1970, 1974 and 198052. The issue of dispute, the price paid for 
raw fish, continued to be the central issue of conflict in the relationship of harvesters with 
processors. 
Licensing and funding policies that decided the location and number of fish processing 
plants had a significant affect on fishermen. It was (and continues to be) a key issue in the 
politics of the Newfoundland fishery. Sinclair (1985: 108, 121) gave an example of a 
processing plant planned for the settlement of St. Barbe, on the northern peninsular, which 
was cancelled when anticipated federal funding for the plant was refused on the grounds that 
it would not be economically viable. Local fishermen were annoyed. They felt that they had 
been denied a competitive market for their fish, and that the project had been cancelled as a 
result of "behind the scenes" campaigning by another processing company. 
Even when there were numerous buyers, the price offered to fishermen rarely varied from 
the minimum price negotiated by the union with the major companies (Sinclair 1985: 123). 
Factors other than price often determined where fishers sold their catch. For example, they 
52 The emergence of the NFF A WU and its rise to dominance was characterised by intense and 
disruptive union politics (see, for example, Macdonald [1980]). The NFFAWU had an overwhelming 
pro-dragger orientation and failed to provide much recognition, support or representation to small boat 
fishers. 
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often preferred to sell to local processing plants rather than to buyers who planned to truck 
the fish to be processed elsewhere. This preference reflected concern by fishermen for the 
wages and the all-important UI stamps for relatives and friends employed in loca.i'plants. It 
may also have helped fishers gain preferred access to sales during the early season when 
catches were high and buyers sometimes restricted purchases to home-port vessels (Sinclair 
1985: 124). Difficulty selling fish during the early season caused frustration to fishermen 
who felt that the plants, by putting on extra shifts, could have handled larger volumes at this 
time when fish were abundant and in good condition. They felt that buyers took advantage 
of the situation and downgraded fish, thus reducing the price they had to pay (Sinclair 1985: 
136-139). 
A new quality control program had been introduced in 1980 to improve the marketability of 
the final product. Fishermen agreed with the logic of the program and took pridf< in landing 
their catch in good condition. But disputes arose because fishers believed that the processors 
were abusing the program by downgrading fish in order to lower the price. Good quality fish 
were downgraded in May when they were in the peak of condition but the market was 
glutted with the high catches typical of the early season. Poor quality fish were accepted in 
August when the buyers could not be so choosy. This sort of behaviour contributed to the 
poor relationship Sinclair observed between the buyers and fishermen in 1982, which was 
"symptomatic of a managerial attitude towards fishermen to the effect that they were there to 
be used or ignored, according to the needs of the company" (1985: 139-140). 
Conclusion: The Newfoundland Fishery in the 1980s 
' 
Sinclair's work provides insight into social, political and economic conditions in the fishery 
at the beginning of the 1980s. He explored the issues and conflicts inherent to the pursuit of 
contradictory development goals and examined the forces acting within the political 
environment of the Newfoundland fishery. These forces generated pressures for economic 
subsidy and expansion, on the one hand, while contradictory policies were attempting to 
rationalise the fishery, restrict entry and reduce its need for financial support on the other. 
Sinclair linked these contradictions to the underlying causes of persistent dysfunction in the 
Newfoundland fishery. His description of the fishery in the early 1980s shows that it was 
marked by division, conflict, and inequality and that these conditions were exacerbated by 
government policies that controlled access to the resource base. Policies of the federal and 
provincial governments had been developed without a clear direction, and were 
uncoordinated, ambiguous and contradictory. Matthews (1995a) comments on the 
contradictory pulls of federal and provincial policies and notes the alienation produced 
among fishers. Charles (1992) also notes that the fishery was characterised by conflict: 
89 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
conflict between the inshore and offshore sectors, conflict between mobile and fixed gear 
users, and conflict between fishers and processors. Symptomatic of social and political 
dysfunction was an industry that was economically inefficient, and wastefully. destructive of 
the fishery resources upon which it depended. These were the roots of the resource crisis 
that rapidly developed in the late 1980s, though at the time of Sinclair's study in the early 
1980s, resource sustainability was not yet considered to be under threat. 
The discussion of theoretical views on the relationship of domestic commodity production 
within capitalism frames a case study of salience to the central issue in the Newfoundland 
fishery from before federation to the present day - the problem of sustaining the outport 
communities within a developing industrial capitalist economy. Part of the problem can be 
traced to dualism in Newfoundland society. The economic benefits of industrialisation of 
the fisheries are experienced by one sector of society while another experiences the costs, 
rather than costs and benefits being shared equally by all, and for the majority of the coastal 
population capitalist industrialisation represented more of a threat than a benefit. 
3.4.6 Fisheries Policies 1977-1990: The A/locational Effect of an Excessive 
TAC 
Blackwood ( 1996) investigates fisheries policy between 1977-1990, paying particular 
attention to the effect of policies on resource allocation between the inshore and offshore 
sectors. He notes the priority given to addressing conservation concerns in the wake of the 
1992 collapse, while little attention has been given to allocation, despite the fact that issues 
related to allocation are often the most "controversial aspect of fisheries management" 
(Blackwood 1996: 11). Blackwood makes the important linkage between the issues of 
conservation and allocation, noting that the high TACs set in the years leading to the 1992 
crash had the effect of redistributing the catch to the offshore sector at the expense of the 
inshore fishery. Blackwood explains: 
The level of the TAC indirectly affects the allocation process especially when 
stocks are over-exploited and at low levels of abundance. Under such 
circumstances mobile gear vessels are able to maintain catch rates by hunting 
for fish while passive fixed gear catches invariably decline ( 1996: 44). 
Increasing the TAC and the nominal allocation of quota to the inshore sector would not have 
enabled it to increase its catch. On the contrary, the inshore's catch would probably have 
declined further as the offshore fleet, armed with more effective technology, could harvest 
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all of its allocation, further depleting the stocks and leading to a further decline in the inshore 
catch53. 
In the context of the politics of the Newfoundland fishery, as described by Brox and Sinclair, 
in which the tension between the inshore and offshore sectors stimulates contradictory policy 
demands, the political attraction of high TACs in the late 1980s can be readily appreciated. 
They enabled politicians to pay lip service to the populist concerns of the inshore fishery by 
nominally allocating to it a generous portion of a high TAC, while at the same time serving 
the immediate economic interests of the offshore sector by allowing it, in fact, to harvest 
both a larger quantity and share of the harvestable cod stock. 
Blackwood maintains that despite public statements and published documents affirming the 
priority of the inshore sector from 1977-1991, "the greater part of the resource was allocated 
to other users such as the Canadian offshore fleet and foreign countries as part of Canada's 
bilateral agreements" (1996: ii). He suggests that the 
failure to adhere to stated goals and objectives was largely owing to the overly 
optimistic resource projections of the late 1970s which projected a 350,000 -
400,000 mt. total allowable catch (TAC) by 1985 and estimated the inshore 
requirement to be approximately 230,000 mt. ( 1996: ii). 
The combination of optimistic resource projections and intense pressure for allocations from 
various sectors resulted in non-surplus allocations of Northern cod to foreign countries and 
the Canadian offshore sector at the expense of the Newfoundland inshore fishery. 
Neglect of the Dependent Inshore Fishery 
Blackwood noted that "hundreds of small isolated communities throughout Labrador and the 
northeast coast of Newfoundland are dependent upon the Northern cod stock for their 
economic and social survival" (1996: 90), and he observes: 
The Northern cod stock never recovered to the point where the needs of other 
users should have superseded the inshore's "priority allocation". By the time 
the biological reality became apparent, however, most of Atlantic Canada's 
offshore fishery had become dependent upon Northern cod and the inshore 
sectors concerns and demands were either ignored or treated the same as those 
of the growing number of other users competing for their share of the Northern 
cod stock ( 1996: 57). 
53 As discussed earlier, this argument rests on the assumption that the offshore and inshore fisheries 
were targetmg the same stock of fish. It is valid to the extent that there is believed to be some seepage 
between partially discrete inshore and offshore sub-groups of the Northern cod stock (Harris 1990: 
47,49). 
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In the 1980s, the Canadian DFO was highly regarded and the Northern cod fishery was 
viewed as a model of effective, modem fisheries management. The subsequent collapse of 
the fishery makes Finlayson's examination of institutional dysfunction within the DFO 'an 
important study that has wider relevance to understanding the behaviour of similar 
institutions in other places. As noted earlier, the study benefited from an exceptional degree 
of openness of the DFO to critical scrutiny and this enabled a clear picture to be developed. 
This openness can be explained, in part, by the extent to which the organisation had become 
discredited in the wake of the fishery collapse. Stripped of the defences usually provided by 
the political power of state authority in shielding affiliated institutions from intrusive 
scrutiny, the DFO was left exposed to criticism (Finlayson 1994: 63-65). Finlayson (1994: 
ix) also emphasises the cooperation and sincerity of the DFO officers he interviewed. They 
were deeply concerned over the crisis and wanted to contribute their insights and experiences 
to developing an understanding of what went wrong. 
Finlayson identifies the tendency of institutions to develop conceptional and operational 
inertias. 
These have the power to predetermine the collective reality of its members; to 
discourage rather than support free and open debate of controversial issues and 
inhibit and punish internal dissent or criticism. In short, these inertias enforce 
the micro-social reproduction of institutional structure and cognitive culture 
(1994: I). 
Overly optimistic assessments and projections of the size of the Northern cod stocks during 
the period from 1977-1990 were the basis upon which the DFO legitimised unsustainable 
harvest levels which ultimately brought about the collapse of the fishery. Finlayson (1994: 
2) argues that these overly optimistic assessments were a consequence of the relationship of 
Canadian fishery science with the federal government. Central to the issue is the inherent 
tension between the positions of "scientific rationality" grounded in an academic tradition of 
independence and disinterest, and the "bureaucratic rationality" of the state grounded in 
"pragmatic/political traditions". Finlayson identifies the conflicting and competing forces 
that mark the relationship between an essentially political institution, the DFO, and the 
professional institution of science: 
The political institution of the federal government, operating through the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, is the primary source of the Science 
Branch's funding and functional authority. However, the Science Branch's sole 
raison d'etre within that political institution is the epistemological authority 
derived from the putative independence of its knowledge from the political 
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concerns of the state and its allegiance to the classical norms and values of 
science (1994: 2). 
Finlayson acknowledges the widely divergent interpretations that can be inferred from the 
above relationship that his correspondent, Dr Jake Rice, a senior DFO scientist, identifies: 
A non-pejorative interpretation is that the government believes in the western 
concept of rational, impartial science, and has chosen to try to base resource 
management decisions on such a rational impartial basis. The authority of its 
(the government's) resource management decisions then flows not from 
authoritarian power but from a rational and impartial source. It is simply good 
housekeeping to make those scientists civil servants. The other interpretation is 
that States are inherently autocratic. Being clever autocrats, however, they 
require dummy justifications for their decisions; otherwise people would 
continually challenge the power of authority. A flock of domesticated scientists, 
kept sympathetic to the goals of the State through selective funding and flattery, 
provides such a far;ade. As long as the government cultivates 'science' as a 
special and higher form of knowledge in the eyes of the public, it gains the 
authority of 'science' for decisions made primarily (if not exclusively) on other 
grounds (cited in Finlayson [ 1994: 2-3] ). 
Finlayson argues that reality lies not with an "either - or" consideration of the above 
propositions, which he suggests "represent the extreme ends of a continuum" (1994: 2). Nor 
is it easy to determine exactly where the truth lies on the continuum - it is complex, 
fragmented, changeable and subject to perspective. 
Writing in a different context, though one that has parallels with Finlayson's study, Duncan 
(2003) provides a concise explanation of the "conditionality of science", and its "rhetorical 
utility". She draws on research into the sociology of science by Jasanoff (1987; 1990), 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) and Latour (1987), to explain how scientific "facts" are 
constructed to serve particular interests. She also uses the concept of a continuum which she 
attributes to Latour (1987), though it is a concept that differs slightly from Finlayson's use as 
described above, to explain the transformation by the processes of scientific review and 
publication in which "useful" information gains power, legitimacy and authority as it 
progresses along the continuum and is transformed from "artefact" to "fact". 
Finlayson explains that the "history of the fishery can be portrayed as a long series of crises". 
After extended jurisdiction in 1977, "a strong, institutionalized role for science was created. 
The fisheries management process arose expressly to help mitigate the 'boom and bust' 
cycles that had plagued the fishery in the past" (1994: 6). However, "in 1982, and again in 
1987 and 1989, generally perceived crises . . . occasioned the formation of federally 
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sponsored task forces to investigate their causes and conditions and recommend remedial 
and corrective measures" (Finlayson 1994: 7). 
The Kirby Report (1983) responded to a "price/costs squeeze" affecting the fishery. Its 
findings reflected confidence in stock rebuilding and forecast annual landings of 400,000 t 
(metric tonnes) by 1987 and 550,000 tin the long term (Kirby [1983: 242] cited in Finlayson 
[1994: 8]). The optimistic projections of the Kirby Report, assisted by various federal and 
provincial government incentives, encouraged heavy investment and expansion in harvesting 
and processing capacity. Finlayson points out that these optimistic projections failed to 
reflect the significant uncertainty of the stock assessment process, and they later became 
discredited (1994: 8-9). Landings increased through 1985 but then remained static through 
1987 in spite of increased fishing effort. Increased catches in the offshore sector in this 
period were offset by declining catches in the inshore fishery (Finlayson 1994: 9; Harris 
1990). 
As catches declined in the inshore fishery, the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries Association 
(NIFA) commissioned an independent investigation of DFO stock assessment. This 
produced a report (Keats 1986) based on DFO data that was highly critical of DFO stock 
assessments, arguing that these had consistently overestimated the stock biomass. Finlayson 
(1994: 37-39) describes the surprise and hostility with which DFO scientists responded to the 
Keats Report. They were surprised that the "science" was questioned, as it was generally 
held to be less prone to political interference than allocational aspects of fisheries 
management. The DFO attempted to dismiss the Keats Report as "pseudo-science written to 
support the political agenda of the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries Association" (Finlayson 
1994: 38). Finlayson (1994: 39) commented on the "unusual antipathy between Keats and 
the DFO scientists" and suggests this was because: 
Keats (and other university 'academic' scientists) are seen as having the 
freedom to be critical or controversial in their claims with no responsibility for 
their consequences or for proposing constructive alternatives. DFO scientists, 
on the other hand, have very little individual freedom - at least with respect to 
stock assessments and management recommendations. The Department's 
policy is that the assessments and quota recommendations should be presented 
as a unanimous consensus. Any dissenting opinions or criticisms must stay 
within the Department and may not be publicly expressed. Further, DFO's 
scientists are collectively responsible (both institutionally and morally) for the 
consequences of the advice which they are obliged to provide irrespective of 
their individual opinions of its reliability (Finlayson 1994: 39). 
The findings of the Keats Report and the continuing decline in the inshore fishery led to 
growing doubts about the accuracy of the DFO stock assessments from 1986 onwards. 
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There was widespread and growing public criticism of the DFO and increasing political 
pressure on the federal government to address these concerns. It responded with the 
Alverson Commission. This was conducted for the federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
by a group of eminent fisheries scientists from the UK, the USA and Canada. The 
credentials and reputations of the Alverson group ensured that their findings would carry 
more weight than the Keats Report (Finlayson 1994: 40). 
The findings of the Alverson Commission were somewhat ambiguous. Finlayson (1994: 40) 
argues that "a careful, informed reading" of the report shows that the Task Group's analysis 
of the data (the same DFO data sets used by Keats) produced an assessment of the status of 
the stock that did not substantially differ from the conclusions reached by Keats. Finlayson 
notes the data analysis supported the position that: 
... chronic, overly optimistic interpretations of data of questionable validity had 
resulted in a persistent underestimation of fishing mortality and an over-
estimation of the growth of the biomass since 1977 (1994:40). 
The Alverson Commission's findings could, therefore, have been presented as strong 
criticism of the scientific effort of the DFO stock assessment process (Finlayson 1994: 41, 
45, 46). Instead, the level of criticism expressed in the text of the report was toned down, to 
the extent that there were contradictions between the position as expressed in the Executive 
Summary of the report, and in graphical information relating to the status of the stock that 
was contained within it. Finlayson (1994: 46-47) suggests a number of possible explanations 
for this "toning down", including a natural reluctance by the Commission's members to 
publicly criticise colleagues as well as various 'interest based' explanations. He also noted 
that the Alverson enquiry was in a sense internal, in that it was commissioned by the federal 
Minister for Fisheries, who was, himself, the political head of the DFO. 
The DFO presented the Alverson Commission's findings to the public as a vindication of the 
integrity of their science and the stock assessment process (Finlayson 1994: 40-42). The text 
of the report supported assessments of an increasing resource base54, albeit at a more modest 
level than previous, overly optimistic DFO interpretations of the data. It also put forward the 
suggestion that environmental factors influencing the inshore migration of cod might explain 
the decline in catches in the inshore fishery, an explanation that conveniently relieved fishing 
pressure and those charged with its scientific management of responsibility for the decline in 
s4 Finlayson (1994: 43) argues that this claim in the text is not supported by the data in the appendices 
which indicated the possibility that the stock was actually in decline at the estimated fishing mortality 
ofF=0.40+. 
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the inshore fishery. The DFO released what Finlayson (1994: 47-48) describes as 
"simplifications" and "misrepresentations" of the Alverson Task Groups findings in a 
publication titled the The Science of Cod (DFO 1988). 
While the DFO was able to put a positive spin on published versions of the Alverson 
Commission's findings, Finlayson (1994: 56-60) suggests that in the course of the inquiry 
the Alverson Commission had expressed a greater degree of "internal criticism" of DFO 
science than had been· publicly acknowledged. Serious questions had been raised about the 
integrity of the stock assessment process, and subsequently the methodology was revised, 
producing much lower estimates of cod stock abundance. 
In 1989 the revised stock assessment process produced markedly lower estimates of stock 
biomass (30-50 per cent lower), and in consequence, DFO management had to recommend a 
corresponding reduction in the TAC (Finlayson 1994: 53-59). This would have severe 
economic implications, particularly for the industrialised offshore trawl fishery. Now the 
offshore sector's voice was added to that of the inshore in attacking DFO stock assessment 
science. Paradoxically, their argument was the opposite of the inshore sector's long-standing 
claims. They claimed that the revised stock assessment methodology underestimated stock 
abundance and unnecessarily limited the TAC (Finlayson 1994: 101). 
By the spring of 1989 the Minister of Fisheries faced a political crisis. Challenges to the 
legitimacy of the Department's management of the fishery could no longer be contained. 
His department's "official construction of reality was passing beyond criticism and 
becoming the object of ridicule and contempt" (Finlayson 1994: 63). The Minister 
responded to the deepening political crisis by initiating another enquiry, through the 
establishment of the Northern Cod Review Panel led by Dr Leslie Harris, a historian, and 
then President of Memorial University of Newfoundland. The terms of reference dictated 
that the panel pay particular attention to the science; 
The panel will consider the scientific advice provided by the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans since 1977 on the Northern cod stock and the current 
state and size of the stock, and make recommendations regarding stock 
assessment methods and means with a view to better forecasting the size, 
growth potential and behaviour of the stock in the future (Harris [1990: 11] 
cited in Finlayson [1994: 63)). 
The Harris Report is ·a useful reference document. It provides an overview of the historic, 
cultural and economic significance of the fishery to Newfoundland and so establishes a 
broad context for its inquiry. In addition to its detailed investigation of the scientific effort 
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applied to Northern cod management, it discusses other interrelated matters affecting the 
fishery and its resource base. These include resource competition between the inshore and 
offshore fisheries, poorly regulated international fishing on the continental slope outside the · · 
200 nautical mile zone, and the complexity of a wide range of ecological and environmental 
interactions that impact on cod populations and which make attempts at stock modelling 
inherently uncertain. 
The Harris Report brought political issues into the debate. It noted that prior to the advent of 
industrial fishing and scientific fishery management in the 1950s, the traditional inshore 
fishery had for centuries consistently yielded an average annual production of around 250 
OOO tonnes (Harris 1990: 1, 21-26, 129). The escalation of offshore effort based on trawling 
technology in the 1960s and 1970s had raised harvests to unsustainable levels, peaking at 
800 OOO tin 1968. This brought the stock to the brink of collapse and inshore landings fell 
to levels lower than any recorded in preceding centuries (Harris 1990: 2, 26). This was the 
situation that led to Canada's push for extended jurisdiction in 1977 and the establishment of 
the science-based fisheries management regime with its emphasis on TAC as the principal 
management tool. Excessive optimism about the productive potential of the fishery under 
scientific management and Canadian control led to excessive investment in offshore trawlers 
and fish processing factories. 
3.5. 1 Criticism of the Scientific Process 
The Harris Report was strong in its criticism of the DFO scientific effort (1990: 2-4). It 
found, among other things, that DFO scientists had "failed to recognise the statistical 
inadequacies in their bulk-biomass model and failed to properly acknowledge and recognise 
the high risk involved with state-of-stock advice based on relatively short and unreliable data 
series" (1990: 2). They had failed to incorporate adequate "scientific management and peer 
review" into their processes and this had allowed shortcomings to go uncorrected (Harris 
1990: 2, 3). Harris also noted that fishery scientists should not have been so dismissive of 
reports from the inshore fishery of declining catches, which, in retrospect, were indicative of 
declining stocks. In view of the large degree of uncertainty inherent in the stock assessment 
process, this should have served as "a warning flag demanding more careful attention" 
(Harris 1990: 3). 
The Harris Report pn;>vided a comprehensive source of information on the Newfoundland 
fishery. Its perspective seems independent of the sectorial interests that may be seen as 
influencing the Keats and Alverson enquiries. Nevertheless, one cannot discount that it too 
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had an agenda. Finlayson (1994: 64) discusses the idea that the Harris Commission had an 
"unofficial mandate" to publicly humiliate the Science Branch in Newfoundland, but to 
avoid undue criticism of the inshore fishery55. In support of this view is the observation that 
following release of the Harris Report, the Science Branch was subjected to a barrage of 
public abuse and criticism, and the Minister and other members of the Government did not 
defend them (Finlayson 1994: 65, 99-100). 
Finlayson (1994: 64-65) shows that the DFO believed the Harris Commission had an 
unstated agenda to "throw the Science Branch to the wolves", and that Harris demonstrated a 
bias in favour of the inshore fishery, but this criticism is poorly sustained. The Harris 
Report's portrayal of the inshore sector in a fairly positive manner might have been 
interpreted as an attempt to placate the outport people and as_an exercise of political damage 
control, but it could also be regarded as a straightforward description of the inshore fishery, 
free of some of the prejudice that had often been attached to it. Harris did not need to 
demonstrate any bias or exaggeration in his criticism of DFO science. Clearly the Science 
Branch's position was deeply compromised. And given the state of political crisis over the 
fishery at the time, and the need by the political sector to deflect criticism from themselves in 
order to protect their own position, one can understand their abandonment of the DFO. So 
while Harris criticised DFO science his report also provided support for establishment 
interests and, notably, support for "science" as the only acceptable basis for management 
(Harris 1990: 149). 
3.5.2 Defence of Establishment Interests and the Status Quo 
Clearly, by 1990, the position of DFO science could no longer be defended. Arguably it had 
arrived at this position as a consequence of its subservience to a political agenda that had 
driven developments in the fishery for decades. However, it is reflective of the role of 
science in its relationship with the political sector that it should now be made the scapegoat 
for the resource crisis. 
It could be argued that if Harris had an agenda, it was not to discredit science, but to re-
establish its credibility, and in so doing, to re-establish the credibility of the 
industrial/scientific model of fishery development. This was a more subtle and complex task 
than merely finding a scapegoat for the immediate crisis. 
55 The Trap fishery has always caught mostly illllllature fish, too young to spawn, a biologically 
dangerous harvesting approach but one that the Science Branch had never actually opposed (Finlayson 
1994: 64). 
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Harris had implied that the traditional inshore fisheries based on technologies such as lines, 
traps and gill nets had proved sustainable for centuries. The report confirmed that the 
inshore fishers' perceptions of the status of the cod stocks, based on what has come to be 
termed "traditional ecological knowledge" or TEK, were more realistic than the stock 
assessments provided by DFO science (Harris 1990: 45). These findings might logically 
have been used to support alternative models for the fishery; models that might have gained 
additional credibility from the failure of the industrial model to deliver hoped for economic 
benefits and resource sustainability. But the Harris Report, as noted, emphasised the 
importance of the scientific method as the only acceptable management approach (1990: 
149). In this it supported the establishment position and the status quo. Clearly reversion to 
a traditional "peasant fishery" would not have been acceptable to the establishment of 
interests served by the modem industrial offshore fishery. If Harris' defence of science and 
the industrial fishery, in spite of the shortcomings he had identified with the system, 
represented support for the status quo, it should not be surprising. One could argue that 
Harris, at that time president of a major university, a very significant and powerful institution 
within society, did not arrive at that position on the basis of revolutionary predilections. 
Leftwich (1983: 227) argues that those who rise to positions of power within the institutions 
of modem societies are selected from members of a small elite who have the "right" attitudes 
and values. So while Harris' defence of science as the only reasonable basis for 
management, the basis upon which the legitimacy of the industrial fishery stands, may 
represent adherence to orthodoxy, it was not consistent with the suggestion that his report 
was excessive or biased in its criticism of the work of DFO scientists. 
3.5.3 Consistency of the Independent Stock Assessments 
Finlayson (1994: 80) found that the Keats, Alverson and Harris Reports had reached 
"remarkably similar conclusions" in their assessments of the status of the stock in spite of 
their differing mandates, institutional sponsors and resources. He points out that this 
"congruence of findings strongly suggested to many interested parties that their constructions 
bore a closer correspondence to natural reality than did the claims of DFO". He then asks: 
Why did DFO science, working from the same data bases as Keats, Alverson, 
and Harris and with vastly superior resources of every kind, persist in the 
construction of what is now accepted as an erroneous reality? Why did it 
defend that construction against competing alternatives to the point where the 
public and institutional authority of its knowledge claims and its effectiveness in 
management were severely compromised? (Finlayson 1994: 80). 
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Finlayson sets out to find answers to these questions. His study explains "how" the "pure" 
science upon which the DFO prided itself produced outcomes that were inconsistent with 
truth and reality and considers "why" this occurred. The "how" aspect relates directly to 
analysis of institutional structure and function from an internal perspective using the 
analytical tools of the social sciences. The "why" takes things a little further into the realm 
of political theory with a more holistic perspective on the functioning of the institution 
within a complex political economy. 
Finlayson (1994: 33-80) explores the role of error, uncertainty and interpretive flexibility in 
the construction of erroneous reality, noting the high degree of uncertainty inherent to the 
science of Northern cod stock assessment. This uncertainty arises from the difficulty of 
assessing the abundance of a fish that is migratory, with a range extending over an enormous 
area of ocean, and having a population that is affected by a wide range of factors. 
Uncenainty linked to the potential for error in the raw data is compounded by further 
uncertainty generated by the ambiguities and assumptions that characterise the models used 
to process it. The result of this uncertainty is that "data and models can potentially support a 
wide range of forecasts and estimates of current stock status" (Finlayson 1994: 33). Thus, 
inherent uncertainty in the stock assessment process provides the opportunity for 
"interpretive flexibility" which Finlayson defines as "the possibility of reading different but 
a priori, equally plausible conclusions into a single data set". 
One can readily appreciate the tendency of the DFO, a government agency combining a 
scientific role with a political agenda, to use this interpretive flexibility to promote that 
political agenda. There was pressure to produce optimistic stock projections to support the 
push for extended jurisdiction in 1977, and the expansion of the offshore industrial fishery 
and the processing sector in subsequent years. There were also interests served by 
downplaying the degree of uncertainty inherent to the stock assessment process and 
projections based on it. These related to the inherent risk that acknowledgement of the high 
degree of uncertainty would undermine the credibility of the process and perhaps encourage 
challenges to it. This would have been likely given the allocational effects of TAC setting 
and the intensive political conflicts that characterised the fishery, as has been discussed. 
But how were DFO scientists, some of the finest fishery scientists in the world, co-opted into 
participation in the production and defence of the erroneous reality that characterised stock 
assessments during the 1980s? The answer to this question reveals something about 
structures and mechanisms that operated within the agency and which served to engineer 
compliance from the scientists who worked there. Finlayson's research identified a number 
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of factors relating to the DFO' s structure of reward and promotion that contributed to this 
situation (1994: 88-100), and he also found non-formalised mechanisms that served to 
discourage challenges to the flawed stock assessment process. 
For one thing, access to the data upon which the stock assessment process was based, was 
' limited to members of a fairly small group. It was not freely ,accessible, almost nothing was 
published and people outside, of ·the group were discouraged from viewing the data 
(Finlayson 1994: 89). In other words, the process was not open to scrutiny, even by other 
scientists working within .the DFO. Finlayson (1994: 90) notes the experience reported by 
Myers, a DFO scientist from outside the group, who, on the instructions of the Aiverson 
Commission, gained access to stock assessment data. His analysis challenged the consensus 
position of the cod stock assessment group and he suffered for it, explaining "there are 
people, who just hate me for doing that" (Finlayson 1994: 90). He "interpreted the 
proprietary treatment of data as a strategy to protect deeply-held personal and institutional 
beliefs" (Finlayson 1994: 92) and noted that the assessment group had developed tribal 
tendencies, protecting its own interests against outside challenges, and that the group itself 
enjoyed protection within the department. 
If on.e _accepts a Kuhnsian pe~pective to understand the behaviour of this group, it is 
possible to accept that its members genuinely believed in the integrity of their stock 
assessment processes and guarded their data as a natural response to protect what they saw as 
the truth from criticism and challenge. A normative scientific perspective migh~ conclude 
that they guarded the data because they knew that the process was flawed and did not wish 
this to be exposed. There is a subtle difference. Either they were sustaining and 
perpetuating their own delusions, .or they were cynical and self-serving, but in either case 
one might perceive that the group protected its own interestS, in terms of the power and the 
benefits that its role in the assessment process conveyed. One could also view it from the 
political-economic perspective of group theory as described by Olson (1965; 1982). 
Members of a group enjoying some privilege or advantage seek to limit membership in order. 
to avoid dilution of the benefit. In this case it could be argued that group membership 
conveyed some benefit of prestige to insiders related to access to .Privileged knowledge or 
simply some non tangible benefits associated with the sense of participation and inclusion. 
However, such an argument is not very convincing in this case as stock assessment work 
does not seem to have been highly regarded within the Science Branch; it was rather seen as 
an arduous if necessary task which, although addressing the core issues of the institute's 
mandate, was less favoured than more "interesting" areas of research (Finlayson 1994: 100). 
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Sandeman, another of Finlayson's subjects and the former Director of the Science Branch, 
provided a different, perhaps more palatable explanation for the reticence in sharing access 
to data (Finlayson 1994: 93-95). Data forms the basis of publications, and within the DFO, 
a scientist's prospects for reward and promotion substantially depended on the number of 
publications he or she produced, just as_ it does in most academic institutions. Competition 
for rewards and promotion among scientists within the department generated a proprietary 
approach to the treatment of data. Thus the department's system of rewards and promotion 
encouraged secrecy rather than the sharing of information and knowledge, and this 
contributed to the failure to "produce useful, robust knowledge in support of their 
institutional mandate" (Finlayson 1994: 93). Finlayson points out that this privatisation of 
data that had been "collected by public servants at public expense" was instrumental in 
preventing the sort of scrutiny that might have produced better science (Finlayson 1994: 92). 
This second explanation is also somewhat unsatisfactory in another respect. While the 
reward and promotion structure might have discouraged data sharing prior to publication, it 
clearly provided incentives to publish. And, as already noted, little was published by the 
stock assessment scientists who "avoided forums where their knowledge claims could be 
challenged" (Finlayson 1994: 92). 
Finlayson ~1994: 103-113) also sought to understand how it was that the DFO had 
persistently ignored claims from the inshore sector that falling catches, from the late 1980s 
onwards, were indicative of stock decline. It is now well known that the inshore sector's 
perception of the status of the Northern cod stock bore a closer resemblance to reality than 
did the DFO' s scientific stock assessments of the time. Set within the context of the 
conflicting interests of the inshore and offshore sectors, and the government's policies over 
several decades, which had favoured industrialisation and development of the offshore 
fishery, one can recognise the political motives at an institutional level for bias against the 
inshore sector. Finlayson revealed how this bias was perpetuated by mechanisms operating 
within the institution. There were a number of factors involved. One relates to the cognitive 
processes that characterised the inshore fishers' systems of knowledge about marine 
ecosystems. This "fisherfolk" knowledge is typically built upon a complex of unquantifiable 
and intangible inputs. Observation and experience are interpreted through a menage of 
influences, which include folklore, myth, anecdote, intuition and other factors. Although this 
knowledge system is built on a history of hundreds of years of fishing experience by 
thousands of fishers, it is largely irreconcilable with the cognitive norms of institutional 
marine science with its emphasis on objective, quantifiable inputs (Finlayson 1994: 109-
113). Even if the validity of this fisherfolk knowledge was accepted, it remains intractable to 
quantification and so to the methods of science, and it is therefore fundamentally 
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incompatible with a bureaucratic management system whose authority is based on the 
epistemological superiority of scientific knowledge systems (Finlayson 1994: 117-119). 
In contrast to the relationship of irreconcilable conflict between science and the inshore 
sector, Finlayson notes that the corporately structured offshore industry "shares a similar 
approach with science to the collection, documentation, and evaluation of information and 
knowledge" (1994: 116-117). DFO scientists and the corporate managers of the offshore 
fishery spoke the same language and understood each other. In particular, the quantitative 
catch and effort data routinely collected by the offshore corporations for their own 
managerial requirements provided an enormous body of data that was available for free, in a 
form that was "tractable" to DFO's scientific and mathematical approach to cod stock 
modelling (Finlayson 1994: 105, 125). Over-emphasis on the industrial sector's catch per 
effort data and a failure to incorporate corrections to account for the continually increased 
efficiency of modern trawlers due to technological innovation was a significant factor that 
masked the stock decline. 
Personal social affiliation and prejudice may also have played a role in the attitude adopted 
by DFO science in the conflict between the inshore and offshore sectors, and in its 
relationship with the protagonists (Finlayson 1994: 112). There is a long history. of social 
division between the respectable middle classes of St John's and the inshore fishers of the 
outports. This social division was apparent in the exploitative relationship of the St John's 
merchant class and the outport fishers in the period leading up to the Commission of 
Government, and in government policies from this period onwards that served to perpetuate 
dualism (as demonstrated in the work of Brox [1972]) and which retarded the social and 
economic progress of the outports. 
While today there is some romanticising of the traditional Newfoundland coastal fishing 
culture56, in the past the official attitude towards the inshore sector has often been 
patronising at best, and at worst, derogatory. This has contributed to the maintenance of a 
negative stereotype of the outport people, characterising them as backward, and serving to 
undermine their social status. One would expect that the low social status of the inshore 
fishers would cause their views and opinions to be devalued in the eyes of those DFO 
56 The Harris Report (1990), for example, elevated the inshore fishing traditions of the outport 
communities to an important position in Newfoundland culture and society. An explanation for this 
subtle flattery, in contrast to a long tradition of government policies that have tended to generate a 
negative impression of the outports, may be provided by the view that an intended purpose of the 
Harris Report was to placate the inshore sector and help alleviate the political crisis surrounding the 
fishery collapse. 
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scientists who shared a closer social affiliation, views, values and outlook with the, 
managerial class associated with the offshore fishery (Finlayson 1994: 111-112). 
So in addition to issues of cognitive process, issues of social prejudice may help to explain 
the lack of regard by DFO science, in general, for the opinions of the inshore fishers in the 
critical period of the late 1980s. But as Finlayson explains, these factors were not universal 
within the DFO. He discusses the case, and perhaps it is exceptional, of a DFO officer who 
came from an inshore fishing family and had an affinity and worked closely with the inshore 
sector (Finlayson 1994: 112-117). This individual apparently suffered personally and in his 
career as a result of his "misplaced sympathies" with the inshore sector that were in conflict 
with the position of his employer, the DFO (1994: 15). 
Institutional structures related to the "structural appraisal system" served to exclude the 
inshore sector's perspective from gaining influence within the DFO (Finlayson 1994: 111). 
These institutional structures are not clearly defined but from Finlayson's interviews with 
DFO scientists, there was clearly an awareness that it was dangerous to get too close to the 
inshore sector. Ambiguous references are made to "burnout" and the frustrations of trying to 
reconcile the· conflicting perspectives of the inshore fishers with the hegemonic position -of 
science, the industrial offshore sector and government policy. Several references were made 
to officers57 who had suffered personally, and in terms of their careers, as a consequence of 
developing a sympathetic perspective with the inshore sector (Finlayson 1994: 115,121); 
"They lose their objectivity and inevitably come to a bad end ... " Clearly there was a general 
understanding within the agency that there were no rewards, but rather serious penalties for 
individuals who adopted the inshore's perspective. There is nothing exceptional about this. 
Leftwich (1983: 224-234) and Saul (1997: 91, 95, 173-4) discuss in detail how conformity of 
individuals within institutions? and internal structures of power are maintained by 
mechanisms of punishment and reward. These are portrayed as essentially universal 
characteristics of hierarchical power systems, including those of resource management 
institutions in Western democracies. Finlayson's observations and interpretation of forces 
operating within DFO are entirely reconcilable with these explanations. 
In the final analysis Finlayson (1994: 93) showed how the DFO had failed in its mandated 
mission: 
57 The references seem to relate to the case already discussed above but are made plural, i.e. officer 
becomes officers, as a rhetorical means of generalisation. 
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... to ensure that the highest standard of scientific information is available to the 
Government of Canada for use in developing policies, regulations and 
legislation regarding the oceans and aquatic life, and to other government 
departments, private industry and the public for use in planning and carrying 
out aquatic activities (DF0/4155 [ 1989:8]; cited in Finlayson [ 1994: 93]). 
Instead the Science Branch of DFO became complicit in the construction and defence of a 
false reality. It is no coincidence that this false reality served a national and provincial 
political agenda closely aligned to commercial interests of the offshore industrial fishery. 
This coalition of powerful commercial and political interests generated extern~ pressures on 
the Science Branch, which were translated into its internal functioning. 
Finlayson explains that in the course of his investigation into the causes of the institutional 
dysfunction of the DFO, he discovered no villains, nor any heroes (1994: vii). Individuals 
within the DFO were either led by a complex range of subtle and overt pressures and 
incentives to conformity with the perspective that served the organisation's interests, or they 
were marginalized and excluded from involvement in key functions. Finlayson showed 
(1994: 123) that scientists were induced into conformity by the system of rewards and 
promotion, and notes that the culture within the DFO and the training of fisheries biologists 
lacked any emphasis on development of a sense of ~ocial responsibility. Reading 
Finlayson's depiction of the internal functioning of the DFO brings to mind Thomas More's 
despairing analysis in Utopia of the futility of trying to provide wise and honourable council 
as a "councillor of kings" engaged in matters of public business, in a collegial environment 
that "would more readily corrupt the best of men" than be reformed itself (Logan and Adams 
1989: 29), and his observation that it is wiser to keep away from matters of public 
business58. 
Hutchings, Walters and Haedrich (1997) reinforced Finlayson's findings. They argued that 
government control of fishery "science" allowed political and bureaucratic interference to 
distort the production of "scientific information" upon which management decisions are 
based and justified, and that this was a major contributing factor in the collapse. They made 
clear that their criticism was aimed at the system of management and not at individuals and 
they described how, in the years following the collapse, government control of DFO science 
limited the effectiveness of government-based research to contribute towards understanding 
58 Finlayson's work also reminded me of a conversation I had in 1987, in Darwin, Australia, with a 
former Canadian DFO officer. This man had once worked in the Atlantic fisheries but had chosen a 
complete change of career and had no wish to have anything more to do with fishery management. 
He explained that "we were the enemy, right.. .I mean we were the bad guys ... and all the fishermen 
just hated us". At the time I had no idea what he meant. 
106 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
its causes. In particular, they described how this political interference promoted the 
argument that the collapse was due to environmental causes rather than to stock decline from 
over fishing, and listed "(i) government denunciation of independent work, (ii) 
misrepresentation of alternative hypothesese, (iii) interference in scientific conclusions, (iv) 
disciplining of scientists who communicated publicly the results of peer-reviewed research 
(that did not correspond to the official position being maintained by the government), and (v) 
misrepresentation of the scientific basis of public reports and government statements" 
(Hutchings, Walters and Haedrich 1997: 1204). The conditions of political interference in 
DFO science that Finlayson identified as causes of the fishery collapse were clearly ongoing 
. in 1997 and they argued that the system of "government-sponsored fisheries science" had, at 
great cost to Canada, "failed to ensure viable fish resources and thereby sustain the fishing 
people and fishing communities" that depended on them (Hutchings, Walters and Haedrich 
1997: 1208). They argued that the system should be restructured. 
3.6 Discussion - Varied and Contradictory Explanations for the Crisis 
Following the stock collapse in 1992 a variety of contradictory explanations were put 
forward. These reveal much about the conflicts of interests and ideologies involved in the 
fishery and the influence these have on shaping cognitive perspectives. Gaining an 
understanding of the interconnected causes of the crisis is facilitated by an interpretation of 
these diverse explanations within the context of the interests that they served. 
3.6.1 The Cold Water Theory 
In the wake of the 1992 moratorium the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), and 
the Canadian Fisheries Resource Conservation Council claimed that the collapse was 
unexpected and could not be attributed to overfishing. Hutchings and Myers (1994) and 
Charles (1995; 1998), for example, note the initial DFO response had stated that the decline 
in stocks was largely due to ecological factors, primarily to temporal changes in water 
temperature. Several theories (critically discussed by Hutchings and Myers [1994]) 
attributed the stock decline to anomalous cold water conditions that caused increased 
mortality (Lear and Parsons 1993), reduced recruitment as cod affected by the conditions 
spawned in sub-optimal locations (de Young and Rose 1993), and migration as cod moved to 
deeper areas (Bishop et al. 1993). 
These environmental explanations seemed plausible. As Johnston (1995) points out, the 
collapse of the great herring fishery of the North Sea and the Baltic that was the economic 
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foundation of the Hanseatic League has been attributed by some historians to a 1 degree 
Celsius rise in sea temperature. So there are precedents for blaming fishery failures on 
uncontrollable environmental factors. Environmental explanations would clearly have been 
attractive to the DFO by providing an alternative to overfishing as the cause of the crisis, and 
thereby absolving those responsible for managing the fishery from blame. However, 
Hutchings and Myers (1994) discounted these environmental explanations. They showed 
that water temperature was not associated with juvenile or adult abundance, or adult 
distribution with depth. They demonstrated that "harvests equivalent to those" of the decade 
leading up to the collapse "were sustainable in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
a considerably colder environment", and they concluded that the "collapse of the northern 
cod can be attributed solely to overexploitation" (Hutchin-gs and Myers 1994: 2126). 
Hutchings and Myers (1994: 2144) explain that harvests of Northern cod had "rarely been at 
sustainable levels" between 1962 and 1992. The view that the 1992 collapse was-primarily 
due to government mismanagement and overfishing by Canadian vessels has now come to be 
generally accepted and is no longer credibly contested. Other factors, if involve~, played 
only a secondary role in the collapse (see Mason [2002]). 
3.6.2 The Failure of Science and Political Will 
With overexploitation identified as the principal cause of the collapse, much of the blame fell 
on the DFO and on the federal and provincial political establishments. The politicians, as 
'discussed by Finlayson (1994: 64-65), attempted to divert the blame towards fishery science, 
but those more sympathetic to the scientists could point out that it was the politicians who 
had refused to cut the TAC sufficiently in accordance with more conservative advice after 
1989. By this time (as has been discussed) the structural inertia in the fishery, with its social 
and economic components, made it-politically impossible to make the recommended harvest 
reduction; especially as the advice was based on what had, by then, become recognised as 
contestable and uncertain data. Both politicians and scientists, and the nature of their 
relationship, had underpinned the creation of an overly optimistic belief in the capacity and 
resilience of the resource, and an unrealistic confidence in the credibility of DFO science, 
and this combination had underpinned the buildup of this inertia. The blame could not be 
separated. 
108 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
3.6.3 Overcapacity - Too Many People, or Too Much Capital? 
Schrank (1995) argues that the origins of the Atlantic Canadian groundfish crisis of the 
1990s stemmed from the repeated failure by policy makers to reduce or at least constrain the 
growth of capacity in the fishery, especially following extended jurisdiction in 1977. 
Harvesting capacity usually refers to the combination of labour and capital equipment in the 
fishery and these can often be substituted for each other. For example, the fishing capacity 
of a 20 metre trawler with a crew of three may equate to the capacity of 100 inshore fishers 
operating from small open boats using handlines and gill-nets. Processing, though, is 
another matter. The catch from both the inshore and offshore trawler fisheries could be 
proce~sed in the same plants, and the number of people dependent on employment in the 
plants, added to the capital costs of the plants, is also a factor in the capacity of the fishery as 
a whole. This was Schrank' s approach. He considers overcapacity in terms of the number 
of workers and capital that depended on income from both the harvesting and processing 
sectors of the fishery59. 
Overcapacity has arguably been an issue in the fishery since the 1850s. The substitutability 
of capital for labour in the harvesting sector has been the underlying factor in the unremitting 
conflict between "traditional" fishers and more powerful technological developments; seines 
in the nineteenth century, trawlers and draggers in the twentieth. This conflict gives rise to 
competing, often partisan views on which component of overcapacity is to blame. Some 
regard technology as the problem and blame the crisis on draggers and trawlers for 
overfishing the stocks on the offshore spawning grounds. Others argue that "too many 
people and too many boats were chasing too few fish"' a situation blamed on the ease of 
entry to the open-access inshore fishery6o. The inshore-offshore bifurcation was complicated 
because many fishing households, traditionally bound to the inshore fishery, had become 
increasingly dependent on jobs in the fish plants where dragger-caught fish were processed. 
This dependency, paradoxically, increased as catches and income from inshore fishing fell as 
cod stocks became depleted. In the processing plants, as in the harvesting sector, there is 
also some potential to substitute capital equipment and technology for labour. 
59 There was significant gender division in the workforce, fishmg in boats bemg almost an exclusively 
male occupation while women formed the bulk of the processing plant workforce. 
60 Blackwood's (1996) thesis, as discussed earlier, suggests that this was not the case - the inshore 
fishery was taking less fish as the stock declined; less than its allocated quota. It was the "regulated" 
trawler fishery, controlled by lirmted entry and quotas, that could continue to harvest large numbers of 
fish from the stock in spite of its overall depleted state. 
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Schrank (1995) avoids entering directly into the inshore versus offshore debate by treating 
overcapacity as a whole rather than dissecting it. But his central argument is that the 
collapse of the fishery was a consequence of repeated failure by policy makers to reduce the 
number of people dependent on the fishery, in both the catching and processing sectors. This 
view is bound up with acceptance of the orthodoxy of industrialisation - a view that was 
arguably the dominant policy-guiding ideology. It fails to consider an alternative view; to 
consider whether so many people could in fact be sustainably supported in the 
Newfoundland fishery if it operated differently; if a different set of economic drives directed 
policy. 
Schrank identified the underlying problem of "uncertainty that characterizes both the market 
demand for fish products and the supply of fish in the sea", and noted a tendency for the 
industrial sector to respond to the unpredictability of resource supply, by expanding capacity 
so that it "could handle the peaks in supply, thereby inflating industrial overneads and 
reinforcing the inherent tendency towards over-expansion in the commercial fisheries" 
(1995: 288). The problem of excessive industrial overheads, far more than simelistically 
blaming the crisis on the "common property problem", explains why it is important to 
separate the human labour and industrial capital components of overcapacity, but Schrank 
does not explore the implications of this. Industrial capital often represents -sunk-cost 
overheads, while labour, on the other hand, is often viewed as a marginal cost. If a trawler is 
tied up at the wharf, its overhead cost remains. For relatively little extra cost it can go 
fishing and cover marginal costs for crew and fuel even if the catch is relatively low. A 
labour intensive artisanal fishery has relatively low overhead costs but high marginal costs. 
Thus, it may be more sensitive to catch fluctuations. Also labour is often more flexible than 
industrial capital in shifting to alternative activities. This is frequently overlooked by those 
who argued that there were no alternatives to the fishery to employ the people of coastal 
Newfoundland. This may have been true so far as industrial employment is concerned, but 
(as discussed by Brox [1972: 10-13, 97-98]) there is a long tradition in_ the outports of 
subsistence activities contributing to household economies, and sustaining the population 
over times when the fishery failed. 
The commitment to developing the fishery in accordance with a capitalist industrial model 
meant that labour 'would have to be displaced. This being politically untenable (within a 
democratic system), it had to be accommodated by economic growth, or else subsidised. 
There were many subsidies applied in the fishery, and many, including unemployment 
insurance and grants and loans for vessel and processing plant construction and operation 
were subsidies that promoted increased capacity and production; generating further pressure 
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for overfishing. In 1995 Schrank saw the crisis as an opportunity to restructure the fishery, 
"downsizing" the number of people working in the fishery from over 20,000 to about 5,000, 
though he speculated that the forces that had caused government to neglect necessary 
downsizing in the past might continue to do so. But the need to downsize is dependent on 
the orthodoxy linked to the industrial model. An alternative approach, to redevelop the 
fishery from the failed industrial paradigm and re-build it according to a new post-industrial 
model has not been widely countenanced; it would not serve interests that have become 
firmly established in the industrial fishery. 
3.6.4 Economic Rationalism 
Burke and Brander (1995) also discuss the problem of overcapacity, not so much as an 
explanation for the collapse of the fishery as to explain why its impact was so severe. They 
identify massive public subsidies to sustain unproductive fishing and processing industries as 
a key factor in the crisis: 
for decades, the productivity of fishing and fish processing has been increasing, 
reducing the labour and capital required to deliver products. In a properly 
functioning market, mergers or consolidations would occur so that surplus 
labour and assets could be retired. Not so in the fishery ( 1995: 60). 
They identified the "common property problem" of the fishery and insufficient security and 
definition of private property rights as significant problems, as well as income support, 
particularly UI, which "served to attract and retain labour which could not otherwise have 
been supported by incomes from the fishery" (Burke and Brander 1995: 61). They identified 
a social cost to this: 
most tragic of all, younger generations were lured away from education and 
real economic opportunity by the attraction of a life style consisting of a few 
weeks of work to qualify for months of state sponsored income. A much lower 
value came to be set on initiative and self-reliance, thus undermining the 
entrepreneurial spirit that self-sustaining communities must possess ( 1995: 61-
62). 
Burke and Brander draw parallels between the political economy of the fishery and that of 
the Soviet Union, arguing that "common property was the basis of both ownership systems" 
(1995: 61). They suggest that a preoccupation with distribution, which underpinned income 
support to fi~hers, came at the expense of neglect for economic efficiency and increased 
wealth creation. Their prescription is to address the common property problem by 
introducing management systems based on individual quota. They also emphasise the need 
111 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
to remove subsidies including capital subsidies for harvesting and processing, "subsidies to 
labour, especially UI", and "public investment in infrastructure, especially in harbour 
facilities, and in resource management" (Burke and Brander 1995: 63). They write from the 
perspective of economic rationalism, which considers the fishery as a commodity and 
economic rent producing system, rather than as a resource capable of producing a wide range 
of social, cultural, spiritual and material goods, to be managed to maximise the wellbeing of 
the community that owns it by tradition and geographical association. Their perception of 
the causes of the crisis and their prescriptions are very much at odds with the views of other 
researchers whose approach is more grounded in social sciences and who consider economic 
issues and the concept of sustainainability from a more holistic, community focused 
perspective61. 
3.6.5 Management Attitudes and Quota Based Management System_~ 
Charles (1995) discusses four sets of conservation-related "attitudes" that, he argues, 
contributed to the Atlantic Canadian groundfishery collapse. The first of these relates to the 
role of managers and the fishing industry, the relationship between them, and the limited 
extent to which issues of broader public interest in the fishery found inclusion within the 
narrow management perspective that served the interests of the government's fishing 
industry "clients". Charles describes the management of the fishery as a tension of the 
"spirit of free enterprise" attitude of the fishing industry, constrained by the management 
controls of the government that rested on the rationale of Hardin' s "tragedy of the 
commons". He argued that the nature of this management environment caused the 
participants to adopt the roles described in Hardin's thesis. The regulations were built on the 
assumption that fishers operated only according to selfish, profit maximising interests. The 
"regulatory agencies typically took sole responsibility for conservation", and by excluding 
fishers62 from management decision-making, left them "no other role than that of catching as 
61 "Coastal community folk - and especially women with family care responsibilities - who have 
lived on unemployment insurance over the winter for years come to see this as a necessary lifestyle 
that allows them to take care of community volunteer work, elder and child care and other priorities. 
Given an option to take on year-round work, they may refuse, preferring to reserve time for this other 
work which may be unpaid but is seen to be necessary and fulfilling. This is not tragic; indeed it may 
be a necessary approach to life in an increasingly crowded planet where paid work must be shared and 
government programs augmented at the commumty level by volunteerism and sharing. In this 
context, removal of the marginal income from employment insurance would cause real difficulty and 
force people out of rural communities where they have access to resources, and into periurban slums 
where they have none" (examiners note). 
62 Women and youth in fishing communities were even more marginalised and excluded from 
consideration in fisheries management arrangements by the management authorities and by the fishers 
themselves (see Grzetic 2004). 
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much fish as possible" and, "thus, Hardin's view of the world became self-fulfilling" 
(Charles 1995: 68). 
Charles also comments on the degree to which the Canadian public, and public interests were 
excluded from decision-making processes: 
... the government's principal fishery mandate lies not in serving the resource 
users, but rather in conservation and wise use of the fish, a natural asset owned 
by the Canadian public. While owners of valuable property usually have some 
say in its management, the attitude of government appears contrary to this. The 
Canadian public - those who should be viewed as DFO's major "clients" - have 
been given no role in fishery management, which has been typically restricted 
to government and industry ( 1995: 68-69). 
He also notes that coastal communities were not included in management decision-making 
and that government managed the fishery according to industry segments and gear type 
rather than with respect to locality. This institutionalised divisions among fishers, "viewing 
them not as residents of coastal communities but rather as members of disjoint special 
interest groups" and it ignored "the potential of coastal communities themselves to improve 
the efficiency of fishery management by increasing the level of moral suasion" ( 1995: 70). 
Charles' second set of attitudes related to the uncertainty that is pervasive in fishery science, 
and asks whether the "burden of proof' should favour exploitation or conservation. 
Favouring exploitation in the past allowed TACs to be set that were too high, and failed to 
curb the use of potentially damaging technology such as trawl-nets or "draggers" (1995: 73). 
The third set of attitudes, the view that "conservation can wait", also favoured exploitation 
' 
over conservation. "The belief amongst most scientists that groundfish were _'resilient' 
enough to withstand exploitation above target levels" (Charles 1995: 74), in the short term, 
contributed to serious delays in harvest reduction when stock decline became evident.- As an 
example, Charles refers to the year 1990 when DFO scientists recommended a TAC of 
125,000 tonnes be set, but the Minister set the TAC at 197,000 tonnes, a controversial 
decision, opposed by many in the inshore fishery who "felt this TAC was so high as to 
endanger the stock, and soug~t an injunction to overturn it" (1995: 75). This is an important 
point which relates to Charles' first set of attitudes as previously discussed, and discredits the 
common misconception of fisheries as systems in which all fishers are motivated by greed 
which must be countered by government management controls. 
Charles' final set of attitudes relates to the faith that the system works; that the basic 
concepts and assumptions upon which the fishery management regime has been based are 
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sound. Charles questions these and suggests that radical restructuring of the fishery 
management system is necessary if future collapses are to be avoided. "Minor tinkering" 
and "a business as usual" approach will only, he suggests, lead to future failures (1995: 77). 
"Blaming the ocean" for the collapse, Charles notes, is symptomatic of the attitude that the 
system works, and an attempt to defend it by deflecting the blame for failure onto 
environmental causes. Likewise, he explains that spreading the blame widely - the 
suggestion that all sectors should share responsibility for the collapse - also serves to deflect 
responsibility from the real problem areas. He points out that while "illegal and 
nonconservationist fishing practices were widespread" (1995: 79) they were not universal. 
These practices included quota-evading activities such as "dumping, mis-reporting, high-
grading, illegal gear, trans-shipments, excessive effort, processor collusion and the like" 
(Charles 1995: 78), but many fishers "behaved ethically throughout'', and called for 
conservation as their catches declined in the 1980s. Spreading the blame, Charles notes 
(1995: 79), "distracts attention from the more serious offenders, but it also benefits the 
management entities who failed to control the operation of these offenders. Furthermore, 
such an attitude serves to spread the pain of restructuring the fishery." It helps to justify 
cutting the number of fishers across the board, rather than penalising those who caused most 
damage, and rewarding those who exercised restraint and "lived within their resource 
means". 
Charles is also critical of the much-repeated argument that simplifies the cause of the crisis 
to "too many people chasing too few fish". This argument is used to support policies to cut 
the number of fishermen as the means of achieving sustainability. He notes that the number 
of fishermen is irrelevant to fish stock conservation. "The key factors are catching power 
and catching methods, not the number of people" (Charles 1995: 79). The problem was "the 
failure of fishery management to predict and control the fishing effort exerted by a fleet with 
excess capacity" (Charles 1995: 79). Charles also notes the perversity, in terms of furthering 
conservation goals, of efforts to reduce the number of fishermen by removing "casual" or 
part-time fishers, those who exert the least impact on stocks, while rewarding those who 
fished most intensively on the declining resource. 
While blame for the collapse of the fishery was attributed to "causes" such as environmental 
conditions and to the presence of too many fishers, Charles (1995: 81) notes that little 
attention had been paid to the "methods" that had been used to manage it. He considered 
that much of the blame for the crisis could be directed at the quota management system that 
was the basis of Canadian groundfish management. He noted that the system unavoidably 
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provided incentives for "anti-conservationist behaviour" and had inherent dangers due to 
scientific uncertainty and the impossibility of ensuring compliance63. 
Problems with the science of stock assessment, fundamental to quota management systems, 
have been discussed at some length. Quota management systems also provide incentives 
that encourage practices such as dumping, high-grading and under reporting, and generally 
encourage fishers to harvest more fish than allowed. These activities were rampant in the 
fishery and contributed to resource waste as well as overfishing. But quota management 
systems, noted for social and conservation problems, serve the corporatist style of industrial 
fishery management and, Charles notes: "little research has been undertaken on alternatives 
to this groundfishery status quo, and indeed, there persists a dominant view in the fishery, 
with respect to quota management, that the system works" (1995: 82). 
Underwood (1995: 37) singles out the system of "single species quotas" that was "the 
foundation of fisheries management in Canada", as the root cause of the collapse. The 
management system became a forum for antagonistic interest pedalling in the negotiation 
and allocation of quota and saw a "general deterioration of the relationship between the 
fishermen and DFO" (1995: 40). The system generated incentives to cheat and to misreport 
landings, producing data that was worthless to be incorporated into theoretical management 
models that "have proven to be incapable of simulating the complexities of a fisheries 
ecosystem" (1995: 39). Underwood concludes that the management system failed miserably 
and that a "single _species quota approach to groundfish management does not and cannot 
work" (1995: 43). He argues: "now that the Canadian experiment in management of 
groundfish through quotas has failed, and I challenge anyone who would still argue 
otherwise, we must look to fundamental reform of the way we manage our fisheries" 
(Underwood 1995: 38). 
It is significant that the attitudes that favoured exploitation over conservation are linked to 
attitudes that favour economic concentration (serving vested interests over a broader 
distribution of access to resource wealth), and to attitudes that favour capital and the 
industrial fishery over the interests of the inshore fishery and the people of Newfoundland's 
coastal communities. These attitudes are linked to the "economic" rather than the "social" 
fishery paradigm. They are the attitudes that when embodied in a society's social, economic, 
63 The dependence of quota-managed fisheries on science and enforcement as the means to provide 
for sustainability was discussed in chapter 2. 
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political and cultural institutions cause it to behave unsustainably. They are arguably 
defining characteristics of unsustainable societies. 
Charles explains that the root causes of the Atlantic Canadian groundfishery collapse can be 
attributed to the four sets of attitudes he identified. But where do these dysfunctional 
attitudes come from? What interests do they serve? What values and ideology are they 
drawn from? And what political and resource management culture do they arise from? And 
what, then, are the prospects for changing them? And what are the conditions required to 
achieve change? These questions are all relevant if sustainability is genuinely to take 
precedence over other sectoral political-economic interests. 
Taylor (1995: 13) provides support for Charles' view that, dysfunctional "attitudes" are 
involved. In addition to identifying the rapid advance in harvesting technology, the 
inadequacy of international conservation controls, and the limitations of science, he also 
attributes the crisis to "a cultural climate that emphasized economic growth above other 
values." Maguire, Neis and Sinclair (1995) also emphasise the role that policies driven by a 
myopic view of economics played in the crisis, while social concerns linked to conservation 
and a different sort of economics were ignored64. Matthews (1995b: 44) takes the analysis a 
step further, arguing that "the way in which we view 'nature' and the way in which we view 
such natural resources of the fishery are 'socially constructed' in terms of particular value 
orientations and the interests that these represent." He makes the point, grounded in Marxist 
political theory, that "it is inevitably the values of the 'dominant' classes in society which 
form the basis of state policy. To be sure, the choice of policy is likely related to the 
'interests' of those who are in charge of the state apparatus" (1995b: 45). 
Matthews ~iscusses, with reference to the work of Thomas Kuhn, how "paradigms" are 
constructed that incorporate particular interests, first translated into values, and then 
translated into management models. Preferring the term "metaphors" to describe these 
management paradigms, Matthews explains how two conflicting "metaphors" existed in the 
fishery, and were fundamental to the question: did Canada want a "social" fishery or an 
"economic" one? "At the moment" he writes "it is relatively clear that those who favour an 
economic fishery are in the ~scendancy, despite the fact that it was an emphasis on high 
economic gain which contributed significantly to the collapse of the fishery in the first 
place" (1995b: 49). 
64 For a discussion of ecophilosophy and the "construction" of nature see Hay (2002: 26-61). 
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Examining the values, which are reflective of the interests, upon which these competing 
metaphors were based, Matthews (1995b: 53) demonstrates that it was those that were 
associated with the social fishery metaphor, rather than those linked to the economic fishery 
metaphor, that also were closer to the basic assumptions and requirements of "sustainable 
development". The issue of equity and redistribution according to need, which is contained 
within the sustainability metaphor, was emphasised. In conclusion Matthews stressed that: 
in sum, "sustainability" is about interests and not altruism, and about the needs 
of mankind rather than the needs of nature. Until that is clearly recognized and 
management systems are developed to regulate the interests involved, then the 
fishery - like the rest of nature - remains endangered ( 1995b: 57). 
It is Matthew' s emphasis of the significance of interests that provides the important key to 
understanding past failures and future prospects for the fishery. But from the foregoing 
analysis it can be seen that regulating the interests involved would require that the 
fundamental political and power relationships of society would need to be reconfigured. 
This would clearly be resisted by those controlling the state apparatus and holding a 
concentration of power in an unequal society. 
3.6.6 A Systemic Explanation - Social and Political Structures Within 
Newfoundland Society that are Incompatible with Sustainability 
The foregoing discussion supports the case that Newfoundland's fisheries crisis is largely the 
consequence of a resource management culture that projects values based on underlying 
political structures and interests that are incompatible with sustainability. The history of 
Newfoundland and the fishery as discussed in relation to the work of writers such as Brox 
(1972), Alexander (1977), Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2001; 2002a; 2002b) and Sinclair (1985) 
provides additional support for this view and establishes that this social and political culture 
of Newfoundland (in which the political and economic disempowerment of outport people is 
linked to unsustainability in the fishery) is deeply rooted in its history. It has persisted 
through the transitions of government through various forms - merchant fiefdom-colony, 
dysfunctional representative government, the Commission of Government period, and 
confederation within the Canadian state. It has been the cause of recurring crises over the 
past century and a half in which political, economic, social and resource issues have been 
interlinked. This argument is not a novel one. It has a solid basis of support in 
Newfoundland folklore, and in the expression of this folklore in contemporary literature (for 
example, Wayne Johnston's [1999], The Colony of Unrequited Dreams). This basic 
argument gains strength and in turn provides validation for a similar case made with respect 
to resource management in Tasmania (Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002), which bears 
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comparison to Newfoundland and will be examined in the following chapter. The basic 
argument linking sustainability crisis to historically entrenched socio-political factors is also 
strengthened if it can be demonstrated that this socio-political cause of resource crisis is not 
just one of several contributing factors, but is an underlying "cause" of other critical factors, 
these then becoming identifiable as "symptoms" of the fundamental problem. 
Two key and widely acknowledged "causes" of the crisis were the failure of fishery science, 
and the buildup of excess capacity in the fishery. Finlayson's (1994) analysis of the failure 
of DFO science gives strong support to the position that this was a symptom of the politics of 
the fishery, and Wright (1997; 2001), Blackwood (1996) and others argue that the build up 
of excess capital capacity in the industrial sector of the fishery was due to policies favouring 
the industrial sector at the expense of the inshore fishery. This can be regarded as a 
symptom of a dysfunctional or "lopsided" political culture driving development policy in the 
fishery; one that served the vested interests associated with the industrial sector at the 
expense of the wider interests of the coastal populations. Understanding the underlying 
forces driving developments in the fishery provides a basis for interpreting the causes of 
fishery failure and understanding how these forces were sustained. 
3.6.7 How F[sheries Dysfunction was Sustained 
The failure of politicians to cut the TAC after 1989, as recommended by the revised DFO 
assessment process, illustrates the subservience of DFO science to political considerations in 
setting the TAC. By extension, it demonstrates the subservience of concern for sustainability 
to short term economic concerns, and thus the subservience of the common interest of all 
Newfoundlanders to the service of private, short-term interests favoured by the allocation of 
unsustainable TACs. It is acknowledged that the interests served had come to encompass a 
large number of people including members of inshore fishing households who worked in 
processing plants that serviced the offshore industry. They, more than most, would have 
experienced the tension caused by the conflicting interests of the inshore and offshore 
sectors. It is important to remember, in the context of the conflict between the inshore and 
offshore sectors (that essential underlying political issue of the fishery), Blackwood's (1996) 
observation that the setting of excessively high TACs served to allocate resources from the 
illshore to the offshore sector while a verbal pretence was maintained that the inshore sector 
received priority in allocation. Thus the interests of capital in the industrial sector could be 
served while pandering verbally to the concerns of the inshore sector. 
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The Minister for Fisheries could not bring himself to make the cuts recommended by the 
\ 
DFO in 1989-91 because of the social and economic costs this would impose on 
Newfoundland, and there was considerable uncertainty about the accuracy of the 
assessments. Too many people and too much capital were dependent on maintaining a level 
of income from the fishery that it could not sustain. The DFO had been an instrument in the 
buildup of this unsustainable capacity and, as Finlayson demonstrates, the agency over many 
years had misrepresented the status of the stock. It was thus complicit in producing and 
defending a false reality that served the interests of the industrial sector against those of the 
inshore fishery. Finlayson moderates his criticism of the 'individuals' working within the 
DFO, but he shows that the DFO as an 'institution' was dysfunctional in terms of its primary 
purpose - to provide sound scientific advice on the status of the stock as the basis for 
management of the fishery. Incentives and deterrents within the operating structures of the 
agency engineered consensus with the politically expedient falsehoods that were being 
perpetuated and served to discourage challenges to them. Individual scientists within the 
agency with the competence and integrity to assess the data and recognise that something 
was wrong, and to do something about it, did not have access to the data or were excluded 
from the inner circle that managed the stock assessment process, an inner circle in which 
consensus prevailed. Finlayson notes, however, "there are no villains in this piece; neither 
are there heroes" (1994: vii), these were ordinary people who were merely caught up in the 
' 
workings of a machine that was the product of the political environment in which the agency 
operated65. 
3.6.8 Why was the DFO Dysfunctional? 
The dysfunctionality of the DFO was symptomatic of the dysfunctional political and 
resource management culture in which it operated. A characteristic of this political culture is 
the tension between the demands of the populous inshore sector and those of the powerful 
vested interests of the capitalised industrial sector, a tension that induces a schizophrenic 
approach to policy. 
65 Comparisons may be drawn to the accounting failures that came to light in the stock market 
corrections of 2001-2002. The culture of dysfunctional accounting that was pervasive m the corporate 
world was highlighted in the discrediting of the firm of Arthur Anderson, involved in the Enron affair. 
There might appear to be less latitude for interpretive flexibility in the keeping of company accounts, 
than in the (more or less) prosaic art of stock assessment science. Other than a few token 
prosecutions, few corporate accountants have been charged as individuals for a corruption that was 
systemic in the corporate world. So long as the myth of increasing stock value could be maintained, 
few complained and criticism could be dismissed. It was only with the reality of the stock market 
value correction (like the reality of fishery failure) that the crisis of accounting integnty became an 
issue of widespread concern. 
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In any polity, governing elites experience a tension between the conflicting pressures to 
share resources, and to concentrate and control them. These tensions are amplified in 
societies in which the contradictions of democracy and social and economic dualism coexist. 
They may be more evident in numerically small, insular societies where the interaction 
between rich and poor is, by force of geographic and demographic circumstance, relatively 
intimate. Thus, the pressure to resort to economic expansionism to avoid having to confront 
these tensions is possibly greater in a small society where they may be experienced at a more 
personal level. 
Another expression of this systemic socio-political dysfunction in Newfoundland society can 
be seen in the way that public policy acted in the conflict between the interests of the inshore 
and offshore sectors. It was the cause of there being "too many fishermen and too many 
boats", or viewed from another perspective, too much technology and capital in the fishery 
requiring too much from the fish stocks and from the people of the fishery to sustain it. The 
overcapacity in the fishery and the dysfunctional overstating of the productive capacity of 
the stock were both symptoms of the same political and resource management culture, and 
each was also a contributing cause of the other. Overstating the productive capacity of the 
stocks was used to justify the buildup of excess capacity in the fishery; and once established, 
the excess capacity required that high TACs be allocated in order to sustain it economically, 
whilst unrealistically high stock assessments were required in order to justify the aJlocation 
of these unsustainably high TACs. 
From this overview, overfishing is seen to be as much a consequence as a cause of 
unsustainability. All the causes of overfishing: compromised science, expansionist policies, 
overcapacity, too many inshore fishermen, and too much capital investment, were symptoms 
as much as they were causes of Newfoundland's fisheries crisis. If we ask why they 
occurred we approach an understanding of the roots of the problem, a problem that is not 
easy to define as it lies within a complex of subjective and qualitative characteristics of 
Newfoundland society. 
3.6.9 The Politics of Over-Capacity, Scarcity, Dependence and Patronage 
A number of writers have commented on the effects of the unemployment insurance (UI) 
system in distorting the development of the Newfoundland fishery. Neis (1999) argues that 
the UI system entrenched familial and social patriarchy in the Newfoundland inshore fishery. 
Brox (1972: 22, 30-33) and Sinclair (1985: 109-110) discussed how the UI system served as 
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a subsidy to the frozen fillet processors rather than to the fishers, Brox noting that 
Newfoundland fishers received only about one third of the price for their catch from the 
processing plants, compared to the price received by fishers in other developed nations such 
as Norway, Iceland and Britain. Schrank (1995) and Burke and Brander (1995), among 
others, have also commented on the effect of the UI system on maintaining excess capacity.-
specifically, too many people involved in the inshore fishery. 
The UI system may be seen as a component of a complex system of patronage linking 
outport people, their communities, the processing corporations, the provincial government 
and the federal government. The UI system underwrote a politics of scarcity that was linked 
to the fish plant politics of the province. In order to qualify for UI payments, an individual 
had to work enough hours and accumulate enough UI stamps. (To qualify for the maximum 
level of benefit required the equivalent of about 10 weeks of full time work). In small 
outport communities where the fish processing plant might be the only potential employer, 
plant managers would have been in a position of considerable power. Not only could they 
control people's access to employment and income from work in the fish plants, they also 
controlled people's access to federal funds through the UI system because UI pay.ments were 
linked to the number of hours worked in the plants. Income from UI could amount to more 
money than the wages received for the work required to qualify for it. Plant managers also 
had some capacity to accept or reject fish offered for sale by fisherman and could use this 
power to keep down the price, and, as Sinclair (1985: 123) noted (and previously discussed)· 
fishermen would often sell fish in their own community for a lower price than they might 
have been able to get elsewhere in order to provide work in the local processing factory for 
other household members, neighbours and kin. The UI system, therefore, magnified the 
power that already resided in the hands of plant managers through their ability to control 
people's access to economic opportunity in isolated communities with almost no economic 
alternatives to the fish plants as buyers of fish and labour. The UI system, therefore, 
reinforced economic relationships that leant themselves to patronage and exploitation. In 
small communities where everybody knew what everybody else did and said there might be 
serious economic repercussions for individuals who incurred a plant-manager's ill will and it 
would be natural, in these circumstances, for resentment, distrust and division to occur. 
Scarcity. is the key to the exercise of power through control over the distribution of 
resources. In this case the opportunity to work in processing jobs or to sell fish in the fish 
plants represented economic resources. The plant managers could maintain scarcity of these 
resources by not putting on extra shifts to handle the early season gluts (a source of fisher 
discontent noted by Sinclair [1985: 137-149]). The threat of not accepting fish could be used 
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to put downward pressure on the price. Scarcity of work opportunities in the plants could be 
maintained in the same way. However, a local plant manager miglit develop a sense of 
affiliation with the interests of a particular community, but the corporations that owned many 
plants could play one community off against another. Overcapacity of processing plants 
allowed the corporations to shift work opportunities by trucking fish landed at one locality to 
a processing plant elsewhere. Thus, one community could be made to compete with another 
and this provided the corporations with considerable power over outport communities as a 
whole. The community itself might discourage 'troublemakers' from agitating to raise the 
price of fish or improve wages and conditions out of fear that all might suffer if the 
corporations shifted work, and the UI benefits that were tied to it, elsewhere. 
The patronage-based power associated with control by the corporations of scarce work 
opportunities was linked to the political structures of the province, and to some extent to 
those of the federal government. The economic well being of an isolated outport fishing 
community could be greatly influenced by whether or not it had a processing plant as a 
market for fish and a source of employment and UI income. The provincial government's 
role in licensing and funding fish plants, and exercising political discretion over where they 
should be located, could clearly present opportunities for political patronage of the most 
basic kind (for example, if a community did not vote the right way in an election, some other 
place might get the fish plant). The Newfoundland settlement pattern of numerous isolated 
communities lends itself particularly well to fish plant politics of this sort. The corporations 
could also engage in this politics of patronage between the provincial government and 
outport communities by controlling plant operations. Hence, provincial politicians needed 
the cooperation of the corporations. This underpinned the relationship between the two 
where the provincial government provided financial and policy benefits to the corporations 
in exchange, presumably, for cooperation with provincial government political objectives in 
outport electorates (see Sinclair 1985: 117-126). 
If a provincial politician could deliver a fish processing plant to a rural community; and if 
the plant could operate and employ people in the community long enough to qualify for UI 
(and this would need the cooperation of the company that ran the plant and could control the 
level of production); then the plant could attract a considerable amount of federal UI income 
to that community. Everyone would get something out of it. The plant workers would get 
wages and UI, and the fish corporations would get cheap, subsidised raw materials and, in 
effect, subsidised labour, not to mention various other provincial and federal subsidies. 
Politicians would presumably benefit through their ability to control, or at least influence, the 
distribution of this largesse. And the federal government would have paid for it all. The 
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question that arises is what was in it for the federal government? Why provide the financial 
resources? One explanation could rest on the value of the cultivation of economic 
dependency in the regions as a means of holding the Canadian federal system together. 
Separatist political sentiments are frequently expressed in Atlantic Canada. Quebec, as is 
widely known, with its pronounced cultural differences, has been fertile ground for a 
smouldering separatist movement that poses a threat to the cohesion of the Canadian 
federation. Separatist views are also fondly nurtured in Newfoundland where there is, a 
strongly entrenched folk tradition of blaming social, political and economic troubles on 
exploitative colonial or federal domination. Newfoundland's confederation with Canada was 
only achieved by a narrow margin after a hard fought campaign. There were also factions 
that strongly supported the re-establishment of independent self-government, and others that 
favoured the continuation of British colonial administration (for a literary interpretation of 
anti-confederationism see Johnston [2000]). Brox (1972: 4) and other commentators have 
suggested that the principal benefit of confederation for Newfoundland was access to the 
Canadian welfare system, UI for outport fishers in particular. But a counterpoint to these 
benefits was the abrogation of control of Newfoundland fisheries to Ottawa and the 
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In the wake of the 1992 collapse, and given 
the extent to which the DFO's mismanagement was implicated in the crisis, it is not 
surprising that there have been stronger claims for provincial management of the fishery. 
Cairns however (1995: 97), suggests that the "Pax Ottawa" with federal control over 
fisheries has some benefits for the smaller, island Maritime Provinces who would ot~erwise 
be more exposed to conflict over resources with the larger mainland provinces such as 
Quebec and Nova Scotia. Clearly, the benefits of transfer payments from Canada provide a 
strong counter-incentive to claims for independence. Over many years these transfer 
payments have served to maintain dependency of the provincial government, the fish 
processing corporations, and individual outport fishing families, on the federal system. 
However, these funding policies that served to establish and maintain economic dependency 
also contributed to the maintenance of dysfunctional social, political and economic structures 
in the Newfoundland fishery66 that contributed to expansionist pressure on the resource 
leading, ultimately, to resource collapse. 
66 These same dysfunctions, it should be noted, are also evident in federal development efforts in 
other provinces and are not exclusively a feature of the Newfoundland case. 
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3.6.10 Newfoundland's Fisheries Failure Compared with Norway's 
Successful Community Focused Fisheries Development 
Support for the theory that Newfoundland's cod crisis and the chronic difficulties that have 
plagued the fishery (and Newfoundland more generally) for much of its history is due to 
something systemic, some persistent, dysfunctional, structural or social factor .that is 
characteristic of Newfoundland, may be found in comparative studies with Northern 
Norway. Northern Norway has much in common with Newfoundland, and some important 
differences, that make it a useful case for comparative analysis. Norway also suffered a 
crisis in the cod fishery in the late 1980s, but was more successful in taking the necessary 
action to avert a stock collapse such as occurred in Newfoundland (Apostle and Mikalsen 
1995). Where the response to the impending crisis was too little and too late in 
Newfoundland, in Norway it had been prompt, decisive, and ultimately successful m 
averting stock collapse. Apostle and Mikalsen (1995) note that harvest cuts may actually 
have been even more severe than necessary to avert the Norwegian cod crisis of the 1980s. 
The Norwegian success was possible because the social, political, technical and economic 
conditions conducive to conservation and sustainable management were attributes of 
Norwegian society and its fishing industry. 
Like Newfoundland, Northern Norway has many small isolated coastal communities, 
traditionally dependent on cod fishing supplemented by other economic and subsistence 
activities. The climate, flora and fauna and geology of both places are similar and impose 
similar limits on agricultural prospects. The structure of Norway's coastal fishery in the 
1980s bore a superficial resemblance to Newfoundland's in that it comprised distinct inshore 
and offshore sectors. The Norwegian inshore sector was made up of around 17 OOO small, 
one or two man vessels ("Europe's Fish, Norway's Lessons", The Economist, 19/10/96: 72), 
comparable to the 20 OOO or so Newfoundland inshore fishers in the 1980s. There were also 
some larger purse seiners and long liners and a few large industrial trawlers. Like 
Newfoundland there was a natural conflict between the interests of the small-scale inshore 
fishers and the corporately structured industrial fishing operations. Bl.lt unlike 
Newfoundland, where for decades a corporatist industrial model of fisheries development 
had been advanced by the policies of both the federal and provincial governments, often in 
ways that clearly compromised the interests of the outport communities and inshore 
fishermen, in Norway fisheries policy had been much more concerned with sustaining rural, 
coastal communities and had been more responsive to their interests. 
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The inshore, fjord fisheries have historically been the reserve of local populations using 
traditional gear such as handlines, longlines and gill nets (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 290). 
While national policy favoured open-access, local populations have, since the 1950s, resisted 
the invasion of home waters by trawls and purse seines, and gear restrictions are enforced 
where necessary to conserve fish stocks (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994: 292-293). 
Apostle and Mikalsen (1995) note a number of important differences in the political and 
social cultures of Norway and Newfoundland that affect resource management policies and 
have a significant impact on shaping regional development. Unlike Newfoundland's 
industrial fishing and processing sectors which are dominated by one or two large, vertically 
integrated corporations, the Norwegian industry was characterised by hundreds of small, 
locally focused family firms embedded in small rural communities (Mariussen 1996: 27). In 
Norway there were various legal constraints that limited vertical integration. The marked 
class structure, symptomatic of dualism, that is a "clearcut bifurcation which divides direct 
or petty producers from the corporate sector" in the Newfoundland industry, is absent in 
Norway67 (Apostle and Mikalsen 1995: 102). In Norway the differences between the more 
industrialised trawlers and the smaller-scale fjord fisheries "reflects differences in 
technology and gear types rather than deep-rooted cleavages between distinct social classes" 
(Apostle and Mikalsen 1995: 102). 
The decision-making processes are also quite different in Norwegian and Canadian fisheries. 
Norwegian small-scale fishers are strongly represented by a national union with various 
affiliated bodies ("Europe's Fish, Norway's Lessons", The Economist, 19/10/96: 72). There 
is a well-developed collectivist political culture. Decision making is more dispersed and 
there is a longstanding tradition of consultation and representation of different groups in 
decision-making. This contributes to a culture within Norwegian fisheries of respect for the 
legitimacy of regulations. In contrast, Canadian fisheries policy-making has been much 
more hierarchical and unrepresentative of the views of a large part of the fisheries 
constituency. Among fishermen in Atlantic Canada there is a poorly developed sense of 
organisation and a marked culture of "distrust" of representative processes and decision-
making outcomes (Apostle and Mikalsen 1995). 
Norway is also well ahead of Atlantic Canada in supporting coastal communities with 
infrastructure and services such as health, education and welfare systems so that in Norway 
67 Apostle and Mikalsen (1995) also note that this social division is less pronounced in Nova Scotia 
indicating that this dualism is particularly pronounced in Newfoundland. 
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rural residents are not disadvantaged. Norway's small-scale fishers have been protected 
from excessive capital involvement in the industry by regulations that recognised the 
necessity to protect Norway's regionalised approach to social and economic development 
(Wise 1996: 144). This contrasts with Newfoundland where, for decades, government 
policies have favoured, albeit with limited success, concentration and centralisation of 
population and the withdrawal of services. Apostle and Mikalsen (1995: 109) note that in 
studies of regional development and local communities, Norwegians are more likely to 
question "conventional assumptions" about the desirability of centralized production, and 
they do tend to "criticize public policies, and discuss alternative scenarios". The culture 
therefore seems to be less politically constrained in Norway than in Newfoundland. Brox 
(2000) discusses how local democratic forces working through the national parliament were 
effective in resisting attempts to impose central planning in Norway's coastal regions in the 
1970s. 
In the 1960s Brox observed differences between Norway and Newfoundland (Brox 1972: 6, 
27-36, 70-90), noting that various policies in Newfoundland were causing neglect and 
economic decline in the outports and fostering the entrenchment of a dual society in the 
fishery with a widening gap between the inshore fishery and the corporate industrial sector. 
He linked this political culture to a historically persistent pattern of political constraint on the 
development of Newfoundland's coastal communities, a pattern that regulated resource 
development to serve exploitative interests. These characteristics were symptomatic of and 
contributed to reproducing a political and resource management culture in Newfoundland 
that contained internal contradictions and was dependent on economic expansion, and 
federal subsidies, if it was to avoid confronting them. This ultimately made it impossible for 
the necessary restraint to be exercised in the Newfoundland fishery to avert the resource 
collapse of 1992. 
The theory that Newfoundland's resource crisis was a consequence of a particular 
Newfoundland culture that shaped and was expressed in social, political and resource 
management structures and practices, and that was itself the legacy of deeply-rooted and 
historically entrenched forces that had shaped Newfoundland society and culture, in contrast 
to Norway where, with a similar resource base and dispersed settlement pattern, more 
sustainable resource management outcomes are linked to a different social and political 
environment, finds some support in the landmark work of Putnam (1993) on civic culture. 
Putnam (1993: 123-157) contrasted northern and southern Italy, and demonstrated that 
dysfunctional characteristics of corruption, the lack of civic culture, economic failure, 
traditions of patronage and clientalism, the failure of democratic institutions of government, 
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and incidentally, a preoccupation with property rights, persisted in societies (South Italian 
case studies) over periods of hundreds of years (Putnam 1993: 135, 154), even within a 
national institutional framework (the Italian state) that also contained societies (North Italian 
case studies) that were, by contrast, well governed, prosperous and enriched by wellbeing 
values associated with functional democratic institutions and well developed civic values. 
Putnam emphasised the importance of indicators of civic culture and the association of a 
healthy civil society with other factors such as effective institutional function. Putnam's 
linking of civic culture and institutional function with social and political characteristics 
rooted in history has been taken up by other writers studying the functionality of societies 
elsewhere. Young (1995), for example, made reference to Putnam's work to explain 
dysfunctional resource management in Tasmania and, in a similar manner, it provides 
conceptual support for the argument that the difference between Norway's apparently greater 
success at achieving sustainable fisheries in contrast to Newfoundland's failure may be due 
to social and political characteristics rooted in history68. 
There is a danger in accepting too wholeheartedly, explanations that lean toward historical 
determinism (or geographic determinism). This can establish a sense of inevitability and 
lead to apathy, acceptance and a fatalistic view of things69. While this is not an uncommon 
attitude ju Newfoundland, it is not helpful in generating the necessary energy to try to 
change things for the better, and sometimes crisis creates the temporary instability that 
provides a window of opportunity for change. Nevertheless, there is also a danger in 
disregarding the long term influence of history on shaping society as this may lead to a 
failure to acknowledge the role of deeply-rooted cultural factors as the underlying cause of 
serious dysfunction, and the corresponding failure, therefore, to recognise the interests, 
structures and policies that encourage dysfunctional characteristics to persist, rather than 
addressing them and attempting to reshape a society to a form more commensurate with 
sustainability. 
68 These issues could also be approached from a range of other research perspectives, for example, is 
the contrast with Norway due to the fact that Norwegians are "native" whereas Newfoundlanders are 
"colonists"? Or that Norway is more protectiomst while Newfoundland more subject to a "wild west" 
free market ethic? Is the constraint on political culture in Newfoundland specific to that province or a 
more general attribute of "small islandness"? And if the latter then how have some other small islands 
succeeded in managing their fisheries relatively well? 
69 There is also a danger of complacency. In Norway the fishermen's union had been for years an 
effective force in resisting attempts by the Norwegian government to impose a quota management 
system that would have promoted concentration and inequality in the fishing industry. Quota were 
introduced as a temporary measure to manage a crisis, and then they became entrenched, as powerful 
vested interests who had benefited disproportionately from the quota system, while not being 
representative of the general membership, gained control of the national fishermen's union (Hersoug, 
Holm and Ranes 2000). Concerns with these developments were discussed in chapter 2. 
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3.6.11 Newfoundland's Fisheries Failure Compared with Iceland's Successful 
Industrial Fisheries Development 
The apparent success of Iceland's development of its fisheries based economy has also been 
a subject of comparison with Newfoundland's failure (Jonsson 1995). Icelandic fisheries 
were developed along a more industrial path than Norway's community centred approach or 
Newfoundland's path of schizophrenic dualism. Modernisation and economic efficiency of 
production was promoted and the outcome was apparently successful, both economically and 
socially. This success is held up as a model by proponents of industrialisation and economic 
rationalisation in Newfoundland. But industrialisation of fisheries in Iceland was different to 
the process in Newfoundland for reasons that can be understood in socio-political terms. 
Structural transformation in Iceland was achieved in an inclusive manner, by incorporating 
the people and their interests in the process, rather than by coercion. Amason (1995) 
identifies two important features of Iceland's fisheries success. He suggests that Iceland's 
independence meant that there were no economic subsidies from a large federal state to 
support the fishery economy. Thus, necessity provided the motivation to take hard 
decisions, such as the push for the 200 nautical mile limit, and the necessity to manage the 
fisheries efficiently in economic terms. 
Jonsson (1995) and Amason and Felt (1995a: 287-304) also explain some important 
differences between Iceland and Newfoundland. The Icelandic population, by comparison to 
Newfoundland's, is highly educated and literate and it is more mobile. People are ?appy to 
move from one place to another or from one coastal community to Reykjavik. They do not 
feel so embedded in, nor have such a tendency to cling to their particular outport community 
as Newfoundlanders do. They are less paroquial. Also Iceland does not have the same long 
tradition and history of fishing that Newfoundland has. Pastoral land ownership and sheep 
grazing historically provided the basis of the economy and political relations in Iceland. 
Until World War I fishing was mainly for local use, and of secondary importance. Iceland is 
also jurisdictionally simple compared to Newfoundland, with none of the complications of 
the Newfoundland/Canadian multi-tiered system of government. 
If Newfoundland had developed economic spin-offs in fishery related industries these would 
have increased the value of the fishery economy to the province without requiring expansion 
of the harvest. While Iceland has been able to modernise its fisheries, market its products 
effectively, and develop fishing technologies that it can market to the world such as nets and 
computerised processing eq~ipment, Newfoundland has not developed similar economic 
opportunities in the production of technological inputs to fishing and processing. The 
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Newfoundland fishery uses "Norwegian plastic tubs", nets and processing equipment 
designed and manufactured in Iceland, "American and German navigational equipment", and 
other processing equipment from Sweden and Germany (Felt and Locke 1995: 232). 
There may be a downside to Iceland's industrialisation of the fisheries sector, linking 
industrialisation per se to threats to sustainability. Iceland's fleet has developed a fishing 
capacity far in excess of its own fishery resource base, and it fishes in waters all around the 
world, creating the potential to generate resource conflicts with other nations; Amason and 
Felt (1995b: 22) note conflict in the Barents Sea in which Norwegian patrol boats were used 
to force Icelandic trawlers out of an area claimed by Norway. And, as discussed in chapter 
2, concerns have been expressed about the way ITQ based systems have been introduced into 
the Icelandic fishery, effectively privatising fishery resources that are so important to the 
economic wellbeing of all the Icelandic people (see, for example, Eythorsson [.2000]; 
Hannibalsson [2001]). 
3.6.12 A Utopian Alternative for Newfoundland's Fisheries? 
Comparison with Norway and Iceland emphasises the failure in Newfoundland to develop an 
economically viable fishing industry based on the cod resource, the failure to prevent 
unsustainable fishing leading to resource collapse, and the failure to manage the resource in 
such a way that it could sustain viable, healthy communities and lifestyles for 
Newfoundland's coastal populations. Many past critics of these failures have expressed the 
belief that they were not inevitable. Comparisons with Norway and Iceland suggest that 
there were no insurmountable problems of a technical, economic or resource nature that 
could not have been overcome if the right social and political conditions existed ·to guide 
resource management in a direction conducive to equity and sustainability. Many put 
forward solutions, often of a technical or policy framework nature that they believe would 
alleviate some of the causes of dysfunction, as they perceive them. Rationalists have 
advocated the simple solution of population reduction to address the resource problems of 
coastal Newfoundland. Schrank (1995), for example, divided the number ·of inshore 
fishermen by the total annual value of the fishery and showed that this could only provide a 
low average income. His solution was to reduce fishermen numbers in order to raise average 
incomes to a level closer to the Canadian norm. Researchers more grounded in the social 
sciences recognise a range of undervalued opportunities to sustain coastal communities. 
Researchers such as Brox (1972: 44-48) had a more holistic approach to economic analysis. 
Brox demonstrated that the quality of life of outport people, and indeed their standard of 
living if subsistence economic activities were factored into the analysis, was higher in the 
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outports where they had access to a range of resources, than that of wage earners (such as 
those working in the frozen fish sector on trawlers and in the plants) Jiving in urban centres. 
Brox showed that this was true in spite of the cash incomes from outport fishing being a 
fraction of the cash wages for urban workers. 
The importance of subsistence activities and access to a range of natural resources 
underpinned traditional outport life. It accounted for the resilience of outport communities 
and their ability to survive through the difficult economic times associated with periodic 
downturns in the fishery. Sinclair, Squires and Downton (1999: 333) have shown the 
continuing, or increased importance of these activities to household economies in the wake 
of the 1992 fishery crisis. Brox (1972), Ommer (1999), Cadigan (2002a; 2002b), 
. Omohundro (1994), and others have all described the traditional contribution of subsistence 
production to outport household economies that was dependent on access to land and marine 
resources that were considered as "commons" by outport people. Forests provided timber 
for firewood and for building boats and houses. The land also yielded meat from moose, 
caribou and hares, and partridgeberries, blueberries and cloudberries that could be preserved 
in various ways. The sea provided cod, and also seals and other fish for household 
consumption as well as for cash sales. This "economic" productivity was often overlooked 
by state bureaucrats who tend to be concerned primarily with "financial" activity because 
this is the economic activity that the state can gain partial access to as a source of revenue. 
Subsistence activities also work against the development of consumer economies. Corporate 
interests and the state have a shared interest in undermining them by favouring the industrial 
appropriation of fisheries and other "common" resources by capital. It is not therefore 
surprising that bureaucrats had a tendency to view the cod fishery as the only significant 
resource of the outports. Newell and Ommer (1999b: 367) point out the shortcomings of 
state policies shaped by a focus on short-term economic growth rather than community 
economic development. 
Brox (1972), Alexander (1977), Charles (1995; 1998) and many others have contributed to 
an alternative vision based on a different economic perspective. Charles (1998: 48) 
advocates adjusting harvest methods "to maximise benefits to society per fish caught, 
thereby increasing income and employment levels without killing more fish" and promoting 
"livelihood diversification by creating employment alternatives outside the fishery and by 
encouraging multi-occupationality among fishers, so as to reduce the reliance on fishing in 
coastal communities". Brox (1972: 80-84) and.Alexander (1977) comment on the lack of 
development of value-adding opportunities in the outports and identify government policies 
as the cause. Charles (1995) comments on the perversity of cutting off the part-time or 
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casual fishers from access to the resource during attempts at rationalisation. He points out 
that they are the fishers who have the least impact on the stocks. Another consideration, if 
one is concerned about sustaining coastal communities and promoting economic 
diversification, is that the part-time fishers are likely to be those who have found or 
developed economic opportunities outside of the fishery. Their overall viability may 
nevertheless still depend on the contribution of fishing to the household economy. fu terms 
of contributing to community sustainability and promoting economic diversity and 
resilience, three part-time fishers who also do other things will likely have greater value than 
one full-time fisher. 
Those whose interests involve them in the debate over jurisdictional issues look to Iceland 
with its simple system, and argue for greater Provincial autonomy over fisheries 
management. They appeal to separatist sentiments, which have remained strong in 
Newfoundland, since the time of federation. 
The unemployment insurance system has also received much criticism. While it brought 
cash income into coastal households it distorted social and political relations in the fishery 
and provided incentives that contributed to overfishing, to the build up of excess capacity in 
harvesting and processing, and arguably locked many into dependency and unproductive 
lifestyles in the inshore fishery by discouraged outport people from see.king education, new 
opportunities, or developing alternative economic activities to supplement fishing. If the 
\ 
financial transfer to the outports that occurred through the UI system had been managed 
differently, some of its damaging effects might not have occurred. The subsidies that 
encouraged overfishing were an obvious problem. The failure of government policies to 
develop in coastal and rural Newfoundland, communities that valued education, were 
confident and had a well developed civic culture can also be attributed, though less explicitly 
to the way that government financial transfers to the communities was administered. 
Literacy levels in rural Newfoundland were, for example, comparable to those of the third 
world and were a justifiable cause for shame (Dr. Arthur May, President Emeritus, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, personal communication, 2002). The failure to develop 
communities able to engage effectively in decision-making that affected their livelihoods and 
their futures can be seen as an important underlying cause of resource management failure. 
While it is easy to criticise, especially from a distance, and to suggest utopian solutions 
based on theoretical models or comparative studies with other North Atlantic fishing regions, 
in practice the difficulties of developing Newfoundland's fishing communities have been a 
challenge and a source of frustration to the efforts of generations of competent and dedicated 
people. This serves to demonstrate the power and inertia of historically entrenched patterns 
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of social and political culture, and, perhaps, the difficulties of achieving change in a 
globalised, resource dependant society. 
3.6.13 Plus ea Change? The Newfoundland Fishery in 2003 
Debate in the mid 1990s emphasised the need for substantial structural reform to the fishery 
if the cycle of crisis was to be broken. That is not to say that there was agreement on the 
direction this reform should take. Those who adhered to the "economic fishery paradigm" 
advocated a substantial reduction in the number of people with access to the fishery and the 
further development of management methods based on market tools such as individual 
transferable quota. Adherents to the "social fishery paradigm" on the other hand, argued that 
this approach would serve to perpetuate the underlying structural, social and political causes 
of the crisis. Their arguments suggested the need for a very different economic agenda, but a 
difficult one to articulate in terms of simple, easy-to-grasp "solutions" to the symptoms of 
the crisis because the required reforms are substantial, complex and holistic in nature. More 
than a decade since the 1992 crisis there have been some significant changes in the fishery, 
yet in many ways there is also a sense that some of the fundamental structural characteristics 
linked to the crisis remain unchanged. 
Unexpectedly, following the collapse of the cod stock, the value of total sea-fish landings in 
Newfoundland remained at about $200 million, and increased in the mid 1990s to an all time 
high of around $250 million (Roy 1997). While cod had collapsed, there was a boom in 
snow crab and shrimp fisheries. This was likely no coincidence. The collapse of cod 
probably reduced their predatory impact and competition for food with shellfish stocks, and 
there might be other, more complex ecological interactions involved (Vardy et al. 1998). 
However, the boom in shellfish landings did not compensate many of those whose lives were 
affected by jobs lost from the cod fishery (Roy 1997). Felt and Locke (1995: 219) estimated 
the Newfoundland fisheries employed only about 10 per cent the workforce in 1995 that they 
had in the 1980s. Crabs and shrimp require less processing than cod and so provide fewer 
jobs in fish plants. The harvesting sectors also provide fewer jobs. Shrimp fishing is very 
much an industrial process, more capital and less labour intensive than the traditional inshore 
cod fishery. The lobster fishery in the Maritime Provinces is a limited-entry fishery but it 
may, in time, become regulated by ITQ (Apostle, McCay and Mikalsen 2002: 116). The 
crab fishery is controlled by limited entry and quota, and relatively few fishermen had access 
to this resource. The boom in this sector made some fishers very wealthy but the benefits 
were not widely shared (McCay 1999; Cox 2003). 
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The crab and shrimp fisheries are not without problems. Vardy et al. (1998), in a report to 
the Provincial Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture and the Minister of Environment and 
Labour identified a number of problems relating to the price settlement mechanisms 
operating in the crab fishery. These included concern that prices paid to Newfoundland 
harvesters were lower than the price fishers received in other places in the Maritimes and in 
Quebec. The report also found that controllable quality factors were an issue of concern and 
suggested the need for a pricing system that recognised and rewarded high quality. It 
identified problems related to a lack of trust between processors and harvesters, and 
recommended the removal of constraints on the export of crab in unprocessed form, 
constraints which forced harvesters to sell to Newfoundland processors. The report also 
recommended that alternative sources of financing be investigated to reduce the dependence 
of fishers on financing provided by the processors. These issues of economic dependency of 
fishers on the processors, low prices, poor quality, and lack of trust; issues sometimes 
entrenched by regulatory constraints; are the familiar dysfunctional characteristics noted of 
the Newfoundland fisheries throughout the twentieth century as discussed above. 
Familiar problems are also evident in the shrimp fishery. In a review of the industry, Vardy, 
Peters and Delaney (2002) found there was overcapitalisation in the processing and 
harvesting sectors; problems relating to quality and handling, and processing practices that 
were not as good as those of European competitors. Oversupply in European markets was 
the cause of a serious price decline, and the fishery had been shut down in July 2001 due to 
unfavourable market conditions caused by a glut. The report recommended the enforcement 
of quota limits to support prices, not for conservation reasons. 
Ten years and more since the moratorium was first introduced, the Northern cod stocks have 
not recovered. In May 2003 the cod crisis was re-ignited by the closure of the relatively 
small cod fisheries that operated off southwest Newfoundland in the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
(Bartlett 2003; Dean-Simmons and Ryan 2003; Musseau 2003). Fierce political 
recriminations inflamed a media debate, with arguments reminiscent of those of the 1990s. 
But the scale of this crisis was less extensive. Fewer fishers remained in the fishery by this 
time, but those who did suffered an intense sense of loss that was widely shared in the gulf 
coast communities. Provincial politicians denounced the closures and castigated the Federal 
Fisheries Minister, Robert Thibault for the decision. But indications are that these stocks 
had dwindled to a very low level and the closure was necessary. Nevertheless, the question 
remains: why have Newfoundland's cod stocks not recovered? 
133 
Chapter 3 Newfoundland 
One theory is that seals are to blame. McLaren et al. (2001) in a Report of the Eminent 
Panel on Seal Management, prepared for Fisheries and Oceans Canada, reported that harp 
seal populations increased substantially during the 1980s and early 1990s because of a 
reduced seal harvest. Higher harvest levels in Canada and Greenland from the mid-1990s 
appear to have stabilised populations at around 5.2 million. A view contained in the report, 
though one contested by some members, suggests that seal predation may pose a threat to the 
recovery of northern cod. There was also speculation that a reduction in seal numbers would 
likely lead to an increase in cod stocks, but this in the longer term might lead to reduced 
TACs for crab and shrimp (2001: vi). Stenson, Hammill and Lawson (1997) estimated the 
harp seal populatio~ in eastern Canada at 4.8 million animals in 1994, and growing larger. 
They estimated that seals consumed 88 OOO tons (95% C.I. 46 000-140 OOO) of Atlantic cod 
off eastern Canada and 54 OOO tons (95% C.I. 14 000-102 OOO) in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 
They also consumed over a million tons of capelin in these areas ( capelin are an important 
prey species for cod). It seems reasonable to speculate that seals may be exerting pressure 
on the depressed cod stocks and hindering their recovery. 
In addition to predation from other species, human fishing activity has also continued to put 
some pressure on the stocks. Cod are taken as bycatch in other fisheries and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that misreporting of bycatch and deliberate poaching also occur, and with 
such ongoing pressure, it is perhaps no surprise that the stocks, generally, have not 
recovered70. 
3.6.14 Does Sustainability Matter? If So, to Whom Does it Matter? 
Does sustainability matter? If the events of 1977-1992 were to be repeated would a different 
course be taken? If the cod could be restored to their former abundance tomorrow, would it 
be allowed to happen? The collapse of the cod fishery could, from some perspectives, be 
regarded as a beneficial event. It broke the nexus between the Newfoundland fishery and the 
outport communities that was based on centuries of traditional access, a connection that has 
vexed policy makers for generations. The collapse contributed to the transformation of the 
fishery by providing an excuse to separate most of the outport fishing people from access to 
the marine resources, and with the help of providence in the form of booming shellfish 
stocks it served the transformation towards a more modem, industrialised industry, and one 
that is based on private property rights as in the case of the quota based crab fishery. Crab 
70 These anecdotal observations were based on casual discussions with people in St John's during 
September 2002. 
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and shrimp fishing interests would not want to see the cod recover if this would reduce 
productivity of these fisheries and the financial value that has come to be associated with 
rights of access to them. And if the cod were to recover tomorrow, would Newfoundland be 
flooded by tens of thousands of returning natives, demanding a resumption of traditional 
outport lifestyles linked to the cod fishery? This prospect would not appeal to those interests 
that benefited most from the collapse71 . From their perspective, it might be better if the cod 
did not recover too soon n, at least not before the cultural traditions and the legitimacy of the 
claims of the coastal people to access to the fishery have had time to die. And what of the 
seals? Are their populations out of balance, and their predatory impact preventing the re-
establishment of cod to their normal role in the North Atlantic ecosystem? Should they be 
severely culled? Or are they keeping cod stocks under control, protecting shellfishing 
interests from the potential depredations of rebuilt cod stocks? Seal culling is always 
controversial. It would not be surprising if shellfishing interests adopted a "conservationist" 
stance on the issue if they believe that large numbers of seals have an ecological impact that 
serves their interests. The sustainability of the cod fishery did not and does not matter to 
everyone. It probably matters most to people with a link to the traditional outport cod 
fisheries. Many of them are among the tens of thousands of Newfoundlanders who have 
emigrated from the island to seek new lives in Toronto, Alberta and British Columbia in the 
decade following 1992, reducing the total population of Newfoundland by 12 per cent 
(Simpson 2003); but will the next generation, reared in these places with their greater 
diversity of opportunities, be grateful, thirty years from now, that the cod collapsed and freed 
their parents from dependency and limited expectations in isolated outports? But from a 
broader perspective the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fisheries also matters to the rest of 
humankind - those not affected by local Newfoundland interests, but who recognise that the 
failure of the Newfoundland fishery represents the failure of a part of an interconnected 
system upon which all life and, ultimately, human wellbeing on this planet depends. Belief 
that the failure of a part of this system may throw increasing pressure on the remaining parts, 
justifies concern by humanity in general about the failure of the Newfoundland cod fishery. 
71 The collapse and subsequent non-recovery of the cod has also played into the hands of petroleum 
interests active in the former fishing grounds, allowing for seismic testing, drilling and pollution that 
might otherwise have been more heavily resisted. The appearance and rapid expansion of the oil and 
gas sector immediately after 1992 is not a mere coincidence. 
72A colleague (Denbeigh Armstrong, PhD candidate, University of Tasmania, personal 
communication, 2003) reported an incident she observed in 2002 aboard a lobster fishing boat 
operated from Prince Edward Island that may reflect a lack of interest in cod conservation by people 
with shellfishing interests. When a fairly large cod was brought up in a lobster pot, it was removed 
and allowed to flop and gasp on the deck. The fisherman, apparently motivated by my colleague's 
concern for the cod said something hke "you want to see it go back in the water, don't you?" and then 
pushed the fish overboard; apparently more out of consideration for my colleague's wishes than for 
the wellbeing of the cod stocks. 
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And the failure adds to the mounting evidence of humanity's seeming inability, in some 
circumstances, to resist the tendency toward unsustainability. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of the chapter was to explore the causes of the Newfoundland fisheries crisis of the 
early 1990s and, in particular, to examine how broader historical and social factors may have 
contributed to it. In the years following the moratorium it was clearly established that the 
collapse was caused by overfishing73, but a closer examination of the underlying causes of 
overfishing reve!ils a complex of interconnected factors, and the tangled interlinking of 
causes and effects permits differences of interpretation, focus and priority. For example, 
overfishing might be blamed on overcapacity, and the buildup of overcapacity blamed on the 
errors of fishery science. Alternatively, reversing the order of cause and effect, the errors of 
fishery science could be regarded as a consequence of excess capacity in the fishery, which 
generated the political pressures on the science branch of the DFO to produce models that 
supported unsustainable levels of harvest. Both explanations are correct, or at least partially 
so to the ·extent that simple linear pathways can explain complex systems. Complicating 
matters further, there were also different perspectives on overcapacity, some emphasising 
capital and advances in fishing technology and efficiency as the cause of a problem that 
others perceived in terms of "too many people". There were also many other factors 
involved including the unemployment insurance system, jurisdictional issues relating to 
confederation with Canada, the hegemony of the economic/industrial fishery paradigm and 
the structural and economic forces that flowed from this, and the dysfunctional attitudes 
(with respect to conservation) that were engendered in fisheries managers, corporations and 
among (some) fishers themselves. Many of these "causes" are also symptoms of other 
conditions and this suggests that one needs to look further in order to discover the root 
causes of the crisis and to understand why a seemingly modern, rational, democratic society, 
equipped with the latest advances in fishery science and centuries of accumulated experience 
in the fishery, should have failed, so decisively, to manage sustainably, the principal natural 
resource upon which its coastal communities depended. 
Many of the issues introduced in chapter 2 were notable features of the Newfoundland 
fishery. In particular, competition between the inshore and offshore sectors was a central 
theme and one that was fundamental to other confliCts. This competition could be viewed in 
73 Though, as discussed, this was seriously contested m the aftermath of the stock collapse by several 
theories such as those attributing the collapse to environmental factors. 
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different ways; as conflict between labour and capital, conflict between small-scale fishers 
and the frozen fish corporations, conflict between the outport communities and the centre, 
and, perhaps of most significance, conflict over matters of ethos and ideology between the 
"social fishery" and the "economic fishery" paradigms. Similar conflicts are common, 
indeed they seem to be a natural feature of fisheries and other primary production systems 
worldwide. But societies differ in how they manage these natural conflicts, and these 
differences provide insight into underlying causes of the Newfoundland crisis. Comparison 
with Norway, in particular, lends support to the argument that the sustainability crisis in the 
Newfoundland fishery is linked to dysfunctional characteristics peculiar to Newfoundland 
itself. While the Newfoundland fishery was characterised by conflict, competition and 
inequality, the Norwegian fishery was (at least through the 1980s) characterised by 
cooperation, and a sense of ethics, community integrity and cohesion built upon shared and 
common interests, and this is linked to sustainable fisheries management in Norway. Jentoft 
articulates this concept, arguing that just as "viable fisheries communities require viable fish 
stocks", the reverse is also true: "viable fish stocks require viable fisheries communities": 
Communities that disintegrate socially and morally are a threat to fish stocks. 
Oveifishing results when the norms of self-restraint, prudence and community 
solidarity have eroded. It occurs when fishermen do not care about their 
resources, their community and about each other. Then, their ability to 
communicate among themselves, to agree and to cooperate is lost. Instead, 
their social relations are featured with opportunism, strife and conflict. Hence, 
their capacity for collective action becomes severely weakened (2000: 54). 
Newfoundland's failure could be linked to characteristics such as those discussed above74. 
But what was the cause of this community dysfunction? Fisheries policies, post World War 
II, had played a part in fostering social and economic dualism and conflict in the 
Newfoundland fishery in contrast to Norway where policies gave greater emphasis to 
furthering social equality and supporting community development in isolated coastal regions. 
This is salient to the "social fishery" versus "economic fishery" debate and as Jentoft points 
out, "economic" fisheries management systems that feature limited entry and private 
property rights tend to increase social stratification, and therefore contribute to undermining 
the structural characteristics that are essential to sustainability. But fisheries policies 
themselves are affects as well as causes; they are generally symptoms of the social 
conditions from which they emerge and they serve to reinforce established cultural and 
structural characteristics. Inequality and exploitation were persistent features of the fishery 
and its regulation from the sixteenth century onwards, and this provides the basis of an 
74 This quote can be regarded as referring to the Newfoundland fishery as a whole including the 
dragger and trawler sectors. As discussed in the section dealing with Cadigan's work (1999a, 1999b, 
2001, 2002a), community ethics can and do appear in Newfoundland coastal communities. 
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argument that links Newfoundland's problems to historically rooted and culturally 
perpetuated socio-economic conditions. Cadigan (1999a; 1999b), for example, showed how 
policies that favoured capital expansion undermined conservation attempts in the nineteenth 
century. Alexander (1977) attributed the decline of the saltfish trade after World War II to 
the lopsided distribution of power in Newfoundland and to the inability, within the fishery, 
to organise cooperative action and effective policies. Brox (1972) identified inequality 
(dualism), and the regulatory "conversion barriers" that served to maintain it as a significant 
hindrance to social and economic development in the fishery in the 1960s. Sinclair (1985) 
described how policies in the 1970s and 1980s fostered inequality and conflict in the fishery 
and Wright (1997; 2001), Blackwood (1996), Finlayson (1994) and other researchers, as 
discussed in the chapter, showed how the "attitudes" of policy makers, which favoured the 
corporate sector while marginalizing the interests of outport fishing people, contributed to 
the fishery's collapse. Thus, there is strong support for an argument that inequality, deeply 
rooted in Newfoundland's history and maintained by cultural and structural forces, is a key 
underlying cause of recurring political, economic and resource management crises in 
Newfoundland, including the fishery crisis of the 1990s. But the origins of inequality in 
Newfoundland are inextricably linked to geography and the economic nature of the cod 
resource, which shaped Newfoundland's settlement pattern and the evolution of social and 
cultural traditions. A description of Newfoundland society from the 1960s noted: 
The smallness and scattering of the population have influenced the 
Newfoundland character. Isolation bred individuality and self-sufficiency, but 
it also extracted a heavy toll. Customs changed slowly; J 61h -century methods of 
fishing and fish-curing persisted; new ideas were rare and were resented; there 
was a marked weakness in co-operation, individualism of the most 
uncompromising sort having been nurtured in long years of near self-
subsistence (Authors unknown [Encyclopaedia Britannica] 1965: 339)75. 
What is lacking in this description is acknowledgement of the extreme economic dependency 
that has always been the pervasive condition of the Newfoundland fishery and the people 
who have lived by it. The richness of the fishery resource coupled with poor prospects for 
agriculture or other economic options has meant that since the 1500s the fishery had been 
dependent on exporting its produce to global markets and importing many of the necessities 
of subsistence and production. This dependence has made the fishery susceptible to 
exploitation by merchant capital engaged in global trade, and vulnerable to the effects of 
international trade relations. In chapter 2 the worldwide ascendancy of neoliberal 
75 Objection to this generalised description may arise from those with experience of long-standing and 
celebrated traditions of mutual assistance in rural Newfoundland. This encyclopedia quote may 
reflect a more distant, urban perspective. 
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globalisation was discussed, and many of its features have, for five centuries, been 
characteristic of the Newfoundland fishery. Social fragmentation, inequality, employment 
and Income insecurity and poverty have been discussed in both contexts and linked to the 
individualism and lack of co-operation that undermines sustainability. The Newfoundland 
case study, therefore, supports the view that fisheries management policies that promote 
selfish interests, inequality and community fragmentation ultimately undermine the moral 
characteristics of a society that are essential prerequisites to sustainability. This key point 
will be explored in the following chapters with respect to resource management case studies 
in Tasmania and Pakistan. 
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Figure 4.2 Lobster fishing boats in front of the old Henry Jones warehouses, Hobart 
4.1 Introduction 
An argu ment presented in chapter 3 linked sustainability failure of the Newfoundland cod 
fi shery to deeply rooted dysfunctional characteri sti cs of Newfoundland society. Entrenched 
social dualism was identi fied as a key factor, the ori gins of which were found to lie in the 
long hi story of European settlement and to social and political structures that were associated 
with the way that its fi sheries have been regulated. The analys is in chapter 3 touched on 
many of the interlinked issues discussed in chapter 2, and the interpretation of the causes of 
Newfoundland's cod crisis is supported by the work of researchers such as Jentoft (2000: 54) 
and Charles ( 1994) who have argued that the characteri stics of a community - factors such as 
equity and cohe iveness and the ability to advance common over vested interests - were 
determinants of the ability to exist sustainabl y; to remain vi able within the constraints of 
natural resource limits. These arguments are salient to the ongoing debate in fi shery 
management between advocates of "social" versus "economic" fi sheries management 
paradigms. Management models that emphasise economic effic iency may (it has been 
shown) generate soc ial consequences, like inequality, that contribute to community 
dysfuncti on, resource management dysfunction, and ultimately sustainability fa ilure . 
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The aim of chapter 4 is to examine marine resource management in Tasmania in a manner 
that lends itself to comparison with the Newfoundland case. To this end, Tasmania's 
settlement history is outlined and a number of similarities are noted with the history of 
Newfoundland. These relate at one level to the cultural evolution of both places as 
components of the British colonial system, but the comparison goes beyond this to examine 
the effects and causes of entrenched social dualism which, for different historical reasons, 
has been a particular characteristic of both places. The nineteenth century European 
settlement of Tasmania occurred through the establishment of a convict colony. This was an 
intensely stratified and hierarchical society, and governing institutions and patterns of 
resource distribution were put in place with the specific purpose of maintaining this social 
order. The chapter examines how social and political dualism was reinforced in Tasmania 
by regulation associated with an entrenched political and resource management culture. It 
demonstrates the persistence of this culture and illustrates with case studies how it is 
reflected in current resource management practices, and it shows how these practices 
compromise prospects for social, economic and environmental sustainability. The chapter, 
therefore, provides a basis for comparison (and validation by triangulation) of a key 
argument that emerged from the Newfoundland case study: that historically entrenched 
inequality was a root cause of sustainability dysfunction. 
4. 1. 1 Structure of the Chapter 
The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of Tasmania's settlement history, highlighting 
points of comparison with Newfoundland including geographic, cultural, political and 
economic features. The manner in which resources and people were controlled in the early 
years of settlement to produce particular features, structures, institutions and attitudes in the 
society that emerged is discussed with some examples. The post-settlement experience of 
Tasmania's Aborigines, similar in many respects to that of the Beothuk people of 
Newfoundland, is outlined, and the effect of convictism in establishing the roots of social 
dualism in Tasmanian society is briefly described. Some examples demonstrate how 
economic mechanisms, political restrictions and the social legacy of convictism served to 
reproduce and reinforce the social and political characteristics of dualism in Tasmanian 
society into the twentieth century. The chapter then considers current resource management 
issues. Tasmania's controversial forest industry is briefly discussed for the insight it 
provides into how the contemporary political and business culture operates in Tasmania with 
regard to management of large-scale natural resource industries. Then two case studies are 
presented that relate to marine resources. The first examines the management of Tasmania's 
rock lobster fishery and the socio-political effects of the introduction of a quota management 
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system in the fishery. The second examines salmon farming and pollution management in 
Tasmania's coastal waterways. It demonstrates how private interests predominate in 
resource dedsion-making, which compromises the integrity of the environmental protection 
functions of government resource management institutions. This, with reference to the 
Newfoundland case study, suggests that these cannot be relied upon to promote 
environmental sustainability. 
4.2 The History of European Settlement of Tasmania and 
Development of a Resource Management Culture With Reference 
to Similar Developments in Newfoundland 
If you take an imaginary straight line from St John's, Newfoundland and pass it through the 
centre of the earth it will emerge in the Southern Ocean, west-south-west of the island of 
Tasmania. Geographically located at almost the opposite ends of the earth, these two 
islands, nevertheless, share a number of characteristics. As noted in the previous chapter, 
much of this stems from their shared history of settlement within the British colonial system, 
and it has also been influenced by the geography and natural resources of these islands and 
the manner of their exploitation. The interaction of social and political factors within the 
resource management environment has also had an ongoing influence in shaping the 
societies that have developed in both Tasmania and Newfoundland. 
Tasmania, generally conceived of as an island, is actually made up of one large and several 
smaller islands that lie on the southern edge of the Australian continental shelf. Separated 
from the Australian mainland by 150 nautical miles (250 km) of Bass Strait, the largest 
island is heart shaped, approximately 320 km long and 340 km wide and approximately 
26,215 sq. mi. in area (compares to about 156,185 sq. mi for Newfoundland). 
The European discovery of Tasmania (known as Van Diemen's Land until 1853) is credited 
to Abel Tasman, a Dutch navigator who first sighted the island in 1642. By this time the 
European fisheries in Newfoundland waters had been established for over a century. The 
extreme remoteness of Van Diemen' s Land from Europe and busy transatlantic shipping 
routes meant that it would be another century and a half before it attracted much further 
interest from Europe. 
Van Diemen' s Land assumed greater importance in the eighteenth century during the 
escalation of conflict between Britain and France for power over global trade and the 
maritime supremacy upon which this depended (Blainey 1983: 28-29; Robson 1985: 12). 
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Several French and British explorers visited the coast of Van Diemen's Land, including 
Marion Dufresne (1772), Tobias Furneaux (1773), James Cook (1777), William Bligh (1788 
and 1792), Bruni d'Entrecasteaux (1792-93), John Hayes (1794), George Bass (1798), 
Nicolas Baudin (1800 and 1802), and Matthew Flinders (1798 and 1802). 
The British had established a convict settlement at Sydney on the Australian mainland in 
1788. Motivated by concerns about possible French intentions for settlement of Van 
Diemen' s Land, and in order to pre-empt them and to secure British control ?f the sea routes 
around south-eastern Australia, an expedition from Sydney landed on the River Derwent in 
southern Tasmania on 12 September 1803 (Robson 1985: 12). The party included three civil 
officers, eight soldiers, three free settlers and twenty-four convicts (Turnbull 1974: 19-22). 
In February 1804, the original settlers were reinforced by a larger party under the command 
of Captain David Collins made up of 178 prisoners, twenty-five marines and a "civil 
establishment" of about eight including officers, a chaplain, a surveyor and supervisors of 
prisoners. 
The survival of the settlement was threatened in the next two decades by starvation, banditry 
and conflict with the Aboriginal inhabitants (Robson 1985: 13-22). In the first few years the 
colony avoided starvation by hunting kangaroos for meat (Boyce 1996; 2004). The needs of 
survival meant that convict discipline was relaxed. Convicts enjoyed considerable freedom 
and were provided with guns and dogs and encouraged to hunt. In the period 1806-8 most of 
the population of Hobart Town was involved in hunting to some extent and some became 
quite wealthy from selling meat to the government commissariat. While initially necessary 
for the colony's survival, this freedom of access to resources undermined the intended social 
order. Convicts with hunting as an option, evaded the less pleasant work of agricultural and 
livestock care for the benefit of an establishment that had monopolised ownership of land 
holdings. Boyce noted that commentators of the time complained of the idleness of the 
workforce, and the administration was concerned about the social implications of this 
egalitarian access to wildlife resources. When circumstances made it possible to do so, the 
situation was addressed by restricting dog ownership and curtailing demand for kangaroo 
meat so as to avoid a developing situation, one that the administration feared, where "the 
basic means of survival and source of wealth would not be privately owned, but freely 
available to all, and the whole system of social control and order, the foundation of privilege 
and power, would thus be undermined" (Boyce 1996: 42). 
During this period a "bandit society" developed, made up of runaway convicts that could not 
be controlled by the colonial government (Robson 1985: 13-14). This outlaw sub-culture 
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roamed the interior hunting and engaging in primitive commerce. Their power was such, at 
least for a brief period, that settlers had to abandon their lands or come to some 
accommodation. with the outlaws, and Boyce (1996; 2004) suggests that these free-spirited 
Van Demonians almost certainly engaged co-operatively with the Aborigines they 
encountered in the hinterland. 
The bandit threat was eventually suppressed when immigration of free-settlers and soldiers 
had increased numbers to the point where they could mount an effective opposition (Robson 
1985: 14). Boyce (1996) describes how, following 1817, Lieutenant Governor Davey 
banned commerce in kangaroo meat and ordered the destruction of dogs as a way to suppress 
the economy that sustained the free-ranging kangaroo hunting lifestyle. Enormous land 
grants were made to wealthy new immigrants, often the younger sons of British aristocracy, 
and Tasmania's grazing lands were occupied and developed for sheep and the profits to be 
. made from wool. A period of harsh repression lasting several decades re-established British 
Government authority. Control over the resource wealth of Tasmania was appropriated by 
around 500 powerful, wealthy men. It remains in relatively few hands. today, and the brief 
period of economic independence of the Van Demonians was ended (Boyce 1996). 
4.2. 1 The Treatment of Tasmanian Aborigines and the Beothuk People of 
Newfoundland Following European Settlement 
The Tasmanian Aboriginal population at the time of European settlement is estimated at 
between 4000 and 6000 (Robson 1985:1). Abel Tasman did not make contact with 
Aborigines when he landed in 1642, but he saw indications of their presence. When 
European navigators visited Tasmania's shores from the 1770s their experiences with the 
Tasmanian Aborigines were mixed (Turnbull 1974: 6-13; Pybus 1991: 19-34). Du Fresne's 
party were pelted with stones and spears in 1772 and retaliated with musket fire. But Cook, 
in 1777, found the natives to be friendly and interested in the strangers. D'Entrecasteaux, in 
1792, and Baudin, in 1802, found them extremely friendly, and exchanged gifts and 
fraternised with them to a significant extent. However, within a few years of permanent 
European settlement, conflict between Europeans and Aborigines over resources, such as 
kangaroo, intensified (Robson 1985:14). 
Conflicts increased as the invaders ventured further inland occupying Tasmania's central 
grasslands with sheep. Aboriginal women were kidnapped, particularly by sealers in the 
islands of Bass Strait and this led to tensions. Conflict was most intense about 1823-4 when 
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Aborigines increasingly attacked isoiated shepherds, and European settlers launched punitive 
expeditions in reprisal and shot Aborigines on sight. 
An attempt was made to form a line of soldiers and civilians, known as the "black line", 
stretching across the island in order to "beat" across it and drive all surviving Aborigines into 
a comer where they could be captured (Tumbull 1974: 99-123). Only two Aborigines were 
caught, but -this show of force and determination had an intimidating effect and Aborigines 
soon acquiesced to the overwhelming strength of European numbers and technology. The 
Governor appointed G. A. Robinson to journey through Tasmania and locate surviving bands 
of Aborigines, to win their trust, and to induce them to be relocated to Flinders Island in Bass 
Strait. After enduring many years of harsh conditions on Flinders Island 46 survivors were 
eventually allowed to return to their ancestral territories on the mainland. Trugannini, 
claimed "officially" to be the last Tasmanian Aborigine, lived out her final years with a 
respectable family in Hobart. An object of curiosity, she died in 1876 (Turnbull 1974: 1; 
Robson 1985: 45; Pybus 1991: 175). 
The "official" demise of the last of the original "owners" and inhabitants of the land was a 
matter of convenience for the new order. It facilitated the disregard of contradictions within 
a society that occupied land as a consequence of the dispossession of its former inhabitants, 
while holding sacrosanct the concepts of property rights and inheritance. 
Brief histories of the treatment, following European settlement, of the Aboriginal inhabitants 
of Tasmania and Newfoundland are quite similar76. The Beothuk people of Newfoundland 
76 Sultzman (2004) estimates the Beothuk population at perhaps 2000 in 1500AD. In general the 
Beothuk avoided contact with European fishers active on the coast in the 1500s. This avoidance was 
probably the result of unpleasant experience, as the Portuguese Gaspar Corte-Real reportedly captured 
50 Beothuk "man-slaves" in 1501 and, in 1507, Norman fishers took seven Beothuk captives to 
France (Sultzman 2004 ). There are accounts of friendly exchanges and trade between Beothuk and 
Europeans around 1610-12 (Marshall 2004; Sultzman 2004) but misunderstandings occurred. In 1613 
a passing ship fired its cannon on a group of Beothuk assembled for a friendly meeting, and relations 
deteriorated. 
In the 1700s the Beothuk found themselves increasingly cut off from access to coastal resources and 
hostilities increased between them and the Europeans and the Micmac allies of the Europeans who 
were settling southern and western Newfoundland. A vicious cycle of killings and revenge became 
entrenched and posed an enormous obstacle to any prospect of establishing friendly relations. 
Beothuk were often shot on sight. Yet in 1787 four shipwrecked French sailors were rescued and well 
treated by a group of Beothuk (Marshall 2004). Towards the end of the 1700s concerns began to be 
expressed about the brutalities inflicted on the Beothuk and attempts were made at conciliation. A 
reward was offered to bring a live Beothuk to St John's to assist in developing trust and 
communication. But these had little success in the face of centuries of entrenched hostility. In 
January 1811, an expedition led by Captain David Buchan encountered a group of Beothuk on the 
Exploits River in the Newfoundland interior. The situation seemed friendly and two hostages were 
exchanged on each side and Buchan returned to his camp to fetch presents. Unfortunately the 
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and the Tasmanian Aborigines both liYed in small groups with extended tribal relationships 
and were seasonally nomadic, though heavily dependent on coastal resources (Robson 
1985:1-24; Marsha.ii' 2004; Sultzman 2004). Both peoples valued red ochre and used it as a 
cosmetic to colour the skin. Both lived by hunting and fishing and used similar technologies. 
They used spears and bark canoes or rafts to hunt seals, shorebirds, fish and shellfish and 
used animal hides for warmth. Both people resisted European occupation of their islands, 
and in the 1800s, coinciding with the expansion of European settlement of Tasmania and 
Newfoundland, both populations dwindled from a combination of disease, warfare and 
starvation, when cut off from traditional food resources by European occupation, and both 
peoples ceased to exist in the distinctive culture that had been theirs prior to European 
arrival. 
There was intermarriage of settlers and Aborigines in Tasmania as there was between settlers 
and the Beothuk of Newfoundland (Marshall 2004), and Tasmanian Aboriginality has 
survived through the bloodlines of these relationships (Pybus 1991: 175-188). But overall, 
the demise of both native peoples as a consequence of European occupation and resource 
appropriation followed a similar pattern, indeed, the colonisation of both places was part of 
the same outward expansion by the same people of the British empire, and the settlers of 
both places were motivated by the same values and attitudes and the same expansionary 
capitalist culture. 
4.2.2 Tasmania's Early Seal and Whale 'Fisheries' 
While Robson (1985) largely overlooks the seal and whale hunting industries that developed 
in Van Diemen' s Land from the beginning of the nineteenth century, Blainey ( 1983: 99-115) 
discusses their vastly underrated importance to the development of the colony. The islands 
Beothuk suspected a trick and beheaded Buchan's two men, the two Beothuk hostages escaped, and 
the opportunity for peace was lost. At this time the surviving Beothuk population numbered only 72 
people (Marshall 2004). 
By 1823, completely cut off from the shore and their means of existence, the tribe was on the verge of 
extinction. Three women were found in a state of starvation and taken to St John's. Two of them died 
soon after but the survivor, named Shanawdithit, lived on with respectable families in St John's until 
dying of tuberculosis in 1829. Marshall (2004) summarises attitudes towards the Beothuk: 
"Thus, in the course of just over three centuries attitudes towards the Beothuk have come full circle. 
In the 1600s they were thought to be harmless and potentially useful as trade partners; in the early 
1700s, when hostilities had started, they were said to be dangerous and sub-human and were 
persecuted and murdered. From the late 1700s onwards at least some people acknowledged that the 
Beothuk had a right to the land and resources and should be protected; once the Beothuk had 
vanished from the island Newfoundlanders considered them victims of prejudice and cruelty". 
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of Bass Strait were the focus of sealing, an activity that occupied half of the 22 private 
vessels located in Australian ports in 1804. From 1800 to 1806 over 100,000 sealskins were 
landed in Sydney. By 1820 the seal populations had been reduced, by hunting, from 
thousands to a few, and the Bass Strait Islands were inhabited by escaped convicts who lived 
with enslaved Aboriginal women on kangaroos, mutton birds (a shearwater) and other game, 
and traded the skins of kangaroo and seal to passing ships in exchange for spirits and 
clothing77. 
By 1820 the seal trade had declined to insignificance due to the collapse of seal populations 
from overhunting, but the whaling industry was entering its most prosperous period .(Blainey 
1983: 99-115). Blainey identifies whaling as Australia's first profitable industry, exceeding 
the value of wool until the 1830s. The industry brought European and American shipping to 
the early colonial ports of Hobart and Sydney. It supported the development of merchant 
enterprises in these ports and it stimulated the development of shipbuilding in Tasmania. 
The whaling industry also differed from other colonial activities as only free men, not 
convicts or ex-convicts, could be employed on offshore whaling vessels, and they usually 
shared in the profits of the enterprise. The social, political and economic conditions of 
offshore whaling, therefore, differed markedly from land-based economic development in 
Van Diemen's Land, which was shaped by the constraints of the convict system. 
Shore based whaling was pursued in coastal bays and estuaries around Van Diemen's Land. 
This 'bay whaling' targeted the southern right whale, a baleen whale, which in the winter 
months entered sheltered bays to give birth and nurse its young. Bay whaling required little 
capital. Two 30-foot whaleboats, some large iron pots for boiling the blubber, huts and a 
crew of 16-20 with provisions for three months were all that was required and could be 
outfitted for a capital outlay of three hundred pounds (Blainey 1983: 110). At its peak over 
30 whaling stations operated each winter, sometimes with many rival crews competing for a 
rapidly diminishing resource. By the 1840s bay whaling, so profitable ten years earlier, all 
but ended as the resource collapsed. Whaling crews waited in the usual places but the 
whales no longer arrived in any number, so great had been the slaughter in previous years. 
The 'ruin of the fishery' was blamed on the practice of killing the calves in order to secure 
the cow whales (Blainey 1983: 113). This fishery and the seal industry provide early 
examples of unsustainable exploitation of Tasmania's marine resources. 
77 A similar existence, perhaps, to that of isolated fishers in Newfoundland outports at that time. 
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Following the collapse of bay whaling, offshore whaling for the less vulnerable sperm whale 
continued for several decades. Sperm whales were hunted on the high seas from large, 
sturdy vessels. Blainey notes that on Good Friday 1847, 47 whaling ships were anchored in 
the Derwent estuary off Hobart (1983: 113). Some of these ships were built and owned by 
Hobart merchants, others came from as far away as the Atlantic whaling ports of Nantucket 
and Salem in the USA. Hobart's whaling industry gradually declined over the nineteenth 
century as land-based activities came to assume greater economic importance. 
4.2.3 Tasmanian History From the 1830s into the Twentieth Century 
By the 1830s settlement had been firmly established in Tasmania and population increased 
rapidly78, largely through the transportation of convicts from England and later from Ireland. 
During the 1830s about 2000 convicts (including 300 women) arrived in Tasmania each 
year. Free settlers also arrived and the population in 1836 was 43,000, "of whom 24,000 
were 'free' (14,000 males and 10,000 females), and 19,000 convicts (17,000 males and 2,000 
females)" but "some 75 per cent of the people of Van Diemen's Land were convicts, had 
been convicts or were of convict ancestry" (Robson 1985: 24). 
Tasmania's economy was largely based on forced labour under the con:vict system. Convicts 
laboured under government supervision on public works, such as road building projects, or 
they were assigned as servants to free settlers. When their sentences had been served they 
obtained a 'ticket-of-leave'79. Robson (1985: 30) notes that some ticket-of-leave men lived 
as "semi-slave labourers" paid in tea and sugar by the 'truck system' 80, an existence that 
contrasted markedly with the life of the gentry who had received land grants of thousands of 
acres and attempted to mimic, in Van Diemen's Land, the lifestyles of the English 
aristocracy. 
78 The first half of the nineteenth century is also the period of large scale British settlement of 
Newfoundland. 
79 "A Ticket of Leave (TOL) was a document given to convicts when granting them freedom to work 
and live within a given district of the colony before their sentence expired or they were pardoned. 
TOL convicts could hire themselves out or be self-employed. They could also acquire property. 
Church attendance was compulsory, as was appearing before a Magistrate when required. Permission 
was needed before moving to another district and 'passports' were issued to those convicts whose work 
required regular travel between districts. Convicts apphed through their masters to the Bench 
Magistrates for a TOL and needed to have served a stipulated portion of their sentence" (Perth DPS 
2004). 
80 The 'truck' system was also a notorious feature of exploitative merchant-fisher relationships in 
Newfoundland's outports until well into the twentieth century. As discussed in chapter 3 it was a 
system in which goods and supplies were provided on credit to fishers. Cash was seldom paid and 
debt or credit was carried on the merchant's books. The system provided a form of economic bondage 
which restricted fishers to selling their catch to a particular employer or merchant. 
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In the 1840s opposition to transportation increased and the last transported convicts landed in 
Hobart in 1853. The colony celebrated the event and as a symbolic gesture of rejection of its 
shameful convict origins, it renamed itself Tasmania (Robson 1985: 33). 
Representative government was achieved in 185681 with the election of a two-chambered 
parliament. The Upper House, the Legislative Council, had the power to block any 
legislation. Its membership was restricted to "gentlemen of independent means" and voting 
restrictions limited the electorate to those with significant property. The franchise for the 
Lower House, the House of Assembly, was also limited, though less severely, to people with 
some material means (Robson 1997: 35). Such a system of government, through the 
blocking powers of the Legislative Council, guarded the interests of large landholders and 
was as effectively anti-democratic, if not more so, than its counterpart in Newfoundland at 
that time, which, as discussed in chapter 3, was controlled by the St. John's fish merchants 
and offered little representation of the interests of the outport fishers. The basic bi-cameral 
structure of the Tasmanian parliament82 remains unchanged today, though the franchise has 
been significantly extended. 
Tasmania suffered an economic crisis m 1893 when the bank of Van Diemen's Land 
failed83. The remainder of the decade was marked by economic recession and 
unemployment and the majority of Tasmanians supported the move to join with the other 
Australian states in a federation, which occurred in 1901. Tasmania, as a poor relation in the 
federation, was expected to be a net recipient of financial benefits from the arrangement. 
This has continued, with Tasmania,_ like Newfoundland within the Canadian confederation, 
receiving financial transfers subsidised by the more populous states with larger economies. 
World War I (1914-1918) had dramatic social and political consequences in Tasmania84. 
Many Tasmanians enlisted and served overseas in defence of the British Empire, and after 
the war, many returned servicemen formed the core of a political organisation, the Loyalty 
League, that had overtones of fascism, and worked against what it saw as threats to the 
British Empire within Tasmania. These threats included people with German sounding 
names, Catholics, and Labor politicians and unions (Robson 1985: 109-116, 125-129). This 
8l Newfoundland gained full representative government in 1855. 
82 Newfoundland's original bicameral parliamentary system, with a Legislative Council dominated by 
the St John's merchants, proved to be dysfunctional due to discord between the houses and the two 
houses were, within a few years, amalgamated to form a single chamber parliament. 
83 Newfoundland's banks also failed at about the same time, as discussed in chapter 3, and led to 
Newfoundland's dependence on foreign investment. 
84 World War I also was significant in Newfoundland and other parts of the empire. 
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suggests that there was division, distrust and a lack of community solidarity within 
Tasmanian society. 
Between World Wars I and II, Tasmania suffered two periods of economic recession, 1922-
26 and 1931-35. The Lockyer Report of 1926 was the result of an inquiry into Tasmania's 
economic conditions and was launched in response to an appeal by the Tasmanian 
government for federal economic assistance; an appeal based on the argument that 
Tasmania's economic troubles could be attributed to the effects of federation85. The report 
contained some criticism of Tasmania's public administration for its lack of financial 
accountability, noting that the parliament and the public were excluded from the "precise 
facts" of government financial arrangements in a manner that would "admit of no 
satisfactory justification" (Lockyer 1926: 2). Lockyer identified heavy taxation and the loss 
of population due to emigration as contributing to Tasmania's economic difficulties, and he 
noted a pervasive attitude of pessimism which engendered a spirit of helplessness and 
dependence in the Tasmanian population86. He did acknowledge some economic impacts of 
federation, notably the Navigation Act that had come into force in July 1921, and which had 
increased the cost of freight and travel between Tasmania and the mainland. Being an 
island, Tasmania was particularly vulnerable to inflated shipping rates which impacted on 
tourism and exports. Lockyer also noted the heavy financial burden of servicing debt 
incurred to develop Tasmania's hydroelectric power system. 
During the economic depression of the early 1930s, unemployment levels rose to 26 per 
cent. Times were hard but Tasmania did not suffer the extremes of economic and political 
collapse that afflicted Newfoundland in the early 1930s. Confederation within the larger 
Australian economy probably helped. Repudiation of overseas debt was debated, but 
vigorously opposed as traitorous by the RSSILA, an organisation of returned servicemen that 
fashioned itself as guardian of empire, the "memories of the Great War", and of public order. 
The RSSILA initiated a "civil patrol movement", to protect private property at a time when 
repudiationist sentiments were being voiced and, as Robson notes (1985: 129) some regarded 
it as a step towards the "establishment of a fascist New Guard". 
In the late 1930s, in the lead up to World War II, economic conditions improved and 
tensions eased, but Robson portrays an entrenched social dualism within Tasmanian society. 
85 This sort of appeal would be familiar to students of the relationship of Newfoundland within the 
Canadian federation. 
86 A similar sense of fatalism, helplessness and dependence is frequently noted as a characteristic of 
Newfoundland. 
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He notes that on the eve of war in 1939, there was, still living, a man who had been 
transported to Tasmania as a convict from England, while at the other end of the social scale: 
there also existed in the island state a very wealthy class which wielded power 
through the Legislative Council especially and which was far from being 
unsophisticated. These people were the gentry who had occupied some of the 
best pastoral land in the world from the very early nineteenth century and had 
been the confident masters and mistresses of a virtual slave labour force of 
convict workers. Educated, cosmopolitan and cultured in comparison with their 
fellow Tasmanians, they and their descendents enjoyed economic independence 
and a sense of security verging on arrogance which enabled them to travel 
widely, to educate their children among their social peers and to insist on forms 
of address, deference and conduct which were the striking opposite of the usual 
Tasmanian egalitarianism. Though their power declined as parliamentary 
democracy was ushered in, the experience and survivals from the past meant 
that still their interests were ensured representation and notice at all levels and 
substantial power through the institutions of the state, in the form of legislative 
and private organisations such as clubs and informal networks (Robson 1985: 
165). 
Robson's description of the Tasmanian gentry strikes a resonance with Johnston's 
description (1999: 21-42), through the character Prouse, of the 'fishocracy' of St John's, 
Newfoundland, with their exclusive private schools, arrogance, and colonial mimickery of 
the snobbery associated with English class distinction. At the lower end of the social scale, 
one can also see a parallel between the lives of Tasmanians of convict ancestry locked into 
relationships of dependency (as a consequence of denial of opportunities of independent 
access to resources) on the patronage of their social betters, as were the lives of 
Newfoundland's outport fishers locked into relationships of dependency with fish merchants 
and their agents, and later with the frozen fish processing companies as discussed in chapter 
3. 
4.2.4 Tasmania and the Convict Stain 
Tasmania's history of settlement as a convict colony had a tremendous influence in shaping 
social and political attitudes in the state. A poster that forms part of a permanent-display on 
the convict system in the Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery in Hobart provides the 
following general description of the effect of convictism on Tasmanian society: 
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The Convict Stain 
Of all the colonies, Tasmania had the highest proportion of drunkards, 
paupers, lunatics, orphaned or abandoned children, invalids and prisoners. 
The workforce was inefficient and unskilled. 
In the 1880s these features were becoming less apparent; the influence of 
convictism was felt in more subtle ways. 
• To prevent ex-convicts from gaining power and influence, the free 
settlers gained a monopoly of elected political institutions; these 
were very conservative. 
• Fear of violence and disorder persisted; each district was subject to 
a very high degree of police control. 
• Fear of the moral corruption believed to be associated with convicts 
led to a social life dominated by snobbery and middle-class notions 
of respectability. 
• The master-servant relationship was characterised by a high degree 
of control over the servant's behaviour, more like the assignment 
system than a contract between free men. Masters bullied their free 
servants as they had the convicts. 
• Tasmania had the largest and best funded welfare system in 
Australia. Tasmania had more prisons and charitable institutions 
like orphan schools and insane asylums than any other colony. 
• Probably because of the large number of ex-convicts, Tasmania had 
the most submissive and conservative working class in Australia, 
which offered little challenge to the social, economic and political 
domination of free settlers and their descendants. 
Many of these features may still be found in Tasmanian society. 
Tasmania 
The convict legacy was to have a profound influence on the ongoing development of 
Tasmania's social, political and resource management cultures . Control over access to 
resources was a priority for a colonial administration determined to maintain the established 
social order, during the convict era and later, as society made the gradual transition from one 
based on an economy of essentially slave labour under the convict system to the 'free' 
society that eventually superseded it (Boyce 1996; Robson 1997). For many decades into the 
twentieth century, the convict legacy continued to haunt Tasmanian society and was the 
cause of extreme social anxiety. Tasmanians were desperate to distance themselves from the 
' hated stain' of links to a convict past (Reynolds 1969). This anxiety was of such intensity 
that people denied their relatives and constructed fake genealogies in order to hide convict 
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ancestries, and a veneer of priggish, conservative respectability papered over a deep-seated 
sense of social insecurity (Hay 2000). The result was a society that lacked the confidence to 
challenge authority and to engage with 'unrespectable' egalitarian, democratic or liberal 
political views. The political culture that developed was one of paternalism, patronage and 
vested interest (Hay 1992; 2000). It was a culture untouched even by democratic institutions 
because the preoccupation with respectability served to limit the emergence of an il!Jellectual 
discourse of sufficient momentum to be politically significant. One might expect this 
political culture of patronage and vested interest to be reflected in resource management 
practices in Tasmania and in the culture of its resource management institutions, and indeed 
this tendency has been noted in regard to a number of Tasmanian industries (Hay 1977; Hay 
1992; Young 1995; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002). 
The conservative preoccupation with respectability, evident in political matters in Tasmanian 
culture, also extends to issues of sexuality and this is also linked to the convict past. Of all 
the Australian states, only Tasmania maintained laws against homosexuality into the 1990s. 
Critics of these laws condemned Tasmania on human rights grounds and grouped Tasmania 
with places like Malaysia and Zimbabwe on this issue. Tasmania's conservative upper 
house eventually conceded and allowed the laws to be repealed in 1996, but only after 
protracted resistance to the ongoing lobbying of the gay movement. The proscriptions 
against homosexual acts were clearly a carry-over from Tasmania's convict origins. In part 
this can be linked to Victorian conservatism, but regulation of sexuality is a general feature 
of totalitarian societies and especially so of prisons. The lopsided population, in which 
males greatly outnumbered females in Van Diemen's Land in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, meant that many males, particularly convicts who were of the lowest socio-
economic order, would have had little prospect of finding female partners. Proscriptions 
against homosexual relations would, therefore, also contain an element of class control and 
thus serve a political purpose, though one not made explicit in regulations grounded in 
"moral principles". Fear of the "accusation" of homosexual practices could have 
undermined prospects for developing platonic bonds of solidarity among convicts that might 
have helped them to resist systemic exploitation. 
But prurient scandal was not only a danger to the convicts in Van Diemen's Land. Sir John 
Eardley Eardley-Wilmot, governor of Tasmania from 1843 to 1847, fell victim to criticism 
that during his administration "sexual aberrations" were "practiced with impunity in the 
ranks of the convict labour force" (Robson 1985: 28). Sir John's enemies included the local 
establishment, the Bishop of Tasmania, and Gladstone, then British Secretary of State, who 
was concerned about the "moral state of the convicts" and the church's complaint that the 
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education system gave insufficient emphasis to "the beliefs of the Church of England" 
(Robson 1985: 28). A campaign of gossip and rumour undermined Sir John. He was said to 
"enjoy the company of young women" (Robson 1985:29) and the Colonial Office gathered 
ammunition and rumours to use against him. He was recalled, but died in Hobart (it was 
popularly claimed) "of a broken heart and ill-treatment at the hands of Downing Street 
bureaucrats" (Robson 1985: 29)87. 
Tasmanians, like Newfoundlanders, suffer as the butt of jokes that make inference to incest 
and inbreeding among the island population and its limited gene pool. The "two-headed" 
Tasmanian is a well known idiom and there is an element of truth behind the jests, myths and 
exaggerations. The noted interference with the genealogical record in order to hide convict 
ancestry might logically have increased the danger of inadvertent inbreeding among future 
generations. Sensitivity and insecurity about matters such as these may contribute to the 
Tasmanian sense of discomfort about talking openly on sexual issues and this reticence could 
reinforce the general impression that Tasmanian society is bound by a preoccupation with 
conservative, middle-class attitudes of respectability where sexual and social matters are 
concerned. 
4.2.5 Monopoly and Vested Interest in the Tasmanian Economy 
Gibson (1958) discusses how in the post World War II period, privilege and power in 
Tasmania, entrenched by the monopolisation of productive land in the nineteenth century, 
was maintained by monopoly over other economic resources in the twentieth. Shipping was 
a major concern. International shipping at that time was controlled by the "Shipping 
Conference" which was essentially a cartel of 22 British and foreign companies that divided 
up global shipping routes and fixed the rates (Gibson 1958: 4-6). All Australian trade was 
affected by the high cost of freight, Tasmania's particularly so because its economy relied 
largely on commodity export. Tasmania also suffered more than other Australian states from 
high fares and freight costs for coastal travel between the island and the mainland. Coastal 
shipping was controlled by another cartel, the Steamship Owners Federation, and no 
effective competition existed to keep down costs. 
Gibson provides examples of how monopoly in the freight industry underpinned the 
extension of exploitative practices to other sectors. He explains, for example, the influence 
87 In July 2004, Richard Butler, the newly appointed Governor of Tasmanian resigned after less than a 
year in office, claiming that he had been undermined by a campaign of gossip and rumours in the 
media, and a lack of support from Parliament and even his own staff. 
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wielded by Henry Jones Limited, a Tasmanian company that came to dominate Australia's 
jam making industry and whose range of interests was so wide that it was said to be "in 
everything" in Tasmania (Gibson 1958: 17). Henry Jones wielded power over Tasmanian 
fruit growers, as it was the dominant shipping agent for most produce going in and out of 
Hobart. It controlled who could export their produce, and in what quantity, and could set the 
price charged for freight (Gibson 1958: 27-28). It also exercised monopoly power over 
Tasmanian hops growers through contracts to buy on behalf of the brewing monopolies 
(Gibson 1958: 29-33). Gibson also explains how a few companies, including Henry Jones, 
dominated Tasmania's timber industries. It was difficult to enter the industry and establish a 
small sawmill because access to the forest resource was restricted, the best areas having been 
"sewn up" by the large timber companies (Gibson 1958: 34). Gibson identified many other 
I 
areas of the Tasmanian economy, including banking and the news media, that were 
characterised by comfortable monopolies, and which, in addition to exacting monopoly 
burdens on the economy, also limited public information and disproportionately influenced 
Tasmanian politics. 
Hay (1977) describes how Tasmanian politics was characterised by a culture of corruption, 
patronage and vested interest, noting that behaviour that would have been considered 
flagrant corruption in other parts of the world was, in Tasmania, regarded as the normal way 
of doing business and conducting public affairs. These practices were so entrenched, so 
much the norm, that participants had no sense of wrongdoing about them and were in fact 
surprised when their conduct was brought into question. Hay (1977) also notes that 
Tasmania's democratic institutions did not function effectively to censure these practices. 
With an economy constrained by monopolies, and a political culture characterised by vested 
interest, Young (1995) and Hay (1977) note the lack of civic commitment in Tasmanian 
public life, and a tendency to serve select private over broader public interests. In the 
following section of the chapter, the effect of these tendencies will be explored in relation to 
three resource management case studies. First, insight into Tasmania's forest industry 
provides an example of the way that politics and business interests currently operate in 
resource management in Tasmania. This provides evidence of the persistence of a particular 
resource management culture, which, it will later be argued, is also instrumental in guiding 
management of Tasmania's marine resources in a way that undermines community values 
linked to sustainability. 
156 
Chapter 4 Tasmania 
4.2.6 The TasmaniEJ,n Forestry Industry: An Illustration of Tasmania's 
Resource Management Culture 
Compared to Newfoundland, Tasmania's capture fisheries are relatively small and not 
intensively industrialised. Forestry is the renewable resource industry that is perhaps most 
comparable in Tasmania to Newfoundland's cod fishery in terms of its social, political and 
economic importance88. 
Forestry has always been important in Tasmania. Enormous stands of old-growth timber, 
useful for building and'refitting ships, were highly valued by Tasmania's European settlers. 
Timber harvesting was a cornerstone of the colonial economy. Today forest products 
support a billion dollar industry which includes fine craft timbers, construction timber, and 
most controversially, export woodchips used for the manufacture of paper products. 
Woodchips now account for over 80 per cent of the timber harvest (Fullerton 2004). 
Opposition to clear-fell, woodchip logging of Tasmania's remaining old growth forests is a 
cornerstone issue for the Tasmanian Greens political party. Internationally renowned 
Tasmanian author, Richard Flanagan (2004a; 2004b) has also been an outspoken critic of 
Tasmania's logging practices. A critique of Tasmanian forestry practices ·was the subject of 
a television documentary aired nationally by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(Fullerton 2004). The documentary suggested that the management of Tasmania's public 
forests was not serving the interests of the Tasmanian people who nominally owned them. 
Instead, public assets were, with the aid of public subsidies, being converted into private 
wealth for the benefit of institutional and private shareholders of Gunns Limited, the state's 
largest timber industry corporation. The program implied that Tasmania's publicly owned 
forests were being managed within an entrenched resource management culture 
characterised by cronyism and corruption, in which a lack of transparency and public 
accountability was maintained by an atmosphere of secrecy and intimidation (Fullerton 
2004). 
Distributional questions were raised. The report noted that while the rate of timber 
harvesting from old growth forests was higher than it had ever been, the bulk of this timber 
was going into highly mechanised, highly profitable but low value woodchips, and 
88 Tasmanian forests became a key issue in the 2004 Australian federal election. Mark Latham, the 
leader of the Australian Labor Party gambled on a conservationist position on old growth logging, 
accompanied by the offer of generous compensation for lost jobs., The Tasmanian timber industry 
unions and some Tasmanian Labor Party politicians campaigned stridently against this and supported 
the conservative (Liberal Party) Prime Minister, John Howard, who won the election. 
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employment in Tasmania's forest industries was in decline. The number of sawmills in the 
island had fallen from 205 in 1980 to less than 30 in 2004 (Fullerton 2004). Quality 
craftwoods were becoming scarce as small-scale sawmillers found themselves increasingly 
denied access to timber resources. Meanwhile, much high value timber was being wasted as 
old growth forest lands, after harvesting, were subjected to high intensity bums using 
residual logs as fuel, before the land was redeveloped as plantations. The report noted that 
public assets were being privatised as forested crown land was converted to freehold 
property under plantations. The value of shares in Gunns Limited had increased 900 per cent 
in five years. Forestry Tasmania claimed an operating profit of $24 million in the last year, 
but when the loss of value of the forest estate was taken into account it made a loss of $11 
million - a figure reported by the state's Auditor-General (Fullerton 2004). This could also 
be regarded as a public to private transfer. 
The environmental impact of forestry operations is also of concern. Fullerton (2004) argues 
that Forestry Tasmania is, for practical purposes, exempt from national threatened species 
laws. The report explained that 'Forestry' operates under a code of practice which is self-
regulated by a Forest Practices Board of five members with a seven member Advisory 
Council. Almost all of the members of the Board and of the Advisory Council have industry 
connections. The presenter of the Four Corners program (Fullerton 2004: 9) put it to Paul 
Lennon, then Minister responsible for Forestry (and now Premier of Tasmania), that "in the 
context of the political environment in Tasmania", a system of self-regulation with a board 
stacked with people with such apparent vested interests "is a recipe for cronyism and is a 
recipe for corruption", a point of view supported by allegations made at a Federal Senate 
Enquiry on 8 October 2003 by Bill Manning, a qualified forest practices officer who had 
worked for 32 years for the Forestry Commission, Forestry Tasmania and the Forest 
Practices Board. Bill Manning described a culture of cronyism, intimidation and deception 
in Tasmanian forestry. He provided evidence to the Federal Senate enquiry of 100 breaches 
of the forest practices code, and indicated that the Forest Practices Board had failed to 
prosecute over any of them. These included the "obliteration" of streams that were habitat to 
the state's unique, endangered giant freshwater crayfish (Fullerton 2004). There is a widely 
held view in Tasmania that forestry practices operate with blatant disregard for even the 
limited "codes of conduct" that are supposed to provide some level of environmental 
protection. 
The political environment within which the forest industry in Tasmania operates is the key to 
understanding these concerns about resource allocation and environmental impacts. The 
documentary pointed out that the responsibility for management of Tasmania's public forests 
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lay with the government of Tasmania. Corporations such as Gunns Limited were obliged to 
put the interests of their shareholders ahead of those of the general public. It is Tasmania's 
politicians who should be accountable for. the way public forest resources are managed. The 
report suggests that Tasmania's politicians evade being held to public account by the use of 
secrecy, intimidation and propaganda. Commercial arrangements between Forestry 
Tasmania and companies such as Gunns Limited are not open and transparent. They are 
deemed to be "commercial in confidence" and, on this basis are exempt from Tasmania's 
freedom of information laws. Forestry Tasmania's general exemption from freedom of 
information laws was granted by an Act of Parliament (Fullerton 2004). People cannot find 
out who is paid how much for what, (for example, no information is available on what 
royalties are paid for access to forest resources by Gunns Limited), a point made by Federal 
Senator Bill Heffernan (Liberal Party) who suggested that such an exemption would not be 
necessary unless there was something to hide (Fullerton 2004: 4). A culture of intimidation 
means that people who work in the industry are _afraid to speak out. They dare not criticise 
forestry practices for fear of losing their jobs, or worse. Senator Heffernan indicated that he 
had spoken to people in Tasmania who had received death threats (Fullerton 2004: 1). 
Forestry Tasmania works hard to generate a positive message about its operations. Evan 
Rolley, the Managing Director, is described as "a communications guru" (Fullerton 2004: 3), 
whose job includes putting a plausible, positive "spin" on forestry operations, protected from 
contradiction by the restrictions on access to information. 
The Four Corners report also commented on the close relationship that exists between John 
Gay, the Managing Director of Gunns Limited, other board members and leading politicians 
of both the Liberal and the Labor parties (the state's two dominant political parties). Robin 
Gray, for example, is a former Liberal Party Premier and now a board member of Gunns 
Limited. He is remembered for his involvement, in 1989, in an attempt by Edmund Rouse 
(then Chairman of Gunns) to bribe a Labor member of parliament to cross the floor and 
prevent the formation of a government in which the Tasmanian Greens would have 
participated as the minor partner. Flanagan (2004a) and Fullerton (2004) suggest that this 
attempt to subvert Tasmania's government was motivated by concerns that the Greens would 
interfere with Gunns' logging operati~ns. The Labor Party Premier, Paul Lennon, and the 
leader of the Liberal Party Opposition, Rene Hidding89, are both unequivocal in their support 
for Gunns Limited and Forestry Tasmania's operations. The only strong voice of political 
opposition comes from the Tasmanian Greens. 
89 Rene Hidding was deposed as party leader following the state elections in March 2006. 
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Flanagan (2004a) criticises the complicity of government in the destruction of Tasmania's 
forest resources in an article that shares many arguments with the Four Corners report. He 
observes that the revelations of Bill Manning at the Senate Inquiry would threaten to bring 
down the government in any other state, but in Tasmania, it caused little lasting discomfort. 
A protest rally organised by the Greens in March 2004 attracted nearly 10,000 people but 
was largely ignored by government. Why is this so? Perhaps the answer lies in The Greens' 
support base. Many have come to Tasmania from elsewhere, and they might, in addition, be 
characterised as urban, educated, and middle class, often employed in professions such as 
teaching and in the public service. A large gulf exists between them and the more traditional 
Tasmanian working class in a society with strong rural links, and in which the culture of "not 
rocking the boat" is so deeply entrenched. Flanagan (2004a: 7) gives emphasis to this point 
noting: 
To question, to comment adversely, is to invite the possibility of ostracism and 
unemployment, and the state is full of those who pay a high price for their 
opinion on the forests, the blackballed multiplying with the blackened stumps. 
It is commonplace to meet people in various positions and businesses too 
frightened to speak publicly of their concerns about forestry practices because 
of the adverse consequences they perceive this might have for their careers and 
businesses. In consequence of the forest battle, a subtle feat has entered 
Tasmanian public life; it stifles dissent, avoids truth. 
This description, which Flanagan links to the current forest battle, has arguably been, and 
continues to be, a pervasive characteristic of Tasmania more generally. 
The primary purpose of this discussion of the Tasmanian forest industry is to illustrate the 
political and business environment within which resource management in Tasmania 
continues to take place. This provides a context which informs the analysis of marine 
resource management in Tasmania in the following case studies. Some comparisons might, 
however, be drawn between Tasmanian forestry and the Newfoundland cod fishery prior to 
the 1992 crisis. Clearfelling of old growth forest may be compared to industrial trawling. 
Common themes of these two resource management case studies include the hegemony of 
government and business interests and their singleminded promotion of industrialisation, 
producing low value product while placing a heavy demand on the resource; the exclusion of 
small resource users whilst government rhetoric talks of job creation; and the conversion of 
the resource base (in Tasmania, old growth forest is converted to plantation, in 
Newfoundland the cod fishery has been converted to a greater emphasis on shellfish). In 
both cases this conversion has been accompanied by a conversion of public resource to 
private property, and in both cases this has been accomplished with the assistance of large 
amounts of public financial and natural resource subsidies. The following sections examine 
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marine resource management in Tasmania. The first deals with the evolution of 
management of the rock lobster fishery to a system based on individual transferable quota, 
and the second deals with regulation of pollution from salmon farming in Tasmania's coastal 
waterways. 
4.3 Private Property and Public Interest in Contemporary Tasmanian 
Resource Management: The Tasmanian Lobster Fishery 
Figure 4.3 Typical Tasmanian lobster fishing vessel with beehive pots stacked on wharf 
4.3. 1 Introduction 
Tasmania's rock lobster fishery is based on the southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii). 
With annual catch valued at approximately AU$ 50 million, it is second only in value to the 
state's abalone fishery (AU$ 102 million in 2006). It has a longer tradition than the abalone 
fishery but has followed the trend set in the abalone fishery towards management by 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) and property rights . The rock lobster fishery has been 
managed by input controls for over a century and by limited entry since the late 1960s. ITQ 
based management was introduced in 1998. This marked the continuation of a management 
trend that has favoured economic efficiency at the cost of reduced employment and greater 
restrictions on access to the fishery with implications for social equality, economic wellbeing 
and environmental sustainability. 
The commercial rock lobster catch of around 1500 tonnes per year is harvested using baited 
pots. There are now about 224 vessels in the fleet, down from about 320 prior to the 
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introduction of the quota management system (QMS) in 1998. Vessels are mostly between 6 
and 26 metres in length, each working between 15 and 50 pots. Recreational fishing for 
lobster is also a cultural tradition in ·Tasmania and over 15,000 recreational fishers 
participate each year using either one pot, up to four baited lift nets known as rings, or by 
diving with or without compressed air. Regulation of the recreational fishery has become 
more intrusive since the introduction of the QMS for the commercial fishery (DPIF 1998). 
4.3.2 /TQ in Context 
In recent decades, as discussed in chapter 2, there has been a worldwide trend towards 
fishery management systems based on private property rights such as ITQ. Iceland, South 
Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are among the pioneers of ITQ fishery 
management systems and their use continues to be adopted more widely in spite of concerns 
and a growing body of criticism about their social and regional economic impacts. 
Justification for introducing private-property based fishery management systems generally 
rests on two foundations, which relate to conservation and economic efficiency (Charles 
1992). First, there is generally an argument that constraint over access and/or fishing effort 
is necessary in order to safeguard biological sustainability. And second, it is argued that the 
form of constraint chosen should promote economic efficiency in the conventional sense. 
This view of efficiency, which underpins neoliberal economic orthodoxy, favours the 
interests of capital - the medium of power in complex, modem societies - but it is 
disconnected from economic perspectives that relate to social and regional economic 
wellbeing, and it serves to invalidate conservation measures that compromise establishment 
interests. Control over access to resources is the essence of power in any society, and this 
applies to control over access to fishery resources, which is often highly politicised. 
The trend towards privatisation of fishery resources through ITQ and other mechanisms can 
be viewed from a socio-political perspective. Based on an integrated study of general social, 
political and economic tendencies, Olson (1982) demonstrated how special interest groups 
with a vested interest in promoting particular policies have an advantage over those with a 
broader interest in the wellbeing of society as a whole. He argued that, over time, special 
interest groups, usually with government help, accumulate privileges and monopolies at the 
expense of the public interest. Redistributive coalitions become more and more entrenched. 
Prosperity is undermined as redistributive activities come to predominate, and productive 
activities suffer increasingly from the predatory activity of these rent-seeking coalitions. 
Social wellbeing and the public good are degraded as resources are monopolised by a 
governing class of self-serving owners (claiming the overriding priority of property rights), 
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bureaucrats, managers and other rent-seekers. This progression, if not disturbed by some 
significant disruption to the social, political and economic order, inevitably leads to the 
development of a society dominated by contesting groups preoccupied with property rights 
and the maintenance of privileges attached to social status. The consequence is poor 
economic productivity and a society characterised by poverty, entrenched inequality, and 
civic and institutional dysfunction. 
Olson's model is relevant to issues raised by Matthiasson (2001) concerning the economic 
effects of the adoption of ITQ·in Iceland's fishery sector. Matthiasson notes a tendency for 
resource-rich countries to be economically less successful than resource-poor ones. He 
identifies the problems associated with rent-seeking behaviour and considers how to prevent 
income from resource wealth ruining the prospects for economic (and social) progress. The 
critical problem in Iceland, he argues, is that interest groups have been allowed to determine 
the shape of the nation's fisheries management systems. 
Phillips (1998) and Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay (2002) examine how interest groups have 
influenced the development of policy in Tasmania's rock lobster fishery and discuss how 
regulation of the rock lobster fishery has developed through various steps to the current 
management system based on ITQ that serves rent-seeking, vested interests at the expense of 
the interests of a wider Tasmanian community. They link these developments to Tasmania's 
political and resource management culture, which, they argue, influenced the development of 
fisheries management policies and practices in ways that promote inequality. Inequality 
linked to entrenched social,dualism has been identified as a causative factor of community 
dysfunction, which in the case of Newfoundland was linked to resource failure in the cod 
fishery. 
Phillips (1998) described the history of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, biological and 
economic considerations, and the politics associated with the introduction of ITQ in 1998. 
The following section includes a brief overview of this analysis with references to additional 
sources, and examines some of the consequences of implementation of the QMS and recent 
developments in the fishery. Some of the material in this section has been published in an 
article in Marine Policy (Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002). 
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4.3.3 History of Tasmania's Rock Lobster Fishe,.Y 
Development and Regulation of the Fishery · 
The Tasmanian lobster fishery had its origins in the early years of European settlement. The 
fishery has been managed since the 1880s, when, following a Royal Commission of Inquiry 
(Seal et al. 1883), laws to regulate it were formally introduced (Parliament of Tasmania 
1997: 34). The most important regulation was the establishment of a minimum size limit of 
'12 inches' (294 mm) total length (Winstanley 1973: 3). This regulation, with slight 
variation over the years, has proven to be an effective conservation measure, protecting the 
fishery from biological overfishing, and has been the principal basis of management of the 
fishery (Harrison 1987b: 11; Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 34). The current size limit of a 
carapace length of 110 mm for male and 105 mm for female lobsters has essentially the same 
effect as the original 12-inch size limit. 
Technological Efficiency Creep and Regulation 
In 1883 Tasmanian fishers were limited to the fairly inefficient, labour intensive technology 
of working baited lift nets or 'rings' from sail and oar powered vessels (Seal et al. 1883: xii). 
These rings were comprised of a weighted hoop of about 1 metre in diameter with netting 
stretched across it. Bait would be tied to the netting in the middle of the ring, which would 
then be lowered on a line to the seabed in rocky areas of likely lobster habitat. After a period 
on the bottom, perhaps half an hour or so, the ring would be pulled quickly to the surface 
with, hopefully, a lobster or two caught in the net. As early as the 1880s it was suggested 
that the use of baited pots (traps) might increase the productivity of the fishery (Seal et al. 
1883: xv), but Tasmanian fishers opposed the introduction of this more powerful technology. 
Their motives were the same as those that saw opposition to more powerful and capital-
intensive technology in the Newfoundland cod fishery in the 1800s as discussed in chapter 3. 
Conservation of the fishery, it was argued, would be damaged as the more powerful 
equipment would deplete the beds through overfishing (Winstanley 1973: 3). It was also 
suggested, that lost pots would continue to trap lobsters or "ghost fish" (Storey 1998). 
Opposition to pots was also motivated by the desire of Tasmanian fishers to. exclude 
'outsiders' who crossed Bass Strait from the state of Victoria. The latter needed large sea-
going vessels to handle the hazardous seas of Bass Strait and these vessels were also more 
suited to fishing with pots than were small, Tasmanian coastal craft. There was also the 
natural resistance of poor, artisanal fishers, to the introduction of powerful, capital intensive 
methods, that clearly had the potential to damage their interests through competition over 
resource and market access (Phillips 1998: 62-63; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002). 
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In 1902 the use of pots in Tasmanian waters was expressly prohibited (Winstanley 1973: 3), 
but not effectively enforced. Fishers from Victoria continued to use them and, as northern 
waters were depleted, they extended their activities down Tasmania's sheltered east coast 
(Winstanley 1973: 3). In 1905 there was a change in policy and regulated use of pots was 
permitted for northern Tasmanian waters (north of latitude 40°38' S). In 1913 this was 
extended to include the east coast fishery (waters north of latitude 42°21' S) and in 1925 pot 
use was extended to all Tasmanian waters with the exception of the Derwent Estuary, the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel and Storm Bay (Winstanley 1973: 3-5). 
There was continued opposition to the introduction of pots by the Tasmanian, 'ring fishers' 
who lacked the capital to obtain the larger vessels needed to fish pots and who preferred their 
traditional methods (Winstanley 1973: 5; Wilson 1987: 5). Nevertheless, the use of pots 
increased gradually from 15 per cent of fishing vessels in 1925 to 37 per cent in 1939 
(Winstanley 1973: 10). Pot use was regulated according to vessel size, with larger vessels 
permitted to use proportionately more pots than smaller ones, up to a maximum of 30 pots 
for the largest vessels in the fleet (Winstanley 1973: 6). The transition from the ring fishery 
to the more capital-intensive pot fishery continued and marked the beginning of the trend 
towards greater capitalisation of the fishery. Traditional inshore fishers who lacked acces~ to 
capital were gradually marginalized (Phillips 1998: 62-63; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 
2002). 
After the wartime disruption of 1939-1945 the industry enjoyed a boom period. Post war 
reconstruction programmes and low interest loans assisted many to enter the fishery. New 
technology, including synthetic rope, echo-sounders and reliable diesel motors, greatly 
boosted fishing efficiency, while advances in refrigerated transport gave the Tasmanian 
fishery access to lucrative markets for lobster-tails in the United States (Smith and Fergusson 
1969: 5). Prior to the 1960s, the fishery was essentially "open-access" to all qualified 
skippers with the capital to purchase gear and a boat of adequate size to qualify for the use of 
pots (Phillips 1998: 63). This situation was not to last. 
Limited-Entry: A First Step Toward Enclosure 
The move to a limited-entry fishery90 began in 1967 when the number of licences was 
capped at 420. The purpose of this move was to protect the incomes of the established 
90 The lobster fisheries of Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces also adopted a policy of limited-
entry in 1967, probably motivated by similar concerns and arguments with respect to technological 
gains and within the context of similar social and economic circumstances in the Maritime Provinces 
as existed in Tasmania/Australia at that time. However, the Canadian Maritime lobster fisheries have 
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operators from competition by additional entrants to the fishery (Harrison 1987a); it was not 
motivated by concern over the sustainability of stocks (Winstanley 1973: 7; Parliament of 
Tasmania 1997: 19). Yet, rather than acknowledge that the measures were merely a service 
to established interests, government and industry conspired to convince the public that the 
measures were for conservation purposes (Bradshaw 2002). 
Following limited-entry there was some growth in capacity as smaller operators were able to 
upgrade vessels and so increase their pot entitlements up to the 40 pot limit that applied at 
that time. Then in 1972 the number of pots in the fleet was capped at a total of 10,507 
(Winstanley 1973: 7). The number of licences was gradually reduced in the following years 
as some operators retired and pots were amalgamated into fewer, though larger, holdings. 
Transfer of licences and pots was permitted within a few years, and a market in fishing 
entitlements soon developed. Thus, rights of access to the fishery, which had originally been 
established as a privilege, began to be transformed into a form of tradable property. 
Limiting entry did not prevent the growth of effort in the industry. The "fishing power" of 
the fleet continued to increase due to various technological improvements, the introduction 
of satellite navigation systems in the early 1990s being particularly significant. There was 
also a significant price increase for the product from AU$ 10 per kilogram in the mid 1980s 
to AU$ 30 per kilogram in the mid 1990s, a consequence of the development of a live, air-
freight, export market to Asia and this encouraged intensification of fishing effort 
(Bradshaw, Williamson and Wood 2000). Regulation also favoured increasing fishing 
efficiency. In 1960, for example, the maximum per vessel pot limit was raised from 30 to 40 
and the pot allowance for smaller vessels in the fleet was also raised proportionately. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s there was growing concern about overfishing, both within 
the industry and in government. Biological sustainability was not the major issue. The 
concern was essentially about economic overfishing. Resource rent was being dissipated 
through excess fishing effort as fishers competed in a race to 'catch the fish before somebody 
else did'. Rent dissipation by excess effort limited profits and constrained the potential for 
increase in the capital value of fishing entitlements. On the other hand, the 'excess' effort 
was the basis of employment for many skippers, deck hands and other suppliers of fishing 
related inputs. 
not taken the next step towards privatisation of the fishery, adoption of a quota management system, 
though the issue continues to be debated. 
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Rock Lobster Biology and Annual Harvest 
The annual catch has been remarkably consistent, varying between 1000 and 2000 tonnes 
since the pot fishery became established in the 1930s and there has been no readily 
discernible trend (Phillips 1998: 64). Effective fishing effort has increased significantly over 
this time, but the fishery has not been in danger of biol<?gical collapse91. There are still gaps 
in the knowledge of factors that affect lobster population ecology but it is generally believed 
that, as long as an adequate breeding population is maintained, the actual abundance of 
lobsters has little direct correlation with future recruitment to the fishery. Environmental 
factors linked to cycles affecting weather patterns and ocean currents appear to be more 
important (Bruce et al. 2000). Conservation of the breeding stock has always been provided 
by the minimum size limit. This generally allowed lobsters to grow to beyond the age of 
sexual maturity and reproduction before they could legally be taken. In lobster fisheries that 
use baited pots with escape gaps and observe an appropriate size limit, effort can in theory be 
greatly increased without affecting biological productivity. Productivity may even benefit 
where food supply is a limiting factor due to the extra feeding provided by the bait that is 
used in excess fishing effort. Until the 1990s the management position was that: "so far as 
conserving the stock is concerned fishing effort need not be controlled" (Harrison 1987b: 
11). 
Social and Economic Considerations 
While curbing effort may not be necessary to prevent biological stock collapse, it is the key 
to raising catch per unit effort and producing efficiency gains that would yield more resource 
rent or profit. Under heavy fishing pressure the abundance of fish of legal harvest size is 
reduced as this part of the population is fished down and the catch per unit effort, which 
relates to the abundance of 'size' fish, is reduced. Effort reduction allows rebuilding of the 
harvestable stock of 'size' fish and increases catch per unit effort. However, an effect of this 
efficiency gain is to redistribute economic benefits away from labour and other inputs of 
fishing effort, to capital owners of access rights to the fishery. These owners became major 
beneficiaries of increasing resource rent capture after the QMS was introduced. Allocational · 
issues have been a powerful driving force influencing policy, but this has generally not been 
made explicit. Instead the rhetoric of conservation is resorted to in justification of policies 
that principally serve the economic interests of particular stakeholders. Self-interest may 
drive policy, but expression of conservation concerns provides a powerful source of moral 
legitimacy (Phillips 1998). 
91 This assumption differs from a similar, though erroneous assumption about the resilience of 
Newfoundland cod stocks to overfishing (discussed in chapter 3). Immature cod could not be so 
easily protected from fishing mortality as Tasmanian rock lobster in the pot fishery. 
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Phillips (1998: 68-71) analysed several economic surveys of the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery that have been conducted over the years, often to support moves toward a change in 
policy. In the mid 1960s, for example, an economic survey (Smith and Fergusson 1969: 45-
47) conducted by the Tasmanian Department of Agriculture found that the industry was 
economically 'marginal' and supported the change to limited entry. Following the move to 
limited entry and the development of a market for fishing entitlements based on 'pots', the 
market price of pots was recognised as a good indicator of the economic performance of the 
fishery (Campbell 1987: 29). At that time the market value of licences, at AU$ 4000 per pot 
attached to the licence, was found to be justified by the economics of the industry (i.e. new 
entrants paying this price of entry would be economically marginal). This academic study 
suggested that there was no cause for concern - no economic crisis requiring a change of 
policy. 
In 1991, in the lead-up to debate over the introduction of ITQ based management, the 
economic "viability" of the fishery was again raised as a matter of concern. By this time the 
price of pots had risen to AU$ 6000. This indicated that the economic return per pot had 
increased, rnising the price that fishers were prepared to pay for access entitlements. 
However, a study, again conducted by the fisheries management authority (Morrow 1991), 
focused attention on the 'internal rate of return', a measure of the economic performance of 
investment capital in the industry. It found the industry to be a 'marginal' prospect for 
investment. This was not really surprising since an increase in the 'economic surplus' 
produced in the fishery would be reflected in an increase in the price of pots to be paid to 
enter and participate in the fishery. While the increased price of pots was indicative of better 
economic returns from the fishery, the economic analysis based on internal rate of return 
claimed that the industry was in economic decline. To address this spurious economic 
'crisis', the study advocated the adoption of ITQ based management and the relaxation of 
efficiency constraining input controls. The logic of this argument is contestable because any 
increase in efficiency leading to increased resource rent recovery would, under market 
conditions, be met by an increase in the cost of entitlements (pots or quota units). This 
increased 'capital' cost of entry would be expected, if subjected to internal rate of return 
analysis, to show the same marginality of the economic performance of the industry. 
Morrow's study (1991: 16) did note that Tasmania could choose to have a large and 
inefficient fleet or a smaller efficient one, but suggested that the fishery and coastal 
communities associated with it would continue on a course of gradual decline unless 
management action was taken to rationalise the industry and make it more efficient by 
reducing operational costs. 
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·Phillips (1998: 70-71) suggests that an argument could have been made for the opposite 
conclusion: that the decline in these regional economies had been associated with reduced 
local employment in the fishery due to previous rationalisatlon and reduction in the size of 
the fleet. Further gains in fishing efficiency, far from reversing the trend, could be expected 
to exacerbate the decline in regional economies. Nevertheless, this economic analysis was 
used to support proposals for the introduction of the QMS and further rationalisation of the 
fishery in order to promote efficiency in terms of increased rent production. 
Adoption. of a Quota Management System 
The decision to move towards the QMS was adopted after 1995 following a ballot of licence 
holders. Many fishers were excluded from this ballot including deck hands and skippers 
who leased rather than owned licences (Phillips 1998: 71; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002). 
Only licence holders deemed to be the owners of property rights in the fishery were 
considered "stakeholders" and included in the ballot, and only 53 per cent of primary votes 
favoured a quota management system. (DPIF 1997a: 21). The decision to attempt to 
introduce a QMS for the fishery was adopted by cabinet in accordance with the wishes of the 
Minister for Primary Industry and Fisheries in August 1996 (Williamson 2002: 123)92. · 
4.3.4 Politics and the Introduction of the QMS 
Several accounts include some discussion and analysis of the political manoeuvrings 
associated with the introduction of the QMS (Phillips 1998; Bradshaw, Williamson and 
Wood 2000; Bradshaw 2002; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002; Williamson 2002). Once 
the decision had been made to adopt a QMS, several years were required to finalise 
arrangements, particularly those relating to allocation of the total allowable catch (TAC) 
among licence holders. The government's draft management plan released in 1997 (DPIF 
1997a) proposed that a total allowable catch for the fishery be set, based on an annual stock 
assessment. This TAC was to be allocated on an equal per pot basis among the total of 
10,507 pots attached to the 320 licences in the fleet. The preference for per-pot allocation 
acknowledged pots as the traditional unit of tradable property in the fishery, and the basis of 
past investment or 'stakeholding' in the industry. Another consideration favouring this 
method of allocation related to a political consideration of simple numbers. The majority of 
licence holders would benefit from this method of allocation and might be expected to 
support it, while those disadvantaged, the "big catchers" in the fleet, were relatively few. 
92 Tasmania's abalone fishery was already managed by a quota management system (DPIF 1997b) 
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Under the draft management plan, quota units were to be tradable and the number of pots 
allowed per vessel increased by 25 per cent to allow for amalgamation of holdings and the 
restructuring of the industry toward fewer, more efficient vessels. The maximum number of 
pots that could be fished from the larger vessels in the fleet would increase from 40 to 50 
(DPIF 1997a: 44). These additional pots would have to be bought from other licence holders 
out of the limited number of 10,507 pots in the fleet. 
As noted, this proposed method of allocation of the TAC disadvantaged the 'big catchers' in 
the fleet. Many objected to the QMS altogether, and thought that allocation of quota on an 
equal per pot basis was unfair. They believed that quota allocation should reflect catch 
history whereby the traditional big catchers in the fleet would be allocated more quota to 
reflect past operational patterns. They lobbied hard, and in response to their concerns, 
Tasmania's Upper House of Parliament, The Legislative Council, conducted a Select 
Committee Inquiry into the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery (Parliament of Tasmania 1997). 
Report of the Select Committee Inquiry 
The Select Committee Inquiry produced a useful report containing a detailed and 
comprehensive analysis of biological and economic aspects of the fishery. It found that the 
fishery was "not in danger of imminent collapse" (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 6) and 
recommended that the introduction of a QMS be delayed, though not dismissed altogether. 
It referred to Morrow's (1991) economic analysis and adopted his view that a reduction in 
effort and catch were necessary to avoid a gradual decline. In this it lent support to the 
"economic" rather than the "social" fisheries paradigm, and it reflected the lobbying efforts 
of the "big catchers" by suggesting that allocation of quota, when a QMS was eventually 
phased in, should recognise catch history. This, as noted by Phillips (1998: 74), "challenged 
the established position of the pot as the unit of 'property' in the fishery". 
Phillips also noted (1998:74): 
Efficiency gains as a result of technological improvements over past decades 
were clearly identified as the major causes leading to overfishing and 
overcapacity (Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 47-57). The link between the 
progressive increase in the market price of lobster over past decades and 
overfishing was also made. These issues were clearly identified in the report as 
causes of the problem, but the recommendations contained nothing to address 
them. On the contrary, the report recommended further reduction in efficiency 
constraints by raising the maximum number of pots per vessel from 40 to 60 
(Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 10). 
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The Nixon Report 
At the time that the management plan was being debated, the Nixon Report, commissioned 
by the Australian Commonwealth Government to provide broad-ranging advice to both the 
state and Commonwealth governments on matters of Tasmanian economic policy, included a 
section advising on management of the rock lobster fishery (Nix~m 1997). The Nixon Report 
recommended a total restructuring of the fishery in the interests of efficiency. It suggested 
that the government buy back all existing rights in the fishery (i.e. pots and licences that 
represented existing capital investment), and then re-allocate rights in the form of quota by a 
process of tendering, which would fund the inhial buy-back. The Nixon Report also 
recommended further measures to promote efficiency, suggesting that remaining input 
controls such as vessel-pot limits be abolished (Nixon 1997: 186). For various reasons 
relating to party politics, and relations between the state and federal governments, the Nixon 
Report received little support in Tasmania and was virtually ignored. 
Discussion of Management Proposals 
Phillips explains (1998: 76) that these three management proposals shared a commitment to 
the management goal of increasing efficiency in the fishery, as measured by the production 
of economic surplus in the form of profit or resource rent. The cost of efficiency gains 
would be measured by a reduction in the number of vessels and people employed in the 
industry. Rebuilding and maintaining the biomass of takeable fish, those above the size 
limit, would lead to improved catch rates and the total allowable catch could be harvested 
with less effort and less cost than in a competitive fishery operating according to the 
equilibrium yield model. Relaxing some input controls, such as limits on the number of pots 
used per vessel, would also increase efficiency but result in a reduction in employment in the 
fishery as pots would be amalgamated onto fewer vessels and fewer crew would be required. 
Phillips (1998: 75) argues that the only real difference between the three positions lay in 
their support for the narrow interests of particular stakeholder sub-groups. The 
recommendations put forward by the Nixon Report, while not really feasible for political and 
practical reasons, would, in theory, have captured a capital gain for government. The 
government position outlined in the Draft Management Plan, by advocating quota allocation 
on an equal per pot basis, favoured the majority of licence holders, who generally landed less 
than the proposed allocation of 150 kilograms-per-pot. The Select Committee Report, 
favoured the minority of licence holders whose catches typically exceeded 150 kilograms-
per-pot and who logically wished quota allocation to recognise catch history. The argument 
was essentially about how to divide the 'cake' among licence holders. It was a redistributive 
argument among rent-seeking interest groups. 
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There was every expectation that the market value of fishing entitlements (pots/quota) would 
increase under the QMS, reflecting increased rent production from the fishery as a 
consequence of efficiency gains. Phillips notes (1998: 75). "this benefit to licence holders 
would, however, come at a cost to other sectors of society". Employment opportunities in 
the industry would be reduced and future generations of fishers would face an increased cost 
of entry relating to the expected increase in the cost of leasing or buying quota. A socio-
economic impact study produced by the University of Tasmania forecast that the number of 
deck-hands employed in the industry would be halved (Williamson, Wood and Bradshaw 
1998: xii). Phillips noted: 
There was no serious consideration given to management options that would 
maintain or increase employment in the industry. The productivity of the 
fishery is limited by the biological constraints of rock lobster ecology. The total 
value of the fishery has progressively increased in recent decades as the market 
price for lobster has risen. The industry today could sustainably generate a 
higher income, adjusted for inflation, than it has in recent years. This incoine 
could support more people in employment than the industry employed in the 
past. The Tasmanian Government (Morrow 1991:16) and the Select Committee 
(Parliament of Tasmania 1997: 20) recognised that there were options. 
Tasmania could have a large fleet maximising employment and lifestyle 
opportunities, each limited to a low annual catch, or a more "efficient" smaller 
fleet producing more economic surplus. However, all proposals favoured 
managing the fishery to reduce employment and increase efficiency in terms of 
rent production. In doing so they all favoured the interests of rent-seeking 
sectors of society at the cost of reduced employment opportunities in the fishery 
and adverse outcomes could be predicted for regional economies and social 
equality generally ( 1998: 75). 
The eventual resolution, arrived at after much debate and negotiation, was a management 
plan for the fishery implemented in March 1998 (DPIF 1997c, and Fisheries (Rock Lobster) 
Rules 1997), which essentially followed the intentions of the Draft Management Plan but 
included some concessions to the historically big catchers in the fleet by incorporating an 
element of catch history in the initial allocation of quota (Living Marine Resources 
Management Amendment (Rock Lobster Quota) Act 1997). 
Phillips (1998: 76-79) discusses some hypothetical alternative management scenarios that he 
suggests would have been more compatible with the concept of equal access and other 
values linked to sustainable development. First, he suggests that state waters could be zoned. 
The established industrial pot fishing practices of the commercial fishery could have 
continued offshore and off the west coast of Tasmania, perhaps limited by a QMS. But in 
the sheltered and heavily fished waters of the east coast where tourism and recreational 
fishing are most important, a different system based on efficiency constraints was 
recommended. Vessels could be restricted to fewer pots, perhaps 15 or less, or fishers might 
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be restricted to the traditional rings. This could counter the escalation of effort linked to the 
increased power of fishing technology and the incentive to fish provided by the inflated 
market price for lobster. This equal access efficiency-constrained. fishery, Phillips argued, 
could have stimulated tourism and provided greater economic benefit to coastal communities 
than a fishery focused on rent production from an industrial approach to.resource extraction. 
He also suggests that a resource tax would have been a useful management tool. Amason 
(1993) notes that a resource tax levied on catch would provide an effective control on effort. 
A charge of $10 per lobster or per kilogram exported from the state could secure a return to 
the Ta~manian people from what is, nominally, a publicly owned resource. For ease of 
administration this tax could be applied only to lobsters exported from Tasmania and, thus, 
would not interfere with the internal market and its potential benefits in stimulating local 
prosperity. The current QMS has, in effect, such a tax in place - quota are traded for 
between $10 and $20 per kilogram - except that this resource rent is collected by the quota 
owners for their own benefit rather than by the T~smanian government on behalf of the 
Tasmanian people. The alternative management scenarios contemplated here are, of course, 
out of step with the privatisation agenda of neoliberal globalisation, which generates pressure 
for policies that tend to transfer wealth out of peripheral regions, such as Tasmania, to 
service the accumulation of private global capital. 
Passage of the Legislation 
The process of passage of the necessary legislation for the QMS through Tasmania's Lower 
House (Legislative Assembly) and Upper House (Legislative Council) has been described by 
' 
Bradshaw, Williamson and Wood (2000) and Williamson (2002: 122-129). Its success was 
far from certain. Politicians, especially those in the Upper House, had been subject to 
intensive lobbying for some time. At the time (1997-8) it seemed likely that the bill would 
not pass and that introduction of a QMS would be delayed for at least another year. It is 
worth noting the support given to the legislation by the Tasmanian Greens93, and by a study 
conducted by researchers at the University of Tasmania into the likely socio-economic 
impacts of the QMS. The support of the Greens (who then held 4 out of 35 seats in the 
Lower House) may not have been crucial, but it demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
carefully promoted idea that urgent action was needed to avert a looming ecological crisis in 
the fishery. Bradshaw, who had an ongoing involvement in a socio-economic study 
monitoring the effects of the QMS, suggests that the Greens simply did not understand its 
broader social ramifications (Dr. Matt Bradshaw, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, University 
of Tasmania, personal communication, 2002). It also may be indicative of the gulf 
93 Greenpeace (in the US) campaigned strongly in 1999 against ITQ based fisheries for a range of 
ethical and practical conservation reasons (Jennings 1999). 
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separating the Greens and their largely urban constituents, from the sort of people most 
directly disadvantaged by enclosure of the fishery, young males with limited educational 
qualifications, often living in rural-coastal communities with limited employment options. 
While the government had been confident of passage of the legislation through the Lower 
House, where it passed with tripartite support in November 1997 (Williamson 2002: 125), 
members of the Upper House were divided. Lobbying of independent members had, as 
I • 
noted, been quite intense. A major point of objection by those holding out against the 
introduction of quota was the lack of a socio-economic impact study into its likely effects 
(DPIF 1997d). A socio-economic study had belatedly been commissioned (in June 1997) to 
address this issue when it began to emerge as a point of contention, but the study was not due 
to be finalised until after the debate in the Upper House. The lack of a completed social 
impact statement was repeatedly raised by anti-quota members and it seemed likely that the 
' 
Legislative Council would follow their Select Committee's advice (Parliament of Tasmania 
1997) and oppose the bill, delaying introduction of quota for at least another year 
(Williamson 2002: 125). 
At this point, and just before the bill was put to the vote, a letter of progress outlining 
preliminary findings of the socio-economic study was introduced into the debate and may 
have helped to quell the opposition to quota. The letter _µoted that much restructuring had 
already been occurring in the fishery and in the opinion of the researchers; the social and 
economic viability of no coastal community would be threatened by the impacts entailed in 
the proposed QMS (Williamson 2002: 127). Williamson (2002: 128) suggests that the letter 
which was read out during debate of the issue in Parliament may have influenced the 
outcome and contributed to the passage of the bill. She notes that the 'independence' of the 
University research team from their employers (DPIF), a matter that had been emphasised in 
the Parliamentary debate, could have been brought into question by the use of their 
preliminary findings to support the pro-quota lobby. They had entered the debate with some 
trepidation, but felt obliged to do so at the request of their employers, the DPIF, who 
specifically wished them to address the question of whether the social and economic viability 
of any port community would be threatened by adopting the proposed QMS (Dr. Matt 
Bradshaw, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Tasmania, personal 
communication, 2002). At that time the researchers, who had been intensively briefed by 
departmental managers and biologists, were convinced that urgent action was needed to avert 
an -ecological crisis and believed that the QMS was the best management option to avert 
biological collapse of the fishery. None of the researchers were biologists and accepted the 
department's advice at face value (Dr. Matt Bradshaw, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, 
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University of Tasmania, personal communication, 2002). One of the researchers, Bradshaw 
(2002), later came to the view that the overfishing crisis was about rent dissipation rather 
than recruitment overfishing and that the QMS was primarily about securing the interests of 
capital in the fishery. 
4.3.5 Effects of the Quota Management System 
Four years on from the introduction of the QMS some of its effects are becoming apparent. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the market price of quota units. From the ~970s, when 
pots/units were traded for less than AU$ 1000, their market value increased to AU$ 4000 in 
1987, AU$ 6000 in 1991, AU$ 10000 in 1997, prior to the introduction of the QMS, and by 
2002, after the system had been in place for three years, the value of lobster quota units 
exceeded AU$ 25000. In 2005/2006 quota units traded for AU$ 35000. The value of 40 
quota units, equivalent to the former "full" 40-pot licence package, has reached a value in 
excess of AU$ 1 million. 
The Trend Toward Investor Control 
There is a trend toward increased ownership of quota units by non-fishing investors and 
increased ownership by non-Tasmanians (Ford 2000). The high cost of quota units has now 
made it almost impossible for fish-workers without capital to work their way up from deck-
hand to skipper, to eventually acquiring access rights and becoming owner-operators (Ford 
2000), the path followed by many in the past. The separation between capital and labour is 
becoming increasingly entrenched. Ownership of property in the form of quota units is 
increasingly providing power over dependent suppliers of contract labour (Bradshaw 2002). 
Williamson (2002: 213) describes this as "refeudalisation" and "prolatarianisation" of the 
fishery. She notes (2002: 214) that retiring fishers are now less likely to pass on licences to 
their children or other relatives to fish with because they have become too valuable as rent 
earning assets94. This is also symptomatic of the widening social gap between those who 
fish and those who own fishing rights. 
The total market value of quota units now exceeds AU$ 250 million. This reflects the 
capitalised value of the right by quota owners to claim approximately AU$ 20 million in 
annual rent from the fishery. Nominally the resource remains publicly owned and managed 
by the Government of Tasmania on behalf of the Tasmanian community. But the strength of 
vested interest that has become established as a result of past management policies, and the 
94 Family members stand to inherit licences and quota entitlements. 
175 
Chapter 4 Tasmania 
priority the legal and political systems give to promoting the financial interests associated 
with private property, means that government is severely constrained in how it manages the 
fishery. This constraint means that management of the fishery must continue to serve the 
rent-seeking interests that have become established, at the expense of the broader public 
interest that might be better served by a wider distribution of the resource wealth. 
A new management environment is emerging with greater involvement of lobbyists, lawyers, 
accountants, and brokers of fishing entitlements. Unit owners are increasingly influenced by 
financial interest, rather than by identification with the values of industry traditions and 
sympathy with the concerns and interests of fishworkers. There is an ongoing push by the 
industry to increasingly 'liberalise' the market for quota units in order to further inflate their 
value. It has lobbied for removal of the stipulation that quota units be attached to licence 
packages, and to allow single units to be held (Bradshaw 2002). Currently a minimum of 
five units may be held and they must be attached to a licence package. (An unanticipated 
development is that the limited number of licences have now acquired a market value of 
about AU$ 50,000, independent of any quota units that may be attached.) One can expect 
that there will be ongoing efforts to promote more regulatory changes that will contribute to 
a further increase in the value of property rights associated with the fishery. Lip-service may 
be paid to socio-economic concerns and the intergenerational inequities that disadvantage the 
next generation of fishworkers. But beyond the rhetoric, the industry is not willing to allow 
any measures that will reduce the present value of fishing entitlements, or limit the potential 
for further increase. 
Government's Perspective 
The conventional view of management of the fishery and the introduction of the QMS is that 
it has been a success. Fishing effort has been reduced and the value of capitalised fishing 
entitlements has increased. A government perspective on developments in the fishery 
expresses little concern about social impacts and reduced employment opportunities (Ford 
2000). On the contrary, it promotes further rationalisation of the industry in the direction of 
fewer participants by arguing that this is the key to increased profitability. It also suggests 
that the cost of an effective enforcement regime in a fishery with strong property rights is 
likely to be higher if there are more fishers. 
Ford (2000) notes the strong investor security that is provided by the QMS and suggests that 
this factor, and further anticipated regulatory measures, will continue the trend toward 
investor control of the fishery and further reduce the opportunity for fishworkers to acquire 
access rights. He suggests that the trend away from an owner-operator fishery to one of 
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absentee landlords and contract harvesters will mean that the property-rights to the fishery 
will exert little deterrence to illegal activity on the part of those actively working in the 
fishery; they, after all, have no stake in the fishery. The government's role as enforcer of the 
property rights regime is emphasised and the value of fishing entitlements is explicitly linked 
to the effectiveness of enforcement. The likelihood that the government will seek to increase 
the enforcement regime, the costs to be passed on to the industry, is clearly foreshadowed 
here. 
The new management environment is one in which government and property rights holders 
engage in a mixture of collaboration and contest. They collaborate to increase the 
production of resource rent from the exploitation of labour and natural resources in the 
fishery, and they contest with each other over distribution of the spoils. This is a contest 
between mutual dependants. The state depends on the property-rights mechanisms to 
produce an economic surplus from the fishery to which it can claim a share. And owners of 
fishing entitlements are dependent on the state, which maintains exclusive, legitimate 
authority to enforce and protect their property rights. Inequality and social tensions with the 
potential to pose a threat to property rights serve to maintain the importance of the state's 
enforcement role and so maintain the dependency of property owners on the state. 
Other actors are also drawn in to the rent-seeking contest. These include politicians, fishery 
managers, biologists and enforcement officers, as well as brokers, lawyers and accountants, 
and also, it must be admitted, academic. researchers. Many are associated with public 
institutions and are subsidised by public finances95 . The rhetoric of public interest is often 
the currency of arbitrage between these contesting groups, and environmental, socio-
economic, and economic efficiency issues are raised when convenient to exert leverage 
during management discussions which, though this is seldom made explicit, are to a degree 
about the distribution of resource rent among these groups. 
Implications for the Recreational Fishery 
Recreational fishing for rock lobster in Tasmania has a long tradition and strong 
participation. Recreational fishing licences cost a base fee of AU $31.50 plus an additional 
AU $5.25 for each endorsement for dive, pot or ring use. Approximately 14,900 recreational 
pot licences, 7,500 dive licenses and 4,400 ring licences are issued each year. The number 
of recreational licences issued has increased since introduction of the QMS. Recreational 
95 Williamson (2002: 205) noted that before the QMS 40% of management costs totalling AU $2.7M 
were recovered from the industry, whilst post QMS 55% of AU $3.4M was recovered, the rest being 
paid from public revenue. 
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fishers may use a combination of methods and gears. Pot fishers are limited to one pot and if 
they have obtained the additional endorsements, may also dive for lobster, and use up to four 
baited lift nets known as "rings". Divers may use compressed air but no implements other 
than a gloved hand may be used to capture lobsters. A daily bag limit of five lobsters applies 
to all recreational fishers and the catch must be 'marked by tail clipping and may not be 
bartered or sold. Penalties for infringements of the rules are quite severe. Minor 
infringements may incur on the spot fines of AU $100-200. Fines for more serious offences 
can total several thousand dollars and there are provisions for custodial sentences in extreme 
cases. 
There has always been some friction between commercial and recreational rock lobster 
fishers in Tasmania. They are, after all, competing for the same resource. But the changes 
to the regulatory environment associated with the move to a QMS, and other factors affected 
by these changes, have more directly affected the relationship. Some of these effects are 
interesting to consider because they relate to the interaction between private and public 
interests in the fishery; the commercial fishery emphasising private property rights and the 
recreational fishery based on regulated public access to the resource. 
Some negative impacts on the recreational sector of changes in the fishery include an 
increasingly onerous compliance system, with harsher penalties for infringements and more 
vigorous policing. The rules and regulations governing the recreational fishery are more 
complex and restrictive than formerly. It takes some concentration and effort to understand 
them and because of their increasing complexity and the more serious penalties for 
transgressions, the enjoyment and sense of freedom that many people seek in fishing as a 
recreation is intruded upon by the increased level of bureaucracy, and increased anxiety over 
the possibility of getting into trouble over a (possibly inadvertent) transgression of the rules. 
In this sense recreational fishers suffer the same impacts of increasing bureaucratisation 
associated with the QMS that afflicts fishworkers in the commercial sector. These 
constraints are also likely to hamper the development of tourism based on recreational 
lobster fishing. Much of the regulation of the recreational sector is in place to prevent access 
rights associated with recreational fishing being used as a way to circumvent and undermine 
the integrity of the QMS. There is also constant lobbying pressure from the commercial 
sector to restrict the recreational fishery further and to reduce the recreational catch. 
Suggestions made by the sector have included "capping" or limiting the number of licences 
issued and bringing in a total allowable catch for the recreational sector. It is in their 
interests to do this as it leaves more stock in the water which could allow an increase in the 
commercial total allowable catch. The number of recreational lobster licences has increased 
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since the introduction of the QMS and there is growing management focus on developing an 
explicit resource sharing arrangement for the two sectors (Revill and Williams 2006). 
Much of the increased policing effort that has accompanied the QMS has targeted the 
recreational sector. There has always been concern within the commercial sector about 
poaching by recreational fishers. This poaching generally relates to taking more fish than 
daily bag limits (5) or possession limits (10) allow, and taking lobsters using extra pots, or 
other illegal methods. Divers using compressed air, either tanks or hookah gear, can be 
especially effective at times and divers can take lobster at times when they do not seem to be 
attracted to the baited pots; the only method of capture permitted for the commercial fishery. 
The sale or barter of lobsters taken by recreational fishing is illegal. Regulations intended to 
discourage illicit trade in recreational catch include the requirement that rock lobsters sold in 
Tasmania must bear an individually numbered tag, while lobsters taken in the recreational 
fishery must be marked by clipping the central fin on the tail as soon as the fish are removed 
from the water. While poaching on a small scale by 'recreational fishers' was once merely 
considered an intrusion upon the privileges of licence holders, it now tends to be viewed 
more seriously by quota owners as an offence against private property. 
Following the introduction of the QMS it appears that there has been some intensification of 
commercial effort in the sheltered, inshore waters of the east coast and a reduction of effort 
offshore on the west coast. Reasons for this include the higher value per kilogram of shallow 
water inshore fish and the relative ease or convenience of fishing the inshore east coast 
waters versus the more difficult conditions off the west coast. A tendency for the 
commercial fleet to target inshore, east coast waters more intensively could increase 
competition with the recreational sector in these areas. The east coast inshore waters are 
particularly important for the recreational fishery, which harvests approximately 20 per cent 
of the east coast catch. The total recreational catch statewide is only about 5 per cent of the 
total commercial catch. Recreational fishing on the east coast supports the tourism economy 
which includes hotels and campgrounds, shops, service stations and other providers of goods 
and services used by fisher holidaymakers. 
The politics of the conflict of interest between the two sectors is likely to continue to play a 
significant part in the ongoing management of the fishery. The recreational fishery, which is 
still open to anybody who wishes to buy a licence, can be viewed as representing a broader 
public interest, while the commercial sector is more narrowly defined by the capitalised 
private property rights that establish stakeholder interest in it. Government is in a position to 
play the two sectors off against each other to some extent, and thus the tension between the 
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two groups provides government with a powerful tool of political arbitrage. Olson's (1982) 
work leads us to believe that although they are more numerous, the recreational sector is 
unlikely to prevail in competition against the interests of the quota owners. However, the 
potential threat they pose to the interests of the commercial sector (the threat of the mob to 
private property), and the vital role of government in restraining them (by policing the 
fishery) suggests that they are a valuable political lever in the hands of government which it 
is in the interests of the government to maintain. It is the lever with which benefits can be 
pried out of the commercial sector, for example in the form of management levies, licence 
fees, resource rent taxes or political donations, to balance against the number of votes that 
the recreational fishery may represent. 
There may, however, be some benefit to quota owners from maintaining participation in the 
recreational fishery. The industry needs skilled fishworkers to harvest the catch under the 
QMS. With the trend towards contract harvesting and the barrier to entry that the inflated 
cost of fishing entitlements now poses to new entrants, there is some concern, about where 
the next generation of fishers is going to come from. Skills developed in the recreational 
fishery may, in theory, supply some of the future needs of the industry for skilled labour. 
But there are no longer the prospects of economic advancement as a reward for hard work 
and good fortune that provided an incentive for an earlier generation to enter the fishery. 
Implications for Aboriginal Fishing Rights 
Williamson (2002: 224) notes that "the ITQ management plan lacked any provision 
whatsoever for Tasmanian Aboriginal people." She suggests that this was due to the 
implementation process of the QMS which only considered established licence holders as 
stakeholders. She also comments that it may be "a reflection of a general lack of 
consideration of Aboriginal rights which may be endemic to natural resource management in 
Tasmania." Williamson suggests that the government may need to buy back quota from the 
commercial sector to address this issue in the future. Inspiration for this view may come 
from New Zealand where the government has bought back quota and allocated it to Maori 
communities in recognition of treaty obligations. 
The Tasmanian Aboriginal community has suffered various forms of social and economic 
disadvantage. This began with dispossession and genocide in the nineteenth century, though 
Pybus ( 1991: 17 5-188) debates the question of the supposed "extermination" of the 
Tasmanian Aborigines. She points out the convenience, to those who had occupied the 
island, of declaring the original inhabitants extinct so that "there would be no more tortured 
questioning about 'the original owners of the soil' and what might be due to them" (1991: 
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178). Aboriginal identity is not defined on purely genetic grounds. From the time of 
settlement, intercourse between Aborigines and whites produced many children of mixed 
racial ancestry whose offspring have continued to be a part of the Tasmanian population, and 
whose primary identification is Aboriginal. Their links to an Aboriginal identity have not 
always provided social or economic advantages. It is only in recent decades that 
Commonwealth programs, and more recently, Tasmanian state ones, have sought to redress 
some of the injustices of the past with various forms of grants and assistance to people of 
Aboriginal ancestry. This often generates resentment from non-Aboriginal Tasmanians, who 
are offended that someone who is as 'white' as they, should receive special benefits (Pybus 
1991: 187-188). 
Internal disputes over membership of the Aboriginal community are also common, 
especially in relation to political conflict over control of organisations and resources, and at 
times Aboriginal organisations seem to be racked by factionalism and in-fighting. 
Allocation of quota to Tasmanian Aboriginal organisations may not be an effective means to 
provide benefits to address past injustices, and it could prove to be counter-productive by 
provoking increased divisiveness within the Aboriginal community and between it and the 
rest of Tasmanian society. In Canada there have been violent conflicts over the allocation of 
fish quota to native Americans, and in South Africa, the policy goal of redistributing fishery 
resources to benefit previously disadvantaged groups has not proven to be successful within 
quota based fisheries (Hersoug and Holm 2000), even in the context of a society that has 
undergone, supposedly, a social and political revolution. 
If one genuinely wants to help the economically disadvantaged members of society, 
irrespective of their race, this might be more readily achieved if resources, such .as the lobster 
fishery, were managed in a way that promotes wealth equalisation through egalitarian 
opportunities of access. Management systems characterised by enclosure of resources for 
the short term benefit of a few and in the interests of capital accumulation do not help the 
disadvantaged of society and compensation mechanisms, such as those discussed, are often 
ineffective at promoting material equality or of securing traditional values of association 
with nature and resources. They can exacerbate inequality and tensions within Aboriginal 
sub-groups and between them and the wider society. There is a subtle irony in the fact that 
the Australian community only recognised Aboriginal Australians as citizens with the right 
to vote in 1967, the same year that access was being closed to fishery resources through 
introduction of limited entry licensing systems. 
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Implications for Sustainability and Social and Economic Development 
It is not difficult to make a case that the evolution of regulation in the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery fits Olson's (1982) theories about the trend towards domination by rent-
seeking, vested interests. The retarding effects of rent-seeking activities on economic 
development and general prosperity has been well established (see, for example, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1998: 53-80). Matthiasson (2001), for example, discusses the problems associated 
with rent-seeking and resource wealth in relation to Iceland's fisheries and it is reasonable to 
expect that there will be similar impacts associated with the management trends in 
Tasmania's fisheries discussed here. 
There are costs associated with the non-productive accounting and policing activities that the 
QMS requires, and also opportunity costs associated with the management system's 
constraints. A less restricted system of management might allow the development of more 
diverse, creative and productive ways to use the resource, yielding greater economic and 
other wellbeing benefits. In some regions, for example, the fishery might produce greater 
wealth from value-adding and multiplier effects if it were managed to promote tourism and 
recreational fishing, rather than 'economically efficient' commercial fishing with an 
emphasis on rent production (Phillips 1998:71-74). 
Perhaps the greatest concern about the implications of the QMS for the broader issue of 
sustainability relates to its distributional effects. Phillips notes: 
The productive capacity of the rock lobster fishery is limited by biological 
constraints. Leaving aside the possibility of increasing the value of this 
productivity by using it in ways that yield greater wellbeing benefits in addition 
to its commodity value, and assuming the commodity value is the same whether 
it is harvested by a property-rights, rent maximising fishery or by an equal-
access rent dissipating or redistributing one, what then is the net benefit to 
society of greater economic efficiency in terms of revenue production? It will 
not increase the production of wealth, and rent not dissipated in wages in a 
labour-intensive, efficiency-constrained fishery, can instead be dissipated in 
profits and rents in a property-rights, revenue appropriating fishery ( 1998: 82). 
Phillips argues that economic efficiency is a matter of perspective: 
A significant economic effect of managing to produce rent is the distribution of 
the wealth produced in the fishery away from people who work in the fishery 
and away from their communities, to the capital based property owners of the 
fishery and ultimately into the pool of global capital ( 1998: 82). 
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In a global economy, Phillips observes (1998: 83), with freedom of capital movement, 
economic surplus generated from the fishery can go anywhere in the world, just as wealth 
from anywhere can buy control over part of the industry. "The only wealth from the fishery 
that can be confidently retained, at least in the first instance, is that portion that is 
"dissipated" in local content fishing costs". Economic analysis that discounts this and 
believes that profit and rent represents the only valid measure of the economic benefit of the 
fishery does not reflect the perspective of local communities. But there are, Phillips notes 
(1998: 57), individuals and occupations at local, state and national level that gain relative 
advantage from participating ·in the consolidation and export of wealth from a region in the 
service of global economic interests. 
The foregoing discussion focuses on the distribution of wealth out of the community, but this 
may be less important than the effect of promoting wealth inequality within it. As already 
discussed, inequality caused by the QMS means that fishworkers may have little incentive to 
protect the resource. Many in local communities might be better off if poaching 
redistributed the wealth more evenly, or. if overfishing or environmental deterioration 
reduced the production of surplus wealth or rent that sustains the advantage of those with 
economic power over them. Jealousy and resentment are natural human responses to 
inequality. Such a situation is not conducive to maintaining, throughout the community, a 
commitment to sustainability (Phillips 1998: 83-84). 
In chapters 2 and 3 the link between social equality and the ability of a society to achieve 
environmental requirements for sustainability was discussed. A systems-analysis 
perspective suggests that sustainable fisheries are associated with sustainable, functional 
communities (Charles 1992, Jentoft 2000). Those characterised by inequality, productivity-
sapping competitiveness, disunity, and other attributes of social dysfunction lack the 
necessary entrenchment of values and .institutional mechanisms to successfully implement 
sustainable patterns of use of fisheries and other environmental resources. The growth of 
inequality in society can be expected to undermine democratic processes, civic cohesion and 
the civic commitment of decision-makers. Management of fisheries by property rights 
mechanisms is not only reflective of poor development of the essential characteristics for 
sustainability in Tasmanian society, but it also contributes to maintaining them because 
resources are distributed in ways that increase the strength of established power structures 
and interests. 
Hypothetically, one can consider different management scenarios for the Tasmanian rock 
lobster fishery. In practice, policy-makers are restricted in what they can do, being largely 
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bound by the legacy of past policies, which have greatly reduced the ongoing powers of 
government to regulate the fishery for the public benefit. The imperative to maintain the 
market value of quota units constrains management to an emphasis on resource rent 
production. Change would be resisted, not just by quota holders, but also by other rent-
seeking sectors with an interest in the fishery. It would also be very difficult for the 
Tasmanian Government to introduce a resource tax such as a royalty charge of AU $10 per 
kilogram. Such a tax would appropriate a significant share of the resource rent and hit 
directly at the property value of quota units. Interestingly, when the Chinese government 
cracked down in 1999 on evasion of the import tax of approximately AU $8 per kilogram on 
Australian lobster entering China, which imports much of the Tasmanian catch, Tasman!an 
processors dropped the beach price paid to fishers by about AU $10 (Williamson 2002: 163). 
It would seem that the Chinese government is better able to secure resource rent from the 
fishery than is the government of Tasmania on behalf of the Tasmanian public. The SARS 
epidemic in China in 2003 also depressed demand and prices for Tasmanian lobster and 
caused serious economic difficulties for some fishers. Some had leased quota at high prices 
and found that low beach prices did not allow them to cover their costs. In a quota managed 
fishery with a high degree of 'virtual' capital costs that need to be covered, a price squeeze 
can generate pressure to overfish and attempt to evade the quota management system by 
selling fish outside of the system. Under these conditions, an economic examination of the 
internal rate of return of the fishery in 2003 might demonstrate worse economic performance 
by this measure than Morrow found in 1991 when he advocated a QMS. 
4.3.6 Conclusion 
Regulation of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery has promoted privilege and exclusion with 
respect to resource access, thereby exacerbating wealth inequality and social division. 
Regulation has fostered consolidation and inflation of the capital market value of fishing 
entitlements at the expense of a wider distribution of resource wealth. It has failed to 
optimise the potential for resource use to contribute to the broader wellbeing of Tasmanian 
society. Further, the consequences of regulation constrain the development within 
Tasmanian society and its institutions of those values and structures essential to social and 
environmental sustainability (Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002). 
The evolution of Tasmania's rock lobster fishery management system included a number of 
significant steps. Landmarks among these were the introduction of pots at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the move to limited entry in the 1960s and 1970s, and the adoption of 
the quota management system in 1998. In each case it could be argued that vested interests 
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were served and that broader principles of community equity were compromised. The 
introduction of pots allowed greater capitalisation of the fishery against the interests and 
objections of many small-scale fishers. The move to limited entry protected the established 
operators from competition from potential new entrants. It is notable that this step, which 
initially served the interests of a particular group of fishworkers, was a cornerstone to the 
eventual capitalisation of the fishery with the introduction of ITQ. It demonstrates a 
seemingly inevitable transformation of privileges into forms of private property. 
At the peginning of the chapter I discussed how Tasmania's history and social and political 
development produced institutions and a resource management culture characterised by 
patronage and vested interest. It is plausible to attribute the evolution of management of the 
rock lobster fishery, in which vested interests have been served and public wellbeing 
compromised, to this resource management culture. Comparis<:ms may also be made with 
the criticisms of ITQ based systems in South Africa (Hersoug and Holm 2000), New Zealand · 
(Duncan 1995) and Iceland (Eythorsson 2000; Hannibalsson 2001; Matthiasson 2001) as 
discussed in chapter 2. It is notable that in Tasmania there has been little disinterested public 
opposition to what was essentially the enclosure and privatisation of valuable public 
resources. With the exception of some university-based academic research (Phillips 1998; 
Bradshaw 2002; Phillips, Kriwoken and Hay 2002) there has been no objection to these 
resource management policies from public institutions concerned about their implications for 
broader issues of social equity and regional economic development. This lack of objection 
to the dominance of vested interests in the management of public resources supports 
observations of a poverty of civic commitment in Tasmania's political and resource 
management culture, a poverty that has serious implications for broader issues of 
sustainability. 
ITQ based management, it must be noted, has also been adopted in jurisdictions, such as 
Norway and Iceland, which have been widely regarded as socially progressive, egalitarian, 
democratic and committed to sound environmental policies and civic values. In these 
countries there have been strong campaigns against the privatisation of fishery resources, but 
in spite of this, vested interests seem to prevail (Eythorsson 2000; Hersoug, Holm and Ranes 
2000). As ITQ is adopted in a growing number of jurisdictions one might conclude that 
Tasmania's resource management culture is not unique but is perhaps only a version of a 
common pattern. One might also suggest that a history of social, economic and political 
repression which I argue has contributed to the development of Tasmania's resource 
management culture, is also reflective of a rather more common than exceptional history of 
human experience. Or it may simply be that even the most egalitarian and well-governed 
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societies find it difficult to resist vested interests and the pressures of political and economic 
globalisation and so this trend may reflect a common future in a world shaped by 
neoliberalism. 
Lessons from the Newfoundland Case Study? 
Charles (1995) strongly linked the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fishery to management 
dysfunction and identified several key problems. First, he criticised the policy-making 
environment which excluded the public, the owners of the resource, from involvement in 
decision-making in the fishery. Instead, government policy-making focused on serving the 
interests of its industry "clients" rather than serving a broader public interest in the 
management of the fishery. A similar argument has been made here in respect of the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. Second, Charles criticised a management system that relied 
on a total allowable catch (TAC), based on very imprecise science, to safeguard the needs of 
conservation. This system was linked to allowing the use of potentially damaging, powerful 
fishing technology (trawling) and to a quota management system that provided incentives for 
anti-conservationist behaviour. Underwood (1995) concurred with Charles's view, 
identifying the management system based on single species quota as the root cause of the 
collapse. Single species quota, a TAC and relaxation of efficiency constraints are all key 
components of the quota management system for the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. Is it 
reasonable, therefore, to draw a parallel between the two fisheries and predict that 
overfishing and resource collapse will eventuate in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery? The 
answer is no, or at least not directly. There are several reasons for this. First, lobster 
fisheries based on baited pots or traps are, as has been discussed, generally resilient to high 
fishing pressure so long as an appropriate size limit protects an adequate breeding 
population. Second, unless social and economic conditions change dramatically, the 
Tasmanian fishery is capable of being effectively policed. So the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery might be held up as a successful example of sustainable fisheries management. But 
taking a broader perspective, the management of the fishery has been shown to contribute to 
inequality, productivity-sapping rent-seeking activity, and other attributes associated with 
societies that become dysfunctional and cannot serve common interest goals such as 
sustainability. The consequences of this may impact on the fishery indirectly or contribute to 
problems of social unsustainability that are far more significant than maintaining a 
productive fishery. These issues will be explored further in a study of salmon farming and 
pollution regulation in Tasmania, and in chapter 5 which examines a fishery within the 
context of Pakistan's social and political environment. 
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4.4 Salmon Farming and Pollution Management: Private and Public 
Interest in Tasmanian Resource Management 
Figure 4.4 Salmon sea cage farm in North West Bay Tasmania 
Overfi shing is one possible cause of the biological fa ilure of a fi shery, the one that is 
generally the focus of primary attention and regu lation in fi sheries management. Fisheries 
can also decline and fail as a consequence of habitat disturbance that alters the capacity of an 
ecosystem to sustain the stocks upon which producti ve fi sheries depend . Pollution is a 
significant cause of this sort of habitat disturbance. The ability of a society to effecti ve ly 
manage pollution to fi shery habitats (so as to avoid adverse social, economic and 
environmental consequences) is like ly to be dependent on the same qualitie of community 
solidarity, cooperation and caring about each other's interests, and the absence of 
opportunism, conflict and destructi ve competiti veness that Jentoft (2000) associated with 
sustainable fi shing communities96. The ability to promote common interests over narrow 
sectoral ones may be even more critical than in the case of simply managing competition 
over fi sh stocks. Thi s is because the connection between the interests that benefit from 
po lluting acti vities and those that are impacted by the effects of pollution may be less direct 
and obvious, and the values and interests affected are likely to be more widely di spersed, 
making it more difficult to organi e effecti ve, collecti ve action in their defence. Thus, 
resource management policies that promote the di visiveness associated with greater social 
inequality and the proli ferati on of rent-seeking activ ities, as has been argued fo r Tasmani a's 
quota management system fo r the rock lobster fi shery, can undermine the characteri stics in 
96 Legiti mate and ethical leadersh ip has also been identified as a critical req uirement (see, for 
example, Novaczek et al. [200 1 ]). 
187 
Chapter 4 Tasmania 
Tasmanian society and its social structures and political institutions upon which the 
protection of its marine environment from potential sources of pollution depends. This idea 
will be explored with regard to management of the pollution from Tasmania's salmon 
farming industry and other sources in the sheltered coastal waters of southern Tasmania. 
4.4. 1 Salmon Farming in Tasmania 
Salmon farming based on marine sea-cage culture has become an important industry in 
southern Tasmania, particularly in the waters of the Huon Estuary, Port Esperance and the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel. The industry grew rapidly following its introduction to Tasmania 
in the mid 1980s. Initially this expansion occurred in a fairly ad hoe manner, and there was 
inadequate information and understanding of the environmental impacts of salmon farming 
to provide for effective environmental decision-making. Industry expansion was, by the late 
1980s, becoming increasingly hampered by objections from the public and other interest 
groups (DELM 1993). Tasmanian government policy has actively promoted expansion and 
specific legislation, the Marine Farming Planning Act, was introduced in 1995 to provide a 
legislative framework to facilitate expansion and regulation of the industry, to manage 
objections and to consolidate control over access to leases and permits within one 
department, and to address some of the concerns relating to environmental impacts. Total 
salmonid production for 2001/2002 was 15,633 tonnes with a farm gate value of AU $111.5 
million, a considerable increase from 1997/1998 when 7,069 tonnes valued at AU $63 
million were produced. Direct employment in salmonid production in 2001/2002 was 290, 
up from 207 in 1997/1998 (DPIWE 2004). 
Opposition to salmon farming has arisen over the impact of farming on recreational and 
visual amenities of waterways and over the effects of pollution discharged from salmon 
farms, especially the discharge of nutrient rich effluent which can contribute to nuisance 
algal blooms and other symptoms of eutrophication. These concerns and conflicts are 
common in other countries where salmon farming occurs97. 
Pollution from Salmon Farming and its Environmental Impact 
Environmental impacts associated with marine farming are described in Marine Farm 
Development Plans for the region (DPIF 1996; DPIF 1997e) and in a number of other 
97 Other concerns associated with salmon farming in the northern hemisphere are less significant in 
Tasmania. Salmon farming in Tasmania makes less use of pesticides and antibiotics, and the tendency 
of salmon farms to provide sources of disease and parasites that affect adjacent wild salmon 
populations is not much of an issue in Tasmania because there are no native salmon stocks in 
Tasmanian waters. 
188 
Chapter 4 Tasmania 
sources, including Ritz, Lewis and Shen (1989) and Woodward (1989). These impacts 
include the deposition of organic matter on the sediments immediately beneath farm cages 
and the release of soluble nutrients, including nitrates and ammonia, into the water column. 
A considerable proportion of finfish farm wastes settles to the sediments immediately 
beneath the cages. Nutrient loading of the sediments is a significant concern and a critical 
management issue for marine farmers. The buildup of organic material under farm cages can 
lead to anaerobic conditions in the sediments and the production of methane and hydrogen 
sulphide. This can affect_ the health and productivity of the fish being cultured on the site. 
These localised impacts have been studied and discussed in some detail (Ritz, Lewis and 
Shen 1989; Woodward 1989; DPIF 1997e), but of greater significance in relation to the 
impact on the wider environment of the water body as a whole are the soluble wastes, 
released directly by the fish, and those released from enriched sediments. 
Most of the phosphorous released from salmon is in solid form and settles to the sediments. 
Most of the nitrogen is soluble, in the form of ammonia (Woodward 1989). Estimates of 
nutrients released range from 52-55kg total nitrogen, and 3-16kg total phosphorous per tonne 
of salmon produced (Bergheim, Aabel and Seymor 1991; Enell 1995; Meggitt 1998). More 
recent estimates using modem feeds include figures provided by Gibson's Limited98 (1998) 
in their feed management guidelines. Notably, these estimates of 56.4-78.0 kg total nitrogen 
and 15.1-19.9 kg total phosphorous per tonne of salmon produced do not show a reduction in 
the amount of nutrients discharged using modem feeds than the quantities referred to in 
earlier studies. 
The quantity of nutrient discharge relates directly to the quantity of feed used and the 
quantity of fish produced (assuming good quality feeds and efficient management practices 
are followed). Thus, the environmental impact of salmon farming can be regulated by 
limiting either the amount of feed that may be used or the amount of fish that may be 
produced at a particular farm site or in a particular body of water. The capacity of a 
particular water body to assimilate the nutrient pollution from salmon farming as well as 
from other sources depends on a complex range of factors, including flushing or dilution 
rates, background nutrient levels, temperature, and turbidity. These factors may vary 
considerably according to season, tides and other variable factors such as wind and rainfall. 
Thus, a quantity of nutrient discharge that has little adverse environmental effect at certain 
times of year may, at others, cause environmental problems. In winter, for example, large 
98 The principal supplier of feeds to the Tasmanian industry. 
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quantities of nutrients may be discharged into Tasmanian coastal waters with little apparent 
effect, but in summer, when background nutrient levels are lower and light and temperature 
conditions are more favourable to phytoplankton growth, the same quantity of nutrient 
discharge can contribute to noxious algae blooms. The ratio of nitrogen to phosphorous can 
also affect the likelihood of nuisance algae blooms developing (AEC 1987). The degree of 
impact that is deemed acceptable is also, to some extent, subjective, however guidelines have 
been developed (ANZECC 1992). Often it is salmon and shellfish farming interests that are 
most directly affected by, and therefore most sensitive to, the environmental impacts 
associated with nutrient enrichment. However, these impacts also affect the environment 
generally and other waterway activities, and they have implications for biodiversity and the 
health of other species which may include commercially important fish stocks. 
Environmental issues relating to fishfarm effluent have also been examined by Solbe (1982); 
Warrer-Hansen (1982); Phillips, Beveridge and Muir (1985); Kelly, Stelltragow and 
Bergheim (1996); Kelly and Cripps (1998); and Wee (1998). 
Regulation of Salmon Farming Pollution Discharge 
For many years salmon farmers in Europe have been regulated by legislation limiting the 
amount and composition of feed that may be used at particular farm sites (Gibson's Limited 
1998). This has not been the case, so far, in Tasmania where the government has been 
reluctant to hinder industry expansion with this sort of regulation. Self-regulation was the 
general practice, sustained by arguments that the industry itself would be most affected by 
any problems due to eutrophication and would therefore behave responsibly. It is also 
difficult to determine an appropriate production limit for a given site or water body due to 
the complexity of the issue, as discussed. However, the absence of regulation of salmon 
farm pollution has been a sensitive issue due to community concerns and opposition to 
salmon farming generally, for a variety of reasons99. This opposition often makes use of the 
pollution issue as the basis for complaint because it seems to carry greater legitimacy than 
other, less tangible aesthetic concerns. This is because salmon farm pollution is comparable 
to other polluting activities that produce effluent discharge and that are regulated by long 
established precedents of environmental legislation. 
An issue that can arise is competition from other activities that also use waterways as a waste 
management resource. Sewage treatment-plants are an obvious example of a competitor 
99 Where science is not capable of providing "the" answer, the fact that aesthetic, spiritual, equity, 
biodiversity and quality of life issues are deemed unimportant (unless these can be demonstrated to be 
also economic), becomes a critical impediment to sustainability. The only way out is through a 
dramatic shift in human's relationship with nature. 
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with salmon farms over the use of waterways as a receiving body for nutrient discharge. 
Agricultural activity that produces nutrient rich run-off is another. This competition can add 
a further complicating dimension to the management and regulation of salmon farming in 
places where the capacity of the waterway to assimilate pollution (subject to an acceptable 
degree of environmental impact) is a limiting factor. There are costs associated with limiting 
nutrient discharges. These include the costs of nutrient removal, for example in sewage 
treatment plants. They can also include opportunity costs associated with developments that 
are foregone in _order to avoid the pollution that they would otherwise produce. 
Consideration of pollution and amelioration costs associated with salmon farming and other 
activities can be used as a basis for integrated coastal management (Folke, Kautsky and 
Troell 1994; 1997). Two approaches for determining the carrying capacity of salmon 
farming in Tasmania's coastal waters and providing a basis for integrated land and marine 
resource planning and management are examined here. These can be considered as a 
"scientific approach" and a "political economy approach". 
4.4.2 A Scientific Approach to Estuarine Management - System Modelling 
The Division of Marine Research of the respected Australian Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) conducted a study of the Huon Estuary in order to 
develop a scientific basis for integrated catchment management relevant to aquaculture and 
the environment in this important salmon growing area. The study commenced in the mid 
1990s, cost over three million dollars, and was finalised in June 2000 (CSIRO 1997; 2000a). 
This study investigated the sources, distribution and cycling of nutrients in the Huon Estuary. 
It traced the links between nutrients and algal blooms and measured the comparative effects 
of nutrients from human activities, including fish farms, and nutrients from natural sources. 
The study sought to address "the inadequacy of knowledge of the physics, chemistry and 
biology of the Huon Estuary system" (CSIRO 2000a: 2) and so satisfy general community 
concerns about the environmental impacts of salmon farming and also to provide a greater 
degree of certainty about the capacity of the environment to cope with the impacts, without 
undue adverse effects, to allow for the projected expansion of the salmon farming industry to 
proceed in the confidence that it would not be threatened by any unanticipated environmental 
repercussions of its own pollution. 
The study examined tidal motions, winds, river flows, and currents, salinity, optical 
absorption characteristics, nutrients and water quality and phytoplankton dynamics of the 
waterway and attempted to generate models based on these extremely complex 
characteristics. The purpose of the models was to predict the effects of increased nutrient 
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loading associated with increased salmon production. A critical concern was the potential 
for an increase in the incidence of algal blooms, particularly blooms of the toxic 
dinoflagellate, Gymnodinium catenatum, that periodically occur in the waterway. Not 
surprisingly, given the complexity of the system and the factors involved, the report 
identified numerous potential sources of error and acknowledged a significant degree of 
uncertainty (CSIRO 2000a: 236, 280), and the report advised "that a formal risk assessment 
of the system's carrying capacity should be carried out to underpin any further expansion of 
finfish farming in the Huon Estuary" (CSIRO 2000a: 280). This advice, with its 
qualifications and recommendations for more research, was a disappointment for the 
industry and government regulators who had hoped that the Huon Estuary project would 
itself provide both the information and a sense of "scientific certainty" to enable confident 
expansion, with the authority of "science" providing the legitimacy to quell community 
concerns. 
The report found that nitrogen was the limiting nutrient on phytoplankton growth in the 
middle and lower Huon Estuary and was, therefore, the key nutrient of concern (CSIRO 
2000a: 270). Nitrogen loads from agricultural runoff in the catchment were found to be 
comparable with the quantity delivered by fish farms in the estuary. The study identified 
uncertainty in the origin of nitrogen in bottom waters during summer and indicated that this 
had major implications for the assimilation capacity for fish farm wastes, and it noted that_"it 
is the impact of finfish-farm nutrient loads on estuary water and sediment quality at the scale 
of the entire estuary that is likely to determine the sustainable carrying capacity" (CSIRO 
2000a: 257). Assessing the likely consequences of salmon farming expansion, the study 
reported: 
According to the model, doubling 1997 finfish-farm loads would carry some 
risk of increased frequency or density of summer blooms, while quadrupling 
loads would put the system on the brink of N saturation, and would 
substantially increase the risk of prolonged blooms. Increasing loads by a 
factor of JO would completely change the nature of the system, producing 
elevated DIN and large blooms throughout summer (CS/RO 2000a: 257). 
The degree of error and uncertainty in this assessment was not provided, at least not in a 
readily accessible form, and the prognosis for the likely effects of doubling and quadrupling 
salmon farming inputs allowed for overlap given their qualitative and generalised nature. 
(Current levels of discharge, and any increase in nutrient discharge associated with industry 
expansion, would clearly have a significant impact on the system.) The report did not 
therefore provide a "scientific" estimate of "acceptable" carrying capacity that the industry 
and government regulators could adopt with confidence and present to the public. 
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A comparison could be made with a fishery stock assessment process as discussed by 
Finlayson (1994) in chapter 3, where managers demand a number to work with, industry 
demands that it be a big number, and scientists are under pressure to provide one with a level 
of certainty that is impossible to obtain when dealing with complex, dynamic systems. The 
response that more research and funding is needed can, however, seem a little self-serving. 
When dealing with risks in an environment of unavoidable scientific uncertainty, political 
decision-making can be based on a range of values and interests. The question is usually 
about whose interests and which values predominate. Government resource managers often 
tend to favour the interests and values of industry "clients" and exclude the public, the 
owners of the resource, from the decision-making processIOO. One mechanism frequently 
used to exclude the public from political decision-making processes is to deny them access 
to information. The Huon Estuary Study could be criticised for not presenting information in 
a form that is readily comprehensible to non-professional members of the public. The report 
also noted (CSIRO 2000a: 234) that while farmsite-specific information on nutrient 
discharges had been used in the modelling, this information was not presented in the 
published report. The explanation provided for this omission was that the salmon farming 
industry claimed that information of this nature had commercial significance and should 
remain confidential. Overall, the study provided some useful scientific insight into the 
nutrient dynamics of the Huon Estuary, and some qualified speculation about the likely 
ecological consequences of industry expansion, but it did not address the political and 
economic issues of resource competition and allocation, and other conflicting values and 
interests that are at the heart of the fundamentally political process of resource decision-
making. An ancillary report clarifying some of the issues for the marine farming industry 
noted: 
The considerable level of uncertainty in these predictions, discussed above, is 
uncomfortable, but hardly unusual in managing natural environmental systems. 
This uncertainty creates two obvious kinds of risk for management of finfish 
farming in the Huon Estuary. There is risk that feed limits will be set lower 
than needed to achieve agreed environmental objectives, resulting in foregone 
socio-economic return to industry and the region. There is a risk on the other 
hand that limits will be set too high, resulting in unacceptable environmental 
damage, and potentially also in economic losses to the industry. Managers 
need to balance these risks, taking into account socio-economic and 
environmental values (CS/RO 2000b: 10). 
100 Charles (1995) identified this as a factor contributing to unsustainability in the Newfoundland cod 
fishery as discussed in chapter 3. 
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The simplistic view expressed here reflects a close association with the perspective -of 
salmon farming interests. It shows no appreciation that there are also socio-economic and 
environmental costs to other sectors associated with lower levels of pollution discharge than 
those that the salmon industry and its regulators might consider optimal from their own 
perspective. 
4.4.3 A Political and Economic Approach to Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management 
The Underlying Concept 
Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1994) discussed a theoretical approach for integrating 
management of the pollution from salmon farms with other catchment activities as a basis 
for integrated coastal management. They examined the ecological and economic costs 
associated with salmon farming in sea cages and argued that society bears the costs of 
salmon farming pollution where the polluter-pays principle is not applied. The 
environmental effects of salmon farming pollution include toxic algal blooms and other 
symptoms of eutrophication, which have socio-economic as well as environmental impacts 
in coastal areas. They suggested that one way of assigning a value to the costs of salmon 
farm pollution is to base it on the willingness of society to pay for treatment plants to abate 
pollution from human sewage, which is similar in many respects to pollution associated with 
salmon farms. They noted however that the (Swedish) salmon farming industry (in 1994) 
would not have been economically viable if it had been required to pay a pollution charge 
calculated in this way, equivalent to the pollution costs that were externalised to the 
environment and society as a whole. Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1994: 173) referred to the 
Rio declaration on environment and development as stating "that unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption should be reduced and eliminated, and that national authorities 
should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs" using economic 
instruments and "taking into account that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution". Their paper was understandably a challenge to salmon farming interests. Black 
et al. (1997) provided a critical response, acknowledging that there was a potential risk of 
eutrophication from intensive fish farming but arguing that eutrophication would not 
necessarily result from farm related nutrient discharge, especially in situations in which 
nutrients were not a limiting factor on phytoplankton growth. They also debated some 
details in the economic analysis provided by Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1994), arguing that 
externality costs only exist in situations where there is a competing resource user, and that 
marginal costs could not be applied to increased production levels because the value of 
resources and products varies with availability. 
194 
Chapter 4 Tasmania 
Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1997) provided a detailed response to this critique. They argued 
that the position of Black et al. (1997) on eutrophication only differed from their own due to 
details of definition. They viewed eutrophication, as defined by Nixon (1995), as "an 
increase in the rate of supply of organic matter to an ecosystem". They were concerned with 
the large scale effects of eutrophication on coastal ecosystems from the perspective of 
society as a whole, as opposed to the perspective of Black et al. (1997) which, they suggest, 
took a more limited view, only acknowledging eutrophication as occurring in association 
with any particular salmon farm if there was an observed increase in phytoplankton 
production in the immediate locality. 
Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1997) defend their economic analysis of the costs of 
eutrophication from salmon farming, which they explain is based on the viewpoint of the 
whole of (Swedish) society. They agree that if society does not regard nutrients from 
sewage, agriculture or other sources as a problem - then nutrients from salmon farming will 
be no problem either. But they point out that the waters around Sweden are already 
"eutrophicated" and a political decision has been made to reduce pollutants. They point out 
that to tax people to pay for sewage treatment to remove nutrients, while at the same time 
allowing a fish farmer to freely release nutrients, is not cost effective. They reiterate their 
initial argument (1994): that society subsidises fish farming when the cost of nutrient 
abatement is lower for fish farming than for sewage treatment. 
The Folke, Kautsky and Troell (1994; 1997) versus Black et al. (1997) debate is relevant to 
the regulation of salmon farming and of other polluting activities in the Huon Estuary and 
the adjacent D'Entrecasteaux Channel that together comprise the major salmon producing 
area of southern Tasmania. Periodic 'nuisance' algal blooms, a symptom of eutrophication, 
are evident in these waters, and there is an acknowledged need to reduce pollution inputs. 
This has been incorporated into costly abatement projects for sewage treatment plants and 
other point sources of pollution. There are also catchment management plans and land-based 
planning development controls aimed specifically at reducing nutrient run-off into the 
waterways. Under these circumstances, Black et al. (1997) would agree with Folke, 
Kautsky and Troell (1994; 1997) that an extemality is present in the form of social, 
economic and environmental costs associated with pollution from salmon farms in these 
waterways. This concept was tentatively explored (Phillips 1999; 2000) in a project to 
develop guidelines for integrated land and marine resource planning in the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel and North West Bay (which lies at the Channel's northern end). This project 
commenced in March 1999 and was largely completed by the time the Huon Estuary study 
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released its report in 2000. The findings of the two projects were not incompatible, but 
reflected different approaches .. The broader consideration of a range of stakeholder interests 
in the D'Entrecasteaux Channel Project gave it a more political and contentious orientation. 
Examination of issues, stakeholder interactions and political consideration in the project 
provide additional insight into the politics of marine resource management and sustainability 
in Tasmania. 
4.4.4 The D'Entrecasteaux Channel and Catchment Integrated Land and 
Marine Planning Project: A Case Study 
Project Description and Background 
The D'Ent:ecasteaux Channel (locally referred to simply as "the Channel") is a narrow body 
of water in southeast Tasmania. It has a north-south orientation and separates Bruny Island 
from the Tasmanian mainland. The- Channel is about 50 kilometres in length and is 
connected in the north via a narrow opening to the Derwent Estuary, and in the south with 
the Huon Estuary and the Southern Ocean. 
The Channel region is noted for its scenery and water based recreational opportunities. It 
lies within Kingborough Council which rates highly in terms of socio-economic indicators 
(ABS 1999). It is close to the population centre of Hobart and the amenity provided by the 
waterway and adjacent land, mainly rural and bush land, supports a wide range of economic 
and lifestyle activities. These include lifestyle residences, tourism, recreational fishing, 
sailing, ocean kayaking, marine reserves, marine education facilities, marine industries and a 
range of agricultural activities including marine farming. As previously noted, the Channel 
and the adjacent Huon Estuary is Tasmania's principle salmon growing region, producing 
over 7000 tonnes of salmon in 1999 and more than double that amount in 2002. The rapid 
growth of this industry and its proposed further expansion had, in 1999, become a cause of 
conflict with other uses. There had been conflict over environmental and amenity impacts of 
marine farms and also conflicts between marine farming interests, which depend on clean 
water, and other potentially polluting developments. These conflicts were particularly 
intense in North West Bay. Addressing these resource use and planning conflicts had been 
complicated by jurisdictional issues. Marine farming development was regulated by the 
Marine Farming Branch within the Department of Primary Industries, Water and 
Environment (DPIWE), an agency of the state government. Land based planning generally 
fell under the jurisdiction of local government, in this case Kingborough Council. It was 
recognised that there were significant areas in which land and marine developments in this 
coastal region had the potential for spillover effects to impact on each other. This predicated 
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the need for integration between land and marine planning processes to overcome problems 
linked to jurisdictional separation. It was partly to address this need that the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel Integrated Land and Marine Planning Project was initiated. 
Project Stakeholders and Environmental Objectives 
Kingborough Council took the leading role in the project and a range of other stakeholders 
were included on the steering committee. These included representatives of Kingborough 
Landcare Group (a local volunteer conservation organisation), Hobart Ports Corporation (a 
planning agency with jurisdiction over ports and navigation issues), the adjacent Huon 
Valley Council, the Local Government Association of Tasmania, Parks and Wildlife Service 
(a Branch of the Tasmanian state government Department of Primary Industry, Water and 
Environment (DPIWE)), Coastal Program (DPIWE), Huon Healthy Rivers Project (based at 
Huon Valley Council), Forestry Tasmania, Huon Tourism Association, Marine Farming 
Branch (DPIWE), and Aquatas and Tassal (two of the state's largest salmon farming 
companies with production sites in the Huon-Channel region). Aquatas was particularly 
active in the project because its production sites were located in North West Bay and the 
northern reaches of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel. 
The Australian (Commonwealth) Government was involved in the project as the provider of 
a grant under Environment Australia's Coast and Clean Seas program, which was the major 
source of the project's budget. To qualify for funding from this source, the project was 
required to promote the objectives of the Coast and Clean Seas program, which were: 
to ameliorate pollution problems in Australia's coastal areas; to protect the 
environment in Australia's coastal areas; to ameliorate threats to Australia's 
marine biodiversity; and to develop an oceans policy for Australia. 
The emphasis on marine environmental concerns directed an environmental perspective for 
the project with a particular emphasis on managing pollution sources. In addition, the 
project aimed to "relate and integrate land, coastal and marine environmental imperatives to 
deliver a strategic environmental framework for the Kingborough Council and its partners in 
the southern region of the state." The environmental perspective for the project was to prove 
difficult for some of the development oriented stakeholders to deal with because their 
development interests would inevitably increase, rather than ameliorate, environmental 
pressures, thus conflicting with the objectives of the Coast and Clean Seas program. 
The project was relatively small with a total budget of approximately $100,000, and this 
included some 'in kind' contributions of value from project stakeholders. The major 
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component of the budget was allocated to the employment of a project officer101 for the one 
year timeframe allocated to the project, with additional funds going for printing and 
publishing costs, and to hire a consultant-facilitator to assist with public meetings and 
workshops. The scope of the project was quite limited. The principal tasks were to prepare 
an issues paper, a State of the Waterway Report, from which a strategic management plan 
and strategic action plan would be developed. The project had no planning powers or 
powers to enforce any outcomes, and compliance with any recommendations would be 
entirely voluntary on the part of stakeholders. The role of community education and 
participation was also emphasised in the Coast and Clean Seas program. 
North West Bay: Site Description and Issues 
The project focused on addressing issues of resource conflict and environmental impact in 
North West Bay where they were particularly intense. North West Bay is a trapezoidal 
shaped body of water which is indented into the "Tasmanian mainland" side of the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel. It covers approximately 2000 hectares, has a maximum depth of 
about 30 metres, and its waters are essentially marine, like those of the Channel itself. The 
catchment of North West Bay is relatively small and the effect of freshwater inflows from 
several tributary streams is generally localised. Tidal range in North West Bay is a 
maximum of about one metre and averages only about half a metre. Consequently, tide 
induced current and flushing is limited. Mixing and exchange with the waters of the 
Channel is primarily driven by wind, and therefore its rate is variable, being dependent to a 
significant extent on the vagaries of the weather (Matthews and Volframs 1978). The 
capacity of the water body to receive and absorb pollutants, including nutrients, is therefore 
variable and depends to a large extent on weather conditions. Hallegraeff and Westwood 
(1994) and Wotherspoon et al. (1994) noted the significance of weather as a contributing 
factor in the incidence of toxic algal blooms in the adjacent Huon Estuary. Factors affecting 
catchment water quality from sources that influence the water of North West Bay have been 
investigated (Gallagher 1996; Green 1998). 
The marine waters of southeastem Tasmania, including the D'Entrecasteaux Channel and 
North West Bay, are influenced by two major ocean currents. During late summer the East 
Australian Current can extend its influence as far south as to affect the waters of the 
Channel. These subtropical waters are relatively warm and nutrient poor. In the cooler 
months from August-January, cooler, nutrient-rich subantarctic waters are pushed north and 
east by prevailing winds and enter the southern end of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel. The 
IOI I was employed in this role. 
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interplay between these two water masses has a significant influence on the nutrient and 
algal dynamics in coastal and estuarine waters in the region (Nyan Taw and Ritz 1978; 1979; 
Harris et al. 1987; Coughanowr 1997; Phillips 1999). North West Bay periodically 
experiences nuisance algal blooms, particularly during summer, and other environmental 
impacts, such as a decline in sea-grass beds in the bay, have been reported and linked to 
nutrient enrichment. Although most of the Channel catchment is characterised as having a 
low level of impact on the waterway (Graddon 1997), significant levels of mercury and zinc 
have been reported in the sediments of North West Bay (Bloom and Ayling 1977). 
Resource Conflicts in North West Bay 
In 1999 several competing and conflicting types of development were proposed for North 
West Bay and its catchment. These included proposals for increased residential development 
around North West Bay, and also proposals to expand production from salmon farming in 
the bay itself and in the adjacent northern reaches of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel. Both of 
these had the potential to generate increased nutrient discharge and can be regarded as 
competitors for use of the waterway as a sink for nutrient wastes. Existing sources of 
nutrient discharge, such as poorly performing sewage treatment plants and runoff from 
agricultural lands, were also recognised as issues to be addressed. Kingborough Council had 
applications in process for grants under the Federal Government's National Heritage Trust 
Coasts and Clean Seas program to assist with the cost of treatment plant upgrades. This 
program had also contributed funds towards an ongoing catchment management plan for 
North West Bay River, the largest tributary entering North West Bay, that included measures 
to reduce nutrient runoff. 
Two industrial developments on the shores of North West Bay were also of concern. These 
were a newly established shipbuilding factory near Margate that constructed large aluminium 
catamarans, and the proposed development of a deepwater port at Electrona to handle bulk 
commodities such as woodchip exports (Hobart Ports Corporation 1997). Opposition to 
these industrial developments brought marine farmers and shoreline residents into alliance. 
These traditional opponents both shared concerns about potential impacts on water quality 
and the visual and aesthetic amenities of the Bay (Phillips 1999: 41-59). 
State of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel Report 
Once the preliminary organisation had been accomplished and a project officer appointed, 
the Steering Committee met (22/4/1999) to identify priority issues for the project to address. 
The Steering Committee determined that managing pollution and maintaining water quality, 
particularly in North West Bay, was the priority environmental issue for the project. 
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Another key issue was to facilitate integration of land and marine resource planning and 
management. The project would focus on North West Bay where problems were most 
intense and it was expected that outcomes would be relevant to the wider Channel region. 
Following this introductory meeting, work commenced on the preparation of an issues paper, 
a "State of the Waterway report". This was eventually published as the State of the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel report (Phillips 1999), but the process of preparing the report and 
obtaining Steering Committee endorsement prior to publication was to involve a 
considerable degree of conflict within the committee. 
A draft of the State of the D 'Entrecasteaux Channel report was prepared in the two months 
following the initial meeting and presented to the Steering Committee in June 1999. The 
report identified a range of values and uses associated with the land and marine resources of 
the region. It also identified and discussed a wide range of threats and pressures on the 
environmental resources of the region, with a particular focus on those subject to resource 
planning and management conflicts and having implications for the sustainability of the 
marine environment. Identification of existing and potential sources of pollution was 
extensively covered. The report included a study quantifying nutrient inputs into North West 
Bay from catchment land use, sewage treatment plants, leachate from a municipal tip site 
and from the one salmon farm located in the bay. This comparison of the sources of 
nutrients discharged into North West Bay was to become a focus of contention. It indicated 
that considerably more nutrients were discharged into the bay from the salmon farm than 
from sewage treatment plants and other point sourcesl02 (Phillips 1999: 88). 
Response of Salmon Fanning Interests to the Nutrient Analysis 
At the Steering Committee meeting on 22/6/1999 the response of the committee to the draft 
report was generally positive: 
the Steering Committee expressed general approval of the standard of the (State 
of the Waterway) report in regard to meeting peiformance indicators. Some 
members expressed concern about the wording in some parts of the report and 
felt minor changes were needed to ensure objectivity was maintained. Each 
member had the opportunity to detail points of concern in the report and 
recommend additions, omissions and word changes. Some members needed 
more time to review the report more thoroughly. The Committee agreed to meet 
again in a couple of weeks to approve final amendments to the draft (Approved 
Minutes of Steering Committee meeting 2210611999). 
102 The largest catchment source of nitrogen was runoff from agricultural and forest land but the 
figure of 57 per cent contained in the report probably over-estimated this source. 
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Aquatas praised the report generally but indicated that there were a few things they were 
concerned about relating to some of the references to salmon farming in the report. The 
Marine Farming Branch representative requested more time for the Marine Environment 
Branch of DPIWE to consider the report before commenting on it. The Marine Farming 
Branch was particularly concerned about the North West Bay nutrient analysis and requested 
information on how the land-based nutrient sources had been estimated103. Details of the 
Council's. nutrient study were provided to the Marine Farming Branch and a follow up 
meeting arranged involving the project officer and representatives of Aquatas, the Marine 
Farming Branch and the Marine Environment Branch (within the Marine Resources Division 
of DPIWE) in order to clarify the issue. 
At this meeting and in further discussions, the Marine Environment Branch and Aquatas 
adopted an increasingly hostile approach. This and other developments were discussed in a 
Steering Committee meeting on July 15, 1999. From the minutes of the meeting: 
The project officer briefed the Committee on a number of matters arising from 
the previous meeting: 
• A telephone call to the project officer on July 61h, from a Mr. Colin 
Dyke, a marine farming industry activist, who expressed concern about 
the content of the report and suggested that significant changes should 
be made to it. The project officer informed Mr. Dyke that the matters 
he had raised were the business of the Steering Committee and should 
be addressed by its members at their meetings. 
• A meeting with Tony Thomas, Angus McNiel, and Gwen Fenton (Senior 
Environmental Policy Officer, Marine Resources, DP/WE) held on 8th 
July 1999. This meeting had been arranged following the last meeting 
to discuss the issue of nutrients and other matters (Marine Farming 
Branch had requested more time to consider these aspects of the 
report). At the meeting Ms. Fenton expressed the Department's 
(DP/WE) view that the report did not meet all of the objectives listed in 
the application for the NHT grant, and would require considerably 
more time and work to improve. Ms Fenton said the Department was 
disappointed in the report and that the Secretary, Kim Evans would be 
writing to the Chairman of the Steering Committee (Michael Ball) to 
103 Land-sourced nutrient discharge estimates were based on an existing study (Emmett 1998) by 
staff at Kingborough Council. This addressed pollution sources and environmental management 
matters that were within the Council's various areas of responsibility. These included catchment 
management, planning scheme environmental controls, and improvements to sewage treatment plants 
and other facilities. This study did not include estimates of nutrient discharge from salmon farming 
activities in the Bay. Estimates of nitrogen and phosphorous pollution from the salmon farm m the 
bay were developed with reference to hterature sources and were based on an estimated 500 tonnes 
production. This was combined with the information on land based pollution sources to build a more 
comprehensive study of total nutrient inputs mto North West Bay from human activities. 
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express these views. Ms. Fenton indicated that other members of 
DP/WE represented on the Steering Committee had discussed their 
positions regarding the SOW report and had a common view. The 
project officer suggested that Ms. Fenton's comments should be shared 
with the rest of the Steering Committee at the next meeting. There was 
no discussion about specific parts of the report; the issue of nutrients 
was not discussed. Salmon production figures for North West Bay were 
not provided to the project officer to allow them to be incorporated into 
the nutrient study for North West Bay in the report. 
• A letter addressed to Michael Ball was received from Kim Evans on 15 
July, prior to the SC meeting. The letter stated that the report did not 
meet all the objectives in the project proposal. It emphasised DPIWE's 
representation on the Steering Committee (with 3 representatives) and 
made the point that DP/WE could not approve public release of the 
report unless significant modifications were made. 
The Project Officer informed the SC that a paper addressing the objectives 
relating to compilation of plans, policies and other instruments, and analysis of 
agency roles was being prepared but had been delayed by concerns that had 
emerged since the last meeting regarding the SOW report. 
Amendments to the Draft SOW report 
The Project Officer briefed the SC on amendments that had been made to the 
report based on information provided by SC members since the previous 
meeting. 
Nutrients 
The section on nutrients had not been updated as no new iriformation had been 
obtained (Approved Minutes of SC meeting 1510711999). 
The letter referred to from Kim Evans, Secretary of the Department of Primary Industries, 
Water and Environment, to the Steering Committee Chair (12/7/1999) raised unspecified 
concerns that the report did not fully meet the objectives outlined in the project proposal. 
The Secretary emphasised that the Department had three representatives on the Steering 
Committee (Parks and Wildlife, the Coastal Program and the Marine Farming Branch) and 
stated that DPIWE could not approve release of the State of the Waterway report for public 
comment unless significant modifications were made to it. He also assured the Chair that the 
Department was willing to provide information and advice to ensure that "we achieve an 
acceptable outcome for the project"104. 
104 The Secretary's letter was interpreted is having the intent to stall, obstruct and censor the project. 
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During this meeting it was agreed that the project officer would work through issues of 
concern in "working group" meetings with the Marine Farming Branch and Aquatas and 
make any necessary corrections prior to the next Steering Committee meeting. In these 
working group meetings representatives of Aquatas and the Marine Environment Branch 
(DPIWE) initially attempted to discredit the North West Bay study where it dealt with 
nutrient inputs from salmon farming. They claimed that the figures used in the study (for 
example 50kg total nitrogen per tonne of salmon produced) were excessive and based on out 
of date information. They claimed that improved feeds and production methods produced 
significantly less pollution than the levels reported in the earlier studies referred to in the 
report. They also claimed that the one salmon farm in North West Bay produced less than 
the 500 tonnes per year production estimate used in the study. Aquatas and the Marine 
Environment Branch declined, however to provide correct figures in place of those they 
challenged, arguing that the information was "commercial in confidence". 
In response to these complaints the project officer obtained additional, up to date information 
from the manufacturer of the salmon feeds used by the industry (Gibson's Limited 1998). 
This confirmed that the amounts of nitrogen and phosphorous pollution produced using 
modern feeds did not differ substantially from the quantities referred to in earlier studies. In 
fact this authoritative source showed that the figures for nitrogen and phosphorus pollution, 
relative to salmon production used in the study, were not excessive, as had been claimed, but 
were in fact conservative, contradicting statements made earlier by Aquatas and the Marine 
Environment Branch. At this time it was established that the Marine Environment Branch 
did not routinely collect farm-site specific information on production and food conversion 
rates from which pollution figures could be calculated; marine farmers were required to 
provide this information only if requested to do so by the department (Phillips 1999: 53). 
The events discussed above established that the estimated quantities of nitrogen and 
phosphorus pollution from salmon farming in North West Bay were reasonably accurate. It 
was also clear that the salmon farming industry and government regulators wished to avoid 
public disclosure, particularly in a site-specific context, of the extent of nutrient discharge 
from salmon production in a manner that allowed easy comparison with the nutrient 
contribution of other pollution sources. 
The project had reached an impasse. The Department (DPIWE) and the salmon farming 
industry did not want information on the quantity of salmon farm pollution to be publicly 
disclosed in an accessible manner, nor did they wish to be seen to be attempting to suppress 
this information, hence the vague and unspecific nature of the concerns expressed in the 
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Secretary's letters. Yet this information was clearly important to the project objectives. 
Information presented in the draft report indicated that nutrient pollution was the most 
significant environmental problem for the region's waterways, and while other pollution 
sources were acknowledged and were being addressed, pollution from salmon farming, while 
clearly substantial, was not, and would increase substantially with industry expansion. The 
integrity and relevance of the project, with respect to the Coast and Clean Seas program 
objectives, clearly depended on it addressing the issue of pollution from salmon farming as 
well as other sources, even if this was opposed by the interests of state government agencies 
aligned with the marine farming sector which had so explicitly expressed their strength of 
representation on the steering committee. 
Only one member of the steering committee really took a strong stand on the issue. This was 
the member representing the Kingborough Landcare Group (this member was also the 
Deputy Mayor of Kingborough Council). In response to the stonewalling tactics of DPIWE 
and Aquatas, she approached the media and reported some general observations on the 
nutrient study of North. West Bay and complained that Aquatas and the Marine Farming 
Branch of DPIWE would not reveal production figures that would be indicative of the 
pollution produced by salmon farming in the bay. 
Aquatas and DPIWE objected strongly to the public discussion of these issues in the media. 
The Secretary of DPIWE wrote again to the Chair of the steering committee (16/8/1999). 
Dear Mr Ball 
I am writing to advise you of my continuing concerns over the management of 
the National Heritage Trustjunded D'Entrecasteaux Channel Integrated Land 
and Marine Project. 
Recent media reports quote a member of the steering committee referring to 
information said to be contained in the report as though the report had indeed 
been released. I have already advised you of my concerns regarding the 
structure of the draft study and its apparent shortcomings with respect to the 
objectives stated in the application. It now appears that the information being 
gathered is being quite improperly used before it is endorsed by the responsible 
committee. 
I should perhaps explain that my own Department's representatives on the 
steering committee are there not only to provide what may be useful expertise, 
but to ensure the prudent use of NHT funds. We peiform this function on a 
number of such projects, and are aware that our prudential presence is of 
assistance in having projects approved for funding. 
I am most concerned that this function (and through it the standing of this 
Department with the NHT) is not compromised. It would be difficult for me to 
justify our continuing support of, and participation in, the project if there were 
to be any further improper release of information or inadequate progress 
towards addressing the project objectives. 
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I therefore ask that you keep the draft study confidential until it has been 
ratified by the steering committee and released for public comment, and ensure 
that its contents properly address the objectives described in the application. 
Yours sincerely 
(Kim Evans) 
SECRETARY 
The Secretary of DPIWE and the Chair of the project would both have been aware that 
Kingborough Council had several applications for NHT funds pending and there was no 
great subtlety to the letter's implications. 
This letter from the Secretary was presented to the steering committee at the next meeting 
(26/8/1999). At this meeting both Aquatas and the Marine Farming Branch stated that, while 
they still held .some reservations about some of the content of the draft report, in the interests 
of progressing with the project they were prepared to approve it for public release. The State 
of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel report was then released, with the nutrient analysis intact, 
and the project moved on to the next stage. 
Shortly after this, Environment Australia (15/9/1999) wrote a letter to the Steering 
Committee Chair, commending the "cooperative attitude of the Department of Primary 
Industries, Water and Environment's Marine Farming Branch to this planning process" and 
noting their reservations. Consistent with these reservations, the letter criticised the State of 
the D'Entrecasteaux Channel report for focusing disproportionately on marine farming 
issues and strongly intimated that the project should focus more on catchment pollution 
sources. This was a clear message to leave the salmon farming industry alonel05. 
Progress with the Project 
By this stage there was an atmosphere of distrust and frustration among some Steering 
Committee members. The heated controversy that had developed over the issue of nutrients 
was a cause of discomfort to some members and many did not see that the issue had any 
relevance to their interests. The project was behind schedule. Project timeframes and 
periodic payments were adjusted. There was some pressure on the project officer and 
Kingborough Council to avoid causing further discomfort to any of the committee members 
I05 All the significant land based sources of nutrient discharge were already being quantified, 
monitored and addressed by Kingborough Council plant upgrades, planning schemes and other related 
projects including a Catchment Management Plan for North West Bay River, also funded by a grant 
from Environment Australia. Salmon farming was the only substantially polluting activity in which 
pollution discharges were not being addressed and in which they would certainly increase with the 
projected industry expansion that was being facilitated by the state government. 
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because their endorsement of the successful completion of each stage of the project was 
required by Environment Australia before release of periodic payments. Among other 
important expenses, these funds were used to pay the project officer's salary. For reasons 
described above and in the absence of any strong countervailing interest from other members 
of the Steering Committee to push for further investigation of the implications of the nutrient 
analysis to regional resource planning and management, the issue was not developed further 
during the remainder of the project. 
Discussion 
This outcome gives rise to a number of questions. If nutrient pollution was a significant 
threat to social, environmental and economic values associated with the D'Entrecasteaux 
waterway, and pollution from salmon farming a significant proportion of the nutrient 
discharge to the system, as suggested by the nutrient analysis in the report, why did 
Environment Australia and DPIWE, agencies with clearly defined responsibilities relating to 
protection of the marine environment from pollution from industries and other sources, 
appear to take the side of the salmon farming industry to prevent the issue from being further 
developed and publicly discussed? And why did the Steering Committee, which appeared to 
include representation from a broad range of community, industry and conservation interests, 
not ensure that this issue that appeared to be so crucial to the environmental objectives of 
both the project and the Coast and Clean Seas program was developed? 
The objections of salmon farming interests are readily apparent, particularly in respect of the 
debate by Falke, Kautsky and Troell (1994; 1997) and Black et al. (1997) already discussed. 
If nutrient pollution is a problem, or a limiting factor in the waterway, and salmon farming 
discharges a significant source of it, then an argument could be made that there is an 
economic cost associated with salmon farming pollution. 
Was Nutrient Pollution a Problem in the Waterway? 
Nitrogen was recognised as a limiting factor on phytoplankton production in the region 
(DPIF 1997e). The regular occurrence of nuisance and toxic algal blooms was indicative of 
eutrophication. Nuisance algal blooms had significant implications for the region's salmon 
and shellfish growers, for recreational uses of the waterway and for conservation of the 
!marine environment and its biodiversity. Studies noting the die-back of seagrass beds and 
other macrophytes in North West Bay and the Channel corresponding to increased amounts 
of epiphytic algae also suggested that excess nutrients ll).ight be contributing to 
eutrophication on a scale that posed a significant threat to the region's marine ecosystems 
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and biodiversity (Edgar 1979; Sanderson 1984; and Sanderson and Thomas 1987; Rees 
1994). The importance of reducing nutrient loads into North West Bay had been recognised 
and it was a key objective of a catchment management plan for North West Bay River that 
had received Natural Heritage Trust funding from the federal government. Reducing 
nutrient loading was also an objective of a number of Kingborough Council projects to 
upgrade sewage management infrastructure and improve management of stormwater and 
other point sources. The state government was then, and continues now to push councils to 
upgrade all sewage treatment plants to tertiary treatment in order to remove nutrients entirely 
from environmental discharges from plants. Clearly, nutrient pollution was recognised as a 
problem: It was also identified by the Steering Committee in the initial meeting as a priority 
issue for the project. 
Was Pollution from Salmon Farming a Significant Proportion of the Nutrient Discharge to 
the System? 
There have been a number of studies into the environmental impacts of salmon farming on 
the environment, both overseas and in Tasmania. Woodward's (1989) report was a 
comprehensive assessment of environmental and regulatory issues. It considered overseas 
experiences and compared them with developments in the Tasmanian industry. Some 
discussion of the environmental impacts of finfish farms is also contained within the Marine 
Farming Development Plan for the D'Entrecasteaux Channel (DPIF 1997e: 19) which notes 
that: 
Changes-to the water column will result from the increases in soluble nutrients 
released from sediments, deposited faecal matter, uneaten food particles and 
excretory products from the fish. The changes in nutrient levels in waters can 
in turn cause changes in phytoplankton populations, not only in density but in 
species composition. 
The plan also notes (DPIF 1997e: 19) that in the marine waters of the lower Huon Estuary 
(which is contiguous with the D'Entrecasteaux Channel), phytoplankton production is 
nitrogen limited. 
Woodward (1989: 3-4) noted that finfish farming in Tasmania 
. . . represents a considerable source of external nutrients to the natural 
systems ... the most important environmental effects associated with fin-fish 
farming are the increase in particulate organic matter entering the sediment 
system and the increase in nitrogen and phosphorus entering the water column. 
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Comparisons have been made between the environmental effects of fish farms and those of 
sewage outlets. The wastes from salmon farms are chemically and biologically similar to 
sewage (Woodward 1989). A farm producing 400-500 tonnes of fish per year causes a 
nutrient-loading equivalent to the untreated sewage from 2800-10,000 persons (Bergheim 
a~d Selmer-Olsen 1978; and Woodward 1989). 
Salmon farming was clearly recognised as a significant source of nutrient input to the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel. Marine Farming Development Plans for the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel (DPIF 1997e: 11) state that "there are no major sources of pollution in the 
catchment that could threaten the industry"; and that future growth of the marine farming 
industry in the D'Entrecasteaux Channel could be limited by "concerns related to the 
development of toxic algal blooms" (DPIF 1997e: 11); and that nutrients released to the 
water column from salmon farming "can increase the risk of toxic algal blooms" (DPIF 
1997e: 17). The nutrient study for North West Bay might, then, have been seen as making 
an important contribution to regional resource management by providing information that 
allowed the relative importance of nutrients from salmon farming and from other sources to 
be compared. 
A Hypothetical Study: Sewage Levy as a Pricing Mechanism for Polluter-Pays Charges 
One could explore, hypothetically, the use of economic instruments to manage pollution in 
North West Bay. In 1999 Kingborough Council had in place a system of user-charges levied 
on residents. The annual rates included a component to cover the cost of treating household 
sewage; the "sewer rate". In the Channel region the sewer rate was about AU$ 340-400 per 
household annually. Funds raised were used by the council to cover the costs of treating 
sewage to an acceptable standard before effluent water was released into the environment. 
In 1999 in most of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel region, sewage was treated to secondary 
level. This neutralises pathogens and removes approximately half (more in well-performing 
plants) of the nutrient content of the untreated sewage. The cost of tertiary treatment (with 
full nutrient removal) is generally estimated to be approximately double the cost of 
secondary level treatment. 
The sewer levy could be used as a benchmark to determine an equivalent price to charge for 
pollution from other sources. The household rate of AU$ 340-400, if we assume 
approximately 3-4 people per household, could, for simplicity, be reduced to an annual 
charge of AU$ 100 per person. If this levy is for secondary level treatment, and tertiary 
treatment would be about double, then AU$ 200 per person would be a reasonable 
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approximate price for the full cost of ameliorating the sewage pollution from an individual 
resident. While sewage is treated to secondary standard, community residents may be 
viewed as paying half the cost in cash, and, either receiving the other half as an 
environmental subsidy, or paying it through acceptance of the cost of some degradation to 
their local environment. 
Polluter-pays charges could be levied on other polluters based on the amount of nutrients 
they discharge measured in population-equivalents as discussed by Falke, Kautsky and 
Troell (1994; 1997). These charges could be levied on poorly performing sewage treatment 
plants (which are already subject to fines if they fail to meet standards), on poorly managed 
agricultural lands and on other activities including salmon farms. 
A salmon farm in North West Bay, for example, with a total production of 500 tonnes per 
year would produce pollution equivalent to the untreated sewage from a population of 3,000-
10,000 persons. If charged at the full rate of AU$ 200 per population-equivalent this would 
amount to a pollution levy of AU$ 600,000-AU$ 2 million per year. Clearly the industry 
would rather avoid paying this levy and it might not be economically viable if this level of 
polluter pays levy was imposed. 
In theory the use of economic instruments to equalise charges imposed on land and marine 
polluters could be a useful toql in integrated management and provide a means of resolving 
some resource conflicts arising over allocation issues, by replacing decision-making 
processes that are essentially political with processes based on market mechanisms. The 
project's contract included "guidelines for sustainable resource use", which echoed 
principles from the Rio Declaration noted by Falke, Kautsky and Troell (1997). These 
referred to the user-pays principle and suggested that prices charged for access to coastal 
resources should reflect all short-term and long-term economic, environmental and social 
costs associated with use of those resources, and that economic instruments should be 
applied equitably across all sectors of society (Phillips 2000: 22). A version to the use of 
such an approach can be understood as a determination by powerful interests to ensure that 
decision-making continued to be based on what is essentially political patronage rather than 
on polluter-pays market mechanisms. 
Why the Salmon Farming Industry Objected to the Nutrient Analysis 
The salmon farming industry has always argued that site specific information on production 
and feed input figures needs to be treated as "commercial in confidence", arguing that their 
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competitors might gain some advantage from access to this information. They have also 
been concerned that this information might be used by the general public to mount 
opposition to their industry on environmental grounds. Given the foregoing discuss!on, this 
provides an obvious explanation for their objections to the nutrient analysis in the State of 
the D'Entrecasteaux Channel report, particularly in the context of their plans, at the time of 
~ 
the study, to expand salmon production in the region. The general public, if aware of the 
above issues, might not only oppose the salmon industry's expansion in the region but object 
to paying increased rates to upgrade sewage treatment plants. 
Why State Government Regulators Objected to the Nutrient Analysis 
The Marine Farming Branch of DPIWE shared the goal of increasing salmon production. Its 
planning role was specifically to facilitate and manage this expansion, including the 
community consultation required by the planning process. Its objection to the nutrient 
analysis in the report would stem from the same basis as those of the salmon farming 
industry. 
A more critical issue to understand is why agencies within the Department, and Environment 
Australia itself, agencies with a specific environmental protection mandate, preferred to 
ignore salmon farming discharges and only address land based sources of nutrients. In part 
this can be explained in terms of the power of salmon farming interests to influence political 
structures and through them the resource management bureaucracies. But there is more. 
Acknowledgment of the polluting effects of salmon farming highlighted major 
inconsistencies and contradictions in environmental management and pollution control 
regulation and policy in the region. These inconsistencies and contradictions raise questio!ls 
about the integrity of the environmental management activities of a number of government 
agencies. 
This is most evident in the case of DPIWE, where one branch of the department regulates 
local government activities toward total nutrient removal from all discharges, claiming this is 
necessary to protect the environment, while at the same time the Marine Farming Branch 
(within the same department) is promoting the expansion of salmon farming, which is, 
inevitably, associated with an increase in nutrient discharge. This policy contradiction 
undermines the integrity of the environmental protection functions of the Department. It is 
understandable that people concerned about these functions would not wish them to be 
undermined by studies and information that raise challenges to their credibility. Therefore, 
they too have an interest in downplaying public discussion of the issue of nutrients 
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discharged from salmon farms into waterways in which other sources of discharge are 
strictly regulated. 
If, instead of salmon, only shellfish farming, which produces little nutrient pollution, 
c:iccurred in the waterway, then the project might have made more orderly and conflict-free 
progress. Catchment sources of pollution could have been identified and prioritised and the 
project outcomes could have supported abatement programs for catchment pollution sources 
without confronting serious contradictions. The project outcomes could have provided 
justification for the established and traditional roles of local, state and feqeral government in 
these pollution abatement programs. Upgrading sewage treatment plants and addressing 
diffuse pollution sources with environmental controls in planning schemes and through 
I 
catchment management plans are part of the core business of local governments. They are 
regulated in these activities by state government agencies, which set policies and standards 
and sometimes fine local governments for failure to comply with them. Federal government 
policies also play a part, and, through programs such as Coast and Clean Seas, the federal 
government has provided grants to fund various abatement projects, including sewage 
treatment plant upgrades and catchment management projects. Justification for these 
programs, which entail considerable expenditure of public resources, rests on the 
environmental benefits they yield for the community. The integrity of these programs comes 
into question if the potential benefits to the environment are not realised because a reduction 
in the pollution discharged from these sources is countered by increased quantities 
discharged by others. 
It might also be perceived in a situation in which the capacity of the waterway to absorb 
pollution discharge is limited, a situation that evidently applies in the case of North West 
Bay, that reducing the quantity of pollution discharged from one source allows increased 
discharge from another. Reducing discharges from sewage treatment plants and catchment 
run-off, for example~ may only compensate for increased discharge from salmon farming and 
so be regarded as a factor enabling industry expansion. Regulation in this case can be seen 
as resource allocation. It determines who may discharge and who may not and who must 
pay and who gets a free ride. Resource allocation of this nature is generally recognised as an 
essentially political process. 
In the case of North West Bay the politics of public and private interest arises. Abatement of 
nutrient discharge from sewage treatment plants and other land sources comes largely at 
public expense through rates-based levies on local residents, and federal grants funded by 
taxpayers and the Australian community at large. These communities do not enjoy the 
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environmental improvements they have paid for, and might feel entitled to, if nutrients 
discharged from salmon farming, a private interest, counter the benefits of the abatement 
programs. This can be seen as an example of environmental regulation privatising the 
benefits and socialising the costs. 
Private and Public Interests and Sustainability Dysfunction 
Saul (1997: 3) explores the social dysfunction in modern societies, linked to corporatism and 
the undermining of the roles of citizenship and democracy, that "leads to our adoration of 
self-interest and our denial of the public good." He identifies (1997: 99) the problem· of 
"interest representation" associated with "stakeholder" decision-making systems where the 
process is not really about policy, but a fight over who gets what, and where there is no room 
"for thought or disinterested participation", disinterest being required to serve the public 
good. Environmental sustainability is essentially an issue of public good, and it requires 
"disinterested" decision-making and functional democratic processes to advance this public 
good in the face of competing vested interests. This basic understanding expressed by Saul 
(1997: 1~9-195) is also common to the views of many philosophers including Olson (1965; 
1982) and Putnam (1993) who have examined the requirements for furthering the common 
good in society. Examination of the decision-making process in the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel project shows how, even in a process with apparent concessions to community 
representation, the political process produces outcomes that are dysfunctional in terms of the 
primary environmental mandate of the project and the committee. This failure was 
demonstrably due to the overwhelming strength of vested interests in the process and their 
co-option of government agencies and the individuals who serve them. It is reflective of a 
resource management culture oriented to the service of private rather than public interests. 
This is not to say that the outcome will be environmental unsustainability, but the process 
did not contribute to avoidance of unsustainable outcomes, although this was the stated 
objective. This case study also shows how, in Tasmania, power is brought to bear to 
suppress access to information upon which democratic processes might work towards a view 
of the broader public interest associated with environmental sustainability. It also provides 
insight into the functioning of Tasmania's resource management institutions and illustrates 
the way in which power is exercised to ensure the subservience of environmental protection 
branches of DPIWE to industry development interests. It therefore provides an example in 
support of the argument that Tasmania has a resource management culture that is not 
conducive to sustainability. 
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Discussion: Private and Public Interest and Sustainability 
Earl~~r. in the chapter I argued that resource management policies that promote divisiveness 
and social inequality and which fragment society into competing groups serve to undermine 
the characteristics in Tasmanian society, and its social structures and political institutions,· 
upon· which the protection of its marine environment from potential sources of pollution 
depends. One aspect of this is that they undermine the ability of society to advance issues of 
common, or public good, over private interests. The D'Entrecasteaux Channel project 
provides insight into the political wrangling within a Tasmanian resource management 
situation that involves stakeholders from the community, industry, and local, state, and 
federal government environmental management agencies. It demonstrates how the social 
and political dynamics generate outcomes that fail to address the most pressing pollution 
threat to the local marine environment, although addressing such threats was a principal, 
stated objective of the project. This failure highlights contradictions in the treatment of 
pollution discharges from different sources, contradictions sufficient to bring into question 
the integrity of the whole approach to pollution abatement in the region. The environmental 
management system involving the state, federal and local government agencies that were 
involved in the project could be described as dysfunctional in so far as it did not effectively 
address a significant threat to the environmental sustainability of the waterway. It did not do 
so because in Tasmania's resource management culture, development interests linked to 
increasing environmental threats and pressures prevail over broader community concerns 
associated with environmental sustainability. The way in which powerful industry interests 
were able to pressure resource decision-making processes into dysfunction with regard to 
their mandate to promote environmental sustainability can be likened to similar influences 
that contributed to the failure of management of Newfoundland's cod resource as descri_bed 
by Finlayson (1994) and discussed in the previous chapter. 
There is a link between management policies in the Tasmanian lobster fishery that promote 
inequality and social division, and the failure of pollution abatement policies to protect the 
marine environment upon which the productivity of these fisheries depends. It may not be a 
direct causative link but rather one that is transferred through complex and subtle aspects of 
Tasmanian society and its culture of resource and environmental management and how this 
is influenced by and serves private or public interests. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The aim of 'chapter 4 was to examine marine resource management in Tasmania in a way 
that enabled comparison with the Newfoundland case study developed in chapter 3. An 
argument developed in chapter 3 linked resource collapse through management failure to 
persistent, dysfunctional structural and cultural characteristics in Newfoundland society that 
are a legacy of historically entrenched social dualism. Historically rooted social dualism is 
also a noted feature of Tasmanian society. Its origins may differ in some respects to those 
pertaining to Newfoundland, nevertheless there are many similarities. Chapter 4 began with 
an overview of Tasmania's settlement history and described the establishment of a society 
with structures and institutions specifically designed to perpetuate a stratified social order 
with an entrenched inequality and clear separation between classes. The way that a self-
reinforcing social, political and resource management culture operated in Tasmania to ensure 
the persistence of social dualism from convict times and into the twentieth century was 
explained with some examples. These demonstrate a tendency towards patronage, 
corruption and service to monopoly and rent-seeking, vested interests. This tendency was 
also noted in relation to criticism of current practices in Tasmanian forestry, which is, 
economically, the most important natural resource harvesting industry in the state. The 
chapter then examined regulation of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, and the 
implementation of a quota based management system in 1998. This case study explored 
many of the issues introduced in chapter 2 and discussed in relation to the Newfoundland 
fishery in chapter 3. It concluded that regulation of the fishery had promoted privilege and 
exclusion and exacerbated wealth inequality and social division. It had, therefore, fostered 
within Tasmanian society similar characteristics to those associated with community and 
resource management dysfunction in Newfoundland. Could a connection be shown between 
these characteristics and sustainability dysfunction in Tasmania? The analysis considered 
this in relation to the rock lobster fishery, but concluded that in the prevailing circumstances, 
these conditions would not necessarily lead to resource failure through overfishing as 
happened in the Newfoundland case. Instead it suggested that these characteristics were 
linked to dysfunctional tendencies in the systems and institutions responsible for managing 
pollution in Tasmania's coastal waters, which could (at least at a theoretical level) pose an 
indirect threat to the fishery. Thus, the conclusions from the Tasmanian case study provide, 
at a general level, support for those developed from the Newfoundland case. In the next 
chapter the issues of entrenched social dualism, private property rights in fisheries 
management, and broader questions of social, political and environmental sustainability will 
be explored further in relation to a fishery case study from Pakistan, in which fishery 
collapse is linked directly to catchment pollution. 
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Pakistan: 
Feudalism and Private Property -
Inequality, Unsustainability and the Rise of Fundamentalism 
Figure 5.1 Map of Pakistan showing 
its location on the Arabian Sea and 
bordering Iran, Afghanistan , China and 
India. 
A 
INDIA 
0 100 200 km 
0 100 200 
Image sourcl!: NASA 2006 
Map Source: CIA 2006 
2 15 
Chapter 5 
5. Pakistan: Feudalism and Private Property: Inequality, 
Unsustainability and the Rise of Fundamentalism 
Figure 5.2 Pakistani fishermen on Rawal Lake 
5.1 Introduction 
Pakistan 
In the previous two chapters, it was argued that historically entrenched social dualism played 
a part in shaping both the cultures and resource management practices of Newfoundland and 
Tasmania and that this contributed to dysfunctional outcomes in terms of resource and 
environmental sustainability. A key theme examined in these studies was the way that 
fisheries management systems, for example, those based on limited entry and private 
property mechanisms, could serve to perpetuate political and economic structures that 
sustain social inequality. This was also linked to tendencies towards a proliferation of rent-
seeking activities and a corresponding tendency towards service to vested interests in the 
political and resource management cultures of these societies. Thi s tendency undermines the 
ability to advance common interest values associated with both environmental sustainabi lity 
and broader goals of social and economic development. These themes will be examined 
further in this chapter in relation to fi sheries management in Pakistan . 
Entrenched social dualism and institutional dysfunction, more than mere features , are, 
arguably, defining characteristics of Pakistani society. Thus, Pakistan stands out as a 
particularly apt location to study relationships between social dualism, associated political 
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and distributional aspects of resource management, and the consequences of this in terms of 
environmental, economic and socio-political sustainability. 
Chapter 5 has three sections. The first provides contextual background, describing 
Pakistan's social, political and resource management environment. The second is a case 
study of a freshwater fishery in Pakistan in which management arrangements are discussed 
in relation to this context. The third section is a discussion of fundamentalism (in various 
forms). Fundamentalism is portrayed as an extreme expression of community breakdown or 
social unsustainability, and an argument is presented which links the rise of fundamentalist 
irrationality and related undesirable social effects, including terrorism, to the sort of socially, 
economically and environmentally dysfunctional resource management practices that have 
been discussed in this and previous chapters. Inequality is an issue of particular focus. 
5. 1. 1 Background 
Pakistan, like Newfoundland and Tasmania, has a history of British colonial occupation. 
Pakistan's political and legal institutions, like those of Canada and Australia, were shaped by 
this shared colonial experience. Like Canada and Australia, Pakistan has a federal system of 
government. There are four provinces, Sind, Baluchistan, Punjab and the North West 
Frontier Province, and each has a provincial government with some legal and administrative 
powers, but important functions, and especially military power, are concentrated in the hands 
of the federal government. The social elites of Pakistan, like those of Tasmania and 
Newfoundland, educate their children in private schools. These schools were developed on 
the model of elite British "public" schools. They were established in colonial times and 
proudly maintain their traditions. Education levels for the country as a whole, however, are 
low. Pakistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world106. Beyond some notable 
similarities, Pakistan appears in many respects to be quite different to Tasmania and 
Newfoundland. While they are peripheral regions of wealthy, Western, developed countries, 
Pakistan is among the "developing nations" of the world; a term that generally refers to 
countries on the margins of the global economy, afflicted by poverty and the many social 
and environmental problems that tend to go with it. 
Pakistan is described as an impoverished and dysfunctional state, with an entrenched and 
corrupt elite who control the economy (Rashid 1996; ~ehar 2002). Government 
management of the economy is, however, hampered by the existence of an extensive, 
106 Mernissi (1992: 80), as will be discussed later, identifies unequal education in the Muslim world 
as a contributing factor to intense social di vision that is linked to the rise of fundamentalism. 
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underground economy known as hundi, with networks of international traders and 
moneychangers who transfer funds across national borders to pay for billions of dollars 
worth of smuggled imports (Behar 2002). There is conflict between ethnic groups (Rose a!ld 
Evans 1997; Mustafa 2005), and secessionist movements create further instability (Rashid 
1996). Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism find considerable support (Rashid 1996; Behar 
2002), and there is' a chronically weak political culture, dominated by the army, which is 
widely regarded as the only institution with the strength to manage Pakistan's state of 
perpetual crisis, to limit corruption, and to maintain stability (Beaumont 1997; Ahmedullah 
2000; Weidemann 2000; Malik 2001; T. Ali 2003: 272-278). 
In this chapter I present a case study of a fishery at Rawal Lake, near Islamabad, within the 
context of these challenging characteristics of Pakistani society. In addition to localised 
concerns over resource and environmental sustainability, the analysis considers some 
broader issues of social and political unsustainability that have the potential to spill across 
national boundaries to have a broader global impact. At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century the region has become one of the focal points in what may be developing into a 
broader global struggle between religious fundamentalism on the one hand, and the traditio.ns 
of humanism and modernity on the other. This struggle, which underlies "the war on terror" 
and the widely held perception of conflict between the Islamic _world and the West (a 
simplification that obscures more critical underlying issues and developments) has since the 
intensification associated with September 11, 2001, become a predominant concern in global 
politics107. A crisis of worldwide proportions has developed and is deepening, one to which, 
at present, there appears to be no end or solution. In addition to shaping international 
relations this crisis is affecting the internal politics of many countries, impacting on civil 
liberties, and affecting the "attitudes" of people and governments. Insecurity and uncertainty 
are being. exploited by some governments and other institutions to justify a move away from 
the secular, liberal, humanist traditions that form the cornerstones of democratic societies in 
the modern Western world, in a direction that, if carried to extreme, leads ultimately to some 
form of totalitarianism. The preoccupation with warfare and security issues, which tend to 
have a high priority and short horizon, can also be expected to push "softer" issues, such as 
environmental sustainability, into the background. This has further long term implications 
for the wellbeing of people and the likelihood that underlying issues of resource scarcity and 
competition will continue to create tensions and intensify conflicts. In human societies there 
is a disequilibriating tendency towards increasing conflict when resources become scarce. 
107 T. Ali (2003: 311-328) downplays the significance of the events of 11 September 2001 (and the 
importance of militant, Islamic fundamentalism). The underlying issue of global political importance, 
he argues, is American imperialism advanced, since the decline of an alternative political economics, 
by neoliberalism, which he regards as a fundamentalist doctrine. 
218 
Chapter 5 Pakistan 
This undermines the prospects for the sort of cooperative action that is required to conserve 
and husband those resources that remain in the interests of providing for resource and 
environmental sustainability. 
Social dysfunction is an important factor in the rise of the irrationality and intolerance 
embodied in various forms of fundamentalism and this will be discussed in some depth. 
Within an holistic approach to political economy one can readily link the underlying social 
and political dysfunction associated with the rise of fundamentalism and violence to the way 
that resources are used, produced and distributed within the global society (as discussed in 
chapter 2). Thus, to the extent that social dualism, perpetuated through the influence of 
political and social structures on patterns of resource use, can be identified as a cause of 
social, political, economic and environmental dysfunction, as has been demonstrated in the 
Newfoundland and Tasmanian case studies, and will be argued here in the case of Pakistan, 
it can also be recognised as a factor in the rise of fundamentalism. The link between global 
security concerns and tensions stemming from localised political and resource issues has 
growing relevance to an increasingly integrated, "globalised" human society. This relates to 
fisheries management debates over policies favouring "social" versus "economic" 
objectives. It also brings renewed salience to studies into institutional function that identify 
why it is so difficult to advance common versus private interests in the politics of resource 
management and human behaviour and why it is so hard to resist the apparent entropy 
towards unsustainability. 
5. 1.2. Research Approach 
The case study of the fishery at Rawal Lake near Islamabad was researched during a visit to 
Pakistan during April and May 2001. Background information was also developed during 
this period while travelling in the north of Pakistan, in the Punjab and the North West 
Frontier Province. During this trip I travelled several thousand kilometres by car and visited 
agricultural lands and several small industries. I conversed with resource management 
academics, feudal landowners, people connected with the military establishment, politicians, 
lawyers, beneficiaries of land reform from the period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto' s government 
and officers from the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency. In developing the case 
study of the Rawal Lake fishery, I made several visits to Rawal Lake, which is close to 
Islamabad, and talked with the fishers and other people there, and accompanied the fishers in 
their fishing activities on the lake. 
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The political situation in Pakistan following the events of September 11, 2001 made a follow 
up field trip in 2002 inadvisable. It would have been helpful to survey the Rawal Lake 
fishery and similar reservoirs in the region more extensively to provide greater authority for 
some of the observations made on the initial trip. While this proved impossible, an overview 
of management arrangements was developed from tlie information obtained during the initial 
trip and served the purposes of this analysis. 
5.1.3 Theoretical Context 
In keeping with the approach taken in the chapters dealing with Newfoundland and 
Tasmania, I have examined the fishery management case study in Pakistan within the 
context of the social and political environment in which it occurs. A central argument of the 
thesis is that the way fisheries and other resources are managed by any society both reflects 
and reinforces the structural and cultural characteristics of that society. Control over access 
to resources, often the central if unstated issue in resource management, is arranged in ways 
that support and maintain prevailing structures of power, wealth and status. I have found 
relevance in Olson's (1982) general arguments, that over time in any society rent-seeking 
groups108 tend to become more and more entrenched and prosperity is undermined as 
redistributive activities come to predominate and productive activities suffer increasingly 
from the predation of rent-seeking, redistributive coalitions. Olson (1982) suggests that this 
progression, if not disturbed by some significant disruption to the social, political and 
economic order, inevitably leads to the development of a society dominated by contesting 
groups preoccupied with property rights and the maintenance of privileges attached to social 
status. This inevitably takes society down a path to poverty and poor economic productivity, 
entrenched inequality, and civic and institutional dysfunction. This progression also 
undermines the qualities that a community requires if it is to achieve social, economic and 
environmental sustainability. In examining fisheries and related resource management case 
studies in Newfoundland and Tasmania I have examined how resource management 
practices foster inequality and serve rent-seeking interests, and I have considered the 
consequences of this in terms of societal dysfunction and the implications for environmental 
sustainability. Here, in relation to Pakistan, the argument is extended. Examining the 
interconnectedness of communal and environmental dysfunction and the view that these are 
l08 Referred to by Olson (1982: 153-175) as redistributive coalitions, which include a wide range of, 
typically, exclusive minority groups such as aristocratic classes, guilds, umons, castes, and certain 
professions that secure rent through regulating exclusive or monopolistic control over certain aspects 
of economic activity. Olson supported his theories with a number of case studies and discussed and 
compared the European aristocracy, the apartheid system in South Africa and the caste system of the 
Indian subcontinent at some length. 
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mutually reinforcing, I show that the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan is linked to 
environmental failure, which is, in tum, linked to resource management practices that are 
shaped by Pakistan'·s social and political culture to serve rent-seeking interests and sustain an 
intensely unequal, feudal society. 
The discussion of fundamentalism has relevance in the West where fears associated with 
Islamic extremism, and dangers associated with the rise of Western forms of 
fundamentalism, have become pressing concerns. The suggested link between inequality 
and the rise of fundamentalism is also relevant in the West where a widening gulf of 
inequality is associated with the dominance of neoliberal economic policies over the past 
quarter century, and there is a sense expressed, for example by Sim (2004), that Western life 
is becoming increasingly influenced by various forms of fundamentalism. 
Holistic, philosophical examinations of the nature of societies and the factors that combine to 
make them thrive and prosper, or fall into decline, rest upon a long and rich tradition. The 
classics of social, political and economic philosophy which include, among many others, 
such w.orks as Plato's Republic, Thomas More's Utopia, Adam Smith's The Wealth of 
Nations, Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and the writings of 
Karl Marx have all contributed to the foundations of this extensive tradition. More recent 
contributions have emphasised the influence of entrenched social and political cultures on 
patterns of resource use, equality, prosperity, civic governance and democratic functionality, 
and community and environmental sustainability (for example, Olson [1982]; Putnam 
[1993]). Often these studies have promoted certain factors that their authors believe provide 
the keys to civic wellbeing. Bernstein (2004), for example, identifies four factors - property 
rights, scientific rationality, capital markets and efficient communications and transport - as 
essential to the development of modem, prosperous societies. But the complexity of human 
societies means that an absolute understanding of what makes them work is elusive, thus 
there are many contradictions and few certainties, and this provides the opportunity for 
ongoing debate; liberal, democratic and egalitarian societies in which individuality and 
creativity can thrive are rare, fragile and transient things. Yet, the sum of all this 
philosophical exploration forms a coalescence of a sort, a foundation of embedded, cultural 
knowledge, which the free thinking associated with the humanistic traditions of the 
Enlightenment may explore, ·challenge, select and build upon, and this unstructured approach 
is followed here. 
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5.2 Pakistan's Geography, History, and Social and Political 
Characteristics 
Pakistan 
The Indus River is the lifeblood of Pakistan and the Indus River Valley is the central 
geographic feature of the country. Its soils are fertile and snowmelt from the Himalayas 
provides abundant water for irrigation. Pakistan has the largest integrated irrigation network 
in the world, with the Indus River system and its tributaries supplying over 30 million acres 
of cultivated land (LEAD 1998). The Indus River Valley is the site of one of the world's 
earliest civilisations based on settled agriculture and irrigation. It thrived between 2500 and 
1500 B.C., and was more extensive and advanced than the civilisations of Egypt and 
Mesopotamia that slightly preceded it. Today, Pakistan is generally regarded as a poor 
country in need of development. 
Pakistan has an extremely unequal society. A wealthy elite is separated from the vast 
majority by an enormous disparity of wealth and opportunity. Feudal patterns of land 
ownership and agriculture persist, especially in Baluchistan and the North West Frontfor 
Province. Land ownership and associated wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of 
a relatively small number of feudal families. Despite attempts at land reform under the 
governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Field Marshall M. Ayub Khan, the feudal class has 
been able to successfully protect its interests (LEAD 1998; Encarta 2004). 
Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 with the partition of India at the end of 
British colonial rule. The division of British colonial India into present day India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh, was largely along religious lines; with Pakistan and Bangladesh 
predominantly Muslim while India was predominantly Hindu. The partition involved a great 
deal of sectarian violence and the forced relocation of millions of people, leaving a bitter 
legacy of suspicion and hostility between India and Pakistan that persists to this day and has 
shaped the relationship of the two countries. 
Profound inequality, the result of a long history of entrenchment of what Olson identifies as 
redistributive coalitions, has been an established feature of life in Pakistan and India. This is 
most evident in the caste system, which so strongly defines the social and political culture of 
society in the Indian sub-continent. Linked to occupation and race, it has been preserved by 
prohibitions on intermarriage, and by Hindu religious doctrine, notably by the concept of 
dharma, which defines morality in terms of the rules of a person's station or caste rather than 
in a more universal way (Olson 1982: 157). In predominantly Muslim Pakistan, the caste 
system is not maintained by religious doctrine - in fact it contradicts the egalitarian teachings 
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of Islam - but many of the prejudices that inhibit social mobility and economic opportunity 
within the caste system are deeply integrated into the values of Pakistani society and are 
maintained by the politics of resource and wealth distribution. In addition, social and 
political life in Pakistan is influenced by the cultural legacy of a long history that features a 
recurrence of invasion and colonisation. Alexander the Great, the Moghuls and the British, 
and others before them, all conquered and ruled the lndus River Valley and other parts of the 
Indian subcontinent. The legacy of a history of conquest and occupation, that was linked to 
circumstances of geography and resources, can be found in the region's ethnic diversity, and 
in the continued preoccupation with control over land, water and other resources in political 
life, and in the importance given to rank, status, family and other connections in all spheres 
of Pakistani life. It may also be a factor that contributes to maintaining the pre-eminent 
position of the military in Pakistani society and politics. 
Olson (1982: 153-161) considers the issues of political and social disruption brought about 
by conquest and other upheavals in the region's history. Why did the Mogul empire and 
British rule not undermine the rigid social systems that appear, instead, to have been 
reinforced? Olson argues that following conquest, the pre-existing social order was 
sustained and incorporated because it served as a useful, supportive structure to the "indirect 
rule" exercised by both the Moguls and the British. The established social and economic 
· systems were allowed to continue. The rulers did not attempt to extend administration to a 
local level. Hindu princes continued to rule autonomous states within the Mogul Empire. 
Religious institutions were not disrupted: missionaries, for example, were kept out of British 
India until 18i3 (Olson 1982: 153). 
Social and economic systems that were developed and refined over a long period under the 
influence of rent-seeking coalitions, while not economically efficient in terms of maximising 
prosperity and well being for the majority of their populations, were quite efficient in terms 
of producing an extractable economic surplus that could be captured by a ruling class. New 
rulers left these systems in place and took a shru:e of this surplus through taxes and tributes. 
At local and village levels, life continued without great change or instability (Olson 1982: 
154). New rulers shared with existing distributive coalitions (especially those that were 
. dominant and had most power in the existing social structures) an interest in maintaining the 
rent-producing systems and the existing order within which they operated. Pakistan's social, 
political and economic characteristics today are very much a legacy of this history, shaped 
by the entrenchment of a highly stratified, rent-seeking society. 
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5.2. 1 Political Culture 
Corruption is pervasive in political life in Pakistan (Rashid 1996; Behar 2002). Most of the 
civil governments that have come to power since 1947 have been tarnished by corruption 
scandals and this has often provided the military with an excuse to replace them ("An Orgy 
of Reprisal in Pakistan", The Economist, 27/11199: 27-28). Mohammed Nawaz Sharif, for 
example, Prime Minister of Pakistan until he was removed from power by a military coup in 
October 1998, is reputed to have transferred millions of dollars worth of public assets to his 
own use. However, it was only when he tried to interfere in the internal power structure of 
the army that it moved against him (PAIS International 1999; Weidemann 2000; T. Ali 2003: 
253-255). Politics is a dangerous game in Pakistan. Wealth and power are the reward for 
success, but imprisonment, assassination and even execution are commonly the price of 
failure. While in government, Nawaz Sharif had claimed to attack corruption, but "his 
crusade against corruption turned out to be a vendetta against his political opponents" (The 
Economist, 27/11/99: 27). He had also embarked on "a war on terrorism" (years before such 
rhetoric was popularised in the USA and other countries following the September 11, 2001 
attacks), but his anti-terrorist courts were criticised; they did not provide "guarantee of due 
process" or that "the rights of the accused are taken into consideration" (The Economist, 
27/11/99: 28). They were kangaroo courts that could be used against political opponents. 
The political culture in Pakistan is not characterised by civic commitment. Many public 
institutions are dysfunctional and civic society is poorly developed (Rose and Evans 1997; 
Malik 2001)109. Environmental protection, for example'.'while supported by legislation 
comparable with that of other countries, is poorly implemented (Gul Khattak 2000: 1, 58). 
In this environment of institutional dysfunction, personal, family and tribal relationships, not 
surprisingly, assume greater importance110. Patronage and clientalism are systemic and 
entrenched. This tendency is exacerbated by the pronounced social and economic inequality 
in Pakistan; the concentration of power in few hands, and the fierce competition for limited 
resources and opportunities by the numerous poor that creates a situation where the ability to 
extend patronage becomes a source of considerable power. 
Social and political dysfunction may also be linked to a preoccupation, in Pakistani society, 
with property rights relating to control over tangible resources. Land grants are commonly 
109 Mustafa (2005) points out that in contrast to this general statement, there are also, in Pakistan, 
some widely admired non-government service-delivery and advocacy groups. 
110 Perhaps due to the importance of personal relationships, Pakistanis are friendly and hospitable 
people. This is especially so among the Pathan people of the North West Frontier Province, with 
whom codes of honour require that hospitality be extended to strangers. 
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the reward for service in government and the military. Land and water are of great 
importance in a society where widespread poverty and a large and continually growing 
population give pressing relevance to Malthusian concepts111. Disputes over land and water 
are central to legal and political life at every level of Pakistani society. Control over the 
sources of water that feed the lndus is an issue of concern and potential conflict between 
Pakistan and neighbouring countries (Postal 2001), and in times of drought there are often 
disputes over water between Pakistan's provinces. There are obvious conflicts between the 
interests of entrenched feudal landowners and the large popul;ition of landless poor. Land 
reform is an ongoing issue of political conflict, and private property rights are often insecure 
in an environment pervasive with socio-political tensions. 
5.2.2 Land Reform Movements 
Pakistan is an agricultural country and almost half of the workforce is involved in farming. 
As noted, a feudal pattern of agriculture persists. Since independence in 1947 there have 
been a number of programs to introduce land reforms. Some, such as the reforms attempted 
by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, created some legal uncertainty and 
conflict over tenure, but they did not break the power of the landlords. "By the end of the 
twentieth century, about half of the country's arable land was held by only a small 
percentage of wealthy landowners" (Encarta 2004: 3) and land reform remains a 
controversial issue. 
Feudal agricultural practices in parts of Pakistan appear to have changed little from those 
that would have been familiar in the Indus_ Valley Civilisation of 4500 years ago. Much 
labour is performed by hand and it is quite striking, in the twenty-first century, to see men 
squatting in fields of wheat, which they are harvesting with hand-held sickles (Figure 5.3). 
The low cost of agricultural labour112 makes manual labour economically viable when 
compared to the cost of machinery and fossil fuels. Also, a move towards greater 
industrialisation of agriculture has significant social implications. Increased mechanisation 
i,mplicitly threatens to displace much of the large rural workforce into an already large and 
growing population with limited resource options and high unemployment. Population 
pressure exacerbates unemployment and poverty, which already pose a threat to the social 
and political stability of the country as a whole. Landowners face a dilemma. Tenant 
111 The population is approximately 154 million and is increasing at 2 per cent each year (Encarta 
2004). 
112 Agricultural workers in Pakistan earn less than the equivalent of one US dollar per day. 
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farmers, whether they remain on the land or are di splaced by mechani sed farming, pose a 
persistent threat. They are a constant source of pressure fo r land reform. 
Figure 5.3 Harvesting wheat with hand-held sickles near Kund , North West Frontier 
Province, Pakistan, April 2001 
The three common forms of land tenure arrangement between landlords and farmers in 
Pakistan are: simple cash-rental; sharecropping or battai, which is most common, where 
tenant farmers work the land and pay a portion of the crop to the landlord (on irri gated land 
the landlord receives up to half the crop); and the "corporate" approach, where the landlord 
employs a mi x of people and machinery to work his land for him. (This system, which is 
simil ar to industri ali sed, corporate agricultural systems in the West, gives greater security 
and contro l to the landlord but requires professional management and oversight. It also 
requires fewer workers than traditional forms of agriculture.) 
In recent years there has been increasing tension between tenant farmers and landowners 
who have generally been backed by the Paki stan mjlitary authorities when conflicts have 
erupted 11 3. Fayle (2003) reports on a land di spute in the Punjab that had been the cause of 
ongoing conflict fo r three years , and T. Ali (2003: 266-269) discus es the same di spute in 
some detail. T his dispute directly involved a million tenant farmer and their families. The 
tenant farmers challenged the legitimacy of landownership and refused to pay rent, either in 
the form of harvest-share or cash-rent. At the heart of the dispute was the fear among 
farmers that, with the move towards the introduction of "corporate farmjng", they and their 
famjlies would be evicted from land that they had worked for generat ions. The landlord 
11 3 The Pakistan military is itself a landlord, owning vast areas of agricul tural land. 
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involved in this dispute is the Pakistan army, which acts as a "collective landlord'' over these 
crown lands (T. Ali 2003: 266). T. Ali (2003: 266) confirms that the dispute was generated 
by the armies' moves to "loosen the grip of the tenants over the land and the produce" by 
replacing crop share arrangements with cash-rent and short-term contracts. "The aim of the 
'modernisation' ... is deregulation, privatisation and the destruction of tenant solidarity", 
according to T. Ali (2003: 266),' with the objective of transferring these tenanted crown lands 
to private property in the hands of senior army officers. The farmers were supported by their 
own organisation, the Punjab Tenants' Association, and by some NGOs. The army had 
attempted to suppress outbreaks of resistance and several people had been shot and killed, 
hundreds had been injured, and new 'anti-terrorist' laws had been used against the social 
movement's leaders (T. Ali 2003: 269). Both the military and the farmers recognised the 
significance of this dispute, which if successful, could ignite similar resistance across 
Pakistan (Fayle 2003). This, clearly, would pose a serious challenge to the feudal order that 
remains such a powerful force in Pakistani society. 
fu March 2002, a Pakistani colleague provided me with a personal account of another land 
dispute that occurred on a large feudal holding near Mardan in North West Frontier Province 
(I had visited this place the previous year as the guest of the landowner). The origins of this 
dispute could be traced back several generations to British colonial times. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century the agreed annual rent amounted to about one eighth of the value of 
-the harvest. The productivity of the land and the predictability of the harvest had been 
significantly improved in 1912, when an irrigation tunnel and canal were built (by the 
British) to bring water from the Swat River Valley to this area (Figure 5.4). Consequently, 
over time, most of the tenancy contracts had been converted from the original rental 
arrangements to a 50:50 crop share, reflecting the increased productivity of the land under 
irrigation. But one plot of 40-50 acres had still been farmed under the original terms, and the 
landlord still received a rent of only about one eighth of the value of the harvest. The 
contract had been renegotiated by the landlord and the elderly tenant (who had held this plot 
for 70 years), but following his death, his sons had rejected the new arrangement. They, 
with the aid of tribal supporters, occupied the land and denied the landlord access. The 
landlord took the case to court and won several judgements at different levels including in 
the Supreme Court, but the tenants refused to yield. This dispute led to a standoff between 
groups of several hundred armed men - dependants and tribal supporters of the tenant on the 
one side, and supporters and relatives of the landlord on the other. The situation was quite 
volatile for several weeks. There was a genuine fear that it would deteriorate into overt 
warfare between the contesting groups, but this did not eventuate. There was some violence, 
including attempts by women from the tenants' camp to bum tractors belonging to the 
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landlord that were worki ng land nearby' 14. The police became involved and arrested some 
of the tenants' supporters, and eventually the situation was calmed and stability restored, but 
tensions continue to simmer. 
Figure 5.4 Irrigated farmlands Swat River Valley, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan 
May 2001 
These examples illustrate the intensity of underlying tensions over land, which also extends 
to other resources in Pakistan . This tension is exacerbated by poverty and inequality, and 
creates a situation of uncertainty over property rights leading to the need for expensive 
policing and the willingness to resort to force in order to assert ownership. The perceived 
threat to agricultural workers posed by the modernisation-industriali sation of agriculture 
associated with the trend to corporate farming is intensifying longstanding tensions over 
land . As noted, increased mechanisation would displace many millions of traditional farm 
workers who would have no immediate prospects for alternative employment. Where would 
they go? What would become of them? 
5.2.3 Religious Fundamentalism 
There is a constant tension between Islamic and secular traditions within Pakistani soc iety 
and its institutions, including the military. Paki stan was officially established as an Islamic 
state and, indeed, the very name Pakistan (land of the pure) affirms the central status of 
114 There were cultural complications associated with this attack by the women. The tractor drivers 
could not defend themselves, nor could the police do much to ass ist them, touching a woman being a 
grievous offence amo ng tribal Pathans, and they could onl y try to get away and to save themselves 
and the tractors. 
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Islam in defining its identity. While the unifying effect of the Islamic religion does not 
generally supersede the power of tribal relationships in Pakistani society (Encarta 2004) it 
provides a common value system that is shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by the majority 
of the population regardless of social status or occupation. 
The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region has been a feature of the past few 
decades and is widely regarded as a serious threat to stability (Rashid 1996, Behar 2002), 
and, as noted, it increasingly relates to broader global concerns. In the 1980s, the growth of 
Islamic fundamentalism was nurtured and supported by the United States and its allies, 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as it provided a useful ideological bulwark against 
socialism/communism and it was encouraged as a source of inspiration for the mujahadin, 
the Afghan guerrilla fighters engaged in jihad or holy war against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan (T. Ali 2003: 195-202). The mujahadin were supplied and supported from 
bases in Pakistan. 
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, interfactional conflict continued and 
over a million displaced Afghan refugees have remained in the border areas of Pakistan. 
With the defeat of the Soviet occupation, the Taliban, backed by the Pakistan army, emerged 
as the dominant political force in Afghanistan and gained control of the Afghan capital, 
Kabul (see T. Ali [2003: 195-202]). The Taliban regime imposed an oppressive rule by 
clerical authority guided by the doctrines of fundamentalist Islam. Many of the footsoldiers 
of the Taliban came from Pakistan and had been educated in the numerous Madrassas 
(religious colleges) located in the North West Frontier Province. These Madrassas, where 
the Taliban were largely created, were funded from Saudi Arabia and were strongly 
influenced by Wahhabism, an extremist form of Islam that is the Saudi state religion (T. Ali 
2003: 323). Education in the Madrassas consisted mainly of religious indoctrination and 
training in obedience to clerical authority, but because they offered free education (with 
board and lodging provided) they attracted many students from poor families who could not 
afford to send their children to secular schools (T. Ali 2003: 196). 
In May 2001, travelling the national highway between Peshawar and Islamabad, I passed 
many of these Madrassas near Nowshera. The word Osama, soon to become quite well 
known in the West, was written as graffiti on walls in villages along the road. The tensions 
that were about to become recognised as a problem in the West had long been a pressing 
source of political tensions in Pakistan. Here the linkage was readily apparent between the 
growth of fundamentalism - now linked to the proliferation of global "terrorism" - and 
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frustrations stemming from inequality and limited access to opportunities and resources. 
This issue will be revisited in the concluding section of the chapter. 
5.2.4 The Role of the Military 
The military, in contrast to many other public organisations in Pakistan, is an effective and 
functional institution. It is widely viewed as being disciplined and largely free of 
corruption I 15. The military occupies an interesting position in Pakistani society. It can be 
regarded as forming a class or caste of its own and in many ways the Pakistan military 
occupies the place in society that was formerly held by the colonial British (Mustafa 2005). 
It commands a significant portion of national tax revenues (Encarta 2004) and its members 
generally enjoy a privileged lifestyle compared to that of other Pakistanis (regulated of 
course by differentiation according to status based on rank). Civil government in Pakist~n 
has frequently been suspend~d by the military and it has held power directly for 
approximately half the 59 years since independence. Even when not ostensibly in power, the 
military has always wielded considerable political influence. Many senior positions irt tbe 
civil service are held by officers who began their careers in the military and can be expected 
to have retained common attitudes and links with former comrades in arms. 
Pakistani society, as noted, is marked by tensions between the rich and poor, tensions over 
control of land, water and other resources, tensions between religious fundamentalism and 
secular and humanist values systems, tensions between traditional values and modernity, 
tensions over issues of gender, and tensions between the people of different ~thnic, tribal and 
linguistic backgrounds that make up the Pakistani population (Mustafa 2005). The military, 
as noted, is the single, central institution with the power to constrain these potentially 
divisive tensions, and to maintain order and the status quo. The army rules, in part, because 
of the power that comes from its position as hegemonic arbitrator over these internal 
divisions. Also of great importance in maintaining the legitimacy and pre-eminence of the 
military in Pakistani society, and securing public acceptance of the large portion of national 
wealth that it appropriates, is the unifying effect of the constant threat of war with India116. 
Since partition in 1947, relations between Pakistan and India have resembled a "cold war", 
with periodic outbreaks of more overt hostilities. This constant state of war serves the 
military-industrial interests in both countries. It also provides a unifying force that 
115 T. Ali (2003: 257-8) refutes this general view, demonstrating that the army is significantly affected 
by corruption, but hierarchical discipline remains and underpins the army's ability to remam a 
functional institution and a force for cohesion, at least for the time being. 
116 This threat also makes Pakistan dependent on US protection and entrenches its subservience to 
American imperialist interests (T. Ali 2003: 166). 
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strengthens the sense of Islamic identity in Pakistan and Hindu nationalism in India, a factor 
exploited by religious and nationalistic politicians in both countries. Indeed, as Mustafa 
(2005) notes, this conflict "is at the core of Pakistan's sense of nationhood and its territorial 
security". Pakistan's ongoing conflict with India also has other implications of concern to 
the rest of the world117. It has fuelled the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries. 
As tensions mounted in the post September 2001 climate, there were serious fears that the 
situation could deteriorate to the point of nuclear war in the region. In 2005-2006, relations 
between India and Pakistan have been relatively cordial, but the underlying tensions and 
potential threats remain. 
Corrupt democracy, entrenched feudalism, military dictatorship, sectarian conflicts, religious 
fundamentalism and institutional dysfunction are among the influences that make Pakistan's 
political and resource management environment a challenging one. The following section 
examines a fisheries management case study that operates within this environment. 
5.3 Pakistan's Fisheries 
Pakistan's total fisheries production was 623,425 metric tons in 2001 (Encarta 2004). Of 
this about three quarters came from the marine fisheries of the Indian Ocean and one quarter 
from inland rivers, reservoirs and irrigation systems. Primary production in fisheries 
employs over 300,000 workers, approximately 100,000 in the marine· fisheries and 200,000 
in the inland sector (FAO 1995b). National marine fisheries policy has encouraged fleet 
expansion and the development of export markets. It has sought to promote "rational, 
efficient exploitation of marine resources for the broad goals of national development. 
Consequently, policy makers' fisheries management concepts and techniques are generally 
less effective in addressing the needs of the coastal communities" (Siddiqi 1992: 395). 
5.3.1 Marine Fisheries: Some Comparisons with Newfoundland 
Dualism, noted as a feature of Newfoundland's fisheries, is also a pronounced characteristic 
of Pakistan's marine fisheries. Coastal waters to the 35-mile limit are reserved for and 
defended by artisanal fishers who mainly use small, inshore vessels, often powered only by 
oar and sail. The majority of the coastal fishers are poor- and their lack of access to capital 
and equipment limits their productivity. Nevertheless, most coastal fisheries are 
117 T. Ali (2003: 199) has expressed concern about the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism 
within the Pakistan military, especially among junior officers, who will become the senior officers of 
tomorrow and wield considerable power over Pakistan and its nuclear weapons. 
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overexploited due to "human population pressure, which exploits the resources beyond 
biologically sustainable limits" (Siddiqi 1992: 409). This is the familiar argument of "too 
many fishermen chasing too few fish" · that was also discussed in relation to the 
Newfoundland cod fishery in chapter 3. 
There is also a capital-based, industrial offshore sector. Siddiqi's (1992: 409) observation 
that "[m]ost of the available funds have been spent to enlarge and upgrade commercial 
fishing fleets, and comparatively fewer financial resources have been provided for 
technological or infrastructural development for the small-scale subsector" is also 
reminiscent of conditions in Newfoundland's fisheries in the 1960s and 1970s, as described 
by Wright (1997; 2001) and Brox (1972) and discussed in chapter 3. 
In Pakistan, as in many other coastal fishing regions, there is a tension between the interests 
of a large population of relatively poor, small-scale, inshore fishers and capital-intensive 
industrial operations. The policy goals of government favour the development of a 
technologically modern, "economically efficient" fishing sector (Dr. M. Hayat, Assistant 
Fisheries Development Commissioner for Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Livestock, personal communication, 2001), but this policy direction, which implicitly 
favours industrialisation over more labour intensive methods, potentially threatens the 
survival of many thousands of poor subsistence fishers who have no other resources upon 
which to base their livelihood. The issues of dualism and fisheries development policy in 
Pakistan are in several respects comparable to those discussed in relation to Newfoundland 
in chapter 3. 
In September 2000 (two years after assuming power m the 1998 coup) the Pakistan 
government under General Pervez Musharraf cancelled all offshore deep-sea fishing licences 
("Decision on Deep-Sea Fishing on 14th: Shafi", The News International, Islamabad, 1/5/01: 
17). These applied mainly to trawlers from Taiwan, China and South Korea. The ban 
benefited the Pakistani inshore sector, with its many thousands of small-scale fishers. 
Catches in this sector increased significantly following the reduction in offshore fishing 
effort. However, in May 2001 offshore licences were renegotiated. The local inshore 
fisheries sector lobbied for a continuation of the off shore fishing ban, but the government of 
Pakistan claimed to be under considerable pressure from the governments of Taiwan, China 
and South Korea to grant renewed access to fishing fleets from those countries. It voiced 
concern about resource sustainability and the interests of the Pakistani coastal fishers, but 
hinted at the need to consider broader issues in the national interest. The situation was 
somewhat complicated when Sind Province independently issued some offshore licences, 
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leading to a confrontation with the federal government, which challenged its authority to do 
so ("Sindh, Balochistan Violate Centre's Fishing Policy", The News International, 
Islamabad, 115/01: 12). The incident demonstrated an underlying lack of clarity in power 
relationships in Pakistan that is reflective of political instability. 
One can speculate on the political considerations behind the withdrawal and reissue of 
licences. This could be viewed as a logical consequence of the transfer of power. It is 
understandable that the new government might seek to renegotiate arrangements for access 
to fish resources in a manner that secured greater benefit to itself. In a political environment 
characterised by personal involvement, patronage and corruption, renegotiation of resource 
access arrangements following a transfer of power is to be expected and reflects the 
relatively high degree of "sovereign risk" associated with doing business in such 
environments. While some rhetorical attention is paid to environmental concerns about 
sustainability, and social concerns about the interests of the Pakistani small-scale fishing 
sector, it is the offshore industrial sector that likely offers the best prospects for the use of 
political power to seek and extract rent from the fishery, for example, through payments 
linked to the issue of licences. On the other hand, the military government of General 
Pervez Musharraf, in the period following the coup, also needed to shore up popular support 
so as to enhance its legitimacy. But in addition to local support, gaining international 
legitimacy and recognition was also a key consideration and this generated pressure to grant 
foreign fleets access to fish resources. There are also parallels between this situation and 
that in the Newfoundland fishery in the decades preceding the cod crisis as discussed in 
chapter 3. There were the same competing policy pressures to serve the interests of the 
populous, local, inshore fishers for local political reasons, while also serving the interests of 
the offshore industrial sector (which tends, by the power of vested interest, to be able to 
muster a disproportionate amount of political influence), and the international sector out of 
consideration of issues of trade and international relations. This situation contributed to the 
failure of the Newfoundland cod fishery and could be expected to generate similar, 
unsustainable expansionary pressures in the Pakistani fishery. The similarities noted here 
also support the comparison of the characteristic dualism in Newfoundland's fisheries with 
dualism in the "undeveloped" world made by Brox (1972: 6) and discussed in chapter 3. 
5.3.2 Freshwater Fisheries 
Freshwater systems in Pakistan contribute about 150,000 tons of fish production, which 
mainly feeds local consumption. The inland sector employs approximately 200,000 fishers 
FAO (1995b); almost double the number that work in the marine fisheries. Inland fisheries 
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occur in rivers, lakes, reservoirs and irrigation canals. Many of these fisheries are enhanced 
by stocking with fry of various species, and represent a form of extensive aquaculture. 
While Pakistan's marine fisheries are considered to be fully utilised there is thought to exist 
significant potential for increased production in the inland sector. Water availability can be a 
limiting factor on production (C.Q. Ali, Ross and Beveridge 1991) but Pakistan's vast 
irrigation systems could be adapted to significantly increase its suitability for freshwater fish 
production (S.R. Ali 1999). 
Pakistan employs some interesting contractual systems to manage inland fisheries. These 
systems include elements of private property rights and market instruments combined with 
production systems that are essentially feudal in nature. fu the following section I present a 
case study of a small reservoir fishery, which illustrates the interrelationship of these aspects 
of management. 
5.3.3 Rawat Lake Case Study: The Easy Integration of Market and Feudal 
Systems in Fisheries Management 
Rawal Lake, located on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, is primarily a water 
storage reservoir with a surface area of 8.8 square kilometres (Figure 5.5). The lake stores 
water for domestic supply to the city of Rawalpindi and provides a recreational facility close 
to Islamabad where boating, angling and family picnics can be enjoyed. It also supports a 
commercial fishery and an associated fishing community of about 200 people. This fishery 
is similar to many others based on small water storage reservoirs throughout Pakistan and 
fudi(!. These fisheries combine the characteristics of capture fisheries, due to their extensive 
nature and methods of fish harvesting, and aquaculture, due to elements such as species and 
stock enhancement through the introduction of hatchery produced fry (Sugunan and Sinha 
2001). 
Rawal Lake is a man-made reservoir and, like others of this type, it is subject to extreme, 
seasonal variations in water level. At the time of the study, in early May 2001, the region 
had been experiencing a drought and the water level had been drawn down exposing 
extensive areas of the lakebed. The lake, due to seasonal drawdown, is subject to 
considerable physical perturbation and also, due to stock enhancement with species exotic to 
the region, it represents a significantly altered ecosystem. Consequently, some 
environmental issues that may generally be concerns in fisheries management, such as those 
relating to the protection of biodiversity and natural ecosystems, have limited significance 
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here. It is the social and economic issues of production and a llocation that are of most 
interest in this analysis. 
Figure 5.5 Rawal Lake, April 2001 
Research Approach 
The case study was based on information gathered during several visits to Rawat Lake in late 
April and early May 200 I. The methodology cou ld be described as opportuni stic and 
flexible, rather than tightly structured, and consisted of observing fi shing and other activities 
associated with the fi shery, and di scussing matters relating to the fi shery with fishers, 
members of their community, proces ors and others involved in the fi shery in any way who 
were encountered at the tudy site. Some follow up interviews were conducted off site. A 
researcher (myself) and a Pakistani ass istant conducted the fi eld study 118. This assistant 
was fluent in several languages including English, Peshto and Urdu, and thi s was vital to the 
exercise, providing essential translation skill s. 
During the fi eld study we visited the fi shers' village, located above the high water mark on 
the lakeshore. We made general observations of matters affecting the fi shers' lifestyles such 
as access to water, fuel , building material s, education faci lities, and the nature and quality of 
the ir habitations. We accompanied fi shers on a fishing trip in Rawat Lake, and observed the 
methods and equipment that were employed. We also visited the camp and processing 
fac ility operated by the agents/employees of the "contractors" who held the fishing rights for 
the lake, and observed and di scussed their operations. Thi s camp is strategically located in a 
I I 8 The lead researcher has fi shery management experience and practical familiarity with small -scale 
fishing gear and methods. The assistant is a Pakis tani national who had recently completed a two year 
Master of Environmental Management Degree at the Un ivers ity of Tasmania in Australia. 
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public picnic ground on the lakeshore. The position overlooks the lake, from where fishing 
activity and movements to and from the fishers' village can be observed. The village is 
several hundred metres from the picnic site and ·car park, and is also separated from the 
public area by a small creek and scattered clumps of trees that provide a little distance and 
privacy. 
An informal and unstructured approach was used in the interviewing process during site 
visits. Specific questions were introduced and the conversation directed towards areas of 
particular interest to the study. Other questions were asked as suggested by the general flow 
of discussion or by activities and observations as they occurred. To confirm responses 
relating to critical issues about management arrangements, key questions were asked of 
different sources, thereby providing confirmation by the process of triangulation. Extensive 
notes were not taken during the interviews, although some facts and figures were noted in_ a 
pocket notebook. Notes were written up in the evening following site visits. This allow_ed 
an informal atmosphere to be maintained and permitted the interviews to be free-ranging and 
flexible. 
Language was a potential challenge to the interviewing process. As noted, the research 
assistant was fluent in English, Peshto (the tribal language of the Pathans, the predominant 
tribal group of the North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan) and Urdu (a widely used 
"common" language in both India and Pakistan and Pakistan's official language): Most of 
the fishers spoke only Sindi, the predominant language in the province of Sind,in the south 
of Pakistan. Some of the children also spoke Urdu. Fortunately a relative of one of the 
fishers was visiting. He was a schoolteacher from their home village in Sind province. He 
spoke Sindi, Urdu and a little English and was a helpful source of information. He also 
assisted with translation, converting Sindi to Urdu, which the research assistant translated. 
into English. The contractors' agents who operated the camp and processing facility were 
mostly Punjabis who understood Urdu, but they also included a Peshto-speaking Pathan. 
Key interview subjects also included a high court advocate who was interviewed while 
purchasing fish from the agent's camp. He was also visited and interviewed in his chambers. 
He was well informed about the fishery and its management arrangements and spoke fluent 
English. 
The essential translation skills of the research assistant and the multi-lingual schoolteacher 
successfully overcame the potential challenges of communication. There is, however, a 
recognised potential for some misunderstanding or bias to be introduced through the 
translation process. There is also the possibility of the- researchers being misled, either 
236 
Chapter 5 Pakistan 
deliberate ly or inadvertentl y, by subject holding inaccurate perceptions of management 
arrangements and other matters. There is, in addition, the possibility of bias be ing induced 
into the interview process by the researcher demonstrating particular interest in some aspects 
of the fi shery and its management or by "picking up" more strongly on certain issues while 
perhaps allowing others to pass unnoticed . Clarification of key issues relating to the 
property-rights mechani sm of the management system was obtained by cross-referencing 
expl anations provided by different stakeholders in the fi shery and, where possible, by 
reference to literature sources. No significant inconsistencies were encountered . 
Many intere ting issues emerged that invited further enquiry, and Pakistan's freshwater 
fi sheries would be fertile ground fo r more in-depth social research. Though limited by time 
and other resources this case study provided a useful insight into the interplay of feudal, 
community and market re lationships in the fi shery. 
Overview of Management Arrangements 
The Islamabad Capital Territory control s fis hing in Rawal Lake. Exclusive commercial 
fi shing rights to the lake are sold or leased by public auction for periods of three years. 
Aucti oning fi shing rights to inland waters for a fi xed period, usuall y three years, is a 
common management practice in Pakistan ("Dera Ismail Khan: lndus Ri ver Fishing Rights 
Aucti oned", Dawn Internet Edition, [http://www.dawn.com/2002/08/0 I /local37 .htm 
accessed 12/8/04]; "Muzaffarabad: Mangla Dam Fishing Rights Auctioned", Dawn Internet 
Edition, [http://www.dawn .com/2004/06/23/local37.htm accessed 12/8/04]) , and also in 
India (Sugunan 1995) . At the time of the study, the rights to Rawal Lake were apparentl y 
he ld by a consortium of fi sh merchants, referred to as the "contractors" who, according to 
differing opinions expressed by fi shers and the contractors' agents at the lake, paid 
somewhere between Rs 1,500,000 - Rs2,700,000 (AU$50,000 - AU$90,000) fo r exclusive 
fi shing rights for a three year peri od. This amount represents a significant resource rent fo r 
the fi shery. The contractors pay additi onal fees to government-run hatcheries to pay to 
"seed" the lake with hatchery-produced fry of several species. Recreational fi shing with rod 
and line is also permitted for a fee l t9 of Rs 10 per day (about AU$0.30). Thi s explanation of 
the management arrangements is consistent with accounts reported in Dawn (and referred to 
above) of the auctioning of fi shing rights to sections of the lndus Ri ver (in which some 
attempted collusion between bidders was noted), and auctioning of fi shing rights to very 
large reservoirs. T he latter case refers to Mangla Dam, which at 27,000 hectares is the 
largest reservoir in Kashmi r. Fishing rights to this water, which supports 15,000 full-time 
fishers and produces over LOOO metric tons of fi sh per year, reportedl y sold for Rs25. l 
I t 9 It was not clear whether thi s fee is paid to the contractors or to the government. 
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million (approximately AU$800,000) for three years, with a further Rs6 million 
(AU$200,000) committed to pay to stock the water with hatchery-produced fry. 
At Rawal Lake, the contractors engage under some form of agreement (or contract), the 
services of a Sindi fishing community to harvest the fish from the lake. The amount the 
fishers receive was variously reported as about 15 per cent of the retail market price of the 
fish, or as approximately Rs700 per 40kg (which worked out at about AU~0.60 per kg). The 
fish would probably have sold for about Rs70-150 per kg (AU$2.00-5.00 per kg) at retail 
markets in Rawalpindi and Peshawar. 
Sugunan and Sinha (2001: 55) report the average yield from small reservoirs in India at 
approximately 50 kg/ha but note that this is low compared to production in other countries in 
Asia and Latin America. If this average is used to estimate the total annual production from 
the 880 ha of Rawal Lake, a yield estimate might be in the region of 44,000 kg or 44 metric 
tons. Correlating this figure with the auction fee paid for the fishing rights, and the fee of 
approximately Rs 25 million reportedly paid for similar rights in Mangla dam with an annual 
yield of over 1000 tons, suggests that the yield estimate and the price reportedly paid for the 
fishing rights to Rawal Lake are credible. 
The contractor employs agents who live in tents on-site at Rawal Lake. From here they can 
oversee fishing activities and presumably police their employers' fishing rights by ensuring 
that fish are not sold by the fishers through other channels. They receive the fish from the 
fishers, weigh and record the quantity delivered, process them by gutting and packing the 
fish in baskets with crushed ice. These baskets of iced fish are then collected by small 
vans120 for transport to the markets. 
The Rawal Lake Fishing Community 
The Sindi fishers of Rawal Lake come originally from Thatta, a large historic village located 
about 200 kilometres from Karachi in Sind Province. This is over 1 OOO kilometres from the 
study area. Sind is Pakistan's southern province and is bordered by its coastline on the 
Indian Ocean. Most of Pakistan's coastal fishers are Sindi. The fishers at Rawal Lake, 
however, identify themselves as a strictly freshwater fishing people with a long tradition of 
fishing the freshwater lakes in their home region in the lower Indus River Valley. 
Sind is one of Pakistan's more conservative regions and is noted for a strongly entrenched, 
feudal social system, known as Vadera (meaning big man). The fishers at Rawal Lake, 
120 A small van and an ordinary motor car were observed being used for this task. 
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however, claim that there is no Vadera system operating there. The community itself 
appears to promote co-operation and resource sharing. Nevertheless, they live in 
circumstances of dependency and their access to the fi shery as an economic resource is 
apparently at the discretion of the contractors, who, as a consequence, would seem to have 
considerable power over them. 
The fi shers of Rawal Lake live in what could be described as either a temporary village or a 
semi -permanent camp located in a patch of sparse forest near the lakeshore and close to a 
small , navigable creek, which, as noted, separates the vi llage from the public picnic area 
(Figure 5.6). The population of the fi shing community is about 200, of which about 35 are 
active fi shers. They li ve in huts with walls and roofs made of grass thatching tied to 
frameworks of timber poles (Figure 5.7). These appear to be made entirely from natural 
materials found in the adjacent forest. The village has no clean water supply, sanitation or 
power121. 
It is doubtful whether the village or camp has any official status under planning 
arrangements for Islamabad and the Capital Territory . An NGO has provided funding for a 
teacher who provides some basic education for the children. Classes are held out of doors in 
the shade of trees. The teacher has a blackboard but there are few other fac ilities and the 
children sit on plastic sacks spread on the ground (Figure 5.8) . 
Figure 5.6 Fishers' village located in trees in the background 
121 The fishers complained that the contractors do not even supply them with a hand pump for water. 
They obtain water fo r domestic use from the creek and this may be dangerously polluted. 
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Figure 5.7 Habitations in the fishers' village are made of reed and grass thatching 
Figure 5.8 Community children receiving schooling out of doors 
Although they have fis hed Rawal Lake under contract for lO years, the fis hers do not seem 
to have any permanent security of access to the fis hery, nor right of res idence in the 
lake hore village. T he contractors, who hold the fi shing rights, can apparently expel anyone 
who disp leases them from the area. One could sense a certain discomfort by the fishers to 
di scu sing some of these arrangements in the presence of the contractors' agents. An 
indication of this was that the visiting Sindi schoolteacher, who was a spokesman for his 
fi sher relatives, chose to speak in English about some of these matters when in the presence 
of the contractors' agents, although he was not fluent in the language. Communication was 
more effective when he spoke Urdu, which was then trans lated into Engli sh by the research 
assistant. But whi le the agents could understand Urdu they apparently cou ld not understand 
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Engli h and he indicated that he was not comfortable about them overhearing hi s expres 10ns 
of dissatisfaction with the system. 
Fishing Practices 
Fishing was done exc lusively by men and boys from about the age of 10 years and older. 
The fi shers operated from small narrow boats. These were planked, partially decked vessels, 
resembling something like a cros between a skiff and a canoe, and ranging between about 3 
metres and 6 metres in length (Figure 5.9). There were approximately 6 or 7 of these small 
boats, which were propelled by paddle. There was also one larger, motorised vessel (Figure 
5. 10). 
Figure 5.9 Young fishworker in a small vessel of typical construction 
Figure 5.1 O The one motorised vessel observed in the Rawal Lake fishery. Rooftops of 
Islamabad in the background 
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A number of fi shing techniques were employed . Several trap nets were set in the lake. They 
had leader nets of approximately a hundred metres length to guide fi sh into the central 
enclosure (Figure 5.11). There were 4 to 6 of these traps deployed in the lake at the time of 
the study. Large seines were also used to crowd and contain fish against a suitable bank, 
where cast nets were thrown to capture and extract them (Figure 5.10) . Gill nets and hook 
and line were also used. It is likely that different methods · would be favoured at different 
times of the year according to fish behaviour and other considerations. In warmer months, 
for instance, fi sh might spoil quickly in gill nets if left in the water for several hours, because 
fi sh that died in the net would soon begin to rot. At these times the catch might retain better 
condition if taken by methods such as trap nets that limited the delay between the death of 
the fi sh and their being processed and cooled with ice. 
Figure 5.11 Trap nets in the middle of Rawal Lake 
Figure 5.12 Cast net being thrown to capture fish enclosed in a large seine 
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The fishers at Raw al Lake indicated that they own the boats used in the fishery. Some of the 
other equipment, the trap-nets and the large seine net in particular, represent a considerable 
amount of capital investment. Unfortunately I did not determine whether these were owned 
by the contractors or by the fishers themselves. 
Other Regulations 
With the exception of very small fish of less desired species, which have little market value 
and were retained by the fishers for personal consumption, the fishers were required to 
deliver the entire catch to the contractors' agents. A minimum size of 12 inches applies to 
some of the more valued species of fish to allow them to grow to a productive size. This 
applies to the various types of indigenous and introduced carp. The fishery is closed during 
June, July and August and the fishers relocate during this period to other waters in the region 
in order to continue fishing. This closure coincides with the breeding period for some of the 
higher value species found in the Lake. 
Fish Species 
Several fish species were noted during visits to the site in early May 2001. These included 
the common or golden carp ( Cyprinus carpio carpio) of up to about lkg in weight (Figure 
5.13), and silver carp (Hypophthalmichthys molitrix) of up to about 3kg in weight (Figure 
5.14). This is a fast growing, pelagic fish that feeds on phytoplankton, and, in addition to its 
use for food, it helps to clean water supply reservoirs of clogging algae. Other species that 
were observed in the catch or thought to occur in Rawal Lake include Catla catla, Cirrhinus 
mrigala, Labeo rohita, Chela chanius, and Ctenopharyngodon idella (grass carp). The first 
three of tf1ese are lndo-Gangetic major carps.- The rapid growth and general adaptability of 
these fish make them widely used species in culture-based fisheries in small reservoirs of 
India and Pakistan (Sugunan and Sinha 2001). A large basket-full of stunted tilapia of about 
5cm length (probably 0. mossambicus), a small catfish (possibly Rita rita or Wallago attu), 
and a large turtle122 of an estimated 5-lOkg in weight were also observed in the catch during 
site visits. 
1 2~ Muslims are forbidden to eat turtles, they being considered harram, but the turtle was reportedly to 
be sold to local Chinese people who consider it a delicacy. 
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Figure 5.13 Common carp (Cyprinus carpio carpio)from Rawal Lake 
Figure 5.14 Silver carp (Hypophthalmichthys molitrix) 
from Rawal Lake 
Pakistan 
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Processing and Transport 
A soon as the catch was brought a hore it was taken to be processed. This wa done at a 
facility taffed by the contractor ' agents or employees. Several of these agents were alway 
in attendance at this camp/processi ng faci lity. This camp contained several large tents, 
which served as living quarters. The adjacent processing facility was in the open air and 
shaded by a tarpaulin (Figure 5.15). It contained a scale to weigh the catch, and three square 
concrete tanks of several cubic metres capacity, with wooden lids. These tanks were used to 
hold ice and fi sh for short periods from the time they were brought in from the lake until 
they were removed to market (Figure 5.16). At the time of the study daytime temperatures 
exceeded 40 degrees Celsius and, at this temperature, fi sh would rapidly spoil unless quickly 
chilled with ice. 
The catch was weighed as fishers brought it in from the lake and the weights were recorded 
in a notebook that was held by the contractors' agents. Payment to the fi shers was based on 
the weight of fish deli vered and was apparently made weekly 123 after the catch had been 
sold . Large fish were gutted; smaller ones were left whole, before being packed with crushed 
ice in large baskets in which they were transported to market (Figure 5.17). A small van was 
used to deli ver ice and other supplies to the site and to tran port the fi sh to markets in 
Peshawar and Rawalpindi . 
Figure 5.15 Contractors' agents at their camp located adjacent to the processing facility 
I23 Debt bondage is common in Pakistan and, although not investigated here, is likely to play a part in 
fisher/contractor re lation hips in this type of fi hery. Parall els may be drawn with the merchant credit 
"truck" systems that were com mon in the Newfoundland fi shery prior Lo World War II as discussed in 
chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.16 The outdoor processing facility showing concrete tanks, and scales used to 
weigh the catch 
Figure 5.17 Basket of fish and crushed ice ready for 
pick-up and delivery to market 
Pakistan 
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Discussion 
The property rights mechanisms of the Rawal Lake fishery, and the way that these 
-mechanisms influence other structures and relationships, are features' of particular interest in 
this study. The auctioning of exclusive rights to the lake for periods of three years 
demonstrates continued government ownership of the resource and the ability to secure rent 
from it, but the lease represents a private property right. The operation of the fishery within 
this private property framework demonstrates a system of feudal dependency within which 
an egalitarian, cooperative community performs the basic role of primary production. 
In recent years there has been considerable debate in developed countries about the 
privatisation of fishing rights through the use of ITQ and other mechanisms. Critics of 
privatisation have sometimes resorted to feudal metaphors to describe the social implications 
of resource privatisation and enclosure. The Rawal Lake fishery, which is based on private 
property rights, clearly demonstrates many feudal characteristics. This is not surprising as it 
exists within a society that is economically, socially and politically shaped by deeply 
entrenched feudal structures, a key factor being the marked degree of social and economic 
inequality that is a feature of dual societies like that of Pakistan. The compatibility of fishery 
management systems based on private property mechanisms, with feudal social structures 
stands as a notable feature. 
Does the Market Auction System Overcome the Problem of Political Corruption? 
The apparently open and transparent auctioning of fishing rights may (in theory) provide an 
impartial market mechanism to manage the fishery and allocate resources, a mechanism that 
is free of the sort of political manipulation and patronage so common in Pakistan. Perhaps 
the fishing community, if it wished to do so, could form a cooperative, obtain finance and 
buy the lease itself, and so cut the contractors, as middle_men, out of the supply chain and 
save the resources required for accounting and policing of the contractor/fisher arrange~ent. 
Sugunan (1995) examined the economics of a similar reservoir fishery in Rajasthan in India, 
and found th~t the fishers would have a significantly higher income if they did this. But one 
can conceive of many potential barriers to such an approach. These might include 
difficulties in acquiring finance, or a lack of the necessary self-confidence among fishers; a 
matter of attitude, education and social status, to attempt to extricate themselves from 
economic dependency. Likely there are also other well understood, embedded cultural 
structures linked to status and power that maintain barriers to people taking this sort of action 
and even apparently transparent auction systems can be subject to political manipulation, 
especially if there is any political discretion over payment. T. Ali (2003: 194) details how 
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state-owned banks in Pakistan were pillaged by politicians, businessmen and landlords who 
obtained loans and were not pursued to repay them. Non-payment of power bills to state-
owned utility providers, particularly by large industries, was also common. A bidder who, 
through political contacts, is confident that he will not have to pay the full amount, if 
anything at all, can bid up the price to uneconomic levels and so gain access to resource 
allocation. This is speculative and may not be a common practice, but it is relevant 
speculation in the Pakistani context where corruption is recognised as pervasive, and where 
in a case like this, it could provide a structural barrier to social mobility for members of the 
fishing community and, thus, serves as a "conversion barrier" that maintains them in 
conditions of poverty and economic dependencel24. 
Micro-Level Production Sustainability? 
At one level, the fishery management system at Rawal Lake appears to work quite well in a 
challenging socio-political environment. As has been noted, a large and growing population 
places intense pressures on resources in Pakistan. Pakistan has one of the world's highest 
birth rates and for twenty years the indigenous population, especially in the north, has been 
. augmented by over a million refugees from the turmoil in neighbouring Afghanistan. 
Extreme poverty is widespread, which intensifies competition for limited resources. Without 
effective controls to exclude people who lack jobs or access to other resources, the fishery in 
Rawal Lake and in similar places might rapidly be subjected to over-exploitation, damaging 
to its overall productivity. Viewed in this regard, the management of the Rawal Lake fishery 
is, arguably, effective. In a broader social environment, in which the maintenance of public 
order is tenuous, the fishery seems to be managed in an orderly and fairly stable way and to 
make an important contribution to the production of fish protein in a manner that appears, on 
the surface, to be ecologically efficient, sustainable, and economically viable. 
It may be argued that private property rights are, indeed, necessary to manage resources in 
societies that are characterised by extreme inequality. The political imperative to use 
property rights to control access to resources so as to maintain power and privilege is easy to 
grasp. But the poverty that extreme inequality produces creates intense pressure on 
resources. People who are very poor would (in theory) if they were allowed to do so, be 
willing to exploit resources to the point of very low yield because their opportunity cost of 
effort is so low. Equal access models of fishery management may not, according to this 
logic, work where there are too many people who are so poor. If it is true that private 
124 Conversion barriers were discussed by Brox (1972: 70-74) in relation to the Newfoundland fishery 
and referred to in chapter 3. 
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property rights are not just a cause of inequality, but also become essential to managing 
resources in circumstances of great social inequality, then the trend to private property rights 
in the fisheries of the developed world may reflect growing inequality in these societies 
rather than simply being the managerial response to technological advances and resource 
limits that is often portrayed (as discussed in chapter 2). If the trend to greater inequality 
entrenches the necessity for resource management mechanisms that create further inequality 
then the process is clearly one that tends away from equilibrium. 
A different view of the necessity of private property mechanisms could be explored through 
the argument that it is actually the egalitarianism and resource sharing within the Sindi 
fishing community itself that is the key to the successful functioning of the system. In the 
Rawal Lake fishery there is also a degree of mutual dependency between the contractors and 
the fishers in enforcing exclusive property rights to the fishery. While the contractors have, 
in theory, to guard against being cheated by the fishers, who could conceivably sell fish 
through other channels and keep a greater share of their value, they also have to guard 
against "their" fish being poached from the lake or stolen by outsiders. The Sindi fishers 
also have an interest in excluding other fishers, although they do not own a direct property 
right to any fish that poachers might take. This is because the resource is limited. They may 
not make a profit or recover any resource rent from harvesting fish at a subsistence level, but 
they earn their living from it, and fish removed from the system by others would leave a 
reduced overall income for the Sindi community. The community therefore has an interest in 
the "exclusivity" of access rights to the fishery, and its members do not appear to have 
access to other economic resources to which they could divert energy and mitigate reduced 
income from the fishery. From the point of view of the fishers, however, the fishery may be 
regarded as a commons, which is "sustainably" managed because of a shared s~nse of 
communal interest and responsibility. 
Clearly the agreement or contract between the contractors and the Sindi fishers, gives them 
some security and a "stake" in the fishery, if only on a short-term basis for the term of the 
contract. The contractors also gain some benefit from the limited sense of resource certainty 
that the contract provides for the fishing community. By giving them a stake in the fishery, 
albeit a small one, it serves to discourage cheating as they have something to lose if detected. 
Incorporating the fishers' interests with those of the contractors in this way may be a 
necessary and important tool to guard against poaching, given the prevailing socio-economic 
pressures in the region. Entrenching a dependency of the fishers on the fishery and the 
contract is a key to aligning their interests with those of the contractors. The balance of 
power, however, remains very much with the contractors because of their power to exclude 
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fishers from the resource if they believe they have been cheated in some way. The fishers' 
livelihoods can, it seems, also be taken away when contracts come due for renewal and the 
harvesting contract could be reallocated to another group of itinerant fishers· who might be 
more compliant to the contractors' interests and willing to accept lower economic returns or 
conditions. 
While the fishing equipment used at Rawal Lake is not technologically advanced it may, 
nevertheless, represent an economically efficient balance between capital and labour inputs. 
The opportunity cost of labour is very low, probably less than Rs 30 (AU$1.00) per day. 
There may be advantages in having many people involved in the fishery and limiting capital 
inputs. From the social perspective more people would have the opportunity of earning a 
living from the fishery, although at a low subsistence level. And many eyes and hands may 
also be useful to guard the fishery against poaching. 
The Fishers' Limited Economic Options 
The Sindi fishers do not seem to have access to other economic options besides the fishery. 
There is little evidence of occupational pluralism. There was no evidence of vegetable 
gardens for domestic use, for example. An insecure tenure at their camp on the lakeshore, in 
spite of it apparently serving as their home for 10 years, may not encourage the development 
of gardens. Possibly there are cultural prejudices (by Sindi fisherfolk) against growing food 
crops. Possibly the contractors will not allow it and, as noted, it may be in their interests to 
ensure that the fishers remain exclusively dependent on the fishery. Possibly government 
regulations discourage food crops being grown in the area. Other opportunities for economic 
pluralism are also constrained by language difficulties and other factors. It might, for 
example, be difficult for the Sindi fishers or their family members to obtain other 
employment in the region. Their language is not widely understood here and they are 
unlikely to have the local family or tribal links that, in Pakistan, are so important in 
accessing jobs and other opportunities. Their boating skills might potentially allow them to 
provide boat rides for tourists and picnickers from nearby Islamabad and so take advantage 
of the recreation and tourism potential of the lake. But language would again be a barrier, 
and there may be other class or caste related issues, and for reasons already discussed, the 
contractors might oppose these sorts of activities. 
The cultural and linguistic segregation of the Sindi fishers from adjacent society may, 
therefore, serve the interests of the contractors by the contribution this makes to maintaining 
their social isolation and dependency on the fishery. The contractors may choose to employ 
a Sindi fishing community for this reason in preference to fishers from the local region, 
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though it may be that the Sindis simply have the necessary fishing skills and occupational 
traditions. Whatever the reasons, the fishery reflects many characteristics of the 
occupational inflexibility associated with feudalism and the caste system. · The inefficiency 
stemming from the constraints of these systems has already been discussed and may be a 
factor in limiting the economic potential of the Rawal Lake fishery and its fishing 
community, just as it is a factor that limits the potential of Pakistani society more generally. 
Environmental Sustainability? 
While the property rights system used to manage the Rawal Lake fishery seems to be 
enforceable and appears effective in protecting the resource from the threats of poaching and 
competitive over fishingl 25, it has not proven to be effective in protecting the fishery from 
the effects of pollution. Ashraf, Tariq and Jaffar (1991) raise concerns that human health 
may be threatened by consuming fish from reservoirs affected by pollution from Pakistan's 
recent industrial and urban expansion. They also examined fish (Cat la catla and Che la 
chanius) from Rawal Lake and found that 50 of 54 specimens tested exceeded the World 
Health Organisation's safe limit for mercury content (Tariq, Jaffar and Ashraf 1992). 
Tributaries that flow into Rawal Lake are polluted. Pollution sources include agricultural 
runoff, dysfunctional sewage systems and poorly regulated industries that discharge organic 
matter, human pathogens and toxic chemicals. Groundwater as well as surface flows are 
contaminated. 
In July 2004 a major fish kill in Rawal Lake was widely reported (Arif and Zia 2004; Khan 
2004; Qaiser 2004). Pollution from a combination of sources, including human wastes, 
runoff from a poultry farm, and chemicals from industry and agriculture, were all identified 
as possible contributing causes (Qaiser 2004), and a lack of coordination between various 
government agencies was identified as a problem leading to the failure to adequately manage 
pollution threats. Responsible agencies seemingly lacked the necessary powers and 
incentives to prosecute polluters. This is symptomatic of the pervasive problem of 
institutional dysfunction in Pakistan. Those with a more direct interest in protecting the 
fishery, the Sindi fishers, clearly lacked the power to prevent pollution. The contractors 
would seem to have a commercial, private property right that was affected by the impact of 
pollution on the fishery. Brubaker (1996) argues that privatising fishing rights is the key to 
preventing damage to fisheries from catchment pollution, but clearly private property rights 
have not been effective at Rawal Lake. 
125 Overfishing might otherwise occur according to the logic of the "tragedy of the commons" thesis 
and undermine efficient and sustainable fish production. 
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Pollution is a threat to fish production in lakes and reservoirs across Pakistan. Manchhar 
Lake in Sind Province is the largest, natural freshwater lake in Pakistan and has ·suffered 
severe degradation due to a reduction in freshwater inflows, and from pollution, especially 
from agricultural runoff (Memon 2000). Salinization, pesticides and pathogens have all 
damaged the fishery and Manchhar Lake's function as an important natural ecosystem and 
reservoir of biodiversity. The annual fish catch has fallen from 3000 tons in the 1950s to 
around 100 tons today. This lake has supported fishing communities for over a thousand 
years. The decline in the fishery in recent years has forced tens of thousands of people to 
move away (Memon 2000) to seek work where they can find it, and perhaps to becoriie 
itinerant contract fishers like the Sindi fishers at Rawal Lake. 
The failure to protect inland fisheries production from pollution is a symptom of 
dysfunction, not only in Pakistan's institutions responsible for environmental protection, but 
of the society as a whole. This dysfunction reflects the inability of Pakistani society to 
advance issues of common interest and is linked to the deeply rooted, divisive characteristics 
that have already been discussed. The society (as a whole126) lacks the general social 
preconditions that Jentoft (2000) identifies as essential to sustainable fisheries and 
sustainable fishing communities. Pakistani society (as a whole) can be said to be 
characterised by "opportunism, strife and conflict" rather than community solidarity. Thus it 
fits Jentoft's (2000: 54) description of unsustainable communities where "their capacity for 
collective action becomes severely weakened", and this leads to environmental failure. It 
also leads to other dangerous forms of irrationality. 
The Waste of Human Resources 
Life for the majority of Pakistan's people would be greatly improved if they had access to 
more and better education and health care, but the country is short of teachers and health care 
workers while the army, five-million-strong, imposes a huge burden on the economy. T. Ali 
(2003: 275) notes defence spending is six times the expenditure on health and education. 
Much low-cost labour is tied up in agricultural production but the potential to substitute 
machinery into the production process and displace some of this labour poses serious social 
and political problems due to already high levels of unemployment. Many people in 
Pakistan are employed as security guards and in other forms of private and public policing. 
The contractors' agents at Rawal Lake can be deemed to fall into this category in their 
policing role where their work relates only to regulating the distribution of resources, rather 
126 The Sindi fishing community at Rawal Lake may, itself, be cohesive, cooperative and functional. 
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than to production. Gross inequality in Pakistan exacerbates circumstances of intense 
resource competition and conflict and makes policing necessary if adequate security is to be 
provided so that productive activities of any sort can occur. But the emphasis on policing, 
which is linked to the rent-seeking orientation in the politics and economy of Pakistan, limits 
prosperity and civic advancement because it occupies human and other resources that could 
otherwise make a more productive contribution. It also constrains productive activities 
within narrow confines that are amenable to accounting and policing. Poverty, 
unemployment, inequality, poor education, poor health care, a lack of civic commitment and 
institutionalised corruption are all linked to dysfunctional human resources development and 
deployment in Pakistan. Strife and frustration are among the consequences, and these are 
linked to the rise of fundamentalism and fundamentalist inspired violence in the region. 
5.4 Fundamentalism: An Extreme Expression of Community 
Dysfunction 
In chapter 2 reference was made to the worldwide rise of various forms of fundamentalism 
associated with the increasing social disengagement, polarisation and employment and 
income insecurity that has been a consequence of neoliberal globalisation. In Pakistan, as 
has been discussed here, there is also a clear link between the rise of fundamentalism and the 
social consequences of resource failure. The implications for sustainability are severe. The 
inability of a society to advance common interests in sustainable resource management when 
beset by internal division, competition and conflict has been discussed in relation to the 
sustainable communities concept. But societies in the thrall of various forms of 
fundamentalist ideology, with their inherent irrationality, often fail even to acknowledge the 
importance of human values and needs, including those associated with resource and 
environmental sustainability127. Fundamentalist systems emphasise power sustained by an 
enforced adherence to doctrine and an authoritarian rejection of rationality. They are a 
symptom as well as an expression of extreme community dysfunction, and they predispose 
societies to the conditions in which, when faced by crisis, they are unable to take the 
measures that might allow them to avoid collapse. This issue has been examined by 
Diamond (2003; 2005) and was briefly referred to in chapter 2. In recent years, and 
particularly since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, fundamentalism has 
become a significant issue of scholarly debate with particular interest given to the conditions 
that give rise to it. There are important connections between fundamentalism and the 
127 Fundamentahst religious movements that look forward with eager anticipation to the "end of 
days", or the end of the earthly material world, clearly, adhere to an ethos that is incompatible with a 
committed concern for environmental sustainability. 
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broader issues of resource management, community and sustainability discussed in this 
thesis and they merit some elaboration. 
5.4. 1 Judea-Christian Fundamentalism and the Enlightenment 
There is an established scholarly tradition (referred to, for example, by Memissi [1992]; 
Bernstein [2004: 5, 91-125, 273-282]; Jacobs [2004: 3-26, 161-176]; Sim [2004: 31-101]) of 
examining the problems of the Islamic world - its intellectual and scientific backwardness, 
lack of democracy and individual freedom, its oppression of women and domination by 
religious fundamentalist movements - by contrasting them with the secular, humanist, 
democratic conditions more characteristic of the West; conditions which foster individual 
freedom and creativity and give rise to intellectual, scientific, -,social and economic 
advancement. Within this tradition, religion is discounted as an underlying cause. 
Reference is made to an Islamic golden age when circumstances were reversed. In the 
middle ages the Islamic world was noted for its racial and religious tolerance, its cultural 
refinements and its advances in philosophy, arts and science. At this time, in Christian 
Europe, "the Church was a smothering ubiquity" that suppressed "scientific rationalism" 
(Bernstein 2004: 32). Torture, painful death and, worse, "consignment to the eternal fires of 
hell" was inflicted upon those unfortunates who did "almost anything that displeased or 
challenged the power of the Church, including, but not limited to, questioning its authority, 
its beliefs, and most important, its wealth" (Bernstein 2004: 32). Bernstein (2004: 92) 
describes how the medieval Church held an "intellectual monopoly" which was "ossified 
into static belief systems that stifled inquiry and dissent", and it exploited this monopoly to 
extract wealth, engaging in "rent-seeking behaviour". The medieval Christian world, 
therefore, suffered under the yoke of a monotheistic clerical despotism comparable to that 
experienced in parts of the Islamic world in more recent times; Afghanistan under the 
Taliban regime being a notable and frequently referenced example128. 
128 The Tahban regime, which dominated Afghanistan in 2001, has frequently been used as an 
example to illustrate the characteristics of religious fundamentalism. The regime was notorious for its 
ruthless exercise of clerical authority. It used fear to enforce unquestioning obedience to a particularly 
conservative set of religious doctrines. Music, videotapes and books were banned and artistic 
representations of the human figure were prohibited. Strict dress codes were enforced for both men 
and women, and intellectual life and culture were suppressed. Obedience was enforced at gunpoint 
(Sim 2004: 75-78)._ In addition to concerns about terrorism, the Western preoccupation with Islamic 
fundamentalism has focused much attention on its oppressive treatment of women and restrictive 
attitudes on issues of sexuality. Homosexuality and adultery, for example, are both punishable by 
death according to sharia law as practiced in some Arab countries. In Afghanistan under the Taliban, 
women were excluded from employment and education, and forced into obscurity, forbidden to 
appear in public unless hidden behind the veil or bhurka. The repression of any public display relating 
to the human figure and especially the female figure with its implicit suggestion of sexuality, is a 
feature of fundamentalist Islam that confronts the ideals of Western secular humanism. Moroccan 
feminist academic Fatima Mernissi (1992: 127) argues that (fundamentalist) Islam, preoccupied with 
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The Christian world did not advance into the age of reason until, in quite recent times, 
science and, later, politics were separated from the stifling influence of monopolistic 
religious control (Bernstein 2004: 106). "Western man and Western culture'" are now, 
according to Bernstein (2004: 93), "defined by this birth of scientific rationalism". The 
freedom for the individual to question, to reason and to form one's own opinion is at the core 
of this Western culture, and this freedom is strongly linked to the West's democratic 
attributes and its openness to scientific rationalism. The European Enlightenment began 
with the Renaissance and found inspiration in the humanistic legacy of ancient Greece and 
its achievements, particularly in philosophy, democratic governance and the arts. The 
Hellenic tradition celebrated individuality and elevated the human condition to a place of 
dignity and beauty. It is associated with reason and intellectual debate and the promotion of 
human values through open and secular forms of government based on democratic 
participation. The difference between the modem West and the Islamic world is that in the 
West the humanistic legacy of classical Greece emerged with the Enlightenment to have a 
significant influence, while in the Islamic world it was suppressed. Memissi explains how 
adherents to Islam's rationalist tradition, 
were systematically combated by the holders of power, who condemned them as 
falasifa (philosophers) who were 'polluting' Islam with the humanistic 
patrimony of ancient Greece . . . they were repudiated as mulhidun (atheists) 
who were perverting the faith ... for fifteen centuries Moslem politicians .have 
censored intellectuals who wanted to synthesize the humanistic traditions by 
labelling as polluting the very thing that creates the dynamic of all civilisation: 
its capacity to assimilate and use new ideas and accomplishments of the human 
spirit ( 1992: 26). 
Reason, intellectualism, modernity and the secular and democratic values are condemned, 
Memissi observes, and "scholarly exploration is systematically discouraged, if not forbidden, 
since rational analysis would not serve the purposes of the despots" (1992: 24). 
the suppression of individuality, insists that the body be hidden behind the veil because "it is the body 
and its unconquerable sexuality that is the meducible fortress of sovereign individuality." She goes 
on to speculate (1992: 133) that the fundamentalist phobia about the female body and sexuality has to 
do with their association with birth, and therefore also of death; "that death that religion has precisely 
come to deny and erase" for Islam, in common with the other Judeo-Christian religions, promises "the 
faithful immortality in exchange for submission" (1992: 128). Banishment of the human body, 
therefore, has to do with the suppression of the consciousness of human mortality that stands in 
contradiction to a principal article of the Judeo-Christian faiths; the promise of immortality. Thus, it 
is all about the suppression of essential realities associated with the human condition, which 
undermines self-confidence, distorts the capacity to reason and supports the perpetuation of power 
based upon obedience to myth and dogma. It also denies elements of biological reality that are 
integral and essential to the very concept of environmental sustamability. 
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The Enlightenment process was never complete or absolute. In East and West alike there is 
a continuing tension between the social and political impulses associated with 
fundamentalism and those associated with humanism. They can be viewed as contrasting 
extremes on a continuum, with humanism on the left and fundamentalism on the right. The 
interface of this tension is not fixed. Within states, institutions and individuals it is- a 
moveable- thing; it can shift, either slowly or dramatically, in one direction or the other in 
response to social and political trends and influences. Afghanistan in the 1970s, for 
example, was considered to be fairly liberal and secular. Women wore modem, Western 
dress and tourists visited from more conservative Pakistan for a taste of liberalism and 
decadence. Examples of shifts to the left, towards humanist values, include Spain after the 
death of Franco and the restoration of democracy, and more particularly France, when, 
following the revolution of 1789 and the post revolutionary turmoil, there emerged tlie 
model for the modem, secular, European state129. A diversity of attitudes can coexist within 
a society. In the Islamic world, for example, there are moderate individuals and institutions 
with values strongly grounded in the humanist tradition, just a~ there are, in the more secular, 
though traditionally "Christian", Western world, individuals and institutions holding to 
extreme fundamentalist values, and contradictory positions may even coexist within an 
individual or institution. The important question to address is, why, in Islamic societies 
today, fundamentalism is a dominating influence in contrast to the more secular, humanist 
orientation that has, generally, been regarded as characterising the developed countries of the 
West. The answer to this question may also provide insights into the causes of the recent 
rise of various forms of fundamentalism in the West. 
5.4.2 Why Fundamentalism Dominates in the Islamic World 
The problems of the Islamic world are widely linked to its restrictions on individuality and 
freedom of intellectual inquiry, restrictions that cause some parts of the Isla:lJlic world today 
to resemble those of Christian Europe in the Middle Ages. These restrictions are embodied 
in the Islamic traqition of taqlid, or "blind and unquestioning following and obedience" (Sim 
2004: 62). Bernstein argues that "the prohibition of free intellectual inquiry inherent in 
129 Both of these shifts were associated with a blossoming of the arts, notably in their dealing with the 
human subject. The films of Pedro Almodovar, with their quirky and amusing exploration of 
unconventional sexuality are an example from Spain. The work of Courbet, especially his treatment 
of the female nude, was influential in elevating humanist realism in contempory art. He influenced 
painters like Manet, Monet, Renoir, Pissarro, Cezanne and Whistler at a time when the humanist 
concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity were ushering Europe into modernity and Paris was 
establishing itself as the cultural and intellectual centre of the Western world; a position it held for a 
hundred years (and continues to claim). · 
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taqlicf' accounts for the backwardness of the Islamic world: "A society that is inherently not 
curious about the outside world and unwilling to challenge its own assumptions is one that 
does not innovate. A society that does not innovate cannot advance or prosper" (2004: ·277). 
Sim (2004: 61, 77, 107, 172, 215) notes the growing dominance of the tradition of taqlid 
associated with the rise of fundamentalism in the Islamic world, and the demise of ijtihad, a 
tradition associated with humanistic and rational values. But what is the underlying cause of 
this trend? Religion has been discounted. Christianity and Islam are both susceptible to 
fundamentalism. The predominance of fundamentalism over secular humanism in much of 
the Arab and Islamic world, therefore, is likely due to other factors there that foster it. It is 
logical to speculate that these factors relate to those social, political and economic conditions 
characteristic of much of the Islamic world that are in marked contrast to (perhaps transient) 
conditions in the West. Key, interrelated factors are inequality; the entrenched social 
dualism of the Islamic world; and the preponderant rent-seeking orientation of their political-
economic structures and cultures. Examples of this rent-seeking orientation include the 
agrarian feudalism of places like Pakistan, and the rent-seeking structural characteristics that 
arise from petroleum wealth in places like Saudi Arabia. Democracy, it seems, cannot 
function under these conditions. Memissi (1992: 166), for example, describes how 
fundamentalism has been sustained by Saudi oil wealth and "the absence of democracy, 
which results in this wealth being managed as a monopoly by a few families ... It is normal 
that millions of unemployed Arabs dream of a more favourable distribution of this wealth" 
(1992: 165). And she notes (1992: 165-166): "the role of oil in fundamentalism should 
never be forgotten. The resistance to progressive ideas, financed in large measure by the 
Saudi oil money that was simultaneously producing an extravagant, princely Islamic culture, 
gave birth to a rigid authoritarianism". 
Further, in the Arab world, politicians use Islamic fundamentalism to entrench despotic rule 
(Memissi 1992: 38-41). Obedience to the leader is equated with religious belief and 
obedience to the will of God. Individual creativity and the cultivation of personal opinion 
are forbidden. But the suppression of 'reason', because of the challenges it might raise 
against despotic rule, accounts, claims Memissi (1992: 39), for the "military, economic, 
political, and ethical decline" of the Arab world. 
Bernstein (2004: 274) argues that the difference between the West and Islam has "little to do 
with religious doctrine, and everything to do with local culture". "This lack of religious 
correlation cannot be emphasized enough", he states (2004: 300). Culture, he argues, is 
determined by geography and he suggests that the conservative, or fundamentalist culture of 
parts of the Arab world would be the same if the populations had adopted Christianity or 
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Judaism instead of Islam. He, like Memissi, links the problems of the Arab world to the 
"curse" of natural resource wealth, noting "the production of wealth from a limited number 
of holes in the ground, owned or controlled by the government, begets rent seeking and · · · 
corruption" (2004: 290), and this, as has been discussed, leads to poverty, inequality and 
despotism, conditions in which fundamentalism flourishes. 
Sim (2004: 106-107) links the rise of fundamentalism in the third world to the poverty and 
inequality that has been exacerbated by economic policies promoted by the "market 
fundamentalism" of agencies such as the World Bank and IMF. These policies have, in 
many cases, exacerbated inequality and made the poor even poorer and this has driven them 
to join extremist movements. They embrace "Islam as a defence mechanism", he argues 
(2004: 107). Memissi agrees (1992: 113), noting the attractions of Islam to the poor and 
dispossessed: " ... as the culture most capable of channelling popular frustrations, Islam gives 
the faithful enormous expectations of social solidarity." She argues that Islam has become 
"a force for the destabilisation of privilege, whether regional or global", whilst itlso 
acknowledging that the Islamic religion is exploited by both secular and religious politicians 
to entrench despotic rule through its insistence on obedience and faith, and denunciation _of 
individuality and humanist rationality. Since Islamic fundamentalism is attractive to both 
despots (because it entrenches authority) and the disempowered (because it promises justice 
to the oppressed, albeit in another world), one can understand that its influence is likely to 
grow in a political environment characterised by widening inequality, poverty and 
unemployment and a narrowing concentration of power. 
Memissi also links inequality in education to the rise of fundamentalism. In much of t_he 
Muslim world _(as discussed earlier in relation to Pakistan) the children of the rich and poor 
receive a very different education, and this unequal access to education, which is linked to 
entrenched dualism, "creates an intense animosity between classes" (Memissi 1992: 80). 
There is a great "bitterness over wasted talent . . . and inequality of opportunity" (Mernissi 
1992: 56) and this, because democratic outlets for their frustrations are barred to them, 
causes people to tum to religion (Memissi 1992: 57). 
Tariq Ali takes the argument further and shows that religious fundamentalism in Saudi 
Arabia (2003: 73-85), Pakistan and Afghanistan (2003: 166-216), Indonesia (2003: 343-393) 
and other parts of the Islamic world, is more than just a by-product of neoliberalism, but was 
deliberately engineered in the decades following World War II to serve the interests of 
American imperialism. Fundamentalist Islamic movements were nurtured by dictators and 
their US allies as a counter to Soviet influence and communism. Political movements with a 
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secular, humanist, democratic and socialist orientation in these countries were actively 
suppressed. For this reason he regards American imperialism as "the mother of all 
fundamentalisms" (2003: 307) . 
. 5.4.3 The Origins of Democracy 
The paradox that rent-producing resource wealth tends to produce inequality, social division 
and conflict, and that this gives rise to despotism of one sort or another, and leads to poverty, 
has already been raised. Resource poverty, on the other hand, has been linked to the 
evolution of egalitarian, democratic, civic-minded and prosperous societies. With reference 
to Hanson's (1999) influential work, Bernstein (2004: 57) explores the theory "that the 
origins of Western democracy" preceded the glories of Periclean Athens by several 
centuries. They were founded by the independent georgos (peasant farmers) of the marginal, 
hill country surrounding Athens around 700 B.C. Bernstein emphasizes the role of private 
property rights as the vital ingredient linked to the flourishing of individual liberty and 
democracy. Dedicated individual effort was required to make these marginal lands 
productive of a diverse yield of grapes, cereals, legumes, fruits, nuts and livestock. Surety of 
continued private ownership underpinned the investment of labour required to develop vines 
and fruit trees where the rewards might not accrue for several years. 
The era beginning around 1100 B.C. presented a protocapitalist opportunity to 
Greek peasants, and they exploited it in great numbers. By 700 B.C., as many 
as 100,000 small farms, averaging ten acres in size, flourished in Greece. 
Fiercely individualistic and antiauthoritarian, giorgoi manifested their 
independence in ways that are deeply embedded in modern Western life, and 
they changed the course of civilisation itself (2004: 58-59). 
Bernstein (2004: 59) identifies three key elements to this socio-political system: private 
property, egalitarianism, and military self-sufficiency. Private property has been discussed. 
Military self-sufficiency was provided as "neighbouring farmers would typically band into 
the hoplite phalanx", each supplying his own weapons and armour. But egalitarianism, the 
key to democracy, rested on the fact that the landholdings "were small and widespread." 
Bernstein reinforces his argument by contrasting the egalitarianism of the foothills 
surrounding Athens with conditions in more fertile areas: 
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The parts of Greece that were rich in bottom/and, like Macedonia and Sparta, 
would not develop democracy, private property rights, and individual freedoms. 
It was not by chance that Alexander the Great, the very antithesis and destroyer 
of Greek democratic values, hailed from the flat, fertile north (2004: 58). 
This thesis reinforces the nexus between egalitarianism, democracy, and the assertion of 
humanist values. It also identifies rich, rent-yielding resources as a source of inequality and 
despotism. The role of inequality and despotism in undermining the ability of a society to 
achieve prosperity and environmental sustainability, and the effect this has on fuelling the 
frustrations that give rise to religious fundamentalism and the abdication of individual 
responsibility and reason has been discussed. This has obvious relevance to resource and 
economic management in contemporary society, including debate over policy for fisheries 
management. Paradoxically, arguments such as Bernstein's are often applied in a perverse 
way. The element of 'private property' is seized upon by market fundamentalists to justify 
enclosure of the commons, often leading to resource monopolisation, thus undermining the 
opportunity for individual, egalitarian access to resources that is, arguably, the criticaj ba~is 
of an egalitarian and democratic society. Economic rationalisation and the promotion of 
'economic efficiency' over 'social values' in resource management can also be understood 
as facilitating the use of technology and other instruments to generate resource rent, that is, 
to shape resource economies to more closely resemble the rich, rent-yielding bottomlands of 
Sparta and Macedonia than the stony hills of Attica that produced such a rich social yield for 
humankind I 30. 
5.4.4 The Rise of Fundamentalism in the West 
The tradition of examining fundamentalism in the Arab world by contrasting it with 
conditions in the West is giving way, in the post 2001 world, to a tendency to examine the 
rise of various forms of fundamentalism in the West by comparing them to the well known 
characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism (for example, T. Ali [2003]; Jacobs [2004]; Sim 
· 
130 An interesting comparison can be made between the marginal, stony foothills that surround the 
rich valleys of the tributaries of the Indus in Pakistan and the stony foothills surrounding Athens in 
700BC. Agriculture in these mountains is hard, but great ingenuity and investment is applied to make 
the land yield a living for its owners. Apricots and walnuts are cultivated, cereals are grown on small 
terraced plots and a variety of vegetables and animals are raised. The mountain Pathans of the region 
are fiercely independent. They successfully resisted British control in colonial times and have 
remained independent of the Pakistan government in the autonomous tribal areas that border 
Afghanistan. They also have a more egalitarian social structure, in contrast to the pronounced 
stratification that is a general feature of Pakistan. They band together in defence of their interests, 
fiercely observing bonds of tribal and family loyalty that have greater precedence with them than 
religious affiliation. The men customarily keep their own arms which they use to maintain their tribal 
interests and their personal honour. It is among these people, bound to codes of conduct that require 
them to show hospitality to guests, that Osama Bin Laden is thought to have found refuge in the years 
since 2001. 
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[2004]). The purpose is to draw attention to the growing threat to the secular, humanist 
values that have been thought of as characterising and defining Western societies. 
Fundamentalisms of all kinds have certain characteristics in common. Intolerance is a core · · · · 
trait: "the fundamentalist mind does not like difference, it does not like dissent. What it 
really likes is submission to the system and uncritkal adherence to the creed" (Sim 2004: 
12). It is authoritarian - fundamentalists believe that they hold the absolute truth - and it is 
about the power that comes from enforcing adherence to a particular set of beliefs. 
In Pakistan, as we have seen, the rise of fundamentalism can be linked to poverty, inequality 
and the desperation of people displaced from access to resources, for example, by the 
mechanisation of agriculture and conflicts over land, or as a consequence of the 
environmental degradation of inland fisheries. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism, that has intensified in the West since September 11, 2001, makes these issues 
relevant to formerly insulated and complacent Western audiences. But of far greater danger 
to the wellbeing of Westerners, and to the survival of secular, liberal, democratic societies, is 
the rise of various forms of homegrown fundamentalism. Sim argues that the world is 
descending "into a new dark age of dogma" (2004: 7, 19, 224) and that, increasingly, "we 
live in a fundamentalist world because fundamentalists exert such a powerful influence on so 
many of our institqtions - religious, political, and economic". He notes that fundamentalist 
tendencies can be found among individuals affiliated to just about any set of values; there are 
Marxist fundamentalists, environmental fundamentalists, feminist fundamentalists, and 
fundamentalists preoccupied with issues of race and nationalism, but he focuses particular 
. attention on 'market fundamentalism' and Islamic and Christian religious fundamentalism, 
which are, today, such powerful forces in global politics. 
Sim observes (2004: 106-107) that "fundamentalism begets fundamentalism" and the rise of 
c;hristian fundamentalism and various forms of racial and nationalist fundamentalism in the 
West is, in part, a reaction to the growing fear of Islamic fundamentalism and instability in 
the third world. But more than this, the rise of fundamentalism in the Western world is also, 
perhaps mainly, attributable to the same things that cause it elsewhere; the growth of 
inequality, the demise of social cohesion and a growing sense of social, economic and 
environmental and resource insecurity. These matters have all been discussed in this thesis 
in relation to resource management in Newfoundland and Tasmania as well as Pakistan. 
They are associated with the dominance of market fundamentalism as a force shaping 
economies around the world (Sim 2004: 102-135). This attribution establishes a link 
between the rise of fundamentalism in the West and resource management driven by 
neoliberal concepts of economic efficiency, which has dominated policy-making in the West 
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and around the world for the past quarter century, and has been a factor in socially, 
economically and environmentally unsustainable fisheries as discussed in earlier chapters of 
this thesis. 
Writing in an Australian context, Mackay (2005: 3-4) explains the link between 
fundamentalism and a quarter century of neoliberal policies: 
The anxiety created by living through such a period of transformation, 
instability and uncertainty promotes a tendency to retreat and disengage from 
the social and political agenda. Such a period is also a rich breeding ground 
for fandamentalism of all kinds. It is a time when extreme and simplistic voices 
are likely to be given more attention than they normally are, almost as if our 
insecurities create a vacuum we yearn to fill with simple certainty". 
The effects of the growth of inequality in the West since 1980 when neoliberal economic 
policies began to predominate are reported by Bernstein (2004: 335-347). He focuses on the 
United States where income inequalities have escalated since 1980 following a period of 
relative equality from the 1940s through the 1970s (see also "Special Report: Inequality in 
America", The Economist, 17 /06/2006: 25-27). Income inequality is now at a level 
comparable to that of the "robber baron" era at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Bernstein (2004: 343) suggests that this level of inequality is "pushing the envelope" of 
social and political stability. It is only Western affluence that diffuses, to some extent, the 
social and political tensions inherent to inequality that, in the Islamic world, are linked to the 
rise of religious extremism. But the tensions are already apparent and the sustainability of 
Western affluence may be threatened by various emerging local and global social, political, 
resource related and environmental crises. 
Jacobs (2004), like Sim (2004), resorts to metaphor in a "Dark Age Ahead'' to express her 
concern about the direction being taken by Western civilisation. She identifies five pillars of 
society that are being eroded: the family (2004: 27-43), higher education (2004: 44-63), 
scientific rationalism (2004: 64-101), representative governance (2004: 102-124), and the 
integrity and self policing of the professions (2004: 125-138). In the Australian context 
Brain (2001: n.p.) raises similar concerns, linking neoliberalism and a "dictatorship" of 
financial interests to the erosion of democracy, education, research and development, and 
environmental protection, and Ellingsen (1999: 31) demonstrates that, in Australia, academic 
freedom is being undermined by a system "intolerant of dissent", as University 
administrations, forced into an increasingly commercial role, put pressure on staff to prevent 
them from expressing views that are critical of government policies or detrimental to 
corporate interests because this puts sources of funding in jeopardy. 
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Sim (2004: 175-177), too, argues that Australia (and the West generally) is moving away 
from its secular and humanist political traditions towards a more conservative politics, one 
more influenced by religious values. Obedience is being cultivated rather than intellectual 
freedom, creativity and the ability to express one's own opinion. The trend is towards the 
fundamentalist taqlid rather than a culture of ijtihad associated with humanist intellectual 
freedom. A plethora of recent books also address this theme, among them The End of Faith: 
Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (Harris 2004), The March of Unreason: Science, 
Democracy, and the New Fundamentalism (Taverne 2005), The Twilight of Atheism: The 
Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World (McGrath 2004), and How Mumbo-Jumbo 
Conquered the World (Wheen 2004). 
These concerns about trends in Western societies are also relevant to the discussions of 
fisheries policy and sustainability in chapters 2, 3 and 4. They are relevant to the question of 
how the current trends in fisheries management may be both reflecting and contributing to 
the shaping of societies - contributing, among other influences, to making societies that will 
be characterised by the sort of entrenched inequality and institutional dysfunction discussed 
in relation to Pakistan and linked to social, political and environmental unsustainability. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The Pakistan case study provided the opportunity to study resource management in a society 
marked by intense social and economic stratification and an economy structured towards an 
emphasis on rent-seeking activities. Historically entrenched inequality, identified as a factor 
that contributes to unsustainable resource management in Newfoundland and Tasmania, is a 
pronounced characteristic of Pakistani society and is linked to other aspects of societal 
dysfunction, resulting in a seemingly perpetual state of political, social, economic and 
environmental crisis. Symptoms include social discord, pervasive corruption, unproductive 
use of human and other resources, a poorly developed civic culture and the failure of 
democratic processes of government, an inability to manage pollution and promote 
environmental sustainability, and the rise of extreme expressions of community dysfunction. 
The case study of the Rawal Lake fishery provided some insight into how, within this 
challenging socio-political environment, a combination of private property and community 
mechanisms can serve quite effectively to regulate the harvesting sector of the fishery, yet 
fail in other ways. It fails in social terms because it serves to perpetuate the entrenched 
inequality that is a cornerstone of many of Pakistan's problems, and, in part because of this, 
it fails to contribute to developing solutions to wider systemic problems, such as 
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management of environmental pollution, which directly threatens the sustainability of this 
and other fisheries. Fishery failures due to environmental degradation is one cause among 
many of the displacement of people from access to resources in Pakistan. It adds to the 
multitudes of frustrated and desperate people in the region. It swells the ranks of the 
unemployed and is linked to the rise of fundamentalism and violence, and this has become 
an issue that concerns not only Pakistan, but also the wider global community. 
Political and resource management cultures based around resource wealth tend to emphasise 
rent-seeking activities, and promote inequality and social stratification, which are associated 
with the rise of fundamentalism. Moreover "fundamentalism begets fundamentalism" (Sim 
2004: 105-107); market fundamentalism, for example, projected on a global scale through 
the advance of neoliberal economic policies intensifies inequality and poverty in many parts 
of the developing world and has been linked to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism, which in tum stimulates fear and the rise of other forms of fundamentalism in the 
West. The fundamentalist preoccupation with power, and the tendency to emphasise 
obedience to authority, necessitates the enforcement of irrational doctrines and the 
suppression of reason, individual opinion, and democratic processes; and the suppression of 
these qualities undermines the capacity of societies to function cohesively and creatively to 
address complex problems, such as those related to the challenges of achieving 
sustainability, whether viewed in regard to social, economic or environmental dimensions. 
The assertion of irrational dogma over more tangible and organic human values makes 
concerns over issues such as environmental sustainability, and even economic prosperity, 
irrelevant to fundamentalist regimes preoccupied with the maintenance of power. 
Conditions in which democratic, egalitarian, rational societies flourish are those whose 
economies are not dominated by rent producing resources which encourage rent-seeking 
activities and sustain despotism. One can logically associate the trend, discussed by Sim 
(2004), towards "a new dark age of dogma" in Western countries, with the widening gulf of 
inequality that arises, in part, from economic policies based on the principles of "market 
fundamentalism". Fisheries policies (such as those examined in this thesis in relation to 
Newfoundland, Tasmania and Pakistan) that promote economic efficiency (in terms -of 
generating resource rent) while intensifying inequality in society, fit this category, and help 
push societies towards community dysfunction and the despotism that is associated with 
various forms of fundamentalism. The linkage, via these processes, of global trends in 
fishery management with the rise of fundamentalism provides a strong point of relevance for 
this thesis in the fisheries policy debate over "economic" versus "social" goals. 
264 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The thesis was based on three case studies, featuring Newfoundland, Tasmania and Pakistan. 
Fisheries issues were examined in the context of a global fisheries crisis and trends in 
fisheries were linked to broader socio-political and economic trends. Implications for the 
sustainability of fisheries and of human societies more generally were explored. The case 
study approach, while having some noted limitations, is useful for building theory from 
which generalisations with a wider application may be drawn. Analysis of political economy 
within primary sectors such as fisheries is also an approach that provides insights that can 
then be applied more broadly. These precepts shaped the analytical approach in which the 
specifics of resource management policies and practices were linked to broader socio-
political factors and influences. In chapter 2 the connection between current trends in 
fisheries management and the global ascendance of neoliberalism as a dominant political and 
economic philosophy was made explicit, and some consequences of neoliberal globalisation 
were discussed. This provided a context for the case study chapters in which the 
interconnection of key themes such as rent-seeking economic policies, inequality, and social 
and environmental sustainability were examined. These themes provided analytical focus in 
the thesis and the principal arguments were developed and refined as the research progressed 
through the case study chapters. 
6.1 Chapter 2: The Context 
Since the early 1990s there has been a growing sense of crisis in global fisheries and 
increased concern about sustainability. Worldwide, there has been an intensifying 
confrontation between the expansionary pressures of excess harvesting capacity in the global 
fishing fleet, and the constraints of ecological limits. This generates a sense of resource 
scarcity and intensifying competition over fishery resources. Characteristic of this 
competition, which in various forms has a long history and is endemic to many fisheries 
worldwide, is conflict between capital intensive, "industrial" harvesting technologies and 
"small-scale" labour intensive methods. Conflict between capital and labour interests -
between global finance and local people and communities - is often the key underlying issue 
in the "economic" versus "social" fisheries debate. Advocates of the economic fishery 
paradigm, in general, favour the interests of capital accumulation, rent-seeking and 
centralisation. The social fishery paradigm, on the other hand, promotes a wider distribution 
of resource wealth among fisherfolk and peripheral fishing communities. The concepts of 
"economic efficiency" versus "equality" are often referred to in debate over matters of 
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technology and regulation that have inevitable distributional implications. The broader 
legitimacy of both the social and economic paradigms also rests on their addressing concerns 
about sustainability, and again, different perspectives on conservation are often linked to 
underlying interests and matters of distribution. 
The economic fishery paradigm, linked to neoliberal economic theory, has beeri ascendant in 
fisheries management for the past three decades. Its conservation/sustainability rationale is 
grounded in the "tragedy of the commons thesis" (as articulated by Hardin [1968]) but its 
theoretical foundations are more accurately expressed in the bio-economic modelling of 
Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955)131, which give a greater emphasis to an economic, rather 
than an ecological perspective. The paradigm's emphasis on economic efficiency means that 
powerful and potentially damaging fish harvesting technologies are favoured, and in these 
circumstances, conservation depends to a significant degree on the combined effectiveness 
of fisheries science to accurately model fish-stock populations and thereby set sustainable 
harvest levels, and regulation to constrain fishing effort to those sustainable levels. Where it 
is deemed necessary to limit the harvesting capacity in a fisheryl32, there is an emphasis oh . 
reducing the number of people/vessels involved rather than on reducing the power 
(efficiency) of the individual fishing units. In its most developed form, the economic 
paradigm features fishery management systems based on private property rights such as 
individual transferable quota. Here, the sustainability rationale is augmented by the claim 
that private property rights in the fishery provide an incentive for resource conservation. 
The social fishery paradigm is, in many respects, more an articulation of dissent from the 
economic paradigm than a prescriptive model in itself. Its critique of the economic fishery 
model has two important dimensions - first, at an immediate and practical level, that the 
economic paradigm fails to promote sustainable fish-harvesting practices, and second, that it 
produces broader, adverse socio-economic effects, linked to inequality, that undermine the 
capacity of a society, at a systemic level, to respond rationally and cohesively, as required to 
successfully address a range of challenges to sustainability. 
The critique of the economic paradigm highlights problems associated with the use of 
industrial fishing technologies that are often wasteful of fish stocks and damaging to marine 
habitats. High capital overheads and high marginal profitability also create economic 
131 Scott and Gordon's models were primarily concerned with maximising the production of an 
economic surplus, or resource rent, from the fishery. 
132 Constraining effort is not always necessary for resource conservation but (according to the theory 
of the models) effort constraint is always necessary for rent maximisation. 
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incentives that encourage overfishing. Associated with the use of powerful technologies, the 
economic fishery's dependence on fishery science (and regulation), rather than bio-economic 
feedback mechanisms as the basis of conservation also attracts criticism. The dynamic, 
sometimes chaotically fluctuating nature of marine ecosystems means that, even with the 
best available science, fish stock population models are often of dubious accuracy and 
precision. They are subject to "interpretive flexibility", and management decisions based on 
them are frequently influenced by short-term economic and political interests at the expense 
of conservation and sustainability. 
Proponents of the social paradigm emphasise the advantages of small-scale (efficiency 
constrained) technologies, and pluriactive fishing economies that are more closely integrated 
with and responsive to ecological fluctuations in the fishery. Advocates of both the 
economic and social paradigms can produce fisheries case studies that appear to support their 
arguments. But the social paradigm embraces greater complexity and a broader, more 
holistic perspective on sustainability, and it is here that the second dimension of its critique 
of the economic fishery becomes important. This relates to the concept of sustainable 
communities. The crux of the sustainable communities argument, as outlined in chapter 2, is 
that a society's ability to respond effectively to various possible challenges to sustainability 
rests on underlying socio-cultural conditions - a sense of ethics, community integrity and 
cohesion built upon shared and common interests is essential. The argument relates to the 
importance of ethical and social considerations as mechanisms to . encourage fisher 
compliance with conservation measures in harvest fisheries; it is even more cogent when 
dealing with broader sustainability issues, such as managing catchment pollution, where 
competing interests and threats to sustainability may be less obvious, less direct, and more 
widely dispersed within a community, and sustainability is, correspondingly, more 
dependent on the maintenance of an effective sense of ethical concern for the wellbeing of 
the social/environmental system as a whole; a sense of concern that must be sufficiently 
encompassing and powerful to transcend individual or sectoral self-interest. Such an 
encompassing concern is encouraged by shared interests and discouraged by competing 
ones. Critics of the economic fishery paradigm argue that the model, conceptually and in 
practice, promotes inequality, selfishness, competition and resource exclusion and thus 
undermines the essential community structures and values, based on resource sharing, that 
are deemed necessary for sustainability. 
In spite of theoretical objections and, frequently, strong opposition from fishing 
communities, the economic paradigm has become the dominant fishery management model 
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over the past few decades133 . It has come to be regarded as the orthodox approach to fishery 
management and it has shaped a worldwide trend towards the adoption of management 
systems featuring instruments such as ITQ. The adoption of ITQ in a number of countries 
was discussed in chapter 2 and linked to broader trends in socio-political conditions and 
cultural attitudes, and especially to the ascendance of neoliberalism as a dominant political 
and economic ideology134. Indeed, it is fair to argue that the economic fishery paradigm is, 
in essence, merely the translation of neoliberal ideology into fisheries management. 
Neoliberalism, as described in chapter 2, is a political and economic ideology of the post-
Cold War era that advances the "globalisation of the capitalist economy" (Martinez and 
Garcia 2000: 1-2). It promotes an "economic efficiency" agenda based on the privatisation 
of public resources in ways that render them amenable to market mechanisms of allocatiQn, 
and it encourages competitive individualism and the elimination of a sense of community. 
These are also key features, noted by critics, of fishery management models based on ITQ. 
Recognised consequences of neoliberal globalisation include widening inequality, within and 
between countries, as a greater share of income flows to rentier-capital and less to labour. 
Also, worldwide, there is a spread of employment and income insecurity associated with 
people's alienation from access to resources. The same effects, as has been discussed, are 
attributed to fisheries management systems based on ITQ and these social effects are, as lias 
also been discussed, linked to the erosion of social cohesion and the communitarian spirit 
required for sustainability. More generally, the increased economic insecurity and social 
polarisation associated with neoliberal policies is linked to the rise of intolerance and 
prejudice, and to social disengagement; it is also linked to the rise of religious and other 
forms of fundamentalism as people, increasingly desperate and disempowered, retreat from 
rationality when their circumstances are such that rationality leads only to despair, and they 
l33 It should not be surpnsmg if the majority of fishery management professionals favour the 
economic paradigm over the social. They have a vested interest. The economic paradigm is generally 
(and indeed theoretically) dependent on the services of institutional and academic fishery scientists, on 
professional fishery managers, and on fisheries officers to police the regulations. Economic fisheries 
also provide opportunities for a range of other rent-seeking professions such as politicians, lobbyists 
and lawyers. By contrast, social fisheries are often community based and ecologically mtegrated and 
have little need for the services of the fishery management professions. 
134 Two alternative pathways explaining the increasing adoption of ITQ in fisheries were presented in 
chapter 2. First, that it is the "rational" response to the "tragedy of the commons problem" arising 
from increasing demand on scarce environmental resources due to modernisation and populat10n 
growth, and, second, that it merely represents the extension of neoliberal economic principles to 
fisheries that has been extended, over recent decades, to other areas of society and the economy. 
These differing explanations are not incompatible. But acceptance of both leads one naturally to 
hypothesise that broader, global issues of mtensifymg resource and environmental crisis may be an 
important underlying cause of the worldwide trend towards neoliberal social and economic policies in 
general, which in turn exacerbate the underlying economic and social causes, leading to a positive 
feedback situation and a downward spiral into social, economic, environmental and political 
dysfunction and unsustainability. 
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turn, instead, to the solace and simple certainty offered by various forms of fundamentalism. 
Inequality and poverty arising from the way that globalisation has occurred is widely 
acknowledged to be an underlying cause of violence and the rise of fundamentalist inspired 
terrorism. The retreat from reason and enlightment values that accompanies the adoption of 
various fundamentalist doctrines is also a key factor that undermines the ability of a society 
to respond in a rational and cooperative way to a range of threats to sustainability - whether 
the threat is perceived in social, political or environmental terms, and whether the society is a 
small fishing community or the global human population. These are not new concepts. 
Indeed, they relate to long established and central themes of Western political philosophy. 
In the post 2001 world these issues are re-emerging as urgent and pivotal concerns in global 
affairs. In the three case study chapters the relevance of these broader themes to fisheries 
management issues in Newfoundland, Tasmania and Pakistan was explored. 
6.2 Chapter 3: Newfoundland - Analysing Sustainability Failure 
Chapter 3 dealt with Newfoundland where the collapse of the cod fisheries in the early 1990s 
provided a defining case study of fisheries management failure. Analysis of the causes and 
processes involved in the collapse provided some important insights into how a modern, 
democratic society, supposedly guided by a rational, scientific approach to resource 
management, could fail to live sustainably within the means provided by a rich resource 
base. The underlying causes of the crisis were found to be deeply rooted in cultural and 
structural characteristics of Newfoundland's institutions and its people, and the analysis 
explored how social division, resource conflict and exploitation in Newfoundland have been 
produced and reproduced as a consequence of interlinked factors of Newfoundland's 
history 135, ge~graphy, and the political economy of the cod fishery. 
European expansion into the Newfoundland fisheries five centuries ago played an important 
part in the early development and globalisation of the modern capitalist economy. From that 
time onwards economic specialisation and import-export dependence have been 
characteristic of Newfoundland and its fish-based economy136. A combination of factors 
have contributed to this including the richness of fishery resources, limitations on agriculture 
and other economic prospects due to climate and geology, and political and economic 
restrictions that have influenced the regulation of the fishery and the international trade of its 
135 This historical overview also provided some points of comparison with the European settlement of 
Tasmania discussed in chapter 4. 
136 Specialisation and dependence are gen~rally defining characteristics of traditional colonial 
relationships and also of the modern globalisation trend. 
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inputs and products. Import-export dependence has favoured the maintenance of 
exploitative political and economic relationships and fostered social stratification and 
disunity, and these conditions have been implicated, recurrently, in Newfoundland's social 
and economic problems (see, for example, Innis 1954: 1). 
The theme of exploitation is well entrenched in Newfoundland folklore. From the sixteenth 
to the eighteenth century (the age of the European migrant fishery) it was the English 
merchants who, with the aid of colonial and maritime laws that were shaped to serve their 
interests, benefited most from the exploitation of the fishery and those who worked in it. By 
the nineteenth century, with the expansion of settlement and the establishment of 
representative government, power had shifted to the saltfish merchants resident in St John.'s, 
and they were to reign as the villains of the exploitation stories until the 1930s. The 1930s-
l 950s period was a tumultuous time for Newfoundland. It saw economic collapse, the 
suspension of representative government, World War II and confederation with Canada. 
During this period the fishery began to be transformed as the traditional saltfish trade, with 
its small-scale, labour intensive methods, declined, and in its place arose an industrialised, 
frozen-fish industry based on capital-intensive processing plants and offshore trawlers. The 
modern era in the Newfoundland fishery was shaped by an industrial vision promoted by a 
partnership between a small number of frozen-fish corporations and the provincial and 
federal governments (Wright 1997; 2001). The incompatibility of this industrial fishery 
model with the traditional lifestyle and perceived interests of Newfoundland's coastal 
populations was a constant source of conflict and division, and this, together with increasing 
capacity, generated expansionary pressures on the fishery. Prior to extended jurisdiction in 
1977 foreign trawlers received much of the blame for overfishing, but in the years leading to 
the 1990s crisis, it was increasingly the domestic frozen fish corporations, the provincial 
government, and especially the Canadian government and its managing agency, the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, that were regarded as the exploiters (and despoilers) of 
Newfoundland's fishery resources and fishery dependent communities. 
Chapter 3 argued that recurring crises in Newfoundland and the cod fishery from the mid 
1800s onwards can be attributed to persistent, dysfunctional, structural characteristics linked 
to dualism and disunity in Newfoundland's social and political framework and this theme is 
developed through analysis of the work of Cadigan (1999a; 1999b; 2001), Cadigan and 
Hutchings (2001), Wright (1997; 2001), Blackwood (1996), Alexander (1977), Brox (1972), 
Sinclair (1985) and Finlayson (1994). Cadigan and Hutchings examined the fishery in the 
1800s and found that similar social, political, economic and resource related issues were 
involved in the fisheries crises of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the mid 
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1800s there were already indications that fishing pressure was depressing inshore stocks and 
encouraging technological and territorial expansion. This was generating conflict between 
those fishers who adopted more powerful, capital intensive technologies (cod traps, jiggers 
and long-lines) and those whose limited means restricted them to traditional methods (hand 
lines). Cadigan and Hutchings examined how Government policy, supported by the 
authority of the science of the day, downplayed concern about resource sustainability and 
favoured expansionary interests. 
Dependence on global trade, 'combined with exploitative relationships in the fishery, were 
significant factors in Newfoundland's economic and political collapse during the depression 
of the 1930s. Beginning with the Commission of Government and continuing after 
Confederation, government policies from the 1930s to 1960s favoured expansion of a 
centralised, industrial frozen-fish industry while neglecting the development of traditional 
outport fishing communities (Alexander 1977; Wright 1997; 2001). This approach 
entrenched dualism in the Newfoundland fishery (Brox 1972). The roots of the industrial 
overcapacity and economic dependency that featured strongly as causes of the 1990s crisis 
ar~, Wright suggests, to be found in the policies of this period. Government policies that 
favoured the frozen-fish corporations while neglecting the inshore fishery were linked to a 
"lopsided distribution of economic and political power" and were implicated in the decline 
of saltfish production and trade in spite of rising demand for quality saltfish in global 
markets (Alexander 1977: 37). Traditional saltfish production was linked to the inshore 
fishery and was a labour intensive, highly value-added use of the Newfoundland cod 
resource. 
At the end of the 1960s Brox (1972) argued that Newfoundland's social and economic 
stagnation, particularly in the coastal communities, could be linked to. a political 
environment that was the legacy of a long established culture of exploitation, patronage and 
social division. He found that dualism was being maintained by government policies that 
served the interests of the frozen fish corporations at the expense of the inshore fishers and 
he identified a number of policy related mechanisms, including the unemployment insurance 
system and various economic "conversion barriers", that contributed to this. Brox observed 
that the inshore fishers were politically ineffective in advancing their interests against those 
of the corporations, for example, in relation to raising the price paid for fish, and they 
received little support from the provincial government or the fishermen's union. Conflict 
was instead diverted towards pressuring the federal government for more subsidies, which 
tended to reinforce dualism and at the same time generated expansionary pressures on the 
fishery (Brox 1972: 25-27, 76-88). Dualism, in addition to retarding social and economic 
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development, entrenched the economic dependence of outport fishers on the very frozen fish 
corporations with which their interests were, in other ways, fundamentally in conflict. Brox 
maintained that the pathologies of the Newfoundland fishery were the result of policies and 
that these could be changed, but he pointed out that the key to understanding the existing 
situation was to be found by considering who benefited from itl37, and this related to the 
underlying distribution of power in Newfoundland society. Suggesting that a different 
approach was technically and theoretically possible, Brox compared conditions in 
Newfoundland with those in Iceland and Norway where fisheries development had been 
more inclusive of the interests of the coastal populations, and more successful in social and 
economic terms, and, as it later proved, in terms of ecological sustainability. 
In the 1980s the Newfoundland fishery was characterised by inequality, division and strife 
(Sinclair 1985). There remained deep division and conflict between the interests of the 
inshore fishers and the corporations. Government policies were ambiguous ~nd 
contradictory as they sought to promote economic rationalisation of the fishery on the one 
hand, while at the same time being unable to entirely ignore the adverse socio-economic 
consequences for coastal communities that rationalisation implied (Sinclair 1985: 106-116). 
The introduction of limited entry policies from the 1960s and 1970s denied many fishers 
access to profitable fisheries, blocking social mobility, creating local elites and entrenching 
inequality by "administrative fiat" (Sinclair 1985: 114). There was a "culture of limited 
expectations" among fishers that hindered their ability to take individual or cooperative 
action to improve their circumstances (Sinclair 1985: 31). They continued to be dependent 
on the corporations to buy their fish, but the imbalance of power meant that the companies 
could keep down the price and treat the fishers disparagingly (Sinclair 1985: 139-140). In 
the early 1980s the fishery was economically inefficient and wastefully destructive of fish 
stocks. Division and conflict, combined with contradictory policies, was, symptomatic of 
social and political dysfunction. Interestingly, neither Brox (1972), Alexander (1977), nor 
Sinclair (1985), focused as they were on socio-economic matters, indicated concern about 
the sustainability of the resource at the time of their studies. 
Leading up to the 1990s crisis, the allocation of an excessively high total allowable catch 
favoured the offshore sector while allowing a pretence to be maintained that the policies 
were serving the priority interests of the inshore fishery (Blackwood 1996). The 
technologically powerful offshore trawlers with sophisticated electronic fish-finding 
equipment could continue to catch fish even when stocks were depressed to low levels, but 
137 Primarily the frozen fish corporations. 
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the catch of inshore fishers, who were largely restricted to passive gears, declined 
irrespective of any quota that was nominally allocated to them. The declining catches in the 
inshore sector more accurately reflected the status of the stocks than catch per unit effort data 
from the trawlers, which was distorted by technological advances. Blackwood (1996) 
explicitly linked overfishing to the politics of resource allocation and to the persistent, 
underlying conflict between the interests of the inshore (small-scale) and offshore 
(industrial) sectors. 
An examination of the internal functioning of the DFO in the lead up to the crisis 
demonstrated how political interests that favoured the corporate offshore sector influenced 
the DFO's operations, corrupting its scientific processes and rendering the agency 
dysfunctional in terms of its mandated task - to ensure the sustainability of the fishery 
(Finlayson 1994). Hutchings, Walters and Haedrich (1997) reinforced Finlayson's views, 
finding that government control of fishery science allowed political and bureaucratic 
influences to distort the production of scientific knowledge, and that this was a major 
contributing factor in the collapse. Furthermore, they showed that in the years following the 
collapse, these same influences hampered the effort to develop an understanding of its 
causes. The argument that the collapse was due to environmental effects (the "cold water" 
theories) rather than to overfishing was promoted, independent work that did not support the 
government's "official position" was denounced, while the work of government scientists 
was interfered with, their conclusions were misrepresented and they were disciplined and 
prevented from communicating research results that did not support the "official position". 
The complexity of the multiple, interacting factors involved in the collapse provided ample 
latitude for varied and contradictory explanations to be produced. Among other things, these 
provide insight into how interests influence the generation of cognitive perspectives and 
attitudes. For example, it clearly was in the interests of government resource managers and 
their agency, the DFO, to promote the belief that the collapse was due to factors other than 
fishery mismanagement and overfishing, and several "cold water" theories linking the 
collapse to anomalous environmental conditions were supported. Despite this, by the mid 
1990s it was clear that the primary cause of the collapse was overfishing. But there 
remained contention over who and/or what was to blame for this. 
The inshore fishers blamed technology and management. During the 1980s, as their catches 
declined, they had complained that the offshore trawlers and middle distance draggers were 
overfishing the stocks. They also blamed the DFO for setting an unsustainably high total 
allowable catch, which largely benefited the trawler fleet. The failure of the DFO to 
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adequately cut the TAC when the crisis began to intensify around 1990 meant that when 
stock collapse became obvious in 1992, it could fairly be attributed to a combination of the 
failure of fisheries science and of political will. But these factors were symptoms of the 
underlying problem of overcapacity, and overcapacity could be interpreted in different ways. 
These differences emphasised different perspectives in the social versus economic fishery 
divide. Adherents to the economic fishery paradigm, for example, considered that the 
problem was caused by too many people being dependent on the fishery, in both the 
harvesting and processing sectors (for example, Burke and Brander [1995]; Schrank [1995]). 
They linked the failure of political will to populist concerns about maintaining employment, 
when, due to advances in technology, less labour was needed to maintain productivity. They 
argued in favour of further rationalisation. Burke and Brander, in particular, advancec:J.. a 
pronounced neoliberal position arguing that a range of subsidies in the fishing sector should 
be scrapped, and the problematic "common property" nature of the fishery should be 
addressed by a management system featuring individual quota. 
Researchers such as Charles (1995), Matthews (1995b), Taylor (1995), Underwood (1995) 
and Maguire, Neis and Sinclair (1995) provided a more systemic and comprehensive 
analysis grounded in the social fishery paradigm. The quota system that had been the basis 
of management of the Northern cod fishery received strong criticism. Its structures provided 
incentives for anti-conservationist behaviour such as illegal gear, excess effort, dumping, 
high-grading, miss-reporting and trans-shipments and the whole economic philosophy upon 
which it was based encouraged a sense of self-interest, division and antagonism (Charles 
1995: 78-79; Underwood 1995: 37). Charles was also critical of a management approach 
that largely ignored the interests of the resource owners - the Canadian public - instead 
serving a narrow group of fishing industry clients. Charles (1995), Matthews (1995b), 
Taylor (1995) and Maguire, Neis and Sinclair (1995) note that the particular economic focus 
that drove fisheries policy was a significant cause of the crisis. The focus (of the economic 
fisheries paradigm) was socially constructed and served particular interest groups, but it 
promoted a range of dysfunctional attitudes. Among these (discussed by Charles [1995]), 
was the belief that the system of fisheries management (based on scientific stock assessment, 
quota and industrial fishing) works. Charles questioned this basic assumption and is 
supported by Matthews (1995b: 49) who argues that the values of the social fishery 
paradigm were closer to the requirements of sustainability than those of the ascendant 
economic fishery model. This analysis, combined with an understanding of the political and 
economic mechanisms of patronage and dualism, both historic and current, in 
Newfoundland's fisheries and society, and informed by comparisons with Norway and 
Iceland, supports an argument that the 1990s crisis in the Newfoundland fishery was caused 
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by a combination of interlinked and self-reinforcing factors. Many of these could be 
attributed to groups with a particular agenda or set of interests and the blame variously 
sourced to greed, too many people dependent on the fishery, too efficient and too powerful 
technology, inadequate science, inadequate politicians, Newfoundland's lack of political 
independence, or to other causes. But the systemic analysis that incorporated all of these 
supported the conclusion that Newfoundland's sustainability crisis was strongly linked to 
persistent structural characteristics of social division and disunity associated with inequality 
or dualism in the Newfoundland fishery and in Newfoundland society more generally, 
6.3 Chapter 4: Resource Management in Tasmania 
Chapter 4, the Tasmanian case study, further explored the themes of inequality and 
sustainability in marine resource management in a situation that lends itself to some 
comparison with Newfoundland. The chapter was divided into three sections. The first 
section described Tasmania and its history since European settlement, highlighting a number 
of points of comparison with Newfoundland. The populations of both places, for example, 
are similar in size and ethnic originl38 and Newfoundland and Tasmania also share other 
cultural, political and geographical attributes that make them suitable subjects for 
comparative study. The economies of both places are significantly dependent on renewable 
and non-renewable resource-extraction industries and both are large islands139, adjacent to 
continental landmasses with which they share a degree of political union. Tasmania, a state 
within the Australian Federation, and Newfoundland, (with Labrador) a province within the 
Canadian Federation, also share jurisdictional similarities due to matters of geography and 
the common legacy of a British colonial system of government. 
Social dualism, identified as a key underlying factor that contributed to systemic dysfunction 
in Newfoundland, was also, from settlement onwards, a feature of Tasmanian society. The 
roots of social dualism in Newfoundland were linked to matters of geography, politics and 
resource economics, but in Tasmania they lie with the island's settlement as a convict 
colony. European settlement of Van Diemen's Land (as Tasmania was initially named) at 
the beginning of the 1800s established a profoundly stratified society. At the top of the 
social order were free settlers of means who were given substantial land grants (in proportion 
to the amount of capital they already possessed) and were assigned convicts to provide what 
138 Tasmania and Newfoundland were both largely settled from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century by people from England and Ireland, although Newfoundland had, on a smaller scale, resident 
and transitory shore-based European populations from around 1500. 
l39 Tasmania and Newfoundland are both generally conceived of as single large islands although, 
jurisdictionally, both include smaller islands and outcrops. 
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was essentially a slave labour force. At the bottom of society were convict labourers, and 
there were also several social strata between the extremes. The early colonial administration 
was preoccupied with maintaining an unequal, stratified society and it regulated access;to 
land and other resources as a principal means of doing so. Institutions were put in place and 
a resource management culture evolved that, rather than promoting an egalitarian ethic, 
instead tended to serve established interests and protect privilege and monopoly. 
A number of writers have commented on the persistence of the convict legacy in Tasmanian 
society into the twentieth century. Shame connected with the convict past was the cause of a 
deep-seated sense of social anxiety in Tasmanian society (Reynolds 1969) and was 
associated with a priggish adherence to notions of middle class respectability (Hay 2000). 
This insecure society lacked the confidence to engage with "unrespectable" democratic and 
egalitarian political views and a political culture persisted that was based on paternalism, 
patronage and vested interest (Hay 1992; 2000), and this was reflected in resource 
management practfoes in Tasmania (Hay 1977; 1992; Young 1995; Phillips, Kriwoken and 
Hay 2002). Gibson (1958), for example, described how monopoly over various economic 
resources, including shipping, timber, banking and the news media, protected privilege and 
power in the post World War II period, whilst Hay (1977) examined the lack of civic 
commitment in Tasmanian public life and explained how practices that would be considered 
flagrant corruption in other places were, in Tasmania, considered the norm and he noted, 
further, that Tasmania's democratic institutions did not serve, effectively, to censure them.,,_ 
The argument that cronyism and corruption persist in the culture of business, politics and 
resource management in Tasmania is supported by a critique of Tasmania's billion dollar 
forestry industry; an industry that is in some ways comparable to fisheries in Newfoundland. 
Forestry is the most contentious political issue in Tasmania. In 2004 the industry was the 
subject of both a Federal Senate Inquiry and of an investigative television documentary aired 
nationally by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). The ABC Report described 
an industry dominated by a single private company, Gunns Limited, and explored the close 
relationship between Gunns executives and state politicians and it argued that Tasmania's 
forests were being managed to serve the interests of Gunns shareholders rather than those of 
the Tasmanian public (the nominal owners). The report was particularly critical of Forestry 
Tasmania, the state government's forest management agency. Forestry Tasmania's 
arrangements with companies such as Gunns are protected from public scrutiny. They are 
exempt by an Act of Parliament140 from Tasmania's freedom of information laws, a 
140 Justified on the grounds that such information is "commercial in confidence". 
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situation, the report noted (Fullerton 2004: 9), that "in the context of the political 
environment in Tasmania" provides a "recipe for cronyism and a recipe for corruption". In 
-Tasmania, it is claimed, people are afraid to speak out about forestry issues because of likely 
consequences for their careers and there is, it is claimed, a pervasive culture of fear and 
intimidation in Tasmanian public life that stifles dissent (Flanagan 2004a: 7; Fullerton 
2004:1). 
The discussion of forestry in Tasmania provided a supporting context for the case of a 
political and resource management culture in Tasmania that tends to serve vested interests 
rather than the public good. Further, the evident lack of adherence to the norms of propriety 
and democratic accountability were linked, albeit loosely, to a cultural legacy of Tasmania's 
convict past. This provided background for the following two sections of the chapter that 
dealt with the management of marine resources in Tasmania. 
The first of the marine issues discussed the history and evolving management and regulation 
of Tasmania's rock lobster fishery, culminating in the current system based on ITQ. The 
examination was framed within the context of the general debate over fisheries management 
issues as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and the background on the culture of resource 
management in Tasmania discussed above. It was also informed by Olson's theories (1982) 
about the tendency, in any society, for rent-seeking coalitions to proliferate, accumulate 
rights and privileges, and entrench social stratification, thereby producing a society in which 
predatory economic activities predominate over productive ones, leading to poor over-all 
economic performance and a poorly developed civic capacity. Olson's ideas relate closely to 
the "Dutch disease" concept that explains why resource rich countries, where opportunity 
encourages predatory rent-seeking (and corruption) rather than productive activities, tend to 
be poorer than resource poor countries. 
The study of Tasmania's rock lobster fishery and the introduction of the ITQ system in 
1997/8, described how a public resource was converted to private property as vested interests 
combined with a resource management culture that, lacking an egalitarian ethic, was oriented 
towards the neoliberal values embodied in the economic fishery paradigm. The fishery was 
principally regulated from the 1880s by a size limit, which consistently provided an effective 
conservation measure. From this time until the 1930s the most contentious issue in the 
fishery, concerned the introduction of baited pots (or traps). These were originally 
r 
prohibited, but were progressively introduced between 1905 and 1940 amidst a controversy 
that pitted small-scale users of traditional methods against those wishing to use the more 
powerful and capital-intensive pots and the larger vessels that were required to fish them. 
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Following World War II pots rapidly superseded rings ·and technological innovation in 
motors, echo sounders, refrigeration and transport greatly increased the efficiency of the 
fleet. From the 1960s the fishery experienced a number of regulatory transitions, taking it 
from a situation of open (though qualifiedl41) access to the current limited entry quota 
management system based on ITQ. 
A significant consequence of the QMS has been the bureaucratisation and "refeudalisation" 
of the fishery. There has been an escalation in the value of access entitlements, with quota 
units that were the equivalent of a full 40-pot licence before the system was introduced 
achieving a market value in excess of AU$ 1 million by 2002. There has also been a trend 
towards investor control and foreign ownership of quota, and the high cost of entry now 
imposes a barrier to social mobility in the fishery. The traditional progression from deck 
hand to owner-operator has effectively been blocked. There has been an increase in rent-
seeking activity as quota ,owners, government bureaucrats, academic researchers, 
consultants, lawyers and foreign govemments142 collaborate and compete over 
approximately AU$ 20 million in resource rent produced annually from the fishery. The 
transition to the QMS facilitated the distribution of resource wealth away from Tasmania's 
coastal populations to the benefit of global investment capital, and while it made existing 
licence holders wealthy it entrenched inequality in the fishery. The analysis noted a distinct 
lack of disinterested opposition to the introduction of the QMS in Tasmanial43, in contrast to 
the widespread reaction against resource privatisation in countries such as Iceland, Norway, 
France, the USA and other places as discussed in chapter 2, and concluded that this was 
indicative of a poverty of civic commitment and the lack of an egalitarian ethic in the cultµte 
of resource management in Tasmania. 
The question of resource conservation and sustainability was also considered. In 
Newfoundland reliance on a system of management based on quota was singled out as a 
major cause of the collapse of the Northern cod fishery, but there is no suggestion that the 
ITQ system will lead directly to overfishing in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. Under 
141 In the 1960s, as discussed in chapter 4, the number of licences was not limited and they were 
available at nominal cost to quahfied skippers who had a vessel of sufficient size. The pot allowance, 
between 15 and 40 pots, related to the vessel size and therefore to capital. 
142 Much of the Tasmanian catch goes to China where, as noted in chapter 4, an import tax secures a 
portion of the rent for the Chinese government. Management and policing costs for the fishery 
increased following introduction of the QMS to approximately AU$ 3.4 million. Approximately 55% 
of this cost is recovered from the industry, the rest falls on the Tasmanian public purse (Williamson 
2002: 205). 
143 There was strong opposition from some industry sectors who perceived that their interests would 
be affected by the system and the method initially proposed for the allocation of quota. 
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current socio-economic conditions in Tasmania, the fishery can be effectively protected from 
poaching and overfishing. But the general criticism of regulation of the fishery, and, in 
particular, the way that it has entrenched inequality in the fishery and more widely in 
Tasmanian society, has broader implications. By entrenching inequality, the management of 
the fishery has failed to contribute to fostering the sense of cohesion and common interest 
that, according to the sustainable communities concept, underpins the necessary cultural and 
structural foundations of social and environmental sustainability. How this could, in theory, 
impact on the sustainability of the fishery by influencing the regulation of pollution in 
Tasmania's coastal waters was then considered. 
Sea-cage salmon farming was introduced to Tasmania in the 1980s and has expanded to 
become a significant, multi-million dollar industry. Salmon farming takes place in sheltered 
coastal waters, particularly in the Huon Estuary and the D'Entrecasteaux Channel, which 
also have a range of scenic and environmental values, and the industry has encountered 
strong opposition (as it has in other parts of the world) due to its environmental effects. The 
nutrients discharged by salmon farms are of particular concern in the region and contribute 
to occasional noxious algal blooms and other symptoms of eutrophication. 
Two different approaches to regulating salmon farm pollution were discussed. The first of 
these was a scientific approach, which attempts to model all of the factors influencing 
nutrient dynamics in a waterway and, thereby, determine a carrying capacity for nutrient 
discharge from salmon farming based on some "scientifically" established level of 
acceptable environmental impact. An alternative approach was also examined. This took a 
political and economic orientation, in which nutrient discharge from salmon farming was 
compared and related to the pollution produced from other sources so that relative economic 
benefits versus costs of amelioration could serve as a mechanism to guide resource decision-
making. These two approaches informed the analysis of an integrated land and marine 
planning project, discussed in chapter 4, in which pollution from salmon farming became a 
contentious issue. 
The study examined the way that agencies charged with industry regulation and 
environmental protection ignored the pollution produced by salmon farms as the Tasmanian 
government sought to facilitate industry expansion. Regulating agencies collaborated with 
the salmon farming industry to suppress public information on salmon farm pollution in a 
manner that tended to restrict democratic participation in resource decision-making 
processes. The study exposed contradictions and dysfunction in Tasmania's system of 
environmental management and provided another example of how, within the Tasmanian 
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resource management climate, private interests predominated over the broader public interest 
associated with environmental protection. This raised concerns about the prospects of 
protecting from pollution, Tasmania's coastal waterways upon which the sustainability of 
various fisheries, along with a range of other values, depends. 
A link was made, drawing together key concepts from the three sections of the chapter. It 
suggested how the regulation of the rock lobster fishery (portrayed as the perpetuation of a 
legacy of historically established dualism in Tasmanian society) in producing inequality and 
other structural characteristics not conducive to sustainable communities, contributed to the 
maintenance of a resource management culture in Tasmania that, in proving dysfunctional. in 
the face of potentially damaging sources of marine pollution could, at least at a theoretical 
level, indirectly threaten the sustainability of the fishery. In chapter 5 the validity of this 
theoretical connection was demonstrated in a resource management case study from 
Pakistan. 
6.4 Chapter 5: Pakistan - Key Concepts Illustrated and Reinforced 
Chapter 5, the Pakistan case study, reinforced some of the key concepts and conclusions 
developed with a focus on fisheries in the preceding chapters. The discussion was then 
expanded to emphasise the relevance and interrelationship of these issues of fishery resource 
and societal sustainability to broader social and political matters of pressing global concern. 
The chapter was divided into three sections. The first provided background and context. It 
described Pakistan as a society in a perpetual state of crisis. Entrenched social inequality 
and institutional dysfunction, characteristics that were linked to unsustainability in 
Newfoundland and Tasmania, are greatly magnified in Pakistan and their effects are more 
clearly evident. Pakistan can be considered advanced in terms of Olson's theories (as 
discussed above in relation to Tasmania) and indeed his studies of the Indian subcontinent 
provided key insights in their development. The Indus River Valley, which is the central 
geographic feature of Pakistan, was the site of one of the earliest civilisations based on 
irrigated agriculture, and in some places agricultural practices seem little changed after 4,000 
years. Control over land and water remains fundamental to political power in Pakistan 
today, where the proliferation and entrenchment of rent-seeking activities has shaped the 
country's social, political and economic structures. As Olson's theories explain, Pakistan is, 
as a consequence, a country beset by productivity-sapping conflicts over resources; by 
entrenched social divisions based on factors such as class, caste, and ethnic difference; by 
widespread poverty and inequality; by a poorly developed civic culture lacking a sense of the 
280 
Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion 
broader public good; and by corruption and institutional dysfunction. The causes and 
consequences of these characteristics were examined, particular attention being given to 
discussions of the entrenchment of feudalism in agriculture, the role of the military as arbiter 
of the divisions and tensions in Pakistani society, and the rise of fundamentalism in the 
region. 
The second section of the chapter concerned fisheries issues. A brief overview of Pakistan's 
marine fisheries demonstrated pronounced dualism and other structural features that were 
similar to those found to have underpinned dysfunction in the Newfoundland fisheries as 
discussed in chapter 3. An inshore sector comprises about 100,000 small-scale fishers who 
work coastal waters from small vessels, often powered only by oars or sail. The offshore 
sector features capital-intensive, technologically modern vessels, and the Pakistan 
government also licenses foreign vessels to fish in offshore waters. There is a perceived 
competition for resources between the inshore and offshore sectors and fish stocks are under 
pressure, being harvested beyond biologically sustainable limits. Government policy favours 
economic efficiency and modernisation and is, correspondingly, less responsive to the needs 
of subsistence oriented, small-scale fishers and coastal communities (Siddiqi 1992: 409). 
Those holding power in Pakistan (frequently the military) exploit the tensions in the fishery 
and play off the two competing sectors for political (and financial) returns. These conditions 
in Pakistan's marine fisheries have clear parallels with those discussed in relation to 
Newfoundland in chapter 3, however, the focus of the section is on Pakistan's inland 
fisheries which provide insights of particular relevance to the questions raised in chapter 4 
about the connections between resource privatisation, inequality, unsustainable communities, 
and the theoretical threat this poses to the sustainability of fisheries through ineffective 
management of catchment pollution threats. 
Pakistan's inland fisheries occur in lakes, reservoirs, rivers and canals throughout the 
country and support about 200,000 fish-workers (almost double the number employed in the 
marine sector). Rawal Lake, a small water storage reservoir near Islamabad, is 
representative of similar freshwater fisheries throughout the region and the Rawal Lake 
fishery was studied during a visit to Pakistan in May 2001. Exclusive fishing rights to Rawal 
Lake are allocated by an auction process for periods of three years. This method of 
allocation is common throughout Pakistan and is also used to allocate fishing rights for large 
lake and reservoir fisheries that support thousands of fishers. In Pakistan, with its feudal 
social structures and barriers to social mobility, it is not the fishers who acquire fishing 
rights. They work as dependent contract harvesters for those (often consortia of business 
interests, fish merchants and the politically connected) who are in a position to acquire 
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monopoly fishing rights to a particular body of water. The Rawal Lake study demonstrated 
the compatibility and ease of integration of market mechanisms with feudal social structures 
in these fisheries. At one level the system appears to work. It seems to be quite effective in 
pr~ducing fish protein and generating resource rent from the fisheries under socio-political 
conditions that are quite challenging. But from a broader, more systemic perspective these 
fisheries management systems perpetuate inequality, social division and unproductivity as 
human resources are cheapened and diverted from creative and productive work to rent-
seeking and distributional activities. Thus, they serve to entrench the structural 
characteristics of Pakistani society that are linked to institutional dysfunction, and this can be 
clearly linked to unsustainability in these fisheries through the failure to protect them from 
the effects of catchment pollution. For, while Pakistan has a comprehensive legislative 
framework to provide for environmental protection144, this is not effectively implemented 
and the reasons for this are those associated with unsustainable communities as discussed 
throughout the thesis; i.e. the lack of social cohesion and sense of civic culture that is 
associated with inequality. Rawal Lake has chronic environmental problems due to poor 
management of catchment pollution caused by agriculture, industry and human settlements. 
In 2004 pollution was thought to be the cause of a devastating fish kill which provided a 
clear demonstration of sustainability failure. Poor management of catchment pollution is a 
problem across Pakistan and has caused the decline of significant freshwater fisheries with 
traditions that date back for millennia. Manchhar Lake, Pakistan's largest freshwater lake, is 
an example of this, where several thousand fishers and their communities were displaced by 
the fishery's decline. Displaced people, such as these, join the ranks of the millions of 
unemployed and property-less in Pakistan, and the poverty and despair of people dislocated 
from access to resources due to environmental degradation, and other causes, is linked to the 
rise of religious fundamentalism in the region. The causative link between unsustainable 
fisheries management and the rise of fundamentalism that is established, specifically, in the 
Pakistan case study, reintegrates the discussion with the general theme, developed in chapter 
2, of the rise of fundamentalism of various sorts as a consequence of neoliberal globalisation. 
The third section of the chapter examined fundamentalism m greater depth. The 
authoritarian suppression of individuality, reason, democracy and other humanist and 
enlightenment values is discussed and the link between fundamentalism and inequality 
associated with preponderantly rent-seeking political economies is explored. The current 
rise of various forms of fundamentalism in the West and the corresponding decline in 
secular, humanist values is also discussed. This has, in recent years, become an important 
144 Similar to that of other countries like Australia. 
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topic of scholarly research and public debate and is associated with broader discussion on 
issues of sustainability and the causes of the decline and collapse of civilisations. This 
debate is clearly relevant to the examination of sustainability and global trends in fisheries, 
the core theme of the thesis, discussed in general in chapter 2 and in relation to specific case 
studies in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The thesis provides substantial support for the argument that global trends in fisheries 
towards management systems that emphasise the neoliberal values of resource privatisation, 
wealth concentration and rent-maximisation as a measure of efficiency, are not compatible 
with sustainability. It also provides support for a broader argument that the worldwide trend 
towards the adoption of neoliberal social and economic policies, which reduce social 
cohesion and contribute to inequality and insecurity, is not compatible with the sustainability 
requirements of human societies more generally. The study also has obvious relevance for 
the management of other resources; debate over the global trend towards the privatisation of 
water stands out as a compelling example. In its broad approach, the study explores themes 
that in various forms have been matters of recurring concern for all human societies 
confronting the challenges inherent to resisting entropy, and it develops many ideas that 
might serve as tangents leading to further useful study, but it does not provide prescriptive 
solutions, conclusive proofs or simple certainties. As was discussed in the introductory 
chapter, it is not in the nature of exploratory, qualitative research to do so. What the thesis 
does is to make a worthwhile contribution to a continuing debate about sustainability that is 
of central concern to all human societies. 
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